Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

  1. Sed contra secundam opinionem istarum (quae sexta est, in universo) arguitur specialiter quod ipsa sit falsa tam in sensu quam in intellectu. - In sensu, quia si species illa quae est visio sit aliqua eiusdem rationis cum illa quae est in medio, illa in medio erit formaliter visio; ergo medium, habens eam formaliter, erit formaliter videns. Si autem praeter hanc speciem in visu quae ponitur visio sit alia alterius rationis ab ea, et alia eiusdem rationis cum illa quae est in medio, habetur propositum - quod licet illud quod est visio dicatur species, tamen est aliquid aliud prius eo in oculo, et alterius rationis: et illud, ut communiter, dicitur species, et ita species proprie dicta differret a visione.

  2. Si dicas quod species in medio differt a specie in oculo propter diversa recipientia, - hoc nihil est, quia sicut albedo est eiusdem rationis in equo et in lapide, et ideo utrumque est formaliter album secundum eandem rationem albi, ita si illa qualitas quae dicitur species sit eiusdem rationis in oculo et in medio, si illa de se sit visio formaliter, visio formaliter erit in utroque: et in quocumque est visio formaliter, illud est formaliter videns.

  3. Principale etiam propositum patet, quia in oculo caeco, remanente tamen sic mixto ut prius, causatur species; similiter in oculo dormientis, alias non excitaretur ab excellenti visibili praesente, nec etiam alias excitaretur a sono excellenti nisi prius esset in aure, tamen in istis non est visio. - Ita etiam in oculo bene disposito recipitur aliqua species eiusdem rationis cum illa quae est in medio, ex hoc quod ipsum organum est similis dispositionis cum medio, propter perspicuitatem utriusque - ex II De anima - et illa non erit formaliter visio, sed prior visione.

  4. Quod in intellectu sit falsum, patet coniungendo aliqua dicta sic opinantium. Ponunt enim nullam esse speciem aliam ab essentia divina in visione beata, et beatitudinem essentialiter consistere in sola visione; iunge istud dictum quod 'visio formaliter est species', et sequitur quod beatitudo nostra erit formaliter essentia divina. Ergo si haec conclusio est inconveniens, aut negent illam praemissam quod 'visio est species', aut ponant quod essentia divina habet aliam speciem a se aut beatitudinem esse essentialiter in alio quam in actu visionis.

  5. Responsio: ubi est 'species intelligibilis' alia ab obiecto, illa est intellectio, sed ubi non est species alia ab obiecto, ibi intellectio non est obiectum; in beatitudine igitur negarent speciem aliam ab obiecto et actu, sed non negatur esse alia ab obiecto.

  6. Contra: nullius obiecti est alia 'species intelligibilis' nisi sola intellectio, secundum istos; ergo cuius obiecti est intellectio alia ab ipso, eius est 'species intelligibilis', - ergo ita debet concedi species in visione Dei sicut in intellectione cuiuscumque alterius obiecti.

  7. Nota de relatione scientiae ad obiectum: Nota quod intellectionis ad obiectum in quantum est motivum intellectus, sive magis proprie in quantum est causativum intellectionis, est relatio pertinens ad secundum modum relativorum, sicut filii ad patrem vel caloris geniti ad gignentem; relatio etiam intellectus ut mobilis ad obiectum ut ad movens, pertinet ad secundum modum, ut relatio calefactibilis ad calefactivum.

  8. Sed praeter istas relationes secundi modi, est alia relatio intellectionis ad obiectum ut terminati ad terminans. Non enim tantummodo intellectio est ab obiecto ut a causa efficiente, totali vel partiali, sed est ad ipsum ut ad terminans, sive ut circa quod ipsa est.

  9. Differentia istarum relationum patet, quia utraque est sine alia: prima sine secunda in calore genito, - secunda sine prima in intellectione lapidis, si fieret in me immediate a Deo. Prima est non identica, quia idem absolutum posset fieri ab alia causa; secunda videtur identica, quia nullus actus natus esse circa obiectum, posset esse idem et non terminari ad idem obiectum. Secunda non est ad aliquam causam ut causam, quia positis omnibus causis, praeter hoc requiritur in tali actu aliquid terminans. Patet etiam dividendo: non est forma, nec efficiens, patet; non finis, quia obiectum ut est primo circa quod est actus, non est propter quod amatum elicitur actus; nec est materia - est enim 'circa', sine 'in' et 'ex'. - Secunda potest poni tertii modi, non quia sit relatio mensurati, sed quia similis illi, quia non mutua: universaliter enim actus requirit illud circa quod sit, non e converso, nec sola relatio mensurati est tertii modi, sed omnis similis, scilicet non mutua, qualis est terminatimodo praedicto - ad terminans; tamen et hic concurrit, inter eadem absoluta, relatio mensurati ad mensuram, sed potest poni formaliter alia ab ista relatione terminati.

  10. Contra tertium et quartum: quomodo est alicui identica relatio 'non ad causam' nisi dependeat essentialiter a non causa, et ita quattuor causae non sufficerent ad esse rei? Item, potest non esse actu exsistente, quomodo tunc identica relatio?

  11. Haec duo videntur concludere quod intellectio est aliqua forma absoluta sicut albedo. Patet enim quod ipsa est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non dependet essentialiter; quando etiam obiectum causat, non dependet identice, quia posset eadem aliunde causari (frequenter etiam est de non ente).

  12. Et si dicas 'est ens in specie', - arguetur de specie, quod sit absoluta forma (vel processus in infinitum), et ipsa non est obiectum terminans, sed illud cuius est. Quomodo ergo Philosophus in VII Physicorum, et alia dicta de habitibus? quomodo ergo tunc relatio identica, cum possit non esse actu exsistente, vel etiam realis, cum terminus non sit?

  13. Item, differentia istarum relationum ponitur, quia intellectus quandoque terminatur in intelligendo ad aliquid a quo non movetur, puta intellectus divinus ad creaturam vel ad relationes intrinsecas vel attributa, cum tamen sola essentia moveat ad intellectio nem, alioquin quod eius esset obiectum primum?

  14. Contra: tunc intellectio Dei haberet relationem realem ad creaturam vel ad aliud obiectum; item, secundo, quare magis 'unum' motivum quam 'unum' terminans requiritur ad unitatem actus?

  15. Ad primum istorum duorum: quare non potest aliqua relatio tertii modi esse tantum rationis sicut et illa secundi qua essentia divina dicitur movere intellectum eius, et e converso? - sicque non sit differentia modorum Aristotelis penes 'esse' rei et rationis, sed penes mutuum et non mutuum: et si mutuum, penes quantum et quale - substantiale vel accidentale, in actu primo vel secundo, ita quod quilibet modus possit esse quandoque realis, quandoque rationis?

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

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