Summa de Ecclesia

Although the objections of the adversaries could be fully answered in a few words, nevertheless for a fuller understanding of the present matter, what the holy Pope can do in the statutes both of universal councils and of the holy fathers and of his predecessors, and for a clearer reply to the chapters adduced by the adversaries to the contrary, note must be taken of the following. This, as can be clearly gathered, from the distinction assigned above between interpretation, dispensation, and revocation or abrogation: in many matters there can be room for interpretation where there can be no room for dispensation, and consequently none for abrogation; and in many matters there can be room for dispensation where there is no place for abrogation; and in some matters there can be room for both, as is shown most clearly by the following conclusions. First conclusion. In many matters the Pope can have the authority of interpreting where he has no faculty of dispensing and much less of revoking.

This conclusion is clear, since the Pope, as vicar of Christ, has the authority of interpreting the doubts in the divine law that can confront the faithful, as we showed above in bk. 2, ch. 107. Hence also in the old law recourse concerning doubts of the law was to the priests, and whoever did not abide by their interpretation was held guilty of death, as is clear in Deut. 17; and it is adduced in Extra, de testibus, licet, where the Pope interprets that text, in the mouth of two or three, that is, not of a few but of very many. And yet he cannot dispense in the divine law. For in the precepts of the law of nature he cannot, as in having two wives, in which only the Founder can dispense, as the Pope himself says in Extra, de divortiis, ch. Gaudemus. Likewise neither in the positive precepts of either testament instituted immediately by God or by Christ, as that a man should not be bound to baptism or to confession or the like, for in the law of a superior an inferior cannot dispense except insofar as it is committed to him; this, however, does not appear to have been committed to him. Hence he is read to have been commissioned rather to change the course of nature by miracles than to dispense with the dictate of natural law and with divine precepts. And the same must be said of the canons and rules of the holy fathers and of the decrees of his predecessors in which things are laid down pertaining to the articles of faith, or to the sacraments which are the foundations of the Christian religion, or to good morals. It is certain that, although the Pope's interpretation can apply to such things when some ambiguity arises, dispensation cannot, and much less revocation, since those to whom lesser things are forbidden are understood to be forbidden the greater, as is held in Extra, de sententia excommunicationis, ch. Cum illorum. To dispense is less than to revoke, since every whole is greater than its part. To revoke is to abrogate the law entirely, with respect to every person, place, and time; dispensation, however, is with respect to certain persons or to certain times or places. And so it is clear that the Pope can neither change nor revoke the articles of faith, nor the precepts of the law of nature or of the Decalogue, nor the sacraments, just as he cannot dispense in them; and in this sense are to be taken and understood the chapters adduced from the opposite side, such as ch. sicut, dist. 15, and ch. sunt quidam, 25. q. 1; 25. q. 1, etc. contra ibidem.

¹ The second conclusion is that in some canons or statutes of the holy fathers the Pope can dispense where he cannot generally take away or revoke anything. This conclusion is clear, since the Pope dispenses in the canons of the apostles, as is clear in that a bigamist is promoted, as is held in ch. lector, dist. 24, and that a fornicating priest is not deposed, as in ch. presbyter, 72. dist.; and yet he cannot generally abolish these canons. For this note, following lord Peter de Palude on the third book of the Sentences, that although what the apostles did in the primitive Church on their own authority, or on the authority of their office alone and by their own impulse, the Roman pontiff can now change, since he does not have lesser authority than those men had, yet not what was done by special commission or spiritual inspiration, since neither the apostles themselves nor their successors can revoke such things except insofar as the principal should commit it, just as the scribe of the imperial law or its promulgator cannot revoke it except insofar as the prince commits it to him anew. Whatever was constituted through the apostles that has been received into the canon is believed to have been specially inspired by the Holy Spirit, and likewise what was done in the four universal councils. Thus in the primitive Church the apostles ordained some things not simply but for a time, which was not revoked but fulfilled when it ended with time, such as the observance by Jews of the legal code together with the Gospel, and abstinence from strangled meat and blood, and celebration with leavened bread, and the like, which ceased with the lapse of time. But some things they so ordained, with the Holy Spirit dictating, as to remain forever; although for place and time it might be licit to dispense, yet not to remove them entirely, and thus it is expedient for the Church. And in such matters it was licit for successors to dispense, with the same Spirit committing it, as is openly gathered from the deed of the holy fathers themselves who are read to have dispensed, as was clear in the examples given and in many others; but it is not licit to revoke such things generally, since it has not been committed, as is apparent, since no saint presumed this. And since for the government of nature, and especially of grace, the Lord does what is better, indeed it belongs to the best to bring about the best, therefore he committed what is expedient and nothing else. It is useful for the Church that dispensation sometimes be granted to a bigamist and a striker and the like, since such men are sometimes found to be better; but it would not be expedient that such men be promoted indifferently just like the rest. Hence he committed the former and prohibited the latter: therefore the Pope can dispense in such matters, but he cannot revoke them generally and universally as he would one decretal issued by himself or by his predecessor. Hence Alanus noted, in Extra, de decimis, ch. licet, that the Pope could grant to some layman that he not pay tithes or that he receive them; yet he could not grant this to all laymen in perpetuity by establishing a general law, but only by dispensing for a cause, for a time, just as tithes of clerics are also granted to kings in aid of the holy land or for another just cause.

The third conclusion. In many canons and statutes of the holy fathers the Roman pontiff, just as he can dispense, so can he also abrogate and entirely abolish them. This conclusion is clear from the many abrogated canons and institutions of the supreme pontiffs his predecessors by the Roman pontiffs who followed, as is clear in the examples given before concerning the ancient canons on the age of those to be ordained. With these points established, reply must be made to the arguments to the contrary. To the first, from ch. in istis, dist. 4, the reply is by denying what the adversaries argue from it, since that chapter is understood not of the supreme judge, namely the Pope or the prince, for these can, even after laws have been established, judge concerning them and abolish or moderate them, but it speaks of the inferior judge. Hence lord Arch., expounding this chapter, says thus: The letter here speaks of the inferior judge. For if the inferior judge wishes to propose something as to why that law should not be established, he will be heard more readily at first than afterwards, as an argument for this in dist. 31, Nicena.

² To the second, from ch. sicut, dist. 5, the reply is twofold. First, to the antecedent: what is said, that those four councils could not be changed or revoked, can be understood in two ways. In one way, because they are councils, and thus the antecedent is not true, since what belongs to something insofar as it is such belongs to every such thing, just as what belongs to man insofar as man belongs to every man. If therefore this belonged to those four councils insofar as they are councils, it would follow that he could revoke no sentences given or constitutions made in any councils whatever, which is nevertheless false, as in the Gloss on per principia, 9. q. 3. Or it can be understood that this belongs to those four councils not insofar as they are councils but insofar as they concern such matter, namely the truth of the articles of faith; and thus we say that this belongs to those four councils, that they cannot be revoked, for this reason, namely that they were nothing but declaratory of the articles of faith. Second, the reply is by denying the consequence, namely that it follows from that chapter that the Pope can dispense or change nothing in the canons of universal councils, although it is well conceded that he cannot change the statutes of universal councils in what concerns the articles of faith and the general state of the universal Church, as the Gloss on the same chapter holds. Hence Arch. in the Rosarium says the same in this form of words: I admit it with regard to what pertains to faith and the general state of the Church; in other matters he can act against the statutes of councils. If it be asked what is said to pertain to the general state of the Church, it seems to us that among others these are such as can touch all the faithful, for instance those things by whose alteration the whole Church would be troubled, as the example given is the deposition of all bishops at once, since, as all Christian souls are in the hands of the bishops, this touches everyone; and since bishops succeed in the place of the apostles and represent the universal Church, the Christian faith would be troubled. Moreover, since in the deposition of all bishops at once there cannot be a just cause, above all a defect of faith in the Pope would be presumed in such a deposition, and this would work to the destruction of the faith, by which the whole of Christendom would be troubled. And it is rightly said to pertain to the universal state of the Church, and thus an example could be given in many other things by which the universal Church would be troubled and scandalized. Likewise the divine precepts, the precepts of the natural law, and the sacraments could be said to pertain to the universal state of the Church, in which the state and salvation of the universal Church consist and which touch everyone universally.

³ To the third, from ch. sancta octo, dist. 16, the reply is in the same way as to the preceding, namely that it is to be understood of what regards the articles of faith and the general state of the universal Church, and what is necessary for salvation.

⁴ To the fourth, from § Hoc autem intelligendum, dist. 19, the reply is that what master Gratian says there is to be understood of those things of which the preceding chapters, as expounded, treat; otherwise he would not speak truly. Hence lord Arch. in the Rosarium, expounding this passage, says thus: Gratian seems to say, namely that the Pope cannot establish anything different against the well-established statutes of the predecessors of his predecessors, which I do not think to be true. For he can revoke even well-established things, with cause considered, provided he does not touch the precepts of the old and new testament or the articles of faith or what is necessary for salvation or what pertains to the general state of the Church; and therefore I do not approve what the Master says here, unless it is understood of such things. Thus Arch.

⁵ To the fifth, from ch. sunt quidam, 25. q. 1, the reply is the same as was given to the preceding ones, and it is the reply of the Gloss, which says there that it is true that the Pope does not dispense in what pertains to the articles of faith and what is of divine right. But he does in other matters, as with a bigamist against the Apostle, as in dist. 34, lector, and against the canon of the apostles, as in ch. presbyter, 82. dist. Likewise also at times against the general state of the Church, as Innocent did in the Lateran council, Extra, de consanguinitate et affinitate. Thus the Gloss.

⁶ To the sixth, from ch. Contra, the reply is as the Gloss replies, which on the word statuta says thus: Of the articles of faith, as was said in the preceding chapter. To this chapter St. Thomas also replies in the same way in the treatise against the attackers of religion, saying thus: What is said here is true in those things which the statutes of the holy fathers decreed concerning divine right, such as the articles of faith which were determined through councils; but what the holy fathers decreed concerning positive right is left to the disposition of the Pope, so that he can change or dispense with them according to the opportunities of times or affairs. Thus St. Thomas.

⁷ To the seventh, which is adduced from Pope Leo, the reply is, granted that that authority stands as adduced by the adversary, which nevertheless is not entirely true, that that authority does nothing for the adversaries, for two reasons. First, because although Pope Leo says that the Nicene canons can be uprooted by no dishonesty or corrupted by novelty, he does not deny that by the authority of the Roman pontiff, for the necessity and utility of the faithful, dispensation can be made in them. There is a great difference between these two things: to be uprooted by dishonesty, and to be moderated for necessity or utility. Second, because although it belongs to the Pope to take care lest the canons be violated by anyone at will, it does not follow that he himself cannot dispense for a reasonable cause, as is manifest.

⁸ To the eighth, from ch. violatores, 27. q. 1, the reply is that that chapter does nothing for the adversaries, since, although violators of the canons voluntarily and without necessity are reprehended and deserve condemnation, the Roman pontiff is not thereby prohibited from dispensing with or changing them if the condition of persons, places, or things demands it. For it is one thing to violate the canons by one's own will without cause and without necessity, and another, with a reasonable cause existing, to dispense in them through one having authority, especially since, as St. Thomas says in the treatise against the attackers of religion, when the Pope dispenses with or changes canons according to the opportunities of times and affairs, he does not act against the canons or statutes of the holy fathers, since he preserves the intention of those who established them, which is the utility of the Church, just as happens in all positive right: for earlier statutes are derogated by later statutes. Thus he. To the same point Chrysostom on Matt. says thus: The law is subject to the lawgiver, not the lawgiver to the law; he therefore who dissolves the law dissolves indeed the letter of the law, but he does not dissolve the purpose of his law; rather, he advances it toward this dignity. Thus he.

To the ninth objection, taken from the same ch. violatores, the reply is as was replied above to the sixth, by denying the consequence. For this note, following St. Thomas and the doctors, that a twofold kind of canons is distinguished which, with the Holy Spirit dictating, were established through many saints in councils or outside councils. The first kind is of those that are of divine right, such as canons pertaining, or statutes, to the articles of faith, or to the substance of the sacraments, or that have a manifest connection with the divine law pertaining to good morals; and of such are understood all those chapters, as St. Thomas says, following also the Gloss, which are set down in 25. q. 1, namely ch. violatores and sunt quidam, ch. contra statuta, ch. prima salus. The second kind of canons is of those which the holy fathers instituted in universal councils concerning positive right. For although all canons issued unanimously and with one consent by the holy fathers are reckoned to have been established with the Holy Spirit as dictating and inspiring them, nevertheless not all are said to pertain either to the law of nature or to divine right, as the adversaries seem to imply; but some are said to pertain to positive right. For if all canons that are said to have been established with the Holy Spirit were therefore said to pertain to the law of nature or to divine right, they would be indispensable, and thus the Church would err in dispensing with canons made by the holy fathers. Likewise neither could those once constituted be changed, and many other consequences would follow that are altogether absurd and unfitting. In the first kind of canons, which seem to pertain to the law of the Lord, the Pope neither dispenses nor makes any change. In the second kind of canons, however, he does so, as has often been said.

⁹ To the tenth, which is taken from the fact that a canon is called a rule, the reply is by denying the minor, in which it is said that rules of such matters of action must be immovable and immutable like principles in speculative matters. For this note that, since the firmness of certitude varies according to the variety of things, as is said in bk. 1 of De anima and bk. 1 of the Ethics, and every measure is spoken of relatively to the measured, not every measure or rule must be of equal certitude or firmness, nor can all be infallible, but only as far as possible in its own kind. Hence, since the things to be regulated by human law, whether canonical or conciliar, are contingent singulars variously variable, human laws cannot have that immutability which the first principles have in speculative matters, as is manifest; indeed, on account of the variety of such things, to which measures and rules must be fitted for the welfare of the republic, it is necessary that the laws themselves be changeable, as was shown above by the authority of the holy fathers, ch. 52. Hence a law which at one time is just and useful, if kept at another time, would be unjust and harmful. For this observe, following St. Thomas in 1-2, that the straight in corporeal things is spoken of absolutely, and therefore its straightness, as far as it itself is concerned, remains always straight; but the straightness of law is taken not absolutely but in relation to the common utility, to which one and the same thing is not always proportioned, and therefore such straightness changes. Hence Aug. says in the first book of De libero arbitrio that a temporal law, although just, can nevertheless be changed. And so it is clear that that argument, which among the adversaries was considered of great force, does not proceed. And to ch. primam salus, 25. q. 1, which is adduced, the reply is that it is understood of statutes established by the holy fathers that are of divine right, and not of those that are of positive right, since in such matters it is licit to depart for place and time. Hence on account of this difference that exists in the constitutions of the holy fathers, Pope Leo says in ch. sicut, dist. 14: just as there are some things that no reasoning can uproot, so there are many that must be tempered either for the necessity of the times or for consideration of them. By this distinction many other arguments of the adversaries, which they adduce concerning the immutability of the canons, are solved. ¹⁰ To the eleventh, which asks whether he can abolish etc., the reply is according to what was said above: that against the sayings of the apostles outside sacred scripture the Roman pontiff can act, since he is thus superior; but against the sayings contained in sacred scripture he cannot, not because they are Paul's, but because as contained in scripture they necessarily contain infallible truth, and because scripture is principally from the Holy Spirit, but from Paul instrumentally, following that of Ps. 4, My tongue is the pen of a scribe, etc. An action, however, is attributed to the principal agent and not to the instrumental one; and therefore, since the Holy Spirit is superior to the Pope, for him to act against them would be against the Holy Spirit; and thus that consequence of the adversaries does not proceed, by which they say: therefore the Pope can abolish what Paul set down in his epistles, since those epistles are contained in the canon of sacred scripture.

¹¹ To the twelfth, from ch. Decretales, it must be said that the consequence is invalid, since they regard different graces: for the first regards excellence of knowledge, the second eminence of power. And therefore, although the most excellent doctors of the divine scriptures may surpass the Roman pontiffs in knowledge, and we say may, since a Roman pontiff can be so learned that in his own time none is equal or even superior to him in knowledge, nevertheless in the definition of causes or doubts, in the dispensation of canons, or in the changing even of the statutes of their predecessors, all of which regard authority, the pontiffs are deservedly preferred. Hence St. Thomas in quodlibet 5 and the last says that one must stand by the sentence of the Pope, to whom it belongs to determine concerning faith, in rendering judgment, rather than by the opinions in the scriptures of any wise men. For he says in 2-2, q. 2, art. 3, that neither Jerome nor Aug. nor any of the saints defended his own sentence against the authority of the Pope. From this the presumption of the new adversary masters is sufficiently confounded, who so openly presume to prefer their own sentences to the sentences of the supreme pontiffs and even of the holy fathers.