Ordinatio

Name: Ordinatio
Author: John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Ad argumenta huius quaestionis. - Ad primum dico quod consequentia non valet, 'est primum ens, ergo est primum cognitum', licet sequatur 'ergo est primum cognoscibile' quantum est de se; et ita debet intelligi 'veritas' de qua loquitur Philosophus II Metaphysicae, pro evidentia rei in se sive pro intelligibilitate eius ex parte sui. Non autem oportet quod res sicut se habet ad entitatem sic se habeat ad cognosci, nisi in cognosci ab intellectu illo qui respicit intelligibilia omnia secundum gradum proprium cognoscibilitatis eorum, qualis non est noster, sed maxime cognoscit sensibilia.
Ad secundum dico quod consequentia non valet nisi in causis praecisis. Patet in exemplo: si eclipsis est cognoscibilis ex duplici causa per duas potentias, videlicet per sensum et per intellectum habentem demonstrationem, numquam cognoscitur perfectissime nisi perfectissime cognito principio demonstrationis, non tamen sequitur 'ergo numquam cognoscitur nisi cognito principio demonstrationis'; habet enim aliam causam, qua cognosci potest, quia ista non est praecisa causa, - tamen per aliam non potest cognosci ita perfecte sicut per istam, quia ista causa, scilicet demonstratio qua potest cognosci ab intellectu, est causa perfectior cognitionis suae quam alia qua potest cognosci, scilicet per sensum.
Ita est in proposito. Quaelibet creatura praeter causam cognitionis suae, quae est essentia divina, habet aliam causam illius cognitionis, videlicet essentiam propriam, quae nata est gignere notitiam sui. Numquam tamen per motionem suam ita perfecte cognoscitur res sicut per essentiam divinam. Non sequitur igitur ab effectu ad causam, arguendo: 'si perfectissime, perfectissime, - igitur si simpliciter, simpliciter', quia illud perfectissime sumptum potest esse causa praecisa, 'perfectissime' in genere; sumptum tamen simpliciter, non est causa praecisa effectus in genere.
Ad tertium dico quod maior est vera loquendo de primitate perfectionis, sed non de primitate adaequationis. Exemplum: numquam est visio circa aliquid sub ratione coloris praecise, ita quod non sub ratione huius vel illius coloris, puta albi vel nigri, nisi illud videatur a remotis vel imperfecte. Visio autem alicuius sub ratione coloris praecise non est perfectissima, sed imperfectissima. 'Perfectissima igitur operatio potentiae est circa primum obiectum eius', verum est - non 'primum' adaequatione, sed 'primum' perfectione, quia videlicet est perfectissimum contentorum sub primo obiecto adaequato. Et ideo dicit Philosophus X Ethicorum quod 'delectatio perfecta est in operatione circa optimum obiectum eorum quae sunt sub potentia', hoc est circa optimum contentum sub obiecto adaequato illius potentiae. Probat igitur ratio ista quod Deus est primum cognitum, hoc est perfectissimum, quod concedo, sed non primum adaequatum - de quo in sequenti quaestione.
Quod dicit illa opinio, in primo membro ad secundam quaestionem, de indeterminato negative et privative, si intelligat de primitate originis, contradixi sibi in primo membro secundae quaestionis.
Et cum arguitur quod (('indeterminatum negative' est magis indeterminatum quam 'indeterminatum privative')) - nego, loquendo de indeterminatione ad propositum, qualis scilicet est in primo intellecto, quia 'indeterminatum negative' est singulare, et tale non est magis indeterminatum quam 'indeterminatum privative'. Indeterminatio autem negativa, scilicet repugnantia ad determinari, etsi sit aliquo modo maior quam indeterminatio privativa, non tamen tale indeterminatum prius occurrit intellectui, quia tale non est confusum sed distinctissimum cognoscibile, sicut prius dictum est.
Quod arguit etiam in secundo membro quod notitia rationali Deus sit ultimum cognitum, quia prius cognoscitur 'illud a quo fit abstractio', hoc non est verum nisi ponendo abstractionem quemdam discursum ab uno noto ad aliud, ita quod illud a quo fit abstractio est cognitum et aliud cognitum per ipsum. Et si ita intelligat abstractionem, talis cognitio per abstractionem non est prima cognitio abstracti. Si enim ita cognoscitur Deus per creaturam, oportet aliquem conceptum praehabere de Deo, ad quem discurritur, quia discursus praesupponit aliquem conceptum de termino ad quem est. Vel igitur propositio quam accipit est falsa, vel si sit vera, concludit Deum esse praecognitum antequam cognoscatur rationaliter, quod forte concederet.
Quod autem addit quod Deus ut est primum cognitum naturaliter 'non distinguitur ab aliis', quia non concipitur in aliquo in quo discernitur a creatura, in hoc videtur contradicere sibi ipsi. Praedixit enim quod est primum cognitum naturaliter ab intellectu ut est 'indeterminatum negative', - et dicit quod in hoc conceptu distinguitur a creatura, quia istud non convenit creaturae.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy