Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God
Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature
Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact
Articulus II: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments
Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite
Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will
Articulus I: I. To the Question
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In ista quaestione primo videndum est de ipsis conceptibus et secundo de significato nominis.
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Quantum ad primum dico quod sicut in intellectu sunt duo actus assentiendi alicui complexo - unus quo assentitur alicui vero propter se, sicut principio, alius quo assentitur alicui vero complexo non propter se sed propter aliud verum, sicut conclusioni ita in voluntate sunt duo actus assentiendi bono, unus quo assentitur alicui bono propter se, alius quo assentitur alicui bono propter aliud, ad quod illud bonum refertur, sicut conclusioni assentitur propter principium, quia conclusio veritatem suam habet a principio. Ista similitudo accipi potest a Philosopho VI Ethicorum, ubi dicitur quod ((in mente est affirmatio et negatio, sed hoc in appetitu est prosecutio et fuga)); et ita, ultra, sicut in mente ƿest duplex affirmatio, propter se et propter aliud, ita in appetitu est duplex prosecutio vel adhaesio, et propter se et propter aliud.
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Est tamen inter haec duplex differentia. Prima, quia illi duo assensus intellectus distinguuntur ex natura obiectorum; sunt enim alteri propter alteram evidentiam huius et illius veri, et ideo habent distincta obiecta sibi correspondentia et ipsos causantia. Hic autem isti assensus non sunt ex distinctione obiectorum, sed ex distincto actu potentiae liberae, sic vel sic acceptantis eius obiectum, quia, sicut prius dictum est, in potestate eius est sic vel sic agere, referendo vel non referendo; et ideo non correspondent istis actibus propria obiecta distincta, sed quodcumque bonum volibile potest voluntas habere obiectum secundum hunc actum vel secundum illum. Secunda differentia est quod illi duo assensus intellectus sufficienter dividunt assensum intellectus in communi, nec inter ipsos est aliquid medium, quia nulla est evidentia media ex parte obiecti a qua possit accipi alia veritas quam veritas principii vel conclusionis. Praeter autem istos duos assensus voluntatis est aliquis assensus medius, quia voluntati potest ostendi aliquod ƿbonum absolute apprehensum, non sub ratione alicuius propter se boni nec propter aliud boni. Voluntas autem circa tale sic ostensum potest habere aliquem actum, et non necessario inordinatum; ergo potest habere aliquem actum volendi illud absolute, absque relatione ad aliud, aut absque fruitione propter se; et ulterius, potest imperare intellectui ut inquirat quale bonum illud sit et qualiter volendum, et tunc potest illi sic assentire,- et tota ratio differentiae hinc et inde est libertas voluntatis et necessitas naturalis ex parte intellectus.
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Ex his ultra: actus assensus bono propter se est actus perfectus; actum autem perfectum consequitur delectatio, ex X Ethicorum; ergo actum volendi bonum propter se consequitur aliqua delectatio. Habemus igitur quantum ad propositum quattuor distincta: actum imperfectum volendi bonum propter aliud, qui vocatur usus, et actum perfectum volendi bonum propter se, qui vocatur fruitio, et actum neutrum, et delectationem consequentem actum.
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De secundo principali, cui scilicet istorum convenit hoc nomen 'frui', potest colligi ex auctoritatibus loquentibus de hoc vocabulo 'frui'; planum est quod non est actus neuter, nec actus usus ƿest actus fruitionis, sed tantum est altercatio de actu perfecto et delectatione consequente. Respondeo: aliquae auctoritates videntur dicere quod frui est iste actus perfectus tantum, aliquae quod est delectatio tantum; aliquae quod includit utrumque, et tunc non significat aliquod ens per se unum, sed unum aggregatione ex duobus entibus vel ens per accidens: nec est hoc inconveniens quod unum nomen significet multa, quia Ilias secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae potest significare totum bellum troianum.
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Quod tantum sit actus videtur illa auctoritate Augustini 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30: ((Omnis perversitas, quae vitium nominatur, est uti fruendis et frui utendis)). Perversitas formaliter est in actu voluntatis elicito, non in delectatione, quia delectatio non est prava nisi quia actus est pravus, nec delectatio est in potestate delectantis nisi quia actus est in potestate eius; peccatum ƿautem in quantum peccatum formaliter est in potestate peccantis. Hoc etiam videtur manifeste dicere Augustinus I De doctrina christiana cap. l: ((Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se)). Ista inhaesio videtur esse per potentiam motivam inhaerentis, sicut in corporibus (a quibus transumptum est hoc nomen 'inhaerere' ibi) inhaesio est virtute inhaerentis.
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Quod autem frui sit tantum delectatio videtur dicere illa auctoritas Augustini I De Trinitate cap. l0 g: ((Plenum gaudium est ƿfrui Trinitate)); quod si non distorqueatur auctoritas ad causalitatem vel ad alium intellectum, quem non sonant verba, gaudium est formaliter delectatio. Similiter et in illa quaestione praeallegata Augustini: ((Fruimur illa re de qua capimus voluptatem)); si sit locutio per identitatem vel quasi definitio, tunc 'capere voluptatem' est frui essentialiter.
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Quod autem frui accipiatur pro utroque, actu scilicet et delectatione simul, probatur ex definitione illa 'frui' X De Trinitate cap. 9: ((Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas propter se delectata conquiescit)). Ad actum enim pertinet quod dicitur 'fruimur cognitis', quia actui voluntatis praesupponitur obiectum cognitum; sed post subditur 'in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit' etc., quod, si delectatio accideret fruitioni, non debet poni in eius definitione. Similiter, si ponatur ad beatitudinem essentialiter pertinere et actus et delectatio sequens, tunc omnes auctoritates quae dicunt ƿfrui esse summum praemium vel beatitudinem nostram dicunt eam includere utrumque, et actum et delectationem. Istam minorem dicit illa auctoritas I De doctrina christiana cap. 6: ((Summa merces est ut ipso perfruamur)).
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Sed de significato vocabuli non est contendendum, quia secundum Augustinum I Retractationum cap. 9 ((cum res constat, non est vis facienda in nominibus)). Res constat quod voluntas haƿbet triplicem actum, et quartum, puta passionem consequentem: et duobus actibus nullo modo convenit hoc nomen; pro alterutro aliorum duorum et pro ambobus simul videntur aliqui uti vocabulo, et tunc erit aequivocum, - vel si est univocum, oportet quasdam auctoritates exponere quod loquuntur causaliter vel concomitanter.