Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

This work is being completed — add a section.

Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

  1. Tenendo quattuor rationes et praecipue duas primas pro conclusione affirmativa quaestionis, respondeo ad argumenta in oppositum. Ad primum, negando maiorem.

  2. Cum probatur primo per necessarium ex se et ex alio, dico quod si idem genus causae importetur per haec duo, 'ex se' et 'ex alio', verum est quod sic nihil est necessarium ex se et ex alio; si autem aliud genus causae importetur, puta per illud 'ex se' causa formalis et per illud 'ab alio' causa effectiva vel productiva, non est inconveniens idem esse necessarium ex se uno modo et ab alio alio modo.

  3. Cum probatur maior prosyllogismi, dico quod illud quod est necessarium ex se formaliter non potest non esse circumscripto quocumque alio cuius circumscriptio non includit incompossibilitatem ponendo esse aliud; sed ex se necessarium formaliter sequitur posse non esse circumscripto quocumque alio per incompossibile, sicut ex uno incompossibili posito sequitur aliud incompossibile.

  4. Sed dubium est tunc, quae sit differentia inter ex se necessarium Filii secundum theologos et creaturae necessario productae secundum philosophos. Respondeo: philosophi, ponentes creaturas necessario produci, haberent dicere quod ipsae haberent entitatem qua formaliter essent necessariae, licet in illa entitate dependerent a causa necessario producente; Filius autem habet entitatem formaliter necessariam, et eandem cum producente. Creatura ergo si esset ex se necessaria, non posset non esse circumscripto omni alio cuius circumscriptio non implicat contradictionem, tamen circumscripta causa alia a se per incompossibile, posset non esse; Filius autem non posset non esse circumscripto quocumque alio secundum entitatem, quia non posset non esse nisi circumscripta persona producente, et producens non est aliud secundum entitatem a producto. Unde si Pater produceret creaturam naturaliter et necessario, produceret eam formaliter necessariam, et tamen non esset necessaria tunc tanta necessitate quanta est nunc Filius necessarius.

  5. Ad secundam probationem maioris dico quod possibile logicum differt a possibili reali, sicut patet per Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. De potentia. Possibile logicum est modus compositionis formatae ab intellectu cuius termini non includunt contradictionem, et ita possibilis est haec propositio: 'Deum esse', 'Deum posse produci' et 'Deum esse Deum'; sed possibile reale est quod accipitur ab aliqua potentia in re sicut a potentia inhaerente alicui vel terminata ad illud sicut ad terminum. Filius autem non est possibilis possibilitate reali neque possibilitate inhaerente alicui neque terminata ad ipsum, quia possibilitas, sive activa sive passiva, est ad aliud in natura, sicut patet per definitionem potentiae activae et passivae V Metaphysicae, quod est principium transmutandi aliud vel ab alio in quantum aliud, vel ab alio vel in quantum aliud. Est tamen Filius terminus potentiae productivae, quae abstrahit a ratione potentiae effectivae, et si illa potentia dicatur simpliciter potentia, terminus illius potentiae potest dici simpliciter possibile; sed illa possibilitas non repugnat necessario formaliter, licet forte possibilitas de qua philosophi loquuntur, de potentia activa et passiva, proprie repugnet necessitati ex se: sed hoc dubium est de activa, si ponerent aliquod necessarium habere principium productivum.

  6. Ad tertiam probationem, cum dicitur 'est ibi ordo, igitur intelligitur prima persona non intellecta secunda', respondeo quod non necessario prima intellectione intelligitur persona secunda cum persona prima si illa prima persona est absoluta; sed non sequitur ex hoc, quod si prima persona intelligitur non intellecta secunda, igitur intelligitur secunda persona non esse, sicut non sequitur 'animal illud quod est in homine intelligitur non intellecto rationali, ergo intelligitur non esse rationale.

  7. Cum autem infers mutationem ex terminis oppositis, accipis ac si intelligeretur productum non esse quando producens est, quod falsum est; abstractionem igitur sine mendacio, quae est non considerando illud a quo fit abstractio, commutas in abstractionem mendacem, quae est considerando illud non esse a quo fit abstractio.

  8. Ad quartam probationem dico quod illa persona non esset in essentia sine productione; habet enim essentiam per productionem. Non sequitur 'igitur essentia de non habente personam fit habens', sed sequitur: 'igitur essentia, quae de ratione sua non includit personam' (quod verum est si persona est relativa, primo quia tunc est aliquid excepto relativo, secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 3, et secundo quia respectus non est de ratione absoluti) - ipsa, inquam, essentia - habet 'illam productionem sive per productionem habet personam in qua subsistit', quae tamen persona vel productio non est de ratione essentiae. Non autem sequitur mutatio ex hoc quod aliquid inest alicui quod non est de ratione eius, sed mutatio requirit quod aliquid insit alicui cui prius infuit eius oppositum, quod non habetur in proposito.

  9. Ad quintam probationem dico quod in generatione etiam in creaturis concurrunt duae rationes, scilicet quod ipsa est mutatio, et quod ipsa est productio; ut autem est mutatio, est forma subiecti mutati, et ut est productio, est termini producti ut via. Istae rationes non includunt se essentialiter etiam in creaturis, quia diversa respiciunt primo. Ergo sine contradictione potest intelligi ratio productionis sine ratione mutationis, et ita generatio transfertur ad divina sub ratione productionis, licet non sub ratione mutationis.

  10. Ad secundum principale dico quod non sequitur 'est ab alio, igitur dependens'. Cum probatur, concedo quod aeque independenter est natura in producente et in producto. Cum arguitur ex independentia quod non erit praeexigentia, nego consequentiam, quia dependentia sequitur entitatem formalem dependentis ab illo a quo dependet; quando igitur habent eandem entitatem, non est ibi dependentia, potest tamen esse praeexigentia si unum suppositum habeat illud ab altero.

  11. Ad ultimum dico quod mutationes aliae a generatione ex ratione sua formali sunt imperfectiores generatione, quia termini inducti sunt imperfectiores quam termini generationis; tamen non requirunt aliae mutationes, quantum ad illud quod praesupponunt, tantam imperfectionem in subiecto quantam requirit generatio, et hoc ut est mutatio, quia generatio requirit in subiecto entitatem in potentia, et hoc ad esse simpliciter, aliae mutationes non.

  12. Ad propositum applicando, dico quod generatio non transfertur ad divina secundum illud quod praesupponit generatio, puta subiectum mutabile, quod est imperfectionis, quia ut est mutatio, non est in divinis, - sed transfertur ad divina in quantum productio, sub ratione qua est productio termini, qui est terminus perfectior terminis aliarum mutationum; et sic bene potest per generationem accipi essentia tamquam terminus perfectissimus in divinis licet non possit per aliquam aliam mutationem accipi aliquis alius terminus aliarum mutationum, quia hoc concluderet compositionem et imperfectionem, quia terminus cuiuscumque alterius foret accidens componibile cum subiecto.

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

↑ Top of work