Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 3 ; q. 63, a. 2 ; q. 65, a. 3 ; q. 114, a. 4 et 8 ; II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 11 ; q. 2, a. 12-13.

638. Thesis I. Infused virtues are infused by God together with sanctifying grace. — This is clear from the documents of the Church cited above (n. 624,3), and is easily understood because they are forces derived from sanctifying grace. For he who is raised to the divine being and nature and life through grace, ought also to acquire virtues for divine operations, for every nature tends to operation and life implies activity. Whence from grace flow supernatural virtues in the potencies of the soul for divine operations.

Therefore those are not to be heard who say that faith and hope are infused in him who by actual grace exercises an act of faith or hope, even though he does not receive grace and charity. For

1. he who does not sufficiently dispose himself for receiving the supernatural being by which he participates the divine nature, is not sufficiently disposed for the supernatural virtue by which he participates the divine operation ;

2. moreover, since the works of God are perfect, He never infuses faith and hope without charity¹].

639. Thesis II. Our acts do not produce infused virtues. — It is proved :

A. Our natural acts 1) do not cause a supernatural habit or virtue, because an effect cannot surpass its cause ; 2) nor do they dispose for it because they themselves are not proportioned to it.

B. Acts done from supernatural grace :

1. They do not produce a supernatural virtue, because a) an operative potency for many acts, as is a supernatural virtue, in its entity (as principle) is more perfect than one of its acts, whence it cannot be caused by it ; — nor b) by many acts, for they do not do this unless each causes something ; but the first cannot produce a disposition toward many acts. — Besides c) those acts, although they can be elicited with the aid of actual grace, require to be elicited by a faculty and habit ; but nothing produces that which is its connatural cause.

2. Nor do they produce an increase, because an operative potency cannot produce a greater potency.

3. However those acts can a) dispose for the infusion of the virtues, which is proximately done by an act of charity ; and b) can merit their increase, inasmuch as they are done from charity. God alone however effects their production and increase, who nevertheless can use others for this as instruments, as Christ and the sacraments ; whence these virtues are said to be infused of themselves (per se) (q. 63, a. 1 ; a. 2, ad 3 ; a. 3, ad 3 ; q. 51, a. 2, ad 3).

640. What about the increase of infused habits ? — Habits infused of themselves and virtues are not increased extensively, because they give potency for all the corresponding supernatural acts that can be done, or potency for acting supernaturally in all circumstances. They are however increased intensively, not by addition but by a deeper rooting and participation in the subject, and indeed by the same causes as they are produced. God alone therefore is the efficient cause of this increase ; but the sacraments produce it instrumentally (ex opere operato), and our supernatural acts done from charity, even the smallest (Mk. IX, 40), can be a disposition toward and merit of the increase (ex opere operantis), as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 24 and 32. Whence they are increased together with grace and charity ; and therefore the Church prays : Give us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope and charity (cf. Prov. IV, 18).

About the time however when the increase of charity and of the infused virtues is given because of our good works, there are principally two opinions among theologians. Some, considering the act done from charity only as the sole moral and meritorious cause of the increase, say that it is conferred as soon as the act is posited, whether this act is intense or not ; whence they also say that the sinner, because all his works revive, always rises again in charity greater than that which he had before. This of course is to be admitted although it seems incredible ; but on the other hand they deny that all the good works of the just are done from the influence of charity and are meritorious. Thus, after the Nominalists, Vasquez, Suarez, De Lugo, Mazzella and the greater part of the moderns. — Others, holding our acts not only as moral and meritorious causes, but also as dispositive, say that every act done from charity merits increase, but not in a determined degree, except under the condition that the due disposition for that increase is present²] ; but this is only an act more intense than the charity had, or equally intense, because by such an act alone does man strive toward increasing charity : for God establishes to cause the increase of charity when our power would cause it, if it could. Acts however less intense do not dispose sufficiently and immediately for the increase, but only mediately, « inasmuch as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt again to act according to charity, and with growing aptitude, he breaks forth into an act of more fervent love by which he is spurred on to the progress of charity, and then charity is increased³] », not only (for one title) because of that act, but (for several titles) also because of all the preceding acts. Whence all works revive in an equal degree of charity, provided the disposition for it is present ; if however the disposition is less, they revive in a lesser degree ; if greater, in a greater ⁴].

The chief argument of the first opinion is that the merit of good works cannot be understood, unless to each work a special reward be given, i.e. a special degree of grace, charity and glory ; for otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one⁵] ; nor would the merits of all good works revive totally. — The chief argument of the second opinion is : A virtue is increased by the same causes by which it is generated ; therefore just as for the infusion of charity and of the infused virtues a disposition proportioned to the quantity of charity to be infused is required (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7), so for the increase a disposition proportioned to the increase is required. And indeed : a) qualities which admit more and less, exist in a greater or lesser degree according to the diverse disposition of the subject. But just as acts less intense of acquired virtue do not dispose immediately for its increase, but for this an act equally intense disposes and a more intense act produces it ; so an act less intense of infused virtue or of charity does not dispose immediately for its increase, but only an act more intense or equally intense does this ;

b) otherwise we could dispose more toward the increase of infused virtue than of acquired virtue ; — and

c) we would be converted and tend toward God our end, and would have friendship, more than we would wish or try to do.

Therefore for charity and infused virtue to be increased, an act more intense or equally intense is required. — It is added that it is very probable that all the works of the just are meritorious, and yet it is incredible that charity is increased almost without interruption at each [act], nor could anyone assert this with any probability.

641. Observation. — It can be added with probability (after Gonet, Billuart and Masi), although it is not necessary, that the increase of charity and of infused virtue which in this life was merited by works less intense, but was not obtained because of the absence of a proportioned disposition, is conferred on us at the first moment after death when the whole soul unknowingly tends with her charity toward an act of love of God. This act is not meritorious, because the separated soul is not in the state of wayfarer, but would be a disposition for obtaining the increase which is owed by the prior merit of this life.

642. Infused virtues can be lost and of themselves are lost by sins directly contrary to them. Hence divine faith is lost by infidelity alone, hope by despair and presumption against hope, moral virtues by a grave sin contrary to them⁶, e.g. justice by grave injustice, charity by every mortal sin.

Accidentally a virtue is lost, when another virtue is lost which is presupposed by it and on which it depends as on a foundation. Thus hope is lost by infidelity, and infused moral virtues when charity with which they are connected is lost.

Faith and hope are not lost when charity is lost, because they are presupposed to it ; God namely out of goodness preserves them in those who reject the supernatural life of grace, as relics by which they may more easily be converted.

643. Infused virtues cannot be diminished. — Charity and the other infused virtues cannot be diminished directly and in themselves, for mortal sin which is contrary to them takes them away totally ; venial sin, because it is not contrary to charity and the infused virtues but is besides them, cannot diminish them. Hence venial sins, or non-use of the infused virtues, do not even accidentally effect their diminution, but only dispose toward their corruption, and this disposition toward corruption can be called an indirect and improper diminution.

644. Corollary. — The gifts of the Holy Spirit, connected with charity, are infused together with it, are increased intensively, and are lost in the same way as the infused moral virtues.