Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God
Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature
Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact
Articulus II: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments
Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite
Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others
Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion
Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: On the Enjoyer
Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God
Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys
Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys
Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy
Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy
Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments
Distinctio II: Second Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently
Articulus I: I. To the Second Question
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus III: III. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear
Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated
Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly
Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion
Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence
Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence
Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions
Articulus I: I. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs
Section II: B. Proofs of Others
Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question
Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded
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Sed hoc declaratur sic ab aliquibus: actus notionales fundantur super actus essentiales immanentes; sed tantum sunt duo actus essentiales manentes intra, qui sunt intelligere et velle; ergo sunt tantum duo actus notionales qui sunt productivi intra, fundati super eosdem essentiales.
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Confirmatur ratio, quia actus notionales fundati super actus essentiales adaequantur eis, et ita non possunt plurificari actus notionales fundati super actum eundem essentialem.
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Modus fundandi eorum est iste, sicut colligitur ex multis dictis opinantis sparsim in pluribus locis: ((Tam intellectus quam voluntas in quocumque habent esse, propter separationem eorum a materia, postquam habuerint esse in suo actu primo simplicis intelligentiae aut volitionis, possunt se convertere super se et super eorum actus simplices et super obiecta eorum per actus conversionis vel conversivos intelligendi et volendi.
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Intellectus enim non solum intelligit verum simplici intelligentia, sed etiam intelligentia conversiva, intelligendo se intelligere et convertendo se super obiectum intellectum et super actum intelligendi simplicem et super se intelligentem per actum conversivum, quia notitia secunda quae est in verbo non solum scit et intelligit rem, sed sic scit et intelligit eam, ut sciat se scire et intelligere eam. Similiter voluntas non solum vult bonum simplici volitione, sed etiam volitione conversiva, volendo se velle, convertendo se super obiectum volitum et super actum volendi simplicem et super se volentem per actum suum conversivum.
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Sed ista conversio partim uno et eodem modo convenit intellectui et voluntati et partim alio modo et alio. Quod enim ambo se convertunt ut sunt ut nudae, purae et solae potentiae, hoc est uno et eodem modo quantum est a parte ipsarum se convertentium; ambae enim se solas convertunt vi sua activa quae aequaliter eis convenit, sed alio et alio modo quantum est ex parte obiectorum ad quae se convertunt.
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Intellectus enim postquam est conversus ad illa ad quae conversus est se habet ut potentiale quoddam et purum possibile, et hoc ut intellectus nudus et purus natus est recipere ab illis, sicut proprium passivum a suo activo proprio naturali, quod quidem activum est intellectus informatus notitia simplici, et hoc respectu formationis notitiae declarativae. Voluntas autem postquam conversa est ad quae conversa est se habet ut activum quoddam, et hoc ut voluntas nuda et pura nata est exprimere de illis, sicut proprium activum de suo proprio passivo, quod est eadem voluntas, informata per amorem simplicem, de qua - sic formata - eadem voluntas ut nuda nata est exprimere amorem incentivum, qui est Spiritus: Sanctus in divinis, qui habet esse a producentibus ipsum non per informationem eius de quo est subiective, neque per aliquam impressionem factam eidem secundum modum quo Verbum sive Filius procedit a Patre per quandam quasi informationem sive impressionem factam intellectui paterno converso, sed per quasi quandam excussionem sive expulsionem, aut progressum, aut magis proprie loquendo - per quandam expressionem producti de eo de quo subiective producitur)).
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((Ex parte intellectus causatur actus dicendi a notitia simplici in intellectu nudo converso supra se et supra notitiam suam simplicem, ita quod intellectus informatus notitia simplici est principium activum et elicitivum actus notionalis intellectus. Ipse autem intellectus nudus conversus non est nisi principium passivum, de quo quasi de materiali producitur Verbum quasi per impressionem. Ex parte autem voluntatis causatur actus notionalis ab ipsa voluntate nuda conversa supra se et super amorem suum simplicem et ipsam voluntatem informatam amore simplici, ita quod voluntas nuda conversa est principium activum et elicitivum actus notionalis voluntatis. Ipsa autem voluntas amore informata simplici est principium quasi passivum, de quo quasi de materiali producitur Spiritus Sanctus secundum quandam expressionem)).
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Qualiter autem intellectus ut natura sit principium activum respectu intellectus ut puri ad producendum Verbum, declaratur sic, quia ((intellectus ut in Patre exsistens notitia essentialis, sive quod idem est, exsistens in actu intelligendi suam essentiam, quem actum ipsa essentia quasi operatur in ipso intellectu suo ut est quasi in potentia ad notitiam essentialem secundum rationem intelligendi, fecundus est naturali fecunditate ad producendum de se ipso sibi similem.
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Intellectus autem ut est quaedam notitia essentialis secundum actum est natura et ut principium activum, quo Pater de intellectu eodem ut est intellectus purus et tantum intellectus ut de principio passivo format notitiam quae est Verbum, quod secundum rem est eadem notitia cum illa de qua formatur, differens solum ab ea in quantum procedit ab ea ut manifestativa et declarativa ipsius.
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Et per omnem eundem modum debemus sic intelligere verbum formari in nobis. Cognitum enim primo simplicem sui notitiam imprimit intellectui nostro repraesentando se illi ut pure passivo et sub illa ratione qua est intellectus. Intellectus autem sic perfectus simplici notitia per obiectum cognitum, quod in se continet expressive, factus est fecundus et principium activum ut natura, imprimens in se ipsum ut intellectus est tantum, ut in principium passivum, ad formandum in se notitiam declarativam de notitia simplici, ut - secundum hoc - quando dicitur 'formari verbum per intellectum' et quod 'intellectus sit etiam in formatione eius activus', hoc intelligitur de intellectu actu informato simplici notitia, per quam ut per rationem formalem agendi intellectus est principium activum; per hoc enim est principium, et necessario prior est ratio eius ut est intellectus et passivus respectu notitiae simplicis quam recepit ab obiecto quam ratio eius secundum quam est natura et activus per notitiam simplicem inhaerentem: et ideo ordine rationis prius habet esse ut est intellectus quam ut est natura)).
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Sic itaque patet modus quomodo secundum istam opinionem fundatur actus notionalis super actum essentialem, et quomodo diversimode in intellectu et voluntate.