Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

235. A law is sanctioned when it is decreed to be sacred, i.e. inviolable ; hence sanction (bekrachtiging) is that which confirms and urges the law. Hence

1. with present-day jurists, sanction is not rarely called the act by which the king or the head of the commonwealth, by subscribed name, completes the law as it were and renders it firm, so that it can be promulgated and oblige ; hence this act precedes the promulgation and denouncement of the law ;

2. with moralists, it is rather the compulsion or penal coercion by which the law is confirmed and urged. It can be considered a) actively (as coercive force), namely the act or decree of the legislator by which an evil or penalty is established for those violating the law, or on the contrary a good or reward for those observing it ; and b) passively, namely the very penal compulsion or retribution of penalty, — or also the denial or concession of reward, — which is added to the law to confirm it and to compensate for the detriment

to be obtained by the mere threat and obligation of penalty. If it be objected that penalty supposes fault, they answer that it does not necessarily suppose fault in the forum of conscience, but suffices that there be juridical fault in the external forum and before human law : transgression of the order established by the law. So Suarez, Billuart, Noldin, Koch, Wernz, Prümmer, Maroto, Vermeersch, A. Janssens are said to hold. — That S. Thomas admitted merely penal laws is clear from II-II, q. 186, a. 9, ad 1.

that arises to the society from the violation of the law : the penalty, or also the reward, established by the legislator, in those who transgress it, or observe it.

236. Sanction differs from obligation : 1) the latter pertains to the directive force of the law, the former to the coercive force ; 2) the latter affects all subjects equally, the former first of itself and immediately only the transgressors of the law ; 3) the latter of itself is conformed to the inclination of the will to the good, the former of itself is repugnant to the will and is opposed to its natural inclination to the good ; 4) obligation is a binding to the good of order, sanction is the immediate privation of some good.

237. Sanction therefore is the complement of law and of obligation. Its end is threefold :

a) that the subjects be efficaciously moved to the observance of the law : for the mere knowledge of the law and the consciousness of obligation, inasmuch as man is now subject to the enticements of concupiscence, do not sufficiently induce him to keep the law ;

b) that the moral order be completed by the retribution of reward, and especially be restored by the retribution of penalty : for the order of justice demands that to the violation of the law a penalty be retributed to restore equality ; or also sometimes it asks that a reward be granted for the observance of the law ;

c) that the subjects, rebellious against the legislator, be subjected to his authority, because they are compelled against their will to undergo an evil, who have refused to subject themselves to a voluntary law. He who rises up against some order, says S. Thomas, must be repressed by the prince of the order (I-II, q. 87, a. 1).

Law therefore, in order that it may efficaciously move us and direct us to the end, must be confirmed by sanction.

Of which there is a twofold influence : 1) antecedently under a preventive respect, when, before the act is placed, by means of promise or threats it induces men to keep the law ; hence the aim of sanction is that the law be observed : so it is for correction ;

2. consequently under a retributive respect, when after the deed a reward or penalty is retributed to those acting well or ill : so it is for coercion.

Hence a) in the state of threat, the primary end of sanction is amendment or preservation, in one word : the avoidance of sin ; b) in the state of execution, the principal end is the restoration of order ; but it can have as a secondary end amendment.