Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy

Articulus I: I. To the Questions Together

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Distinctio II: Second Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Existence of God and his Unity

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

Articulus I: I. To the Second Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus III: III. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Section II: B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

Subsection I: 1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

Subsection II: 2. The infinity of God is proved directly

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether there is only one God

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

Section II: B. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - On the Persons and Productions in God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions

Articulus I: I. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Scotus’ own Proofs

Section II: B. Proofs of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

Articulus III: III. To the Fourth Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded

Section II: B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. Instances against the Solution

Articulus IV: IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

Articulus V: V. To the Second Question

Tractatus I: A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

Section I: B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VII. To the First Question

Section I: A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

Section II: B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

Articulus VIII: VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Distinctio III: Third Distinction

Pars I: First Part - About the Knowability of God

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether God is Naturally Knowable by the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Tractatus I: Question 2 - Whether God is the First Thing Naturally Known by Us in this State of Life

Articulus I: I. Clarification of the First Question

Articulus II: II. Opinion of Others as to Each Question

Articulus III: III. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

Section I: A. A Quidditative Concept can be Had of God

Section II: B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

Section III: C. God Cannot be Known under his Proper Idea

Section IV: D. About the Concept of Infinite Being

Section V: E. God is Known through the Species of Creatures

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the First Question

Articulus V: V. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

Section I: A. About the Order of Origin of Intelligibles

Section II: B. About the Order of Perfection and Adequacy in Intelligibles

Articulus VI: VI. To the Arguments for the Second Question

Quaestio II: Question 3 - Whether God is the Natural First Object that is Adequate Relative to the Intellect of the Wayfarer

Quaestio III: Question 4 - Whether any Certain and Sincere Truth could Naturally be Known by the Intellect of the Wayfarer without a Special Illumining of Uncreated Light

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Henry

Articulus II: II. Attack on Henry’s Opinion and Solution of the Question

Section I: A. Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Section II: B. Against the Opinion in Itself

Section III: C. Against the Fundamental Reasons insofar as they are Less Probative

Section IV: D. Against the Conclusion itself of the Opinion

Section V: E. Solution of the Question

Section VI: F. Once More Against the Fundamental Reasons Adduced

Articulus I: I. Opinion of Others

Section I: A. First Opinion

Section II: B. Second Opinion

Articulus II: II. To the Question

Section I: A. Of What Sort the Univocity of Being is and to What Things it Extends.

Section II: B. About the First Object of the Intellect

Section III: C. Arguments against the Univocity of Being and their Solution

Articulus III: III. About Other Transcendentals

Articulus IV: IV. Doubt about the First Object of the Intellect for this Present State

Articulus V: V. To the Initial Arguments

Pars II: Second Part - About the Vestige/Footprint

Quaestio I: Single Question - Whether in Every Creature there is a Vestige of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Idea of Footprint/Vestige

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Against this Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Section II: B. About Ratification and Somesort-ness

Subsection I: 1. Opinion of Others

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection I: a. A First Rejection of the Opinion

Sub-subsection II: b. Another Rejection of the Opinion

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons for the Rejected Opinion

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Pars III: Third Part - About the Image

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether in the Intellective Part Properly Taken there is a Memory that has an Intelligible Species Naturally Prior to the Act of Understanding

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ Response and his own Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Reasons on the Part of the Universality of the Object

Subsection II: 2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

Subsection III: 3. Scotus’ Concluding Opinion

Subsection IV: 4. To the Reasons from the Authorities

Section III: -

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the Intellective Part Properly Taken or Something of it is the Total Cause Generating Actual Knowledge or is the Idea of Generating

Articulus I: I. Six Opinions of Others are Expounded and Rejected

Section I: A. About the First Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinion

Section I: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section II: B. About the Second Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the opinion

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinion

Section III: C. About the Third and Fourth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Section IV: D. About the Fifth and Sixth Opinion

Subsection I: 1. Exposition of the Opinions

Subsection II: 2. Rejection of the Opinions

Subsection III: 3. Rejection of the Sixth Opinion Specifically

Articulus II: II. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus III: III. To the Arguments for the Opinions

Section I: A. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

Section II: B. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

Section III: C. To the Things Said in the Third and Fourth Opinion

  1. Pro tertia opinione et quarta non sunt argumenta adducta, ad quae oporteat respondere. Qui vult credere de actu primo simplici, et de secundo distincte cognoscendi, vel illud dictum secundae opinionis quod 'species inclinat', credat; non credenti, cum non sit articulus fidei, per rationem ostendatur.

  2. Istae tamen duae opiniones, videlicet tertia et quarta, quae videntur inter se oppositae, concordantur ad invicem et conformantur, - et hoc sic: ad agendum requiritur ratio formalis agendi et ratio agentis; 'agens' est suppositum, 'ratio agendi' est forma elicitiva actionis. In prima ergo actione in intellectum possibilem 'agens' est phantasma, sed 'quod quid est' - splendens in phantasmate est ratio agendi, et hoc in quantum illud 'quod quid' stat in lumine intellectus agentis et penetratur ab ipso lumine et ambitur ab isto agente. Et hac ratione agendi primum impressum in intellectum possibilem est inchoatio habitus scientialis, quae inchoatio non est species intelligibilis, nec forma movens ad actum intelligendi, quia obiectum est in se praesens quatenus relucet in phantasmate, quia phantasma praesens est intellectui quia ubique est in corpore; ergo non requiritur aliqua species alia, per quam obiectum sic sit praesens, nec aliquid tenens vicem obiecti vel repraesentans ipsum. Tamen ipsa impressio prima habet rationem et 'quo' et 'quod' respectu intellectionis: 'quo', quia per ipsam intellectus est in potentia propinqua et accidentali ad actum intelligendi, sicut per gravitatem est corpus in potentia ad 'ubi', - et est etiam 'quo' quantum ad hoc quod manet in intellectu impedito ab actuali intellectione; est etiam 'quod', quia sibi primo occurritur (sicut secundum Avicennam 'primum sensatum' est species), - non ut obiectum terminans, sed ut quod non per collationem sed per continuationem ducit in obiectum. Sic ergo concordantur prima opinio et secunda quoad hoc quod prima negat speciem et secunda concedit inclinanationem praecedentem actum.

  3. Quoad hoc autem quod prima opinio ponit intellectum esse passivum respectu primi actus et activum respectu secundi actus, et secunda opinio videtur ponere quod anima se ipsa eliciat actum, haec concordantur sic, quia facta tali impressione prima in intellectum possibilem, ipse intellectus occurrit tali passioni, quia omne passivum occurrens agenti nititur salvarc suum 'esse'; hoc etiam vult Augustinus VI Musicae, ubi loquitur de illis 'numeris occursoribus', et aliis numeris. Et in isto occursu intellectus combibit illam intellectionem confusam et transmittit ad intima sua, et tunc recipit eam a se intimius quam possit eam recipere ab obiecto; illi etiam impressioni sic intimatae occurrit intellectus secundo, et in illo secundo occursu immergit se illi penetrando illam, et in hoc est distincta et perfecta cognitio intellectus.

  4. Quidquid sit de opinionibus illis quas ille medius nititur exponere, arguitur contra multa hic dicta. Quod primo ponit 'quod quid est, relucens in phantasmate, esse rationem formalem agendi phantasmati', - contra: quomodo aliquid est ratio agendi alicui in quo non est formaliter? Aut si quo modo 'quod quid est' ponatur in phantasmate, cum illud sit 'esse' eius 'secundum quid' - quia 'esse' repraesentati- et non sit ibi secundum aliquod 'esse' exsistentiae, quomodo ipsum 'quod quid est' secundum istud 'esse' erit formalis ratio agendi aliquam actionem realem? Et ita, cum illud phantasma per quod convenit sibi istud 'esse', non sit principalis causa agendi, secundum eos, nec 'quod quid est' secundum quod exsistit in eo, est principalis ratio agendi, quod est contra eos.

  5. Praeter hoc, quaero quid est 'quod quid est stare in lumine intellectus agentis'? Si nihil aliud est nisi intellectum agentem esse in anima et in phantasia eiusdem animae esse phantasma, ergo perpetuo quando phantasma est in virtute phantastica, fit illa penetratio et ambitio, et ita erit in phrenetico et dormiente, quod negat ille cuius opinio exponitur. Si aliquid aliud est quam illa duo esse simul, fit aliqua actio nova, cuius 'terminus novus' non erit in phantasmate; ergo erit in intellectu possibili. Igitur 'quod quid est ' non agit per aliquam penetrationem, quae penetratio praecederet actionem 'quod quid est', sed tantummodo cum intellectu agente coagit, causando aliquam impressionem novam in intellectu possibili; hoc dicit illa alia opinio prima.

  6. Si dices 'illa alia opinio ponit speciem intelligibilem impressam, ista non ponit, sed inchoationem habitus scientialis', - contra: ista opinio ponit illam impressionem 'esse principium quo intellectus est in potentia accidentali', cum tamen prius esset in potentia essentiali. Si per istam impressionem non est 'obiectum intelligibile' praesens nunc magis quam prius, non magis est nunc in potentia accidentali quam prius. Si est praesens aliquo modo nunc quo modo non fuit prius praesens, illud in quo nunc est praesens est 'species intelligibilis'. - Hoc etiam magis apparet ex hoc quod ponitur quod 'primo ei occurrit, tamquam ostendenti obiectum, propter naturalem continuationem ad ipsum'. Hoc non posset esse nisi obiectum reluceret in eo, et ita haberet rationem speciei.

  7. Similiter, hoc quod dicitur 'praecedere', 'inchoatio habitus scientialis', non est verum, quia habitus, proprie loquendo - ut Philosophus loquitur II Ethicorum - generatur ex actu aliquo elicito, et sicut ultimus gradus habitus generatur ex ultimo actu, ita primus ex primo, ita quod quicumque gradus habitus est posterior aliquo actu. Ergo illud quod est simpliciter primum in intellectu possibili, non est aliquid ipsius habitus. - Confirmatur hoc secundum opinionem illius doctoris qui exponitur, quia ponit 'illam inchoationem' esse essentiam habitus totam.

  8. Quod ulterius dicitur de illo occursu, - respondeo: 'occursus' non bene assignatur, nec ad intentionem Augustini. Patiens enim occurrens agenti nititur salvare se et contra agere agenti corrumpenti se; istud agens agit ad salutem et perfectionem passi, ergo non occurrit propter istam rationem 'ut salvet se'. Nec illa est intentio Augustini; vult enim quod anima - occurrens passioni factae in aere in aure - vehementius agitat illum aerem, et sic causat auditionem quam solus sonus non causavit. Hoc ergo 'occurrere' est 'coagere'. - Et tunc respondeo breviter ad argumenta Augustini: impressione speciei sensibilis facta in organum, vel speciei intelligibilis facta in intellectum, anima per potentiam talem occurrit, id est ut cum illa specie impressa coagat ad actum perfectiorem aliquem quam posset illa species de se sola causare.

  9. Et cum ultra additur - de illo duplici occursu - 'primo occurritur passioni quasi tangenti, post passioni imbibitae', quaero quid significent ista verba metaphorica. Si significent quod per secundum occursum causatur aliquid perfectius quam per primum, et illud intimius perficit (sicut dicitur materia intimius perfici a forma perfectiore quae magis actuat eam), ergo in illo secundo occursu non transumitur passio illa ad intra magis quam prius; sed anima coagens illi passioni causat aliquid perfectius, quod est intimius in anima quam illa passio prius causata.

Section IV: D. To the Arguments of the Fifth Opinion

Articulus IV: IV. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio III: Question 3 - Whether the More Principal Cause of Generated Knowledge is the Object Present in Itself or in the Species, or the Very Intellective Part of the Intellect

Articulus I: I. Solution of the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

Quaestio IV: Question 4 - Whether there is Distinctly in the Mind an Image of the Trinity

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Section II: B. Two Doubts

Subsection I: 1. To the First Doubt

Subsection II: 2. To the Second Doubt

Subsection III: 3. Corollary

Articulus II: II. To the Initial Arguments

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