Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

  1. Ex his dictis patet improbatio illius opinionis quae ponit Christum esse primum subiectum, quia tunc necessariae veritates de Patre et Spiritu Sancto - puta 'Pater generat', 'Spiritus Sanctus procedit' - non essent veritates theologicae, nec contingentes veritates de eis, puta 'Pater creat per Filium', ' Spiritus Sanctus temporaliter missus est visibiliter et invisibiliter'; nec veritates necessariae de Deo trino, ut quod est omnipotens, immensus, nec contingentes, ut quod Deus creat, Deus gubernat mundum, remittit peccata, punit, praemiat, et huiusmodi. - Consequentiae omnes probantur, quia ad nullam scientiam pertinet per se aliqua veritas nisi sit de subiecto primo eius, vel parte eius subiectiva vel integrali vel essentiali, vel de aliquo essentialiter attributo ad ipsum subiectum. Patet quod Pater vel Trinitas non est Christus, nec pars aliquo dictorum modorum, nec aliquod attributum ad Christum essentialiter: tum quia Christus cum dicat duas naturas - et hoc in quantum est subiectum, secundum ponentes illud - sequitur quod ut habens naturam creatam erit essentialiter prior Patre vel Trinitate, quia essentialis attributio non est nisi ad essentialiter prius, quod falsum est; tum quia Christus etiam secundum divinitatem non habet aliquam talem prioritatem secundum quam posset Pater vel Trinitas ad ipsum attribui.

  2. Contra etiam istam opinionem sunt rationes ultimo positae supra in solutione secundae quaestionis contra positionem respectus ad extra. - Contra idem est prima ratio posita ad solutionem primae quaestionis, quia veritates necessarias de Patre, de Spiritu Sancto et de Trinitate impossibile est contineri primo in Christo virtualiter, quia si Verbum non fuisset incarnatum, illae veritates non fuissent necessariae, quod est falsum. Tertia etiam, ibidem, valet hic, quia non esset tradenda aliqua notitia de Deo nisi ut includitur in Christo; haec est de Verbo tantum, et ita non distinctissima notitia quae posset tradi; ergo esset alia prior requirenda.

  3. Ad hoc faciunt aliquae persuasiones ibi positae, quia illa unitas quae est Christi ut est suppositum unum in duabus naturis non est unitas aeterna; illam autem ponere oporteret formalem unitatem primi subiecti; ergo primum subiectum ut primum non est tantum aliquid aeternum. Illa etiam persuasio de fide videtur concludere; non enim est creditum vel verum theologicum hunc hominem esse crucifixum, non implicando Verbum in subiecto, quia hunc hominem potuerunt in cruce iudaei naturaliter videre. Sed creditum est et verum theologicum Verbum esse hominem natum de Virgine, Verbum esse hominem crucifixum, Verbum esse hominem resurgentem, et sic de articulis ad humanitatem pertinentibus; pertinentes autem ad divinitatem, patet quod non conveniunt primo Christo ut Christus est, sed aliqui aliis personis, aliqui Trinitati. Ergo adaequatum obiectum theologiae non est Christus, sed aliquid quasi commune Verbo, de quo primo creduntur articuli pertinentes ad reparationem, et Patri et Spiritui Sancto, de quibus sunt aliquae theologicae veritates.

  4. Videtur igitur dicendum quod sicut si in medicina corpus humanum sit primum subiectum de quo consideretur ibi ut passio sanitas et infirmitas: si species corporis humani essent corpus sic mixtum et sic, puta corpus sanguineum et corpus phlegmaticum, etc., hoc totum, corpus sanguineum sanum, non esset ibi primum subiectum, tum quia nimis particulare, tum quia includit passionem considerandam de subiecto, quae non potest esse ratio subiecti, quia subiectum ut subiectum est est prius naturaliter eius passione, et ita passio esset prior se ipsa. Et breviter, quidquid diceretur de aliqua medicina tradita quod esset de tali, licet particulari et ente per accidens, saltem impossibile esset primam scientiam de corpore hominis esse de corpore sanguineo sano. Immo si qua esset de isto, alia posset esse prior: sive de corpore hominis in communi, quia ipsum in communi habet quasdam passiones cognoscibiles de ipso per rationem communem, ut est prior inferioribus; sive de corpore sanguineo, cuius ratio naturaliter est prior sanguineo sano, et ista ratio prior virtualiter continet aliquas passiones; sive de corpore hominis sano, quia eius ratio praecedit corpus sanguineum sanum. Ita in proposito. Christus dicit Verbum hominem, secundum Damascenum; ante ergo notitiam quae esset de Christo ut de primo subiecto nata esset esse alia prior de Verbo, si qua sibi insunt per rationem qua Verbum, et ante illam, alia de Deo quantum ad illa quae insunt per rationem Dei ut est communis tribus personis.

  5. Igitur si theologiam tenemus esse secundum se primam notitiam, ipsa non erit primo de Christo; et si aeque est de veritatibus communibus et propriis tribus personis, ipsa non esset de aliqua persona ut de aliquo subiecto adaequato, sed de Deo ut communis est tribus personis. Et tunc salvabitur quod omnis veritas theologica vel est de primo subiecto, puta quae inest Deo per rationem Dei, vel quasi de parte subiectiva primi subiecti, puta quae inest proprie alicui personae, vel de eo quod attribuitur ad subiectum primum vel quasi partem subiecti, puta de creatura quantum ad respectum quem habet ad Deum ut Deus, et de natura assumpta quantum ad respectum quem habet ad Verbum sustentificans.

  6. Aliter tamen ponitur Christum esse primum subiectum secundum Lincolniensem in Hexaemeron, et hoc secundum quod Christus est unum triplici unitate, quarum prima est ad Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum, secunda Verbi ad naturam assumptam, tertia Christi capitis ad membra. Et pro ista opinione de Christo videtur esse prima ratio posita ad primam quaestionem, et paenultima, quia septem articulos fidei pertinentes ad humanitatem non continet Deus ut subiectum, quia per naturam deitatis sibi non conveniunt. Illud autem subiectum continet passionem per cuius formam passio sibi inest. Christus autem illos continet, quia secundum humanitatem sibi insunt, et hoc realiter; continet etiam alios pertinentes ad divinitatem, quia secundum divinitatem illa videntur sibi inesse.

  7. Confirmatur, quia subiecta partium doctrinae debent contineri sub subiecto totius vel ut partes subiectivae, vel ut quasi integrales; non sic continentur sub Deo subiecta partium Scripturae. Quod probatur per glossas multas in principiis librorum, assignantes causas materiales aliqua quae non sunt aliquid Dei, puta super Osee dicit glossa quod materia Osee est 'decem tribus'.

  8. Item, tertio: nihil proprium de Deo narratur in aliquo loco Scripturae, quia nullum factum ibi narratur ubi requirebatur aliquid ex parte Dei nisi tantum generalis influentia; ergo liber talis non est de Deo.

  9. Ad primum dico quod veritates contingentes enuntiatae de Christo in nullo subiecto continentur virtualiter sicut subiectum dicitur continere passionem, quia tunc essent necessariae; tamen habent aliquod subiectum de quo immediate enuntiantur et primo, et illud est Verbum, nam veritates theologicae de incarnatione, nativitate, passione, etc., sunt istae: 'Verbum est factum homo', 'Verbum est homo natus', 'Verbum est homo passus', etc. Cum dicis 'passio inest secundum naturam humanam', respondeo: humanitas non est prima ratio subiecti ad quam stet resolutio, sed est quasi passio prior, medians inter primum subiectum istarum veritatum, quod est Verbum, et alias posteriores passiones, ut 'natus', etc. Patet quod non potest esse humanitas ratio subiecti respectu primae passionis quae est 'esse incarnatum', quia illud dicitur de Verbo non praeintellecta humanitate in ipso ut subiecto; haec est ratio prima.

  10. Ad secundum dico quod sufficeret partium scientiae attributio ad primum subiectum, qualis attributio ad Deum potest salvari cuiuscumque materiae assignatae per istas adductas glossas. Aliter: materia cuiuslibet libri est Deus, de quo ibi narratur quo modo genus humanum gubernaverit; sed gens vel persona gubernata est materia remota. Ita intelligendae sunt glossae tales.

  11. Per hoc patet ad tertium, quod licet aliquis liber esset nullum Dei miraculum continens, tamen quilibet continet providentiam et gubernationem Dei circa hominem in communi vel determinatam gentem vel personam, in tantum quod si eandem historiam de Pharaone scribat Moyses in Exodo, et aliquis Aegyptius in chronicis Aegyptiorum, subiectum historiae Moysi est Deus, de quo traditur ibi gubernare hominem, misericorditer liberando Hebraeos oppressos, iuste puniendo Aegyptios oppressores, sapienter ordinando formam liberationis congruam et, ad hoc ut populus liberatus legem gratanter acciperet, potenter signa tot faciendo propria sibi; subiectum vero historiae historiographi esset regnum, vel rex, vel populus aegyptius, cuius actiones et casus circa ipsum contingentes ipse intendit scribere, ita quod incidens est sibi quid Deus fecit, sed principale quid gens sua fecerit vel passa sit. Principale est Moysi quid Deus egerit vel permiserit, quasi autem incidens sibi circa quam materiam hoc contigerit. Et dato quod alicubi nullum miraculum enarretur, tamen quid Deus permiserit, assistendo secundum communem influentiam, non impediendo, hoc principaliter intenditur in libro illo in quantum est pars Scripturae; et qualiter illud convenienter ordinatum sit ad bonum aliquod, si fuit ordinabile, vel iuste punitum si fuit malum, hoc frequenter additur in eodem libro vel alio, aut si permissum fuit nec hic punitum, non tacet Scriptura alibi de illo in generali quod alibi punietur.

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

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