Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

  1. Contra istam opinionem. Intellectus agens, secundum eam, nihil causat quod sit formaliter in phantasmate, sed solum fit remotio prohibentis per quemdam contactum spiritualem huiusmodi lucis ad phantasma, qua remotione facta virtute intellectus agentis, fit informatio intellectus possibilis.

  2. Ex hoc sequitur quod nihil in intellectiva - et hoc ut intellectiva comprehendit agentem et possibilem - habebit aliquo modo rationem activi, sive ut agentis sive ut rationis agendi, respectu cuiuscumque intellectionis sive respectu obiecti intellectionis, et ita tantum phantasma effective se habet ad intellectionem; vel si sit ibi efficientia alia, per quam fiat irradiatio vel illustratio super phantasmata, illa efficientia erit praecise ipsius Dei, qui creavit tale lumen in intellectu possibili; nihil ergo aliud a Deo active se habet respectu intellectionis cuiuscumque nisi phantasma tantum.

  3. Hoc videtur inconveniens, quia vilificat valde naturam animae. Nullam enim perfectionem videtur phantasma posse causare in intellectu excedentem nobilitatem eius, quia effectus non excedit suam causam, sed deficit ab ea, specialiter effectus aequivocus. Ergo nihil causatur praecise a phantasmate in intellectu, sicut ponit ista opinio. Omnis enim intellectio, aut est perfectior phantasmate, aut nulla erit in homine.

  4. Item, secundo, ex ista positione sequitur quod angelus, in quo non potest poni talis distinctio in subiecto, nullam intellectionem posset habere novam, quantumcumque habeat obiecta multa praesentia habitualiter; immo nullam potest habere effective nisi a Deo, quia opposito posito intellectus movebitur a se, vel agens et patiens erunt indistincta subiecto.

  5. Hoc videtur ipse concedere, quia ponit 'angelum posse habere novam intellectionem' esse mere creditum.

  6. Sed hoc non evadit. Nullum enim creditum repugnat conclusioni sequenti ex veris principiis. Ex isto autem principio 'agens et patiens necessario sunt distincta subiecto', sequitur quod angelus non potest habere ex se aliquam intellectionem active. Ergo si oppositum huius conclusionis est creditum, principium illud ex quo sequitur illa conclusio erit falsum. - Hoc patet magis de 'velle': constat enim quod primum'velle malum' angelus non habuit immediate a Deo; igitur ibi agens fuit indistinctum subiecto a passo.

  7. Tertio, sequitur quod non oportet ponere aliquem habitum in intellectu, quia ad 'ordinate intelligendum' requiritur et sufficit, secundum istam opinionem, quod phantasmata ordinate occurrant, quae, occurrentia, ordinate moveant intellectum. Sed quod ipsa ordinate occurrant, non potest fieri per habitum in intellectu, quia nihil in passo dat moventi 'ordinate movere', - aut saltem per habitum in phantasia possunt ordinate occurrere absque omni habitu in intellectu; igitur etc.

  8. Confirmatur: ideo enim, secundum istos, negatur habitus in voluntate, quia ipsa faciliter movetur conformiter intellectui; ergo a simili, cum intellectus moveatur a phantasmatibus eo modo quo occurrunt, secundum eos, sufficiet habitus in phantasia ad hoc ut ordinate moveant. - Haec tria pondero.

  9. Fiunt autem et alia argumenta contra eos. Primo sic: si phantasma causat omnem intellectionem effective, et causa naturalis nihil agit nisi secundum naturam illam qua est in actu, phantasma numquam causabit aliquam actionem in intellectu nisi conformem phantasmati, et ita numquam causabit compositionem falsam, repugnantem rationibus extremorum quorum phantasmata sunt in virtute phantastica; aut si quodammodo potest, sicut respondent 'per unum oppositorum cognitum posse suum oppositum cognosci', hoc non est nisi quia per unam compositionem veram potest cognoscere oppositam esse falsam; sed numquid illud phantasma causabit aliquam intellectionem falsam tamquam veram, vel e converso? - Et si dicas quod phantasma falso repraesentat obiecta, ideo causat intellectionem falsam in intellectu, - sequitur quod idem phantasma manens numquam potest causare assensum oppositum, et ita non poterit intellectus eandem complexionem apprehendere nunc ut veram, nunc ut falsam.

  10. Item, secundo, 'intellectio' secundum Philosophum est actio immanens.

  11. Respondent quod 'intelligere' secundum modum significandi grammaticalem significat actionem, et 'intelligi' passionem, tamen secundum rem 'intelligere' est passio, et 'quod intelligitur' est agens. - Quid autem 'intelligere' habeat de ratione actionis? Dicunt quod 'intelligere' non significat aliquid ut habet 'esse' in subiecto, in se et absolute, sed quasi tendens in alterum ut in obiectum, sive ut in terminum; ((et quia actionis est procedere ab agente et tendere in passum, ideo tales perfectiones)) - quae in re sunt passiones, hoc est manentes in eo quod denominatur ab eis per modum actionis - ((dicuntur esse actiones immanentes)).

  12. Contra. Philosophus distinguens actionem a factione I et VI Ethicorum et IX Metaphysicae, assignat diversa principia ac propria actioni et factioni, quod non oporteret si intelligeret quod illud quod assignat esse actionem esset passio, quia tunc non oporteret assignare sibi principium activum proprium. Non enim oporteret prudentiam esse activam sicut ars est habitus factivus, si actio nihil esset nisi quaedam forma recepta in alio, ut in eo quod dicitur 'agens'.

  13. Item, tertio, habitus non ponitur praecise ad patiendum, et maxime in passivo summe disposito ad formam. Non enim oportet illud facilitari ad recipiendum quod in se est summe dispositum ad recipiendum. Sed intellectus est summe dispositus ad quamcumque intellectionem, quia nihil habet contrarium; ergo non oporteret ponere aliquem habitum in intellectu, si praecise esset passivus respectu intellectionis.- Probatur prima propositio, quia habitus est 'quo utimur cum volumus', et habitus ((habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit)) etc., II Ethicorum. Omnia ista attribuunt aliquam activitatem habitui.

  14. Item, Sa quarto, quomodo intellectus discurreret, syllogizando et arguendo, si phantasma causet omnem intellectionem? Non enim videtur intelligibile quomodo phantasmata occurrentia causant omnem discursum.

  15. Item, quinto, quomodo causabuntur intentiones logicae vel relationes rationis? Si enim phantasma causat omnem intellectionem, quaecumque intentio causata ab eo erit realis, quia illa dicitur 'intentio realis' quae immediate causatur a re, vel a specie repraesentante rem in se. Ergo nulla intellectio causabit intentiones logicas vel relationes rationis, quia intellectus nullo actu suo poterit conferre obiectum ad aliud, quae collatio causat relationem rationis vel intentionem secundam in obiecto.

  16. Confirmatur, quia intellectus, conferens a ad b secundum talem habitudinem qualis est ipsorum ex natura rei, non causat relationem rationis, puta quando comparat ea ut differentia vel ut contraria, vel ut totum et partem, vel huiusmodi. Ergo sola illa collatione causatur relatio rationis quae nec in 'esse' nec in 'cognosci' consequitur extrema ex natura extremorum. Ergo extrema non sunt causa illius actus collativi.

  17. Item, sexto, quomodo reflectitur intellectus super actum suum, et hoc quomodo erit in potestate potentiae reflectentis? Si enim phantasma, causans aliquam intellectionem, habet naturaliter causare reflexionem super illam intellectionem, pari ratione et reflexionem reflexionis, et sic in infinitum, ut dicit Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 12 vel 31. Si autem non habet causare reflexionem, sed tantum actum absolutum, et post occurrat aliud phantasma, non videtur posse assignari ratio quomodo posset esse aliqua reflexio super aliquem actum.

  18. Istarum sex rationum ultimarum, prima non cogit contra eos, quia quaerit difficultatem communem omni opinioni. Sive enim phantasma ponatur esse causa activa intellectionis, sive species intelligibilis, sive intellectus - cum quodcumque istorum sit principium naturaliter agendi, non libere - semper aeque potest quaeri quomodo opposita possunt causari in intellectu, utpote nunc opinio vera vel scientia de aliquo, nunc autem opinio falsa sive error de eodem.

  19. Secunda non cogit, quia prudentia ponitur principium activum propter actum alium, qui est 'actio', ad quem suus proprius extenditur ut regula ad regulatum, sicut proprius actus artis extenditur ad actum alium, qui est 'factio', licet tamen neuter habitus sit principium proprie activum respectu sui actus.

  20. Per hoc ad tertium, quia habitus inclinat passum ut forma prior ad posteriorem convenientem, sicut alibi dicitur de habitu; licet enim passum sit ex se summe dispositum per amotionem oppositi, non tamen per appositionem convenientis. - Illud II Ethicorum 'bonum reddit' etc., debet intelligi quod non effective reddit, sed inclinative.

  21. Quartum coincidit cum tertio ponderato, scilicet quomodo habitus disponit ut phantasmata in discursu ordinate occurrant, nisi ponatur ille habitus in virtute phantastica, non in intellectu? quod forte concederet.

  22. Sextum non quaerit nisi quomodo in potestate nostra est, quam intellectionem habeamus per alteram, et per quid cognoscitur actus super quem reflectimus. Primum quidem est propter voluntatem. Et secundum etiam est per vestigium derelictum ab actu (vel aliter per phantasma, quod primo ostendit obiectum, sed secundo causatur ab obiecto; tamen non est necesse ipsum actu causare intellectionem intellectionis, nisi quando voluntas imperat): illo ergo derelicto, per illud elicitive potest haberi actus reflexus, voluntate imperante, et potest non haberi, voluntate imperante aliam intellectionem.

  23. Quintum videtur ponderandum, si 'nulla comparatio est relatio rationis quam extrema nata sunt causare in intellectu', quia si ista propositio est vera, tunc licet intellectiones simplicium comparatorum causentur ab illis, non tamen comparatio illa quae est in actu collativo, quo causatur in extremo relatio rationis. Posset dici quod aliqua habitudo consequitur extrema in re, et illa consequitur in cognitione extrema cognita, puta contrarietas vel huiusmodi, et haec est realis; alia non consequitur extrema in re, nec necessario in cognitione, - possunt tamen ipsa extrema causare actum collativum elicitive, quando voluntas ipsum imperat: causato autem actu collativo secundum talem respectum qui non consequitur extrema in re, causatur relatio rationis.

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

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