Summa de Ecclesia

The first part of this fourth book being finished, where we have touched briefly on a few things concerning schisms and schismatics, it remains to take up the second part in which we promised to treat modestly, yet usefully, of heresies and heretics, which part, trusting in heavenly aid, as we take it up we shall begin from the definition of heresy. For which it must be noted, according to Saint Thomas in the fourth distinction, the thirteenth, that the name heresy is Greek, and imports division according to Isidore in the book of the Etymologies. Hence heretical things are also called divisive, and because in choice there is made a division of one from another, choice is termed heresy in the first book of the Ethics. But division belongs to a part through recession from the whole. Now the first gathering which is among men is by way of knowledge, because from this all others arise. Hence also heresy consists¹ in a singular opinion beside the common opinion. Hence also philosophers who held certain positions beside the common sentence of others constituted sects or heresies. Hence of the nature of heresy seems to be that one follow a private teaching as if by one's own choice, but not the public teaching which is handed down divinely. Which well considered, we seem to define heresy in its generality quite fittingly, saying: That heresy is a false opinion or assertion or false doctrine contrary to catholic truth in one who has professed the Christian faith. The fittingness of which definition is clear both by authority and by reason. By authority first indeed. For Aug. says against Faustus: Heresy is what holds diverse opinions from those which the catholic Church believes. Likewise second, blessed Jerome in ch. Inter haeresim, 24, q. 3, assigning the difference between heresy and schism, says that heresy has perverse doctrine, that is, false and pernicious in the teaching of the Christian religion. Likewise third, the Gloss on that text 2 Cor. 3, We are not sufficient, etc., says: Faith is to think something of things to be believed with right assertion, and by opposition heresy is to think something of things to be believed with assertion not right. But by reason the fittingness of the aforesaid definition is shown, since in it are contained those things which are both of the substance of heresy and those by which it is distinguished from other false assertions. It is clear: for it is said that heresy is a false assertion or opinion or false doctrine; this is put in place of the genus, for every heresy is a false assertion, but not conversely. For according to Aug. in the Enchiridion, to err in many things is no sin or the least sin. And in the first book On the Trinity he says: I can err, but I shall not be a heretic. But it is notedly said false assertion or perverse doctrine and not deed, because a perverse deed, as we shall show more fully, is not heresy nor makes a heretic. For example, if one steals, if one is an adulterer, he acts against the truth of Scripture which says: Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt do no theft. For from such a deed one is not made a heretic; but he would be made one if he obstinately asserted that it were lawful to steal and commit adultery, because so thinking he would think against catholic truth. There follows: Contrary to catholic verity, in which is touched the matter about which heresy is, because about those things which pertain to catholic truth. But catholic truth is principally called an article of faith; there is also called catholic truth whatever is assertively placed in the canon of the Bible, or handed down to us through the apostles of Christ from his instruction or by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, or determined and approved through the universal Church or general councils, as we shall explain more fully below when we speak of catholic truths. But by this difference heretical doctrine or assertion differs from other false doctrines which neither formally nor incompossibly conflict with catholic truth. But there is added in one who has professed the Christian faith in place of the ultimate difference; for by this heresy differs from other species of unbelief, namely from the false doctrines of pagan gentiles and Jews, which although they are contrary to the orthodox faith or catholic truth, yet in them, properly speaking, there is not said to be heresy. For heresy is a species of unbelief pertaining to those who profess the faith of Christ, but corrupt its doctrines. For the fuller knowledge of which it must be noted with Saint Thomas in 2.2, q. 11, art. 1, that the name heresy imports choice. But choice is of those things which are for the end, with the end presupposed. But in things to be believed the will assents to the true as to its proper good. Hence what is the principal truth has the nature of the ultimate end, but secondary things have the nature of those things which are for the end, because since whoever believes assents to someone's word, the principal thing seems to be, as it were the end in every belief, he to whose word assent is given, but secondary as it were are those things which one holding seems to assent to someone. So therefore he who rightly has the Christian faith by his will assents to Christ in those things which truly pertain to his doctrine. From the rectitude therefore of the Christian faith one can deviate in two ways: in one way, because he will not assent to Christ himself and has an evil will concerning the end itself, which pertains to the species of unbelief of pagans or Jews; in another way by this, that he intends indeed to assent to Christ, but fails in choosing those things by which he may assent to Christ, because he chooses those which are not truly handed down by Christ, but which his own mind suggests. And therefore it was well said that heresy is a species of unbelief pertaining to those who profess the faith of Christ. Hence blessed Aug. in the book On the Shepherds, ch. sixteen, on that text: After the flocks of thy companions, says that all heretics went out from Christ. And on Matt., homily 11, on that text: He shall make fire come down from heaven. What is to make fire come down from heaven but heresies falling from the Church, as it is written: They went out from us, but they were not of us.

But that a fuller understanding may be had of the aforesaid definition which we set down concerning heresy, we shall bring forward some objections against it, so that the truth itself may become more splendid to us. ¹ First, thus: heresy, as Isidore says, is the same as division; but division is opposed to union. But union comes about through charity, since love is a unitive power, as Dionysius says. Therefore heresy seems to include the perversity of hatred rather than a doctrine adverse to faith. ² Second, thus: superstition is opposed to religion, not to faith, but heresy is called a superstition; therefore it seems not to pertain to the perversity of faith, but rather to the perversity of religion. ³ Third, thus: many false or perverse things contrary to the faith and to catholic truth newly become heresies, although they do not newly begin to be contrary to the faith and to catholic truth. Since therefore, before they should be reckoned heresies, they are false doctrines contrary to the catholic faith and truth, it seems that not all false doctrines contrary to catholic truth are to be called heresies, and consequently the assigned definition of heresy does not seem fitting, since it is not convertible with what it defines. The consequence is good, and the antecedent is gathered for the most part, yet, from ch. Notandum, 24, q. 3, where Urban says that Saint Aug., with the legates of the holy Roman Church and with his holy bishops, excommunicated Pelagius and Celestine as introducing a new heresy into the holy Church of God. Then secondly from what Gratian says in 24. q. 1. §. 1: Every heretic either follows an already condemned heresy or invents a new one. From these it is openly gathered that there have been and can be new heresies, which nevertheless are not new falsehoods contrary to the orthodox faith. ⁴ Fourth, it is argued thus, as blessed Jerome says in 24. q. 3. ch. Haeresis: Heresy in Greek is named from choice, namely because each person chooses for himself the discipline which he thinks to be better; therefore it seems that no doctrine, however false or perverse it may be, before someone has chosen and asserted or taught it, should be counted among heresies, and consequently the aforesaid definition is not fitting.

⁵ Fifth, thus: if that definition were fittingly set down, it would follow that the assertions of unbelievers, for instance of pagans or Jews, would have to be called heretical, since those are perverse doctrines and contrary to catholic truth, and yet the consequent is false, since pagans, although they are unbelievers, are nevertheless not said to be heretics. Therefore the aforesaid definition does not seem to be fittingly set down.

⁶ Sixth, thus: there are many assertions which in the truth of the matter are contrary to catholic truth, which nevertheless, before they have been condemned by the Church, are not to be numbered among heresies, just as there are many truths consonant with divine Scripture which, because they have not been defined or determined by the Church, are not numbered among catholic truths. Therefore heresy does not seem to be fittingly defined when it is said to be a perverse doctrine contrary to catholic truth, etc. The assumption is clear from examples: for the Greeks denying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son were not reckoned heretics before the condemnation of their assertion, though after the condemnation of it they are counted among heretics. Likewise, the asserters of the opinion of Abbot Joachim, condemned by a general council, would after the condemnation be judged heretics; yet Abbot Joachim himself, although before the condemnation he held the same assertion, was not a heretic, as is found in Extra, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, ch. Damnamus. Therefore etc.

¹ These things notwithstanding we say that the definition of heresy assigned was fittingly posited. Whence it must be said to the reasons made. To the first it is answered denying the consequence, for although love makes complete union, nevertheless the principle of union is from knowledge, and therefore the division which is in faith constitutes heresy. ² To the second it is answered denying the consequence, and the reason is that faith is the principle of those things which are required for religion, because all religion or worship of God is a certain protestation of faith. Hence the truth of faith is called the truth which is according to piety, to Tit. 1., and therefore also those things which are of heresy pertain to superstition, and so superstition as it is opposed to religion is also opposed to faith. ³ To the third, when it is said that some false doctrines are newly made heresies, it is answered that the argument does not proceed, and the reason is that the fact that some heresy is called new is not because in truth of the matter it newly begins to be a heresy, that is divided from the common doctrine of the catholic faith, but because it is newly asserted by some. Whence a proposition contrary to the catholic faith is not called a new heresy on its own part, so that it began to be what before it was not, but on the part of the asserter or defender, because namely it begins anew to have asserters. Which sense is manifestly gathered from ch. 1. of the twenty-fourth question 1., where Pope Gelasius says that Achatius is not the inventor of a new error, but an imitator of an old one. From which words it is given to be understood that if Achatius had been the first asserter of his error, he would have been the inventor of a new error, and yet the same error would before have been to be deemed an error. ⁴ To the fourth, when argument is made from ch. Haeresis etc., it is answered that the reason does not militate, since it proceeds from a bad understanding of the saying of blessed Jerome. For Jerome does not mean to say in those sayings that no false doctrine should be counted among heresies before it is chosen or asserted by someone, but the true understanding of Jerome is, both according to Albert in 4, at the end of dist. 13, and according to Saint Thomas in 2.2, that heresy is named from choice because the heretic chooses that discipline, not which holy Scripture or the catholic Church teaches and hands down to the faithful to be believed, but which his own mind suggests to him.

⁵ To the fifth, when argument is made concerning infidels and pagans, it is answered denying the consequence, speaking of heresy properly so called, which is said to be that which makes one pertinaciously asserting it a heretic; of which kind is nothing but a dogma contrary to catholic truth falling upon him who has before professed the Christian religion. Hence it is that the dogmas of pagans contrary to faith and catholic truth, although they pertain to infidelity, yet are not properly called heresies, nor are pagans, Saracens and Jews properly speaking called heretics, but rather infidels, by the reason assigned above in ch. 1. But we say properly speaking; for broadly speaking, as pleases some, the dogmas of pagans contrary to faith can be called heresies, and the pagans themselves be called heretics.

⁶ To the sixth, when it is argued that many assertions contrary to the catholic faith before the determination of the Church are not to be numbered among heresies, etc., it is answered denying the antecedent. For we say that just as concerning those things which pertain to faith neither the Roman pontiff nor the whole Church of God can make a true assertion from one not true, or a false from one not false, so it cannot make a catholic assertion from one not catholic, nor a heretical assertion from one not heretical, nor conversely. For as catholic truths without any approbation of the Church from the nature of the matter are immutable, and immutably true, so they are to be reputed immutably catholic; and likewise as heresies without any damnation of the Church are heresies. But because concerning some assertions that they are contrary to catholic doctrine and consequently heretical is not always known, for sometimes disputes upon this first arise even among great men, as happened between Jerome and Augustine upon the cessation of the legal observances, so well is the declaration and determination of these made through the Roman pontiff, to whom belongs the determination of these doubts according to ch. Quotiens the reason of faith is ventilated, and ch. Haec est fides, O most blessed father, 24, q. 1.; and so the Pope well defines or determines whether an assertion is catholic or heretical, but does not make it catholic or heretical, because it depends on its own nature, according to that of Aristotle: From the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is called true or false, in the first book of the Perihermenias.

That heresy is in the first place to be located in the intellect is sufficiently evident from its very definition. From this too it is openly gathered that faith itself, to which heresy is contrary, since it is a certain spiritual cognition to which the vision in the homeland corresponds, according to that passage of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13, “We see now through a glass and in a dark manner,” etc., is located in the intellect as in its proximate subject in relation to the will; for opposites are known to belong to the same subject. For a fuller understanding of this, however, it is to be noted with Saint Thomas in 2.2, q. 10, art. 2, that sin is said to be in that power which is the principle of the act of sin. Now the act of sin can have a twofold principle. One is indeed the first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sins, and this principle is the will, since every sin is voluntary. The other principle of sin is the proper and proximate one which elicits the act of sin, just as the concupiscible power is the principle of lust; in this sense gluttony and lust are said to be in the concupiscible power. But to dissent, which is the proper act of unbelief or heresy, is an act of the intellect, though moved by the will, just as to assent is; and therefore unbelief and heresy, like faith, are in the intellect as in their subject, but in the will as in the first mover, and in this way every sin is said to be in the will. Again, since a false assertion contrary to the faith of Christ is sometimes found named heresy, sometimes sect, sometimes superstition, we have deemed it right to examine the difference of these names. The difference can be assigned according to Saint Thomas as follows: heresy is so called from choosing, sect from following, as Isidore says in the book of the Etymologies. Superstition, indeed, because it is contrary to the faith of Christ, which is the first foundation of the Christian religion. The Lord Bonaventure, moreover, in book 4 at the end of distinction 13, assigning the difference among these names, says: Heresy differs from schism, for the former is against faith, while schism is against the bond of charity; sect can be said to be against faith by reason of invention, while superstition is a superfluous institution. By reason of adherence it is called heresy; by reason of defense, sect, speaking by appropriation; or heresy because against the truth, sect because against the community, superstition because against utility, as a superfluous institution; or heresy from choosing, sect from following, superstition from standing over. Hence heresy denotes the presumptuous and deliberate invention of falsehood; sect adds imitation; superstition denotes the inveteracy of long duration, just as aged survivors dote, so too do heretics, and therefore heresy is called superstition because it agrees with old age and dotage. Properly, however, superstition is so called from standing over, for just as in faith the intellect is held captive, so too in error it is puffed up and lifted high. Thus far the Lord Bonaventure.

Since, however, as we showed above following ch. 5 of the first part of this fourth book, the sin of heresy is in its genus the greatest of sins, inasmuch as it is contrary to the greater good, namely God Himself insofar as He is in Himself the first truth, and inasmuch as it harms the more since it subverts the foundation of all goods, without which no good remains, namely faith itself, perhaps someone will wonder ¹ why the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 11 that heresies must be, when concerning other sins it is not said that they must needs be, such as fornication, envy, pride, and the like; we have therefore decreed to expound here the aforesaid apostolic word. ² For this it is to be noted, following Aristotle in Metaphysics 5, that necessary is taken in many ways. In one way that is called necessary which cannot be otherwise, and in this way heresy is not said to be necessary to the Church. In another way something is called necessary which in itself is expedient, and in this way too it is not necessary that there be heresies. In a third way that is called necessary which accidentally is useful. For God, since He is supremely good, would not permit heresies and evil and perverse dogmas to exist unless they redounded to our utility, since, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, God, since He is supremely good and just and wise, would not allow evils to happen unless He elicited good from them; and according as it is said in Matt. 18, “It must needs be that scandals come; but nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh.” And in this sense the Apostle says here in the aforesaid authority that heresies must be, because God orders the malice of heretics to the good of the faithful. Hence Augustine in On True Religion: The catholic Church spread throughout the whole world uses all who err for her own progress, and for their correction when they refuse to keep watch; for she uses the gentiles for the matter of her working, heretics for the proving of her doctrine, schismatics for the lesson of her stability, Jews for the comparison with her beauty. Thus Augustine. But in a special way God’s power elicits manifold good in the Church from heresies.

³ The first is that the truth of faith is more elucidated. Hence Augustine in the Gloss: a question raised by an adversary becomes an occasion of learning. Many things pertaining to faith, while they are agitated by the hot restlessness of heretics, so that they may be defended against them, are both considered more diligently and understood more clearly and preached more urgently; hence too it is said in Prov. 27: “Iron is sharpened by iron, and a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend.” And Augustine in book 7 of the Confessions: The disapproval of heretics makes prominent what the Church holds and what sound doctrine contains. Likewise in the treatise on the harmony of Matt. and Luke concerning the generation of Christ: Heretics are useful for finding the truth while they calumniate to seduce into error. For truth would be sought more negligently if it had no lying adversaries. For, says the Apostle, heresies must be. Thus Augustine.

⁴ The second good which is elicited from heresies is the rousing of the sloth of catholic doctors, that they may awake and apply themselves to doctrine against the cunning of heretics, lest the simple be deceived. Hence Augustine on Genesis against the Manichaeans says: Therefore divine providence permitted many heretics of diverse error to exist, that when they insult us or question us on things we do not know, we may thus shake off sloth or desire to know the divine Scriptures. For this reason the Apostle says, Heresies must be. Thus Augustine. The same in On True Religion: Let us use heretics, not so as to approve their errors, but so that, bringing forth catholic discipline against their snares, we may be more watchful and more cautious, even if we cannot recall them to salvation. Thus he.

⁵ Likewise the third good resulting from heresies is the increase of knowledge and wisdom in the doctors of the Church. Hence Augustine on John: For this God permitted heretics to abound, lest we be always nourished with milk and remain in brutish infancy.

⁶ The fourth good which is elicited from heresies is that the patience of the faithful is exercised; for heretics, violent through pride and insulting toward the Church by raging in quarrels and contentions, exercise the patience of the Church and of the good. Hence Augustine. Hence Aug., in book 16of the City of God: Hot is the race of heretics, not with the spirit of wisdom but of impatience, with which the hearts of heretics are wont to burn and to trouble the peace of the saints; but these redound to the use of progress, according to that of the Apostle: Heresies must be; and in book 18 he says: Heretics by their evil example profit those true catholic members of Christ, while God uses even evils well, and all things work together unto good for them that love Him. All enemies of the Church, whether blinded by error or depraved by malice, profit her: for if they receive power to afflict bodily, they exercise her patience; if by holding wrongly they oppose her, they exercise her wisdom; and that enemies too may be loved, they exercise her benevolence.

⁷ The fifth good which the divine power elicits from heresies is the increase of merits in good and faithful doctors; for when catholic doctors strive with praiseworthy zeal to labor concerning the conversion of heretics, or their persecution if they refuse to be converted, there is no doubt that by thus trading with the talents entrusted to them, merits grow in them by which they are led to beatitude.

⁸ The sixth good which is elicited from heresies is that the firmness of faith is manifested in those who believe rightly, and this is what the Apostle adds: that they who are approved, that is, approved by God, may be made manifest among you, that is, in your midst. Wisd. 3: “As gold in the furnace⁹ He hath tried them.” Hence blessed Augustine in the book On True Religion: For there are innumerable men in the holy Church proven by God, but they are not made manifest among us so long as, delighting in the darkness of our ignorance, we prefer to sleep rather than to behold the light of truth. ¹⁰ And thus it appears how it is useful that there be heresies, and through this the answer to what was argued at the beginning — that it was not so with other sins that they must needs be — is clear; for, as Master Alexander of Hales says in his second book, there is no complete likeness in other sins and in this one. For other sins, although they are evil in themselves and God elicits some good from them, yet not so much as from this sin; for on the occasion of this sin the exercise of the Church is chiefly acquired, just as from the persecution inflicted by tyrants, as was explained above.

There is distinguished, moreover, according to the theological doctors, a threefold kind of credibles, which is nevertheless variously designated by them. For in one way there is designated how the credible stands to the intellect, in three ways, concerning which blessed Augustine in book 83 Questions says thus: There are three kinds of credibles. Some are always believed and never understood, such as all history running through temporal and human deeds. Others, as soon as they are believed, are understood, such as all human reasonings. The third is of those which are first believed and afterwards understood, such as are those concerning divine things. Thus Augustine. There is therefore a threefold kind of credibles. The first is of those credibles which stand to the intellect incompatibly, such as are histories of the deeds of men. For since these receive faith from sense alone, as Albert says, they have no power of universality, as do those which stand to the intellect compatibly, and thus they are of the kind of those which are always believed and never understood. The second kind of credibles is that which stands to the intellect antecedently, as are divine things surpassing the human intellect, into which the intellect cannot enter except by the light of faith infused into it, such as the articles of faith which are not understood unless they are first believed. Isa. 7, according to the translation of the Seventy: Unless you believe, you shall not understand. The third kind of credibles is that which stands to the intellect consequently, such as are those, as Alexander of Hales exemplifies, which the intellect can attain from itself or through the light innate to it, as that God exists, and that He is one and omnipotent, and the like; and these are said to be believed as soon as they are understood. This threefold kind of credibles, moreover, is signified by others differently. For the Lord Bonaventure in book 3, dist. 25, says thus: that the doctrine of faith has certain antecedents, certain consequents, certain principal matters, just as in other sciences we see there are certain common principles which are supposed, such as dignities; certain others as proper principles of those sciences, as are the intrinsic principles of their demonstrations; certain others are consequents, such as correlative propositions. In this way too in the doctrine of faith the antecedents are those which are of the dictate of the natural law; the principal matters are those to which the illumination of faith directly directs, and those are called the articles of faith; the consequents are those which can be elicited from those articles and stand in sequence to those articles. Thus he. With this distinction of credibles in hand, we say by way of conclusion that heresy extends to these three kinds of credibles.

This conclusion is proved. First thus: faith extends to all those credibles, but heresy is opposed to faith; therefore faith itself extends to all those credibles, and therefore consequently heresy extends to those three kinds of credibles. The consequence is clear, since opposites seem to be of equal scope. Second thus: faith concerns truth according to godliness, which is called Sacred Scripture, in Titus 3. Hence Hugh of Saint Victor: Truth according to godliness is Sacred Scripture, because it teaches and lovingly embraces those things which pertain to the religion of God; therefore heresy too regards all things which are in Sacred Scripture, but in it all the aforesaid kinds of credibles are contained; therefore error concerning any credibles contained in Sacred Scripture, whether they pertain to histories or to articles of faith or to morals, will be called heresy.

But it will perhaps seem to some that heresy does not extend to all the aforesaid kinds of credibles, and first it seems that it does not extend to the credibles of the first kind, of which sort are those which are always believed and never understood, such as histories.

¹ First thus: for if this were true, since the saints hold diverse or contrary opinions concerning histories, heresy would be reckoned on one side or the other; but it is not reckoned, since on this account no one on either side is judged a heretic. Therefore it does not seem that heresy concerns that kind of credibles.

² Second thus: certain saints held contrary opinions concerning the works of the six days; yet on neither side is there heresy. Therefore heresy does not extend to that kind of credibles.

³ It is argued third that heresy does not extend to the credibles of the third kind, namely those which are at once understood and believed. First thus: whoever is a heretic deviates from some article of faith, but he who deviates from those credibles of the third kind is not seen to deviate from any article of faith, as for instance one who would say that fornication is not a mortal sin; therefore there is no heresy concerning such credibles.

⁴ Fourth thus: among other credibles which are at once believed and understood are reckoned human reasonings and sciences, whether concerning numbers or concerning any other disciplines whatsoever; but concerning these there is no heresy. Hence Jerome on the epistle to Titus: If a man knows the art of grammar or dialectic, we do not disapprove; for they are sciences of truth, not of godliness. Therefore heresy is only concerning credibles which pertain to godliness, as faith is, as has been said. Therefore heresy is not concerning credibles which are at once believed and understood, whether they be principles or reasonings or human sciences.

But notwithstanding those objections it must be said, as we foretold, that heresy extends to the three aforesaid kinds of credibles, just as does the faith to which it is opposed; yet, as Master Alexander of Hales says in his second book, according to a certain analogy, namely by priority and secondarily, directly and indirectly, principally and less principally. For concerning those credibles which are first believed and afterwards understood, namely concerning the articles of faith, the first character of faith is found, and thus by opposition heresy itself is first found concerning them.

For this it is to be noted that, as Saint Thomas says in 2, q. 1, art. 6, certain credibles are such that faith concerns them in their own right; others are credibles which faith does not concern in their own right, but in relation to others, just as in other sciences too certain things are proposed as principally intended, others for the manifestation of others. Since faith concerns those things which we hope to see in the homeland, according to that in Heb. 11, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” therefore those things which directly order us to eternal life pertain to faith in their own right, such as the three Persons, the omnipotence of God, the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, and the like; hence the articles are distinguished according to these. Certain things are proposed in Sacred Scripture as to be believed not as principally intended, but for the manifestation of the aforesaid, such as that Abraham had two sons, and that at the touch of the bones of Elisha a dead man was raised, and other such things narrated in Sacred Scripture in relation to the manifestation of the divine majesty or of the incarnation of Christ; and thus concerning the first credibles there is first faith, and by opposition heresy. Moreover, secondly faith extends to those credibles which are at once believed and understood, as that fornication is a mortal sin and the like, and by opposition heresy. Thirdly faith extends to those credibles which are believed and never understood, such as are the histories contained in Sacred Scripture, and thus by opposition heresy.

And with this sentence of Saint Thomas agrees in 2.2, q. 11, art. 2, when he says that something pertains to faith in two ways: in one way directly and principally, as the articles of faith; in another way indirectly and secondarily, as all those things from which there correlatively follows the corruption of some article; and concerning each there can be heresy in the same way as there is faith. Hence it must be answered to all on the opposite side.

⁵ To the first, when it is argued that it would follow that the saints, etc., I answer by denying the consequence. For this it is to be noted according to Master Alexander of Hales that it is one thing to say that a history is not true, and another to expound a history in this way or that and to hold opinions concerning its expositions. He who would say that a history is not true, and this obstinately, would be judged a heretic; but the saints did not so act. Others, holding^{6 7} various opinions concerning histories, although they hold various views in expounding them. And in this way answer is given to what is argued in second place concerning the works of the six days: for the saints do not deny the history itself; indeed in it they all agree, yet they expound it differently, since some expound it of material days, some of spiritual days; but this is not to destroy or deny the history, but to expound it. Hence such expositions are declarative of Sacred Scripture, which the holy fathers made, induced to this by good reasons. Hence Augustine: That the holy fathers held such diverse views is from the Holy Spirit. All therefore agree in the history, for the history says there were so many days, but they disagree in the exposition of the days. Hence those saints are moved by the Holy Spirit to those expositions, for the declaration of Scripture; and if there is there sometimes falsity, this is not from the nature of man as first instituted, but from the punishment of the condemned. For in nature as first instituted there were no opinions, nor will there be likewise in glory; but now there are, since opinion implies a penal character.

⁸ To the third, when argument is made concerning the credibles of the third kind, I answer that concerning them too there is heresy, namely when one believes wrongly concerning them. And to the reasoning, when it is said that whoever is a heretic, etc., I answer in two ways. First by denying the major, since it is not necessary that every heretic deviate from some article of faith; it holds well conversely that everyone deviating from some article of faith is a heretic. For just as faith does not extend to articles alone, but also to other credibles which are not articles of faith but are as principles, so we say of heresy. Hence it is not necessary that where there is heresy there be deviation from some article, unless it be heresy concerning the credibles which are first believed and afterwards understood, concerning which there is heresy according to its first character just as there is faith.

Second I answer by denying the minor, and we say that one erring concerning credibles of the third kind, although he does not deviate directly and formally from any article of faith, yet since from that negation it follows that he says Holy Scripture contains falsehood, he indirectly opposes that article: I believe in the Holy Spirit, by whom divine Scripture was inspired. For it is written in Gal. 3: “Manifest are the works of the flesh, which are fornication,” etc.; and afterwards he adds: “They who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God”; which would not be so if fornication were not a mortal sin.

⁹ To the fourth, when it is argued that concerning human disciplines there is no heresy, I answer that to err concerning human disciplines, as for instance to err concerning geometry and the like, we readily concede is not heresy; nor does Augustine speak of these when he says that certain things are at once understood and believed, but of those which are as certain principles known in themselves in theology, such as that fornication is a mortal sin, and pride and the like, which pertain to morals.

Since in defining heresy above we said that heresy is a false assertion contrary to catholic truth, and since it is manifest that to know what is meant by catholic truth will greatly help toward a fuller knowledge of this definition — especially since the knowledge of one of two contraries is sometimes recognized to contribute to the knowledge of the other — we deemed it worthy to consider something on this point. For this it is to be noted, briefly repeating some things from what we said most amply in book 1, ch. 15, that the name catholic is Greek and in Latin means universal. Catholic truth, therefore, is the same as universal truth, just as the faith of Christ is called catholic, that is, universal. And for this at present I shall use a twofold reason. First, because it is universally true, having no counter-instance or exception whatever, since to such truth no falsehood ever did, does, or will underlie at any time or place; as happens in the doctrines of philosophers, which although in some part of themselves they speak or suppose truly, yet in many things fall short of truth. But the faith of Christ or catholic truth cannot fall away from truth; hence the prophet in the psalm: “Forever, O Lord, abideth Thy word, and Thy truth unto ages of ages.” Likewise Christ says: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away,” Luke 21. And the Apostle in 2 Cor. 1: “But the Lord is faithful, for our preaching which was to you was not in Him yea and nay” — a lie, as in the speech of pseudo-preachers — “but in Him was simple truth”; on this account too the Son of God Himself is called the Truth, John 14, because universally true are all the things He taught through Himself or through His saints, through whom He spoke.

Second, truth is called catholic because it is to be preached everywhere and is proposed to all nations to be believed; hence the Lord says in the last chapter of Matt.: “Going teach ye all nations,” etc. These two reasons Boethius assigns at the beginning of his book On the Trinity, saying thus: Faith is called catholic, first because it is commanded to be observed not by one nation only, but is proposed to all nations; second because no falsity or iniquity is mingled with it.

From these it is seen that catholic truth implies two things. The first is that it be universally true, so that no falsehood underlies it nor ever can underlie it, so that it be of perpetual and infallible truth. The second is that it be necessary for all the faithful to believe explicitly or implicitly. But no doctrine whatever can assuredly have these unless it spiritually draws its origin from the unchangeable fount of divine truth; for other doctrines which draw their origin from the marsh of human investigation cannot have this condition, since the human spirit, as blessed Thomas says on John, is most fallacious, and human thought most fallacious. Wisd. 9: “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.” And the prophet says in the psalm: “Every man is a liar.”

From these we can elicit such a definition of catholic truth, that we say:

¹ Catholic truth is that which is had from the supernatural light of divine revelation immediately or mediately, explicitly in the proper form of words or implicitly by good and necessary consequence.

But it is said “by supernatural light” to distinguish from truths which are had by a certain general divine revelation through a general light, concerning which the Apostle says in Rom. 1 that what is known of God is manifest in them, namely the philosophers; for God hath manifested it unto them. And Ambrose in the Gloss on 1 Cor. 12 says: Truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Spirit. For since the general light by which men come to knowledge of the truths of human disciplines can only be from the first light, as Augustine says in the book On Marriage: It must needs be that every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is spoken with God inspiring. Hence Augustine in the book of Confessions says: By none other inspiring, O Lord, but Thee do I believe I speak truth, since Thou art the truth; but every man is a liar, and therefore he who speaks a lie speaks of his own; but what truth I speak, I speak of Thine. Thus he. But catholic truth must in a special way, namely by supernatural light, be derived from God. But it is said “mediately or immediately”: since some things God has revealed and reveals to us immediately through Himself, as He did the Gospel. Hence John 1: The Only-begotten Son of God who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared it unto us; and Isa. 52: “Behold I Myself that spoke, am here”; and in Heb. 1 the Apostle says: “God, who long ago spoke to the fathers in the prophets, in these last days hath spoken to us by His Son,” etc. Sometimes He reveals through others, as through holy angels or through apostles or through other holy men. Hence in 2 Pet. 1 blessed Peter says: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.” And therefore not only truth delivered immediately by God through Himself to the faithful is to be called catholic truth, but also that had mediately which is had through saints taught and inspired by Him, since the Holy Spirit by whom the holy men of God inspired spoke and speak teaches and breathes nothing but truth. John 16: “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth.” It is said further: “explicitly in the proper form of words,” etc. For in these two ways something is said to be contained in Sacred Scripture: either in the proper form of words, as this is: Christ was man; or implicitly, namely what by good and necessary consequence follows from what is formally set forth in the letter, as from this: Christ was man, it follows that He had a rational soul, an agent and a possible intellect, and all the powers of the soul. Likewise that in His body there were sinews and veins and the like, none of which nevertheless is had in the proper form of words in the letter of Sacred Scripture. And let these suffice for grasping what is to be called catholic truth.

With the definition of catholic truth given, since it is known that among catholic truths there are many truths to which adherence with firm credulity is owed, we deemed it opportune to distinguish their steps or kinds. It seems to us that seven kinds of catholic truths can be distinguished.

¹ The first is of those things which are contained in the canon of Sacred Scripture of the Old or New Testament, and in the proper form of words. And this kind of catholic truths can be distinguished also according to the three kinds of credibles posited above, among which, as we said before, the kind of credibles which are believed before they are understood is principally to be reckoned, of which sort are those which pertain to the articles of faith, on which our salvation principally depends. That such truths formally contained in Sacred Scripture are to be reputed catholic is manifest, since concerning the truth of Sacred Scripture there can in no way be doubt. Hence blessed Augustine in the book on the one baptism, as is recited in ch. Who Is Ignorant, distinct. 9, says: Who is ignorant that the canonical Holy Scripture of both the Old and the New Testament is contained within fixed limits, and is so set before all later writings of bishops that concerning it there can be no doubt or dispute whatever, whether whatever is contained as written in it be true or right, etc.

² The second kind of catholic truths is of those things which from what is contained in Sacred Scripture alone by necessary and formal consequence can be inferred. Hence since such truths have the same firmness of truth and necessity of credulity as have the truths from which they are inferred by necessary and formal consequence, it is manifest that they are to be numbered among catholic truths, as is this truth: Christ is true God and true man, which although it is not found thus formally in the whole course of Sacred Scripture, nevertheless because it is inferred from what is contained in Sacred Scripture by formal and necessary consequence, it is held catholic and to believe it is necessary to salvation.

³ The third kind of catholic truths is of those things which are contained concerning the canon of Sacred Scripture, which nevertheless came to the faithful through revelation and approval only with the apostles mediating. Indeed since Christ, when He lived in mortal flesh with the apostles, taught and did many things which are not had in the canon of Holy Scripture, according to that in the last chapter of John: “Many other things did Jesus do which are not written in this book”; Christ taught the apostles many other catholic truths to be taught through them which are not had in the canon of Scripture. Hence Augustine in book 3 on the baptism of infants says: Those things which the universal Church keeps unwritten she received from the apostles with Christ teaching. For thus the Apostle concerning the communion of the Lord’s body and blood in 1 Cor. 11 says: “What I received of the Lord, the same have I delivered unto you; but the rest I will set in order,” that is, I shall ordain, “when I come.” Likewise to the same effect is the same Augustine, who as is had in ch. Of Ecclesiastical Constitutions, distinct. 11, says to the point thus: Of ecclesiastical constitutions we have received some from the Scriptures, some indeed confirmed by apostolic tradition through successors in ministry, and some use has approved as strengthened by custom, to which an equal rite and the same affection of piety of each is owed. Thus he. Further, since according to the promise of Christ the Holy Spirit about to come upon the disciples was to teach them all truth, many things are assuredly to be believed to have been learned by them from the Holy Spirit which afterwards they taught the faithful, which nevertheless were not placed in the canon of the Bible. Hence Alexander III in ch. With Martha, Extra, on the celebration of Masses, speaking on the form of the consecration of the Eucharist says thus: Indeed we find many things both of the words and of the deeds of the Lord omitted by the evangelists, which the apostles too are read either to have supplied by word or to have expounded by deed. For Paul in the Acts of the Apostles says thus: “We ought to remember the word of our Lord Jesus Christ, who said: It is more blessed to give than to receive.” Yet none of the four evangelists described this. Hence the Gloss on Acts 2, and it is of blessed Jerome, says: This is not read in the Gospel; for not all things were written, but perhaps Paul heard this from the apostles or perceived it from the Holy Spirit. And Master Nicholas of Lyra pursues the same in his exposition. Hence such truths, and those which from it can be inferred immutably by necessary consequence, are to be reckoned among catholic truths.

⁴ The fourth kind of catholic truths is of those things which were defined by the universal Church in plenary councils as pertaining to the religion of the Christian faith, although they are not found expressly in the canon of Sacred Scripture. And the reason for this is manifest: since, as above in book 3, ch. 58, we showed most amply and irrefragably, the plenary councils of the universal Church cannot err in those things which are of faith. Hence blessed Gregory in ch. Just As, distinct. 15, says that just as the four books of the holy Gospel, so the four councils I confess to receive and venerate. And the reason is: since, as blessed Gregory says in the treatise which is entitled On Catholic truth. As God is truth, so those things which the apostolic Church taught concerning God are true. Hence it is deservedly said in Prov. 1: “Forsake not the law of thy mother,” the Gloss: of the Church. But it was notably said: Which the apostolic Church taught, namely by judicial definition to be believed; which is said because of many things which are permitted and tolerated in the Church to be read by the faithful, all of which to believe is not of the necessity of salvation, nor are they to be reputed among catholic truths, although many of them are piously believed by the faithful, such as are many things contained in the legends or histories of the saints and the lives of the fathers, which since they are not manifestly known to be false, but rather have some appearance of probability, can be believed because they profit unto moving the pious acts of the faithful to devotion, are securely read and piously believed, provided only the mind does not adhere to them with obstinate assertion.

⁵ The fifth kind of catholic truths is of those things which in matter of faith were defined by the judgment of the apostolic see, which although they are not found contained in the canon of Sacred Scripture, are nevertheless to be reckoned among catholic truths: since, as in the foregoing both by authorities and by reasons we manifestly showed in book 2, ch. 109, the judgment of the apostolic see in those things which are of faith cannot err from truth. For this avails that promise of Christ in Luke 22: “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not, and thou being once converted confirm thy brethren.” Which blessed Augustine too seems most openly to confirm in ch. Among the Canonical, distinct. 19, where among the canonical Scriptures to be reckoned he places the epistles which the apostolic see merited to have and others merited to receive from it. Likewise Pope Agapetus in ch. If All, in the same distinction, where he says thus: If all sanctions of the apostolic see are to be received as strengthened by the divine voice of Peter himself. Likewise blessed Jerome confirms this most clearly in ch. This Is the Faith, 24, q. 1, where he says thus: If this confession of ours is approved by the judgment of thy apostolate, whoever shall wish to calumniate me will prove himself unskilled and ill-disposed, or prove himself not to be catholic but a heretic.

⁶ The sixth kind of catholic truths seems to be of those things which concerning the holding of faith and the confutation of heretics were handed down assertively by doctors approved by the universal Church, although they are not contained expressly in the canon of Sacred Scripture. This is clear: since when the universal Church, which is ruled by the Holy Spirit, approved certain doctors, receiving their doctrine as true, it is necessary that the doctrine of such men, posited assertively and never elsewhere retracted, be true and to be held by all the faithful with firm credulity in that part in which it was received by the universal Church; otherwise the universal Church would seem to have erred in approving and accepting their doctrine as true which nevertheless was not true. Who these doctors approved by the universal Church in universal councils are is gathered from the fifth universal council, in which, as Saint Thomas recounts in book 4 against the Gentiles, ch. 24, it is had thus: We follow in all things the holy fathers and doctors of the Church: Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, and Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Proclus, and we receive all things which they set forth concerning right faith and the condemnation of heretics. Thus there. Afterwards Pope Gelasius in his synod, approving other doctors, adds, as is clear in the canon of the holy Roman Church, distinct. 25. But concerning the approval of the little works of the aforesaid doctors it is to be adverted and noted that the fifth universal council did not simply approve all things contained in the little works of the aforesaid doctors, but only those things which they set forth concerning right faith and the condemnation of heretics. By which it is sufficiently given to be understood that by the fact that the Church has approved or approves the little works of certain doctors, it is not necessary that all things contained in them be understood as approved, but only as regards those things which they set forth concerning right faith and concerning the condemnation of heretics, which they handed down to the faithful to be believed as necessary. Nor consequently is it had from the aforesaid approval that all truths contained in the little works of the aforesaid holy approved doctors are to be held as catholic truth, but only truths of the aforesaid kind, namely those which they set forth concerning right faith and the condemnation of heretics. Many other things indeed are contained in them of another kind, namely of probability. Hence Augustine, who is of the number of those approved by the universal Church, says to Vincent Victor, and it is had in ch. I Cannot Deny, distinct. 9: I cannot deny, he says, nor ought I, that as in the greater ones themselves, that is in the writings of the elders, so in so many little works of mine there are many things which can with just judgment and with no rashness be blamed. Nor does that stand against the aforesaid kind of catholic truths which blessed Augustine says in ch. Do Not and in ch. I Alone, distinct. 9. For, as the Gloss says in ch. Do Not, Augustine speaks according to those times when the writing of Augustine and of the other holy fathers was not yet authentic, but today all things are commanded to be held down to the last iota, as in distinct. 15, last chapter.

⁷ The seventh kind of catholic truths is of those things which from the fourth, fifth, and sixth kind of catholic truths can be inferred by necessary and formal consequence. We say by necessary and formal consequence, for if something were inferred only by probable consequence, it would not properly be called catholic truth, but only probable.

⁸ An eighth kind can be distinguished of those truths which although absolutely they are not catholic, are nevertheless redolent of catholic truth; for they are near to catholic truths. Hence truth redolent of catholic truth can be defined thus: Truth redolent of catholic truth or faith consequently is that which, with some other truth joined to it not pertaining to faith, but nevertheless which cannot reasonably be denied, becomes catholic truth. For example, since now in the apostolic dignity sits Master Thomas of Sarzana. This: Thomas of Sarzana is Pope, is a proposition redolent of catholic truth. This is clear, since with that truth joined to it which cannot be denied, namely that he was duly and canonically elected, as for instance by the whole college of lord cardinals or by two parts, it is made to be called catholic truth. Master Thomas of Sarzana duly canonically elected and received into the papacy by the universal Church is the true Pope; this proposition is catholic from the determination of the universal Church, as in ch. In the Name of the Lord. Likewise in the decretal epistle of Martin from the council of Constance: Among the things to be believed by every faithful is placed that the canonically elected Pope who for the time shall be, with his proper name expressed, is the successor of blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God. From the foregoing it is easy to understand that all truths are not of the same stamp, but of diverse kinds or grades. For certain, as has been seen, are catholic, certain redolent of catholic truth, and certain only probable, certain to be piously believed, certain impertinent.

From those things which we expounded a little before concerning the multiplicity of kinds or grades of catholic truths, it will be quite easy to understand that heresy, which is contrary to catholic truth, also contains under itself many kinds or species. And since, according to the sentence of Aristotle, in as many ways as one of opposites is said, in so many ways is the other also said, the species of heresies cannot be described more rightly than according to the species of the catholic truths to which they are opposed. Let us say therefore that the first species of heresies is of those false assertions which contradict in their proper terms the catholic truths of the first kind, namely truths contained under their proper form in sacred Scripture. In which kind are these assertions, namely that in the beginning the Word was not, or that not all things were made through him, or that the Word was not made flesh, which in their proper terms contradict truths formally contained in the gospel of Saint John. The second species of heresies is of those false assertions which conflict with truths of the second kind of catholic truths, namely those inferred by necessary and formal consequence from the contents of sacred Scripture alone. In which kind of heresies are these, namely that angels do not have being from God, or that Christ did not have a passive or agent intellect. The opposites of which are inferred by manifest necessary consequence from the contents of sacred Scripture. The third species of heresies can be distinguished of those assertions which are contrary to truths of the third mode of catholic truths, namely those which the universal Church believes and observes by apostolic tradition or revelation. Of this kind is that heretical proposition, that the faithful ought not to be signed with the cross, or that the use of the sign of the cross ought not to be in the Church. The fourth species of heresies is of those false assertions which contradict truths of the fourth mode of catholic truths, namely those defined and determined by the judgment of the universal Church in universal councils. The fifth species of heresies is of those false assertions which are contrary to truths of the fifth mode of catholic truths, namely those determined and defined by the judgment of the apostolic see. The sixth species of heresies is of those false assertions which contradict truths of the sixth mode of catholic truths, namely the doctrines of the holy fathers approved by the universal Church in those things which they expounded concerning right faith and the condemnation of heretics. The seventh species of heresies is of those false assertions which contradict truths of the seventh mode of catholic truths, namely truths inferred by necessary and formal consequence from the fourth, fifth, and sixth kind of catholic truths. But besides these species of heresies there is distinguished a certain species of false assertion, namely of assertions which although absolutely they are not heretical, yet savor of heresy because near to heresy, such as that which asserts a perverse doctrine from which, with a notorious truth that cannot be denied, follows heresy properly so called. For example, this proposition, every man existing at Rome is in mortal sin, can be said to savor of heresy, because from it, with some true assumption, namely that a newly baptized infant is at Rome, it follows that a newly baptized infant at Rome is in mortal sin, which is heretical. For in baptism every man, whether little or great, dies to sin, as Aug. testifies in the Enchiridion, found On Consecration, dist. 4, ch. A parvulo, where he says: From a newly born infant to a decrepit old man, just as none is to be prohibited from baptism, so there is none who does not die to sin in baptism, etc. Likewise in ch. Regenerante, the same distinction, the same says.

With the things said above rightly understood, it appears that there is not one but a manifold kind of damnable propositions. For there is the rash proposition, the erroneous proposition, the injurious proposition, the ill-sounding or scandalous proposition or one offensive to pious ears¹, the seditious proposition, the heretical proposition, the proposition savoring of heresy. For a rash proposition is a proposition asserting something as certain which cannot be efficaciously proved by reason or authority, as a proposition asserting that the world will end within a hundred or two hundred years. But this, although it can be true, yet one asserting it as certain is called rash, because for it neither authority nor efficacious reason is had. An erroneous proposition is called a proposition asserting something which is false. Hence Aug. in the book On the Academics says: Error is approval of the false for the true. But an injurious proposition is one which detracts from the state of any of the faithful or any notable person. A scandalous or ill-sounding proposition or one offensive to pious ears is called a proposition which furnishes occasion of ruin to hearers, as many propositions which, although with an added modification they are true, yet by themselves and absolutely, uttered without modification, seem to favor heretical propositions, as if one should bring forward simply that the Father is greater than the Son, and that God in the incarnation was made a creature, and the like, which according to the doctors are rather to be expounded than extended. A seditious proposition is called an assertion which would induce division and rent in the people, as is that proposition that an evil prelate or prince is not to be obeyed, and the like. But what a heretical proposition or one savoring of heresy is, we explained above in the preceding chapter. But here it is to be noted that these kinds of propositions are not so distinguished that at times many of them do not concur in one proposition. For one and the same will at times be both a rash, erroneous, injurious, ill-sounding proposition and one offensive to pious ears, and even heretical, as is manifest.