Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

  1. Ad argumenta opinionum, per ordinem. Primo, ad auctoritates Augustini. - Dico quod 'imago', quae ponitur ab eo 'esse in spiritu', oportet quod intelligatur esse in anima vel in aliquo animae ut in subiecto, et non praecise in corpore sic mixto, - aliter non concluderetur illam imaginem esse nobiliorem omni corpore, quod tamen ipse dicit XII Super Genesim. Quod autem est in anima vel in aliquo animae ut in subiecto, non est illa species quae communiter dicitur 'species', sed illa recipitur in parte organi quae est corpus sic mixtum; sed illud quod recipitur in anima vel potentia animae, est actus cognoscendi: ergo per 'imaginem' intendit ipse talem actum.

  2. Ista glossa arguitur ex dicto eius XI De Trinitate cap. 2, ubi vult quod informatio sensus, quae fit a solo corpore, 'visio' dicitur. Illa autem 'informatio' est propria species, quae recipitur in parte organi, scilicet in corpore sic mixto; hoc patet ex hoc quod dicit quod ((gignitur a solo corpore quod videtur)). Sicut ergo illud quod est proprie imago dicitur 'visio', ita e converso visio potest dici 'imago' et multo verius, quia 'visio' - secundum veritatem est quaedam qualitas, et talis qualitas quae est quaedam similitudo obiecti, et forte perfectior quam illa similitudo prior, quae dicitur usitate 'species'.

  3. Hoc intellecto, faciliter patet ad auctoritates eius. Concedo enim quod illam 'imaginem', quae est 'sensatio', non causat corpus in spiritu ut totalis causa, sed anima causat in se, 'mira celeritate', non tamen ut causa tota, sed ipsa et obiectum; unde dicit ibi XII, quod ((mox ut visum fuerit)) etc., innuens quod praesentia obiecti requiritur in ratione visibilis, ut anima faciat visionem in se, et non requiritur nisi ut aliquo modo causa partialis, sicut ipse exprimit in XI De Trinitate cap. 2, quod ((a vidente et visibili gignitur visio)).

  4. Istam conclusionem sic intellectam probat ratio sua primo allegata, - quia ista, quod 'agens est praestantius patiente', non est immediata, sed dependet ex istis tribus: 'agens est praestantius effectu', et 'effectus agentis est forma et actus patientis', et 'actus est nobilior potentia'. Ubi ergo istae propositiones sunt verae, ibi propositio Augustini quam accipit est vera; illa autem quod 'agens est praestantius effectu' non est vera nisi de causa aequivoca et totali: potest autem aliqua causa esse partialiter agens ad aliquem effectum nobiliorem se, sicut elementum in virtute corporum caelestium potest agere ad generationem mixti, quod est nobilius ipso elemento, agente ut partiali causa.

  5. Per illud apparet ad auctoritatem secundam Augustini X De Trinitate cap. 5. Format enim anima in se imaginem, hoc est sensationem, - et 'de se', hoc est ipsa est in potentia naturali ad sensationem et non in potentia neutra, sicut superficies ad albedinem est in potentia neutra et non naturali; et istam naturalitatem ostendit, quod dicitur 'de se'. Et loquitur ibi tantum de sensationibus; quod apparet, quia ibi dicit quod ((illae animae partes quae corporum similitudinibus informantur, habemus communes cum bestiis)): hoc verum est de illis quae informantur imaginibus, hoc est sensationibus, extendendo nomen 'imaginis' ad sensationem.

  6. Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione: concludit pro me, quia cogitatio - cum sit operatio vitalis - non est a non vivo sicut a totali causa; potest tamen non vivum esse causa partialis alicuius vivi, vel effectus vitalis, sicut sol non vivus est causa partialis cum patre ad generandum filium vivum, et multo magis in proposito est possibile, quia hic causa principalior est 'vita', sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione.

  7. Cum arguitur post de forma perfecta, hoc concludit quod aliquam activitatem habeat respectu propriae operationis. Sed quod videtur concludere totalem causalitatem in ea respectu suae operationis, - respondeo quod illa forma ex perfectione sua ordinatur ad habendum operationem circa totum ens, ut dicitur tertia quaestione huius distinctionis; quia vero non est simpliciter perfecta, quia non est infinita, ideo non potest habere in se totum ens. Ex eius igitur perfectione, cum sua imperfectione, concluditur quod aliquam activitatem habeat, et tamen non sufficientem, quia non posset habere totalem causalitatem cognitionis respectu totius entis nisi haberet in se totum ens. - Et ideo dico quod formae imperfectiores bene possunt esse causae totales respectu suarum operationum, quia operationes earum sunt limitatae respectu aliquorum, respectu quorum totalem activitatem habere non concludit aliquam perfectionem activam nisi limitatam. Sed in illa forma perfecta quae ordinatur ad totum ens, non potest poni talis causalitas respectu cognitionis totius entis (tunc enim poneretur in ea virtus activa illimitata), sed potest poni partialis causalitas in ea et partialis in obiecto, ut sic ipsa possit cooperari perfectioni suae circa quodcumque obiectum, et obiectum etiam quodcumque sibi cooperari, magnum ad magnam perfectionem eius et parvum ad parvam.

  8. Alia duo argumenta, videlicet de actione ut distinguitur contra factionem, et quod actio denominat agens, concedo. Pono enim actum intelligendi vere manere in agente quod est eius causa partialis; non tantum in supposito agente, ita quod non transeat extra suppositum, sed quoniam nec transit extra partem intellectivam in sensitivam, nec extra partem intellectivam in appetitivam, nec extra principium eius activum in aliam potentiam, sed manet in parte intellectiva, quae est causa partialis eius. Non oportet autem actionem proprie dictam manere in sua causa totali, sed sufficit quod maneat in sua causa partiali.

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

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