Ordinatio

Name: Ordinatio
Author: John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Ad argumenta istius quaestionis. - Ad primum dico quod illa comparatio debet intelligi quantum ad primam motionem intellectus ab obiecto; ibi enim phantasma cum intellectu agente habet vicem obiecti primi moventis. Sed non debet intelligi quantum ad omnem actum sequentem primam motionem: potest enim intellectus abstrahere omnem obiectum inclusum in obiecto primo movente, et considerare illud abstractum non considerando illud a quo abstrahit - et considerando istud abstractum, sic considerat commune sensibili et insensibili, quia in illo consideratur insensibile in universali, sicut et sensibile, - et potest considerare illud abstractum et aliud abstractum, in quo sit proprium alteri, scilicet insensibili; sed sensus non est abstractivus, et ideo in omni actu - tam primo quam secundo - requirit obiectum aliquod proprium movens, quomodo non se habet phantasma ad intellectum.
Ad secundum dico quod Commentator exponit illud simile Philosophi de difficili et non de impossibili. Et ratio sua est, quia tunc natura fecisset otiose illas substantias abstractas intelligibiles et non possibiles intelligi ab aliquo intellectu. Sed ista ratio eius non valet, tum quia non est finis istarum substantiarum, in quantum intelligibiles sunt, ut intelligantur ab intellectu nostro, et ideo si hoc non conveniret eis, non propter hoc essent frustra intelligibiles, - tum quia non sequitur 'non sunt intelligibiles ab intellectu nostro', 'ergo a nullo'; possent enim intelligi a se ipsis. Et ideo est ibi fallacia consequentis. Unde licet multipliciter posset exponi auctoritas Philosophi, dico quod oculus noctuae non habet cognitionem nisi intuitivam et naturalem, - et quantum ad istas duas condiciones potest exponi auctoritas Philosophi de impossibilitate, quia sicut est impossibile illi oculo intuitive considerare obiectum istud, sic intellectui nostro est impossibile naturaliter et etiam intuitive cognoscere Deum.
Ad tertium dico quod infinitum potentiale est ignotum, quia unumquodque est cognoscibile in quantum est in actu. Non tamen est ignotum sic quod repugnet sibi intelligi ab intellectu infinito, sed non potest infinitum cognosci ab aliquo intellectu cognoscente ipsum secundum modum suae infinitatis. Modus enim suae infinitatis est accipiendo alterum post alterum, - et intellectus qui cognosceret hoc modo, alterum post alterum, cognosceret semper finitum et numquam infinitum. Intellectus tamen infinitus potest cognoscere totum illud simul, non partem post partem. - Cum etiam arguitur de II Metaphysicae, de infinitis et infinito, dico quod non est simile, quia cognitio obiectorum infinitorum numeraliter concluderet infinitatem potentiae cognoscentis (sicut patuit in quaestione prima secundae distinctionis, articulo 2, ad infinitatem), quia videlicet ibi pluralitas ex parte obiecti concludit maioritatem virtutis in intellectu. Sed intellectio alicuius infiniti non concludit infinitatem, quia non oportet actum habere talem modum realem qualem habet obiectum, quia actus sub ratione finiti potest esse ad obiectum sub ratione infiniti, nisi esset actus comprehensivus - et concedo quod talem actum circa obiectum infinitum non habemus, nec possibile est habere.
Ad Gregorium dico quod non debet intelligi quod contemplatio sistat sub Deo in aliqua creatura (quia hoc esset 'frui utendis', quod esset 'summa perversitas', secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30), sed conceptus illius essentiae sub ratione entis est imperfectior conceptu illius essentiae ut haec essentia est, et quia est imperfectior, ideo inferior in intelligibilitate. Contemplatio autem, de lege communi, stat in tali conceptu communi, et ideo stat in aliquo conceptu qui est minoris intelligibilitatis quam Deus in se, ut est haec essentia. Et ideo debet intelligi ad aliquid quod est sub Deo, hoc est 'ad aliquid' sub ratione intelligibilis, cuius intelligibilitas est inferior intelligibilitate Dei in se, ut haec essentia, singularis.
Ad argumenta pro prima opinione. Cum arguitur quod Deus non potest intelligi in aliquo conceptu communi sibi et creaturis univoce, quia est singularitas quaedam, consequentia non valet. Socrates enim in quantum Socrates, est singularis, et tamen a Socrate plura possunt abstrahi praedicata. Et ideo singularitas alicuius non impedit, quin ab eo quod singulare est, possit abstrahi aliquis conceptus communis. Et licet quidquid est ibi in re sit singulare ex se in exsistendo, ita quod nihil contrahit aliud ibi ad singularitatem, tamen illud idem potest concipi ut hoc in re vel quodammodo indistincte, et ita ut singulare vel commune.
Quod dicit, pro illa opinione, de cognitione per accidens, non oportet improbare, quia quasi per accidens cognoscitur in attributo, sed non praecise, sicut probatum est.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy