Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach

Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)

Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi

First published 1935

Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.


Prologus

Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio

Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine

Introductio

Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI

Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA

Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI

Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS

Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM

Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se

Introductio

Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum

§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum

Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani

Quaestio I: De voluntario

Articulus I: De voluntario in se

Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto

Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa

Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario

Articulus I: De violentia

Articulus II: De metu

Articulus III: De concupiscentia

Articulus IV: De ignorantia

Quaestio III: De libero

Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi

Articulus I: De passionibus

Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine

Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus

Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani

Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto

Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis

§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum

Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis

Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis

Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale

§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere

Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis

Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis

Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali

Articulus II: De norma moralitatis

Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis

Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis

Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis

Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis

Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum

Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos

Articulus I: De obiecto

Articulus II: De circumstantiis

Articulus III: De fine

§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie

Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris

Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris

Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi

Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum

Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum

Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium

Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali

Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis

Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali

Introductio

Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico

Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium

Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae

Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine

Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium

Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere

Introductio

§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum

Pars I: De lege in genere

Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se

Articulus I: De essentia legis

Articulus II: De promulgatione legis

Quaestio II: De distinctione legum

Quaestio III: De effectibus legis

Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis

Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis

Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis

Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae

Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae

Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae

§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales

Pars III: De lege naturali

Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis

Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis

Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis

Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis

Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis

Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se

Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis

Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae

Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae

Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae

Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae

Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae

Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae

Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis

Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae

Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae

Caput I: De Lege Vetere

Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se

Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris

Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis

Caput II: De Lege Nova

Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae

Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae

Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se

Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae

Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae

Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae

Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae

Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae

Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis

Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae

Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis

Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis

Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae

Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae

Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae

Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae

Articulus I: De Ignorantia

Articulus II: De Impotentia

Articulus III: De Dispensatione

Articulus IV: De privilegio

Articulus V: De cessatione finis

Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione

Articulus VII: De consuetudine

Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere

Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere

Quaestio I: De essentia peccati

Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati

Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario

Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario

Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati

Articulus V: De definitione peccati

Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum

Articulus I: De distinctione specifica

Articulus II: De distinctione numerica

Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum

Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati

Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis

Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa

Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio

Pars I: De causis peccatorum

Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus

Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis

Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi

Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis

Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus

Articulus I: De deo permittente

Articulus II: De diabolo tentante

Articulus III: De homine cooperante

Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati

Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat

Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria

Articulus III: De avaritia

Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula

Articulus V: De invidia et ira

Articulus VI: De acedia

Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum

Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae

Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati

Quaestio III: De reatu poenae

Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali

Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale

Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis

Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis

Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis

Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis

Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se

Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere

Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere

Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum

Quaestio I: De essentia habitus

Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus

Quaestio III: De causa habituum

Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum

Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis

Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis

Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis

Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum

Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus

Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus

Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus

Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum

Articulus I: De medio virtutis

Articulus II: De connexione virtutum

Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum

Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum

Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis

614. Necessity of supernatural habits. — The end to which we are in fact destined consists in participation of the life proper to God, i.e. in seeing and loving God in the way that He sees and loves Himself. Such an end is absolutely supernatural, and therefore no creature can reach it through the principles of its nature. Hence, in order that man be ordered toward it and tend toward it by his acts, it is necessary that certain principles or habits be added to human nature, by which he be raised above himself, carried over to the divine order, and become capable of eliciting divine operations proportioned to the supernatural end. This is done by the gift of divine habitual grace which is formally a good form.

« Acts leading to the end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle ; and therefore we see in natural things, that no thing can by its operation produce an effect that exceeds its active virtue ; but it can only produce by its operation an effect proportioned to its virtue. But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature,... and therefore man by his natural principles cannot produce works meritorious of eternal life ; but for this a higher virtue is required, which is the virtue of grace » I-II, q. 109, a. 5.

615. Which supernatural habits are given. — Grace, as Dogmatics teaches, is as it were an entitative habit which perfects the very essence of the soul, which it raises to the divine order, and renders deiform, i.e. like to the divine nature itself and a participant of its life (II Peter I, 4 ; I John III, 2) ; whence it is as it were a new supernatural and divine nature, or a new divine form inserted and communicated to us. Hence it is not a mere adornment of the soul, something merely static, but it is also a dynamic principle which founds and constitutes a new supernatural life, by which we live for God, live with Christ in God, and Christ in us (Rom. VI, 4-11 ; VIII, 2 ; John X, 10 ; II Cor. V, 15-17 ; Col. III, 3 ; Gal. II, 20), by which we are inserted into Christ as branches into the vine (John XV, 1-5), by which the seed of God and the beginning of divine life remains in us (I John III, 9), by which we are regenerated and reborn from God to new life (John I, 13 ; III, 5 ; James I, 18 ; Tit. III, 5 ; I Peter I, 23 ; I John III, 9), children of God (I John III, 1-3 ; V, 18 ; John I, 12 ; Eph. I, 5 ; Rom. VIII, 15 ; Gal. IV, 5-7).

But for life three things are required : a fundamental vital principle, vital operative faculties, and vital acts. Whence in the infusion of habitual grace there are simultaneously given :

a) grace itself which is a new vital principle raising us to a new degree of intellectual life, which far exceeds the rational life and is a participation of the very intellectual life of God ; a new principle of a new operation, namely of the intuitive vision of God and of the operation preparatory to it ;

b) infused virtues which flow from grace : they are as it were new faculties by which the potencies naturally inherent are perfected and raised so that they can elicit supernatural acts, deiform acts. For « as from the essence of the soul its potencies flow forth, which are principles of works, so also from grace itself the virtues flow forth in the potencies of the soul, by which the potencies are moved to acts » (q. 110, a. 4, ad 1) ;

c) supernatural and meritorious vital acts which proceed from the virtues and by which we tend toward the supernatural end and merit to obtain it. Since however for that end which so greatly exceeds our nature, in our acts we are not sufficiently directed by our own reason even enlightened by faith, but we need the Holy Spirit Himself as our guide, who by the instinct and inspiration of actual grace moves us, that, eliciting supernatural acts even in a superhuman manner, we may be preserved and may progress in the supernatural life ; hence we also need principles or habits, by which we are ordered to follow the leading of the Holy Spirit in the use of the infused virtues, which are called gifts of the Holy Spirit.

616. Root of the whole supernatural life. — Therefore the very essence of grace, and the fundamental reason from which all its attributes are conceived to be derived, is a physical participation of the divine nature inasmuch as it is intellectual, and therefore a resplendence of the divine light in us (Eph. V, 8), and a participation of the life proper to God, which renders us deiform (q. 110, a. 3). From this follow :

A. First and immediately absolute perfections : for because grace renders the soul deiform, therefore it renders it

  1. amiable and worthy of God's love and friendship (John XV, 14-15), and pleasing and acceptable to Him ; hence

  2. also worthy of eternal life and divine beatitude (Col. I, 12-13 ; Rom. VI, 23 ; II Cor. I, 22 ; Eph. I, 13-14) ; hence

  3. remotely capable of supernatural operations and meritorious of eternal life : for a supernatural nature is ordered to operation, and he who is worthy of eternal life ought to do works worthy of eternal life ; whence

  4. grace is the root of the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, which flow from it and by which we are proximately capable of supernatural works ; but principally it is the root of charity by which we are proximately capable of meriting.

By all of which is constituted a state of holiness and justice (Eph. IV, 24) and of supernatural beauty (Eph. V, 8).

B. Then from these result relations which are founded on the absolute perfections : because grace renders one a participant of the divine nature, pleasing to God and worthy of eternal life, therefore it renders man

  1. an adoptive son of God, especially of the Father, and therefore heir of eternal life (I John III, 1 ; Rom. VIII, 15-17) ; hence

  2. brother of the Son and co-heir (Hebr. II, 11 ; Rom. VIII, 17), and image of the Word (Rom. VIII, 29), indeed in the hypothesis of the Incarnation, a member inserted into Christ the head, and renders the soul a spouse united to Him (Eph. V, 28) ; 3) through the charity which flows from it, renders him God's friend and companion, and the temple of the Holy Trinity indwelling (John XIV, 23), especially of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. III, 17), that by Him we may be directed in the ways of eternal salvation and enjoy His love and presence.

C. Finally from all these are derived further effects, both permanent and transient : because grace renders us participants of the divine nature, it also renders us participants of the divine operations, whence from it are derived

  1. supernatural operative habits, namely infused virtues, theological and moral, and gifts of the Holy Spirit (II Peter I, 5-7) ;

  2. supernatural and meritorious acts, namely divine operations.

617. Matter to be treated. — About the way in which God raises us to supernatural being through habitual grace, enough has been said in the treatise on grace. Whence it remains to speak of the supernatural operative principles or habits, which are the most proximate principles of human acts and so pertain in a special way to moral theology.

Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum

S. Th. I-II, q. 51, a. 3 et 4 ; q. 110, a. 2 ; q. 62, a. 1 et 2 ; q. 63, a. 2, 3, 4 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 9 et 10 ; q. 5, a. 4.

618. Thesis. Supernatural operative habits are infused in us by God.

It is proved :

1°) No one perfectly tends and operates toward an end except through a permanent principle of operation, by which he is intrinsically inclined toward it ; whence for natural things God not only moves them to their acts but has given them permanent principles of operating toward their end, by which their movements become connatural and easy. Therefore also for our supernatural end (about which God certainly provides no less) He has given us supernatural habitual and permanent principles, that we might perfectly operate and tend toward it ; otherwise we would be moved not connaturally but as it were violently.

« It is not fitting that God provide less for those whom He loves for obtaining a supernatural good, than for creatures whom He loves for obtaining a natural good. But for natural creatures He so provides, that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also grants them forms and certain virtues, which are principles of acts, that according to themselves they incline themselves to such motion ; and thus the motions by which they are moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures. Much more therefore, for those whom He moves toward obtaining an eternal supernatural good, He infuses certain forms, or supernatural qualities, according to which they are moved sweetly and promptly by Him toward obtaining the eternal good » (q. 110, a. 2).

2°) Which is certain, because it is clearly deduced and is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, although it is not expressly defined : for it says that grace and charity inhere in us (can. 11), and that man is justified through the susception of grace and gifts (c. 7), and receives infused : faith, hope and charity (c. 7) ; all of which indicate habitual principles, especially because it grants the same justification to infants (sess. 5, can. 4 ; sess. 6, c. 2) who are not capable of acts and movements to act.

3°) Whence the Scriptures say that the seed of divine life remains in us (I John III, 9), and they describe justification as regeneration ; which indicate the granting of a permanent principle.

619. What is the essence of infused habits. — Supernatural entities properly are not in the categories of natural entities, in the same way as God Himself whose participation they are ; yet they are reduced to the categories according to a certain analogy more or less, and thus sanctifying grace, since it is a spiritual and permanent accident, is reduced to quality, as an entitative habit. Similarly supernatural operative principles are reduced to quality and indeed as operative habits, although they do not have all in common with them. For they are neither pure habits nor pure potencies, but have something of potency and something of habit. For :

1°) In some respect they fall short of the notion of habit, because they do not give an all-around facility for operating : they indeed confer an intrinsic inclination, aptitude and promptitude for good, even greater than acquired habits, but not an extrinsic one, because they do not remove from us all the obstacles of good, as is clear from the converted sinner who does not experience a notably greater facility for good than before ; whence they are not habits properly so called.

2°) But they make it that man can operate supernaturally, which habit does not do, in which therefore they agree not with habit but rather with operative potency.

3°) But in all other respects they agree with habits, for a) like habits, they reside in natural operative potencies which they raise and with which they operate : for they do not give simply the ability to act, but the ability to act better and supernaturally ; b) man, if they are active, uses them when he wishes and to whatever degree he wishes, intensely or remissly, and can use them only for good ; c) they can be increased and corrupted. All of which do not belong to potency properly so called. Therefore they have more of the notion of habit than of the notion of potency, and so supernatural habits are usually so called.

620. Supernatural habits and virtues differ from natural ones in many ways :

a) On the part of essence : natural ones are habits properly so called, whence they do not give potency but facility of acting ; supernatural ones give potency of acting supernaturally, but not such an all-around facility.

b) On the part of efficient cause : natural ones are acquired from the principles of nature and from our acts, supernatural ones must be infused by God (q. 51, a. 4 ; q. 63, a. 1).

c) On the part of nature and of the end to which they are ordered : by the natural ones man is well disposed in relation to human things and to natural acts befitting human nature ; by the supernatural ones man is well disposed in relation to this, that he be an adoptive son of God, destined for eternal life, and that he exercise supernatural acts befitting the divine nature (q. 54, a. 3 ; q. 63, a. 4).

d) On the part of the formal object : in the natural ones the good is according to the rule and light of human reason, or conformity to the natural end ; in the supernatural ones the good is according to the rule and light of the supernatural law divinely revealed (which exceeds human reason), or conformity to the supernatural end. Therefore they are nobler than acquired virtues (q. 63, a. 4).

621. Observation. — By exercising supernatural virtues man will overcome and remove extrinsic obstacles to the habit, and thus will acquire an all-around and perfect facility for good. For acts produced from a supernatural habit can be considered in two ways :

1°) as supernatural, or as tending toward something precisely as supernatural, exceeding human nature, and thus they cannot produce habits of the same species, or supernatural ones, which are infused by God alone (n. 639) ; but

2°) supernatural acts, while they tend toward the supernatural end or good and object, at the same time tend in some respect toward the natural end and good befitting natural reason, both because the natural faculties are simultaneously exercised, and because the supernatural act and good eminently contain and include the natural act and natural good : thus however they can produce natural habits of the same species as that object insofar as it is natural and conformed to reason, and through this overcome and remove the obstacles opposed to this act and object, in the same way as was said about acquired virtue (n. 567). And thus an all-around facility is acquired, which however is not of supernatural virtue, as not proportioned to the supernatural end, but a natural habit : e.g. while one believes in God, exercises chastity or justice with a view to eternal life, he also does something conformed to reason. Cf. De Verit. q. 10, a. 10, ad 1 ; Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2.

Others say that habits are not produced, but only the impediments are removed ; whence all difficulty in acting ceases.

Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum

622. A threefold species of infused habits. — For operating supernaturally, we need three principles :

1°) principles by which we are ordered toward the supernatural last end itself : these are the theological virtues ;

2°) principles by which we are ordered concerning the means to the supernatural last end to be chosen reasonably under the guidance of reason : these are the moral virtues ;

3°) principles by which we are ordered to follow the very leading of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life : these are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

About each of these something must be said.

Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis

S. Th. I-II, q. 62 ; De Virt., q. 1, art. 10 et 12.

623. The theological virtues are operative principles by which we are immediately ordered to God as the supernatural end, so that through their acts the soul immediately attains God the supernatural end and is united to Him. They are rightly called theological :

1°) because God Himself, the supernatural end, inasmuch as He exceeds the cognition of our reason, they have both as material object, which is attained by them, and as formal object or motive,

2°) and therefore they are infused in us by God alone,

3°) and can be known by revelation alone (a. 1).

624. Thesis. Theological virtues are necessary, and indeed three. — It is proved :

1°) By the reason of S. Thomas : In the natural order man would be habitually inclined toward the natural end, radically through the soul, immediately through the intellect knowing the end and judging that one must tend toward it, and through the will which of its nature tends toward the end or its proper good. But, since man, by the gratuitous goodness of God, is destined to a supernatural end, the beatific vision, it is necessary that supernatural principles be added to nature by which he may be habitually inclined toward the supernatural end. There is one substantive principle : sanctifying grace, in the very essence of the soul, and three operative ones : faith by which the intellect attains God, the supernatural end, as true, and is able to know Him and the other supernatural principles ; hope by which the will tends toward God the supernatural end as its good but arduous ; and charity which is ordered toward Him as the good in itself and thus through love is supernaturally conformed to Him. Therefore there are three theological virtues (a. 3 ; II-II q. 17, a. 6).

  1. By Scripture and Tradition, in which these three virtues are constantly enumerated, as requiring to be connected to one another by a peculiar fittingness and to be distinguished from all the others ; whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 16 : « Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greatest of these is charity » (cf. I Thess. V, 8 ; Col. I, 4, 5).

  2. By the Decrees of the Church. For this is supposed by Innocent III (cap. Maiores), saying that among the learned it is disputed whether faith, charity and the other virtues are also infused to little ones ; and by Clement V in the Council of Vienne, who establishes this opinion as the more probable to be preferred ; he teaches it however as certain for faith, hope and charity, the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, although he does not define it.

625. Among the theological virtues there is an order :

A) An order of generation, not indeed 1) according to time, for all are infused together, but 2) according to reason faith precedes, hope follows, and finally charity comes a) according to acts : for no one hopes or loves what he does not know ; but what he hopes and loves, he knows through faith ; — and similarly man, hoping for the good from God, also considers Him as his own good and goes forth to love Him ; — b) also according to habits, but in relation to acts : for faith is presupposed to hope and hope to charity, as intellect is presupposed to will, and imperfect love precedes perfect love.

B) But in the order of perfection charity precedes, which is the perfection of all the virtues (a. 4).

Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus

S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 3 et 4 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 10.

626. Thesis. Besides the theological virtues, supernatural moral virtues are to be admitted, as Saints Augustine, Gregory and Thomas teach, against Scotus and the Nominalists, and as the quasi common opinion of theologians now admits. For :

In the natural order man would not only be well disposed habitually toward the last end, but also concerning the means to the end through acquired moral virtues. Therefore, also in the supernatural order, about which God certainly provides no less, it will not suffice that man be habitually well disposed toward the supernatural last end, but it is also necessary that he be habitually well disposed concerning the supernatural means to be ordered toward the last end, which is done through infused moral virtues (q. 65, a. 3). — Otherwise a) there would be lacking the proportion between the soul raised to the divine being and its moral life, between the supernatural end and the moral virtues, between the theological virtues about the end and the moral virtues about the means : for there would not be of the same order, but the divine effects of theology would have to be operated through instruments not proportioned and defective. Whence b) supernatural moral acts would not be elicited by us connaturally, but the faculties would be moved to them as it were violently (q. 63, a. 3).

This is supposed by Innocent III and the Council of Vienne (n. 624,3) and by Leo XIII, ep. to Card. Gibbons (n. 581) ; and Scripture hints at it (Wis. VIII, 7) : « She teaches sobriety and prudence (eternal Wisdom), justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in the life of men » (Cf. II Peter I, 5-7).

627. Infused moral virtues are operative principles by which we are ordered toward the right choice of human acts as means to the supernatural last end, and therefore they are not immediately about God the supernatural end, but about our acts and the whole life to be ordered, for which reason they are called moral.

Whence 1) they also pertain to the divine life participated in us, inasmuch as they mediate pursue the supernatural end itself : for under the influence of the theological virtues they in some way order all works toward God the end and His glory, as God orders all things to Himself.

  1. They are therefore as many as the many and diverse human acts ; in general theologians say that as many supernatural moral virtues are infused as natural virtues can be acquired]. They can however all be reduced to the four cardinal ones, in the same way as was said about acquired virtues.

**628. Supernatural moral virtues are distinguished from natural ones, as was said above, q. I, n° 620, and indeed not only

a) according to essence, as habits less properly so called from those properly so called ; and

b) according to the efficient cause, which is God alone, not our acts ; and

c) according to the end and nature, namely that man be well disposed for the heavenly city and eternal life, and not only for human things ; but also

d) according to the formal object : in natural virtues the good is according to the rule of human reason ; in supernatural ones the good is according to the rule of the divine law, or of human reason raised through faith. Thus e.g. natural prudence dictates what is good according to reason, supernatural prudence what is good according to the supernatural law of faith ; justice chooses the mean by a higher title, preserves peace and society, that peace and society be as it were deiform and heavenly ; by natural abstinence man uses food moderately for the sake of human reason, e.g. lest it harm his health, by supernatural for the sake of the reason of faith, e.g. that he may chastise his body and reduce it to servitude and himself more freely attend to divine things ; supernatural patience is to be exercised not from the reason of human wisdom, but that he may be conformed to Christ, etc. Whence infused prudence does not always dictate the same mean as acquired prudence, and therefore infused moral virtues do not have the same act as acquired virtues (q. 63, art. 4). Whence they differ in species.

629. Corollary. — From which can be understood how the virtues are distinguished as political, purgative, and of the purified soul, as S. Thomas teaches, q. 61, a. 5 :

« A. Because man according to his nature is a political animal,

  1. virtues,... insofar as they exist in man according to the condition of his nature, are called political, inasmuch as man according to these virtues behaves rightly in the conduct of human affairs...

B. But because it pertains to man that he also draw himself toward divine things as much as he can... and this is commended to us in Scripture in many ways, as is that Mt. V, 48 : Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, it is necessary to posit certain virtues intermediate between the political ones, which are human virtues, and the exemplary ones, which are divine virtues (in God Himself) ; ... so namely that 2) certain virtues are of those tending toward divine likeness, and these are called purgative virtues : so namely that prudence despises all worldly things by the contemplation of divine things and directs every thought of the soul to divine things alone ; temperance indeed leaves, inasmuch as nature allows, what the use of the body requires ; fortitude is that the soul not be terrified by the departure from the body and the approach to heavenly things ; justice is that the whole soul consent to such a proposed life.

  1. Certain virtues however are of those already attaining divine likeness, which are called virtues of the already purified soul, so namely that prudence contemplates divine things alone, temperance knows nothing of earthly desires, fortitude is ignorant of passions, justice is allied with the divine mind in perpetual covenant, namely by imitating it ; which virtues indeed we say are those of the blessed and of the most perfect in this life ».

Whence virtues are distinguished as political, purgative, and of the already purified soul.

Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti

S. Th. I-II, q. 68, a. 1-4 ; q. 69 et 70 ; II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

630. Thesis I. The gifts of the Holy Spirit differ from the infused moral virtues : we need these to be disposed to obey promptly right reason ; therefore all the more do we need those to be disposed to obey promptly the motion or inspiration of the Holy Spirit in us through charity (as of the proper mover) indwelling. « For the higher the mover, the more necessary it is that the mobile be proportioned to it by a more perfect disposition, as we see that a disciple must be more perfectly disposed in order that he may grasp higher teaching from a doctor ». And therefore, just as for obeying reason the appetite needs habits, so all the more it seems to be said that the gifts by which we obey the Holy Spirit are habits, not transient dispositions, so that we may be moved connaturally, promptly, easily and sweetly, not however as it were violently, but as instruments fitted and proportioned to Him.

Therefore the gifts of the Holy Spirit are supernatural habits by which we are disposed to obey promptly the motion or inspiration of the Holy Spirit Himself in us through charity as of the proper mover indwelling. They are called gifts not only because they are given by God, but because they dispose for following the instinct of the giving (i.e. infusing) Holy Spirit, and render man promptly movable by divine inspiration, which is a special gift of actual grace ; they can also simply be called spirits.

631. Thesis II. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. — For the motion of the Holy Spirit, or the special aid of actual grace, is needed not only by those who exercise extraordinary and more excellent works (for which one's strength is not sufficient), but by each one that he may persevere and progress in the grace received, as is proved in the treatise on grace. The fundamental reason for this is assigned by S. Thomas, that through grace and the theological virtues we possess the nature, life and forces of God only in an imperfect way ; but he who possesses some nature or form or virtue imperfectly cannot always and in all things operate of himself, unless, at least sometimes, he be moved by Him who perfectly possesses that nature : as infants in life, who must be led lest they fall, but also that they may progress. Therefore the imperfect in divine life are to be moved and led by God Himself, that we may always live so as to arrive at eternal life.

Whence the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation to every just person, and although especially for extraordinary and more excellent works, not however uniquely but also for common works they dispose, whenever and inasmuch as they are done by the just under the motion of the Spirit of God. Hence those gifts are granted to all the just (Rom. VIII, 14) and are connected with charity by which we are united to the Holy Spirit the mover.

632. What those gifts are. — Those gifts are enumerated in Isaiah XI, 2, where they are attributed to Christ the exemplar of the just and the firstborn among many brothers (Rom. VIII, 9-29 ; Gal. IV, 6) : « The spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of piety, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall rest upon him ». But, according to the doctrine of the Fathers from the beginning of the Church, they are also granted to all the just.

Nothing certain can be established about the number of gifts, for in the Greek and Latin text seven are enumerated, in the Hebrew text piety is lacking ; besides the prophet does not seem to intend a complete enumeration but rather indicates the more excellent gifts to teach that the fullness of the gifts of the Holy Spirit belongs to Christ. Nevertheless the Fathers, theologians and mystical authors are wont to order all the sanctifying effects of the Holy Spirit according to the seven gifts which are enumerated in our text, to which the Liturgy alludes in its hymns.

Four are in the intellect, by which we are disposed that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and as it were experimentally 1) we may penetrate the truths of faith through the gift of understanding, and judge both 2) about created things through the gift of knowledge, insofar as they lead to God or lead away, and 3) about divine things, and about human things according to divine reasons, through the gift of wisdom, by which we sweetly relish them (Wis. VII, 8, 11), and 4) about individual things to be done or avoided in the spiritual life, and in more difficult and unforeseen cases, through the gift of counsel, by which we are directed to operate without hesitation. This is the practical gift ; the three preceding are principally speculative, secondarily practical.

Three are in the appetite : for impelled by the Holy Spirit 5) we lovingly revere God, not as creator but as Father, and all men as His children (Rom. VIII, 15) through piety ; 6) we confidently scorn whatever dangers and adversities in the way of salvation through the gift of fortitude ; and 7) with filial reverence fear to offend God especially in the pleasures toward which we are most inclined, and this is the fear of the Lord].

633. The gifts correspond to the virtues. — And indeed 1) immediately] to the seven principal infused virtues : to faith correspond understanding and knowledge ; to hope the fear of God insofar as it makes us avoid offending God ; to charity wisdom ; to prudence counsel ; to justice piety ; to fortitude the gift of fortitude ; and to temperance the fear of God insofar as it makes us flee the pleasures that most allure us to sin. By these gifts respectively we are disposed for acts both common and ordinary, and the more excellent ones of these virtues to be exercised under the impulse of the Holy Spirit. Thus S. Thomas ; according to others however, while counsel [corresponds] to hope, knowledge corresponds to prudence ; according to still others to hope, to which then fear does not correspond ; according to others, as Innocent V, to temperance.

  1. They also correspond mediately] to the seven principal acquired virtues : to understanding, the principle ; to knowledge and wisdom correspond the three gifts of the same name ; to prudence counsel ; to justice piety ; to fortitude fortitude ; to temperance the fear of God.

634. The Beatitudes are not habits but certain perfect and excellent works of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which especially conduce to beatitude, and especially merit both perfect beatitude in heaven, and also the inchoation (sure hope) of beatitude in the present life. Whence by reason of their singular perfection they are a pledge, merit, and inchoation of perfect beatitude.

About the fittingness of their enumeration and signification, cf. S. Thomas, q. 69, a. 3 and 4. — According to him also one beatitude corresponds to each gift, considering in the beatitudes their motives, namely in this way : To the gift of fear, the first beatitude : Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven ; — to the gift of piety, the second : Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land ; — to the gift of knowledge, the third : Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted ; — to the gift of fortitude, the fourth : Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall be filled ; — to the gift of counsel, the fifth : Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy ; — to the gift of understanding, the sixth : Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ; — to the gift of wisdom, the seventh : Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God (III Sent. d. 34, q. 1 a. 4). The eighth beatitude however : Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, is a certain confirmation and manifestation of all the preceding, inasmuch as through them it comes about that for the sake of these goods no one withdraws because of any persecution (I-II, q. 69, a. 3, ad 5).

635. The fruits of the Holy Spirit are whatever works of virtue when they have a special delight and sweetness attached, whence they are called fruits ; they are perfected under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, whence they are called fruits of the Holy Spirit. When carnal and worldly delights allure us, the Holy Spirit Himself produces in us a much greater and as it were heavenly delight through the works of the virtues ; hence the fruits are opposed to the works of the flesh.

The principal ones are enumerated by the Apostle, Gal. V, 22, 23.

636. Corollaries. — From the fact that the gifts dispose man to be well moved by God, the virtues to be well moved by reason, which is the fundamental distinction, it follows

  1. that the virtues are given that man may actively act well, the gifts that he may be passively acted upon well ; and although he also acts freely under the action of the gift, yet he is more passive than active, « because the mind of man does not behave as mover but rather as moved » ;

  2. that the virtues perfect man for acting in a human way, accommodated to human nature ; the gifts for acting in a higher way, superhuman and divine, according as it befits the Holy Spirit : thus as to the object when someone exercises more excellent and heroic works, or as to the manner alone when he is moved spontaneously, as it were instinctively, and acts without discourse and is rather led than leads himself ;

  3. that we can use the virtues when we wish, the gifts when the Holy Spirit wishes.

637. Observation. — The gifts are not to be confused with the gratias gratis datas (gracious gifts), although these can be founded on a gift, e.g. of knowledge or wisdom, which they manifest : for they remain distinct ; and they are rather transient, not habits. Cf. q. 68, a. 5, ad 1 and 2.

Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum

S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 3 ; q. 63, a. 2 ; q. 65, a. 3 ; q. 114, a. 4 et 8 ; II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 11 ; q. 2, a. 12-13.

638. Thesis I. Infused virtues are infused by God together with sanctifying grace. — This is clear from the documents of the Church cited above (n. 624,3), and is easily understood because they are forces derived from sanctifying grace. For he who is raised to the divine being and nature and life through grace, ought also to acquire virtues for divine operations, for every nature tends to operation and life implies activity. Whence from grace flow supernatural virtues in the potencies of the soul for divine operations.

Therefore those are not to be heard who say that faith and hope are infused in him who by actual grace exercises an act of faith or hope, even though he does not receive grace and charity. For

  1. he who does not sufficiently dispose himself for receiving the supernatural being by which he participates the divine nature, is not sufficiently disposed for the supernatural virtue by which he participates the divine operation ;

  2. moreover, since the works of God are perfect, He never infuses faith and hope without charity].

639. Thesis II. Our acts do not produce infused virtues. — It is proved :

A. Our natural acts 1) do not cause a supernatural habit or virtue, because an effect cannot surpass its cause ; 2) nor do they dispose for it because they themselves are not proportioned to it.

B. Acts done from supernatural grace :

  1. They do not produce a supernatural virtue, because a) an operative potency for many acts, as is a supernatural virtue, in its entity (as principle) is more perfect than one of its acts, whence it cannot be caused by it ; — nor b) by many acts, for they do not do this unless each causes something ; but the first cannot produce a disposition toward many acts. — Besides c) those acts, although they can be elicited with the aid of actual grace, require to be elicited by a faculty and habit ; but nothing produces that which is its connatural cause.

  2. Nor do they produce an increase, because an operative potency cannot produce a greater potency.

  3. However those acts can a) dispose for the infusion of the virtues, which is proximately done by an act of charity ; and b) can merit their increase, inasmuch as they are done from charity. God alone however effects their production and increase, who nevertheless can use others for this as instruments, as Christ and the sacraments ; whence these virtues are said to be infused of themselves (per se) (q. 63, a. 1 ; a. 2, ad 3 ; a. 3, ad 3 ; q. 51, a. 2, ad 3).

640. What about the increase of infused habits ? — Habits infused of themselves and virtues are not increased extensively, because they give potency for all the corresponding supernatural acts that can be done, or potency for acting supernaturally in all circumstances. They are however increased intensively, not by addition but by a deeper rooting and participation in the subject, and indeed by the same causes as they are produced. God alone therefore is the efficient cause of this increase ; but the sacraments produce it instrumentally (ex opere operato), and our supernatural acts done from charity, even the smallest (Mk. IX, 40), can be a disposition toward and merit of the increase (ex opere operantis), as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 24 and 32. Whence they are increased together with grace and charity ; and therefore the Church prays : Give us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope and charity (cf. Prov. IV, 18).

About the time however when the increase of charity and of the infused virtues is given because of our good works, there are principally two opinions among theologians. Some, considering the act done from charity only as the sole moral and meritorious cause of the increase, say that it is conferred as soon as the act is posited, whether this act is intense or not ; whence they also say that the sinner, because all his works revive, always rises again in charity greater than that which he had before. This of course is to be admitted although it seems incredible ; but on the other hand they deny that all the good works of the just are done from the influence of charity and are meritorious. Thus, after the Nominalists, Vasquez, Suarez, De Lugo, Mazzella and the greater part of the moderns. — Others, holding our acts not only as moral and meritorious causes, but also as dispositive, say that every act done from charity merits increase, but not in a determined degree, except under the condition that the due disposition for that increase is present] ; but this is only an act more intense than the charity had, or equally intense, because by such an act alone does man strive toward increasing charity : for God establishes to cause the increase of charity when our power would cause it, if it could. Acts however less intense do not dispose sufficiently and immediately for the increase, but only mediately, « inasmuch as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt again to act according to charity, and with growing aptitude, he breaks forth into an act of more fervent love by which he is spurred on to the progress of charity, and then charity is increased] », not only (for one title) because of that act, but (for several titles) also because of all the preceding acts. Whence all works revive in an equal degree of charity, provided the disposition for it is present ; if however the disposition is less, they revive in a lesser degree ; if greater, in a greater ].

The chief argument of the first opinion is that the merit of good works cannot be understood, unless to each work a special reward be given, i.e. a special degree of grace, charity and glory ; for otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one] ; nor would the merits of all good works revive totally. — The chief argument of the second opinion is : A virtue is increased by the same causes by which it is generated ; therefore just as for the infusion of charity and of the infused virtues a disposition proportioned to the quantity of charity to be infused is required (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7), so for the increase a disposition proportioned to the increase is required. And indeed : a) qualities which admit more and less, exist in a greater or lesser degree according to the diverse disposition of the subject. But just as acts less intense of acquired virtue do not dispose immediately for its increase, but for this an act equally intense disposes and a more intense act produces it ; so an act less intense of infused virtue or of charity does not dispose immediately for its increase, but only an act more intense or equally intense does this ;

b) otherwise we could dispose more toward the increase of infused virtue than of acquired virtue ; — and

c) we would be converted and tend toward God our end, and would have friendship, more than we would wish or try to do.

Therefore for charity and infused virtue to be increased, an act more intense or equally intense is required. — It is added that it is very probable that all the works of the just are meritorious, and yet it is incredible that charity is increased almost without interruption at each [act], nor could anyone assert this with any probability.

641. Observation. — It can be added with probability (after Gonet, Billuart and Masi), although it is not necessary, that the increase of charity and of infused virtue which in this life was merited by works less intense, but was not obtained because of the absence of a proportioned disposition, is conferred on us at the first moment after death when the whole soul unknowingly tends with her charity toward an act of love of God. This act is not meritorious, because the separated soul is not in the state of wayfarer, but would be a disposition for obtaining the increase which is owed by the prior merit of this life.

642. Infused virtues can be lost and of themselves are lost by sins directly contrary to them. Hence divine faith is lost by infidelity alone, hope by despair and presumption against hope, moral virtues by a grave sin contrary to them, e.g. justice by grave injustice, charity by every mortal sin.

Accidentally a virtue is lost, when another virtue is lost which is presupposed by it and on which it depends as on a foundation. Thus hope is lost by infidelity, and infused moral virtues when charity with which they are connected is lost.

Faith and hope are not lost when charity is lost, because they are presupposed to it ; God namely out of goodness preserves them in those who reject the supernatural life of grace, as relics by which they may more easily be converted.

643. Infused virtues cannot be diminished. — Charity and the other infused virtues cannot be diminished directly and in themselves, for mortal sin which is contrary to them takes them away totally ; venial sin, because it is not contrary to charity and the infused virtues but is besides them, cannot diminish them. Hence venial sins, or non-use of the infused virtues, do not even accidentally effect their diminution, but only dispose toward their corruption, and this disposition toward corruption can be called an indirect and improper diminution.

644. Corollary. — The gifts of the Holy Spirit, connected with charity, are infused together with it, are increased intensively, and are lost in the same way as the infused moral virtues.

Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum

Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum

S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 13.

645. The theological virtues are not in a mean, properly and of themselves and according to the very notion of virtue, i.e. by reason of the object, because in their matter excess cannot be given : for the object and measure of the theological virtues is not a good of reason to be placed in acts (which is in a mean), but God Himself (an infinite perfection which exceeds every human faculty), toward whom we cannot tend too much, indeed whom we cannot love or in whom we cannot believe or hope as much as is due. There is namely no excess in attaining the measure.

However on our part and by reason of the subject and of the manner in which they are exercised, they are in a mean between two extreme vices, because we must tend toward God according to the measure of our nature and condition ; whence thus we must hope and believe so that our hope may be a mean between presumption and despair, and our faith between two opposite heresies, and therefore the presumptuous man sins who hopes for a good that exceeds his condition, and the despairing who does not hope for what he can hope for according to his condition ; likewise he sins who would give himself to contemplation when detriment would follow for society or when he ought to attend to family matters. But this is accidental as to the nature of the theological virtue, because it does not proceed from its proper acts considered in themselves, and from its proper matter, but from extrinsic circumstances of the subject in which it inheres. Whence improperly they are said to be in a mean.

646. The theological virtues therefore are summarily in the highest degree, i.e. they adhere to God above all things :

  1. Faith adheres to the divine authority above every other authority, hope adheres to the omnipotence above every other power ; charity to the divine goodness above every other goodness.

  2. Faith believes God more firmly than all others ; hope, immovable, hopes in God rather than in any others and loves above all things the lovable ; charity prefers God to all things and loves Him above all things lovable.

  3. Whence we are ready to lay down all things that are contrary to faith, hope or charity, rather than depart from them.

647. Infused moral virtues are in a mean, in the same way as was said of acquired virtues ; but the mean can be different because they are not determined by relation to human reason but to the divine law.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are not in a mean because they are directed by the instinct of the Holy Spirit which cannot fail or exceed ; moreover the Holy Spirit is not something regulable.

Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum

S. Th. I-II, q. 65 et 68, a. 5 ; De Virt., q. 2, a. 3 ; q. 5, a. 2.

648. Principle I. Theological virtues according to their essence are not connected, but as virtues. Among the theological virtues : 1) Faith and hope according to their proper essence do not depend on charity, for they are presupposed to charity ; whence they can exist without charity, as is clear in the sinner who has not denied faith and hope. This for faith is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15 and can. 28 ; for hope it is certain from the unanimous opinion of theologians.

  1. However without charity they are not perfect virtues or forms, because in fact they are not referred to the last end. For it pertains to the notion of a perfect virtue not only that we do good, but also that we do well ; faith however is a voluntary assent, which will not be perfect unless it be made in the due manner and the will also be well disposed through charity ; hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits, which will not be perfect unless present merits are had, for which charity is required. Hence charity, by which we are ordered to the supernatural last end, is called the perfection and form (extrinsic) of all supernatural virtues ; and faith and hope without charity are unformed (q. 65, a. 4).

  2. Faith can be without hope because it is presupposed to hope according to reason.

  3. But charity cannot be without faith and hope, and hope cannot be without faith. Hence S. Thomas, q. 65, a. 5 : « As one could not have friendship with someone if he disbelieved or despaired of being able to have some society or familiar conversation with him ; so one cannot have friendship with God, which is charity, unless he have faith, through which he believes in such society and conversation with God, and hopes that he belongs to this society ».

649. Principle II. Infused moral virtues are connected :

A. Among themselves through prudence : for they incline us to the right choice of supernatural means for a good end, or to acting supernaturally well in all circumstances, which without perfect supernatural prudence is impossible ; — and conversely perfect prudence cannot exist for rightly ordering means in all circumstances, unless one is disposed for the particular good end in all circumstances, for which all the moral virtues are required. In the same way as was said of acquired virtues (q. 65, a. 1).

B. They are also connected with charity :

  1. They cannot exist without charity. For they cannot exist without supernatural prudence ; but supernatural prudence cannot exist without charity, for if for perfect prudence it is required that man be well disposed in relation to the particular ends due in such and such a matter, which is done through the moral virtues, much more is it required that he be well disposed in relation to the last end, which is done through charity : for an act rightly ordering means toward a particular end good but toward the last end evil becomes evil. Therefore infused moral virtues are connected with charity (a. 2).

  2. Likewise charity cannot exist without infused moral virtues. For a) charity is connected with sanctifying grace, which raises to supernatural being and is the remote principle of supernatural operations. But infused moral virtues are properties of sanctifying grace, for he who has supernatural being as remote principle, ought to be able to operate supernaturally and to have proximate principles for supernatural operations. Therefore — b) Grace and charity, inasmuch as they order man toward the last end, are the principle of all good works which can be ordered to the last end. But no work of his tends toward the end unless he has the potency of disposing means toward the end, and the principle of certain works is not found in some thing, unless those things which are necessary for accomplishing such works are also found. But the moral virtues give the potency of choosing the means necessary for the last end and of accomplishing each kind of good supernatural work. Therefore they are connected with grace and charity. For God namely does not operate less perfectly in the works of grace than in the works of nature.

Hence he who receives grace and charity receives the supernatural moral virtues ; and by every mortal sin charity and all supernatural moral virtues are lost (a. 3).

  1. Likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with charity by which we are united to the Holy Spirit the mover, and therefore are granted together with charity, are increased intensively, and are lost (q. 68, a. 5).

650. Principle III. Natural acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, and conversely, for the sinner who is converted does not therefore have acquired virtues ; and he who sins mortally does not therefore lose them (q. 63, a. 2, ad 2).

651. Observation. — S. Thomas says : Charity is the form of all the virtues because it gives and impresses on the acts of the other virtues their form and ultimate perfection ; according as it orders them to the last end ; it is their root because it nourishes and sustains them ; end because it orders all the other virtues to its end ; and mother « because from the appetite of the last end it conceives the acts of the other virtues by commanding them » (II-II, q. 23, a. 8). Prudence therefore is the form of the moral virtues because it gives the ordering toward the particular end according to reason ; charity is the form of the theological virtues and of prudence because it gives the perfect ordering toward the last end ; grace is the form of charity because it gives the divine being and thus confers on it dignity and a right to the last end (De Virt., q. 2, a. 3, ad 19).

Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum

S. Th. I-II, q. 66, a. 1, 2, 6 ; q. 68, a. 7 et 8 ; II-II, q. 23, a. 6. De Virt., q. 5, a. 3.

652. Principle I. According to species, theological virtues are more perfect than others. — For as object they have God Himself the supernatural end and attain immediately the very primary rule of human acts, namely God ; and so they are more perfect according to species than the other virtues which attain only human reason. Among themselves however charity excels, for faith and hope include a distance from God and imperfection, since faith is about God not seen and hope about God not possessed, but charity is about God who is already in some way possessed through the love of friendship,

and will be fully possessed. Whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 13 : The greatest of these is charity (q. 66, a. 6).

Faith, entitatively as habit, is more perfect than hope because it is in the intellect, whose object is nobler ; but hope, as virtue, is more perfect because it approaches God more.

Moral infused virtues are less perfect than the theological virtues, because they are immediately about the means alone toward the end ; they have however a diverse degree of perfection in the way which was said of acquired virtues.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are less perfect than the theological virtues which are their principles and roots, and which immediately unite to God as the last end ; while the gifts only perfect man so that he be subject to God moving : but it is more perfect to be united to God than to be subject to a mover. But they are more perfect than the other virtues which perfect either reason itself or dispose us to follow the motion of reason, while by the gifts we are subjected to the nobler mover, the Holy Spirit. « But it is manifest that to a higher mover the mobile must be disposed with greater perfection » (q. 68, a. 8). — Among the gifts, the more excellent are the intellectual ones over those in the appetite, and indeed 1) wisdom is the more worthy, 2) understanding, 3) knowledge, 4) counsel, 5) piety, 6) fortitude, 7) fear, according to the order of the natural virtues.

653. Principle II. According to extension and intensity, infused habits are equal. — Infused virtues — likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit — cannot be increased extensively, but they dispose for all the corresponding supernatural acts ; and therefore in all men and in the same man even at different times they are equal according to extension. Likewise, because according to their formal nature they are connected, they are infused together, and they are also equal according to intensity in the same man at the same time : thus all infused habits are equally ordered to the supernatural end through charity, just as also the moral virtues through infused prudence adhere equally to the good of reason and conform to reason. Hence if charity is increased, all are increased proportionally at the same time ; just as, with prudence increased, all the moral virtues are increased proportionally.

Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum

S. Th. I-II, q. 67 ; q. 68, a. 6 ; De Virt., q. 5, a. 4.

654. Principle. In the blessed there remain those infused habits which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. — Whence :

  1. Faith and hope do not remain, which include imperfection because they are about the unseen and the not yet possessed ; whence when vision and possession come, they are emptied away.

  2. Charity remains, because love by its nature includes no imperfection ; it can be about what is possessed and not possessed, about what is seen and not seen.

  3. The supernatural moral virtues remain according to essence, but they will have other acts conformed to the heavenly life, as was said of acquired virtues ; before the resurrection however the virtues which are about passions will exist only in root, because they are in the sensitive appetite, which cannot exist without a body.

  4. The gifts of the Holy Spirit according to essence remain in the other life because the blessed perfectly follow the leading of the Holy Spirit, and are most perfectly subjected to Him ; but they will have other acts befitting the heavenly life.

655. Observation. — In the souls of purgatory there remain besides faith and hope because they do not yet see nor possess God. In the damned no supernatural habit or virtue can exist, because they are no longer destined for the supernatural life.

SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY.

On the Matter, Method and Order of Special Moral Theology.

656. Matter. — After general moral theology, which comprises the treatises on the last end, on human acts in themselves, on their rules namely conscience and laws, on sins, and on habits and virtues, considered in general, we begin special moral theology which treats in particular

1° of the individual good acts, and of the evil or sins opposed to them,

2° of the individual habits, virtues or gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of the vices opposed to them,

3° of the individual precepts whether affirmative, which pertain to good works and virtues, or negative, which pertain to sins and vices.

Moreover, among all these, some pertain to the state of all men, some to a determined state, namely clerics, religious, bishops, etc.

657. Method. — Now however all the aforesaid things can be explained separately, or even several of them together, as many modern authors do, who with S. Alphonsus divide moral theology according to precepts. But the scientific and more perfect method of S. Thomas, as being more complete at the same time and more compendious, is to consider all these together so that in the same treatise we examine both the virtue with its proper acts, and the vices and sins opposed, and the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to this virtue, and the affirmative or negative precepts pertaining to all these.

« It must be considered, says S. Thomas, ... that if we determined separately about virtues, gifts, vices and precepts, we would have to say the same thing many times... The way of consideration will therefore be more compendious and expeditious, if under the same treatise consideration proceeds together about the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, and about the opposite vices, and about the affirmative or negative precepts. This mode of consideration will however be more fitting for the vices themselves according to their proper species. For it has been shown above that vices and sins are diversified in species according to their matter or object... It is however the same matter about which both the virtue operates rightly, and the vices depart from rectitude in the opposite way ».

In reality the order of precepts does not favor a scientific exposition, by which all things are logically joined together among themselves and reduced to principles. For

a) there are many acts, which are reduced to precepts in a rather arbitrary and very remote way, e.g. imprecation, anger, even gluttony and drunkenness, which are born to harm the body, to the 5th precept ; all the sacraments to the 3rd ; the obligation of alms to the 4th or to the 5th ; humility to the 8th ;

b) there are acts or virtues, which must be reduced to several precepts, e.g. charity to the 1st for the love of God, to the 5th for the love of neighbor, to the 4th or 5th for the duty of almsgiving ; likewise restitution to justice, fortitude and temperance to diverse precepts according to various matters ; — and thus many things are mixed whose morality proceeds from very diverse reasons, or conversely things are separated which pertain to the same virtues ;

c) moreover the said method gives place to an incomplete treatment : those treating expressly about the acts of precepts omit those which are of counsel and which pertain to perfection, and more or even uniquely consider sins, not virtues.

Whence the division according to virtues is altogether to be preferred.

658. Order of division. — There are seven virtues, to which all others are reduced : three theological and four cardinal. Special moral theology therefore comprises seven treatises : on faith, on hope, on charity, on prudence, on justice, on fortitude, on temperance, which pertain to all states ; to which is added an eighth : on particular states].

We begin to speak about the theological virtues.

ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

ON DIVINE FAITH.

Tractatus VII: De fide divina

Introductio

Quaestio I: De Obiecto Formali Fidei

Quaestio II: De Obiecto Materiali Fidei

Articulus I: De obiecto materiali in se

Articulus II: De conditionibus ad obiectum materiale requisitis

Articulus III: De evolutione obiecti materialis

Articulus IV: De ecclesia proponente obiectum fidei

Pars I: De Actu Fidei

Caput I: De Actu Fidei Interiore

Quaestio I: De Essentia Actus Fidei

Quaestio II: De Analysi Actus Fidei

Articulus I: De ipso actu fidei

Articulus II: De ipso credulitatis affectu

Articulus III: De iudicio credibilitatis seu de praeambulis fidei

Quaestio III: De Necessitate Fidei

Caput II: De Actu Fidei Exteriore seu de Eius Confessione

Pars II: De Habitu Fidei

Quaestio I: De Ipsa Fide

Articulus I: De fide in ordine ad subiectum spectata

Articulus II: De fide spectata relative ad virtutes supernaturales

Articulus III: De fide spectata relative ad habitus intellectuales

Quaestio II: De habentibus fidem

Quaestio III: De causa et effectibus fidei

Quaestio IV: De donis fidei correspondentibus

Pars III: De vitiis et peccatis fidei oppositis

Quaestio I: De peccatis directe oppositis fidei

Articulus I: De infidelitate

Articulus II: De haeresi et apostasia

Quaestio II: De peccatis indirecte oppositis fidei

Articulus I: De communicatione cum infidelibus et haereticis

Articulus II: De cooperatione ad infidelitatem et haeresim

Articulus III: De lectione et evulgatione scriptorum prohibitorum

Articulus IV: De admissione vel professione doctrinae quae pro fide est periculosa

Quaestio III: De blasphemia quae opponitur confessioni fidei

Pars IV: De praecepto fidei

Quaestio I: Quaestio unica

Tractatus VIII: De spe divina

Introductio

Pars I: De obiecto et actu spei

Quaestio I: De obiecto formali spei

Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali spei

Quaestio III: De necessitate spei

Pars II: De habitu et subiecto spei

Quaestio I: De spe ut est virtus

Quaestio II: De subiecto spei

Quaestio III: De timore dei

Pars III: De peccatis spei oppositis

Quaestio I: De desperatione

Quaestio II: De praesumptione

Pars IV: De praecepto spei

Quaestio I: De Praecepto Spei

Tractatus IX: De divina charitate

Introductio I: De Divina Charitate

Pars I: De ipsa charitate

Quaestio I: De essentia charitatis

Quaestio II: De excellentia charitatis

Articulus I: De excellentia charitatis in se

Articulus II: De excellentia charitatis relative ad alias virtutes

Quaestio III: De charitate quoad subiectum spectata

Articulus I: De subiecto et generatione charitatis

Articulus II: De augmento charitatis

Articulus III: De diminutione et amissione charitatis

Pars II: De obiecto charitatis

Quaestio I: De obiecto formali

Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali charitatis

Articulus I: De diligendis ex charitate generatim

Articulus II: De diligendo deo

Articulus III: De diligendo seipso

Articulus IV: De peccatoribus diligendis

Articulus V: De inimicis diligendis

Quaestio III: De ordine charitatis

Articulus I: De ordine inter deum et nos

Articulus II: De ordine inter nos et proximum

Articulus III: De ordine inter varios proximos

Pars III: De actibus charitatis

Quaestio I: De actu proprio seu dilectione

Quaestio II: De effectibus internis charitatis

Quaestio III: De actu charitatis externo seu beneficentia

Articulus I: De eleemosyna corporali

Articulus II: De eleemosyna spirituali seu correptione fraterna

Pars IV: De peccatis charitati oppositis

Quaestio I: De odio quod opponitur dilectioni

Quaestio II: De peccatis oppositis gaudio

Articulus I: De acedia

Articulus II: De invidia

Quaestio III: De peccatis oppositis paci

Quaestio IV: De peccatis oppositis beneficentiae

Articulus I: De scandalo activo

Articulus II: De scandalo passivo

Articulus III: De quibusdam scandalis in specie

Pars V: De praeceptis charitatis

Quaestio I: Quaestio unica

Appendix I: Excursus de philosophorum systematibus circa fundamentum et normam moralitatis

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