Summa de Ecclesia

Notwithstanding these objections, to which it is easy to reply although they are many in number, we must stand firmly in the position stated before, namely that the Pope, the general vicar of Christ holding His place and stead on earth, is greater and superior in authority not only to any prelate of a particular church but also to a universal council gathered from all the other prelates of the world. Therefore we must speak to each of the arguments.

To the first we answer ¹ as was answered elsewhere most fully in the second book, ch. 98, where it was held in conclusion that by the term church to which every one of the faithful seems to be remitted as to a judge in that authority of Matt. 18, “tell the church,” there is not regularly to be understood the universal Church, neither as dispersed through the world nor as gathered synodally into one, but the prelate of the church, according to the exposition of Chrysostom, blessed Augustine and blessed Thomas and almost all the ancient doctors. ² To those testimonies brought forward by the adversaries to prove that the aforesaid text “tell the church” is to be understood of the universal council, we answer that it is false that any of those doctors wished to understand this, which is clear by going through them one by one. Not indeed blessed Gregory when he says, “it remains for me to bring in the church,” since there by church he calls neither the universal Church which is the gathering of all the faithful nor a universal synod, but the discipline or censure of ecclesiastical authority, which is clearly manifest from two things. First from the form of speech, for he says: “If I am despised in my correction, it remains that I ought to bring in the church,” which seems to sound like nothing other than: if I am despised in my correction which I have often made by my letters and through my messengers, it remains that I bring in ecclesiastical discipline, for instance of excommunication or suspension. Second, this same thing is gathered from the deeds of blessed Gregory concerning that cause, since blessed Gregory, despised in his correction by the aforesaid John, patriarch of Constantinople, did not bring in a universal council for his correction but ecclesiastical discipline, whence he commanded his envoys whom he sent to Constantinople not to communicate with him in sacred things. Hence the same Gregory, writing to Emperor Maurice concerning the same man, says of the same brother and fellow-priest of mine: “I have taken care earnestly to admonish him, that if he desires the peace of the concord of all, he restrain himself from the appellation of a foolish term.” Likewise in the following letter to Eugenius, bishop of Alexandria, and Anastasius, bishop of Antioch, concerning Cyriacus the patriarch who had followed John in usurping the universal name, he says thus: “My deacon ought not to celebrate the solemnities of Mass with our aforesaid brother Cyriacus, because he has either committed or follows the profane term through the fault of pride, lest if (which God forbid) he proceeds while placed in such elation, we seem to confirm the vanity of the foolish name; but I have endeavored to admonish the same brother to correct himself of such superstition, because if he does not correct it he will in no way have peace with us.” Likewise in another letter to the same Cyriacus the Patriarch he writes thus: “With that charity which is fitting we endeavor that you hasten to remove from the midst of the Church the scandal of the profane elation of a perverse and proud term, lest we be found divided from the fellowship of our peace.” Thus far he. Behold what blessed Gregory calls the church which he wished to bring in or approach, since it was nothing but the ecclesiastical censure which he himself could inflict. Second, it can be answered that even if blessed Gregory wished to understand by church there the universal council, it does not follow on that account that the universal council is superior in authority to the Roman pontiff, since Gregory himself, writing to the Emperor Maurice against the aforesaid John, patriarch of Constantinople, says: “Behold, Peter received the keys of the heavenly kingdom, to him was given the power of binding and loosing, to him was committed the care of the whole Church and the principate, and yet he is not called the universal apostle.” Hence it is not to be taken that he was about to bring in the church as a greater tribunal but for the greater confusion and shame of him, just as the Gloss of Jerome says on that passage of Matt. 18, “tell the church,” namely that he may suffer the greater shame; after all these things follows excommunication, which must be made through the mouth of the church, that is, through the priest. But what is secondly brought forward from ch. Principally, 11, q. 3, also does not serve the adversaries, because when Pope Nicholas says “that we say to the church,” by the name of the church he understands not the universal Church or the universal council, but designates himself as present in judgment.

For as holy Thomas ³ discusses the meaning of the aforesaid authority, “If your brother sin against you,” etc., “tell the church,” both in 4, dist. 19 and in 2-2, q. 34, he says that to tell the prelate presiding in judgment is to tell the church, and that this is so in the present place is clear through the Gloss on the aforesaid chapter, which runs thus: “therefore in a cause of denunciation the same man can be judge, accuser and witness, Extra, On synods, ch. It is permitted.” ⁴ What is thirdly brought forward from Albert the Great does not serve the adversaries, for two reasons. First because it is false that Albert the Great said it as alleged; but his formal words are these which follow: “tell the church, that is, the prelate in sight or in synod,” so that “in synod” is in the ablative case just as the term “in sight.” Second because, even if Albert said it as brought forward from the other side, no superiority in the synod over the Roman pontiff follows on that account, as is manifest. ⁵ To the second principal argument, from Acts of the Apostles ch. 8, it is answered that it is false that sending always imports superiority in the sender with respect to the person sent, as we showed most fully in book 2, ch. 14; see there. To the third, which is taken from that passage of Acts 15, ⁶ “rising,” etc., it must be said that it avails little, since blessed Peter is not said to have risen to speak out of reverence to be shown to the other apostles as though to greater men, or to show subjection, since he was the prince of the apostles and the head of the apostolic choir, but so that he might be better heard in so great a multitude, as Nicholas of Lyra expounds that passage of Acts 11, “Peter rising said.” And in like manner it is answered to the other objection of the adversaries by which they argue from the fact that presidents of the pope are read to have risen at times in universal councils when they ought to speak, as in the sixth council in action 1.

To the fourth, concerning the eighth synod, ⁷ it is answered that that authority, well considered with a sound eye, even considering what precedes, does nothing for the adversaries but rather against them, which is clear thus: for that synod to say that if any ambiguity has arisen concerning the Roman Church it is permitted venerably and with fitting reverence, namely, to inquire, that is, to search into it, and so, by thus venerably searching, to receive a solution, or to profit, or to make progress, yet not boldly to give sentence, as if assigning the reason, subjoining against the supreme pontiffs of elder Rome: plainly the Roman pontiff would not be supreme if anyone could give sentence against him by way of superiority. But the consequence which the adversaries draw, saying that the synod, if not boldly yet reverently, could bear sentence against the Roman pontiff, is null, because in this the argument from the contrary sense is void: for it would not be reverence but irreverence, confusion, rash presumption, for inferior pontiffs to bear sentence against the supreme pontiff. Similar things notes the Archdeacon on ch. It is not fitting, dist. 12, on those words let there be no resistance by hard pride to apostolic precepts, saying thus: here the argument from the contrary sense is void, for it would not be humility but pride, not discretion but indiscretion, if he be resisted.

To the fifth, which is taken from the declaration made at Constance by certain fathers of the obedience of John 23, ⁸ thus named in his obedience, we have answered sufficiently above in book 2, ch. 99; see there. To the sixth, which is taken from the bull of lord Martin, ⁹ it is answered by denying the consequence: since from the fact that the universal synod is called supreme among other churches it in no way follows that it is above its head, which is the Roman pontiff, in superiority of authority, especially since the whole authority of the councils themselves, and their name and dignity, are judged to depend on the apostolic see in which the Lord placed the principate of the whole Church, as in dist. 17 throughout.

To the seventh, which is taken from ch. Whoever ¹⁰ 35, q. 9, it is answered that the adversaries err in two ways. First because they allege the authority badly. Second because they conclude badly from it. The first is clear, for that text does not run as it was brought forward but thus. For Pope Hilary says that what was constituted by him, so that it may henceforth be kept more tenaciously, “if it please, accommodate all of you your sentences and your own subscriptions,” etc. The second is clear, namely that from that text the argument is badly made from the other side: since Pope Hilary did not require the sentences and subscriptions of the fathers of that synod as of a superior tribunal or of a greater power, but because with the consensus and approbation of them all intervening, his sentence and institute would be kept “more tenaciously,” as the text has it. For we said above that the consensus and approbation of a synod avails much both for the easier obedience of the statutes of the Roman pontiff and for their firmer custody. Moreover, if the adversary had fully considered that text he would have found it more against himself than for himself: both from the fact that the pope in that council is said to preside, and secondly from the fact that he alone gave the rule in the reformation of the Church and the synod concurred by assenting. To the eighth, which is taken from ch. Well, dist. 96, ¹¹ it is answered that it in no way favors the adversaries but most strongly confirms our proposition, since in that place the pope does not ask that the synod authoritatively give sentence as a superior judge as to what should be done about that writing, but only that it counsel or say what appears to the judgment of its discretion, whether that writing has any strength or not. Hence all those bishops who answered that it was of no strength assigned this reason, because it had not been strengthened by the authority of the apostolic see which by consenting to synodal statutes gives firmness to them. Moreover this same thing is here manifest from the words of the synod itself which spoke after the aforesaid bishops, saying thus: “Although according to the prosecution of our venerable brothers Laurence, Peter,” etc., “nor is it held uncertain among us that this same writing is of no moment, yet if anyone could by reason subject it, in every way in synodal sight it was fitting that it be enervated and led to nothing by the provident sentence of your beatitude,” etc. Behold that the synod, recognizing that the principate of authority is with the Roman pontiff, professes that it belongs to him to give definitive sentence in the synod as to what should be done concerning the aforesaid writing, whether by declaring it to be of no strength or by annulling or voiding it, and not to the synod.

¹² To the ninth, which is taken from the same Symmachus, it is answered that it in nothing favors the adversaries. First because that synod proceeded by the authority of Symmachus the pope himself. Second because, even if in some case it were true that the pope were accused of heresy or despoiled and were to be restored, and the council were the competent judge, according to what is noted by the doctors on ch. If the pope, dist. 40, it does not on that account follow that the council would be above the true and undoubted pope in superiority of authority. ¹³ To the tenth, which is taken from ch. Providence, etc., it is answered that it does nothing for the purpose of the adversaries, for many reasons. First because the apostles gathered together synodally are not read to have defined any provinces or constituted any patriarchs or primates or archbishops, etc. Second because even if the apostles, dispersed through the world preaching and converting peoples to the faith of Christ, erected certain churches and constituted certain prelates, they did this by the authority of blessed Peter who was their prince, and because what was done by the authority of the Roman Church, the Roman Church herself is said to have done, as Pope Nicholas says in ch. All, dist. 22: “The Roman Church instituted the primacy of every patriarch or the primacy of any metropolitan and the chairs of bishoprics, or of churches, or the dignity of any order whatsoever; but He alone founded her and erected her, soon to be born, upon the Rock of faith, who committed to blessed Peter, keeper of the keys of eternal life, the rights of earthly and heavenly rule together.” ¹⁴ To the eleventh, which is taken from ch. Although, and ch. Aforetime, 3, q. 6, it is answered first that the adversaries speak falsely, namely that the company of the apostles as gathered synodally defined such things, nor do the chapters brought forward say this. Secondly, it is answered that even if it were as the adversary says, namely that it had been defined by the company of the apostles gathered as it were synodally that no one but the Roman pontiff ought to define the accusations of bishops and to convoke universal councils, it does not follow from this that there is any superiority in the council over the pope, or was in the council of the apostles over Peter. First, because such a definition conferred no sublimity on Peter, as the adversary falsely and erroneously understands, but well declared what was due to Peter by reason of the primacy. Then secondly, because it is false what the adversary subjoins, that the company of the apostles transferred to Peter authority both concerning the convoking of universal councils and concerning the determination of the causes of bishops; since the Roman pontiff received no authority from the other apostles, but rather they from him, as we showed above in many ways in book 2, ch. 54, and as is had in ch. So the Lord, dist. 19, and in ch. He speaks, 24, q. 1. But what the adversaries bring forward concerning ch. Whoever, where it seems that of old the primate or a council deposed a bishop, avails little, because this was by permission of the pope, as the Gloss says on ch. The accused, 3, q. 6.

¹⁵ To the twelfth, in which it is said that the pope is bound to obey, etc., it is answered that it can be understood in two ways that the pope is bound to obey the statutes of a universal council. In one way because they are statutes of a universal council, and thus we say that it is false that the pope is bound of necessity to obey the statutes of any council whatsoever; since to be bound to obey the statutes of another in such a way designates inferiority in him who is bound to obey: but since the pope is over every council, as has been proved, in this way it is in no way to be said that he is bound of necessity to obey anyone but God, who alone is superior to him, as we shall speak of this more fully below. In another way it can be understood that he is bound to obey the statutes of a council not because they are statutes of a council, but because they are of such matter, for instance of faith, or are things pertaining to divine law, as most especially are the statutes or definitions, for the greater part, of the four universal councils of which Gregory speaks in ch. As, dist. 15, and ch. Against, 25, q. 1, and other like things. And to be bound to obey in this way the statutes of councils, approved however by the apostolic see, by reason of the matter of which they speak, does not argue superiority in the councils over the pope, just as neither in a predecessor if they established like things which concern faith or divine law, as Gregory says in ch. If those things, 25, q. 1: “If I destroyed what our predecessors established I would be proved not a builder but a destroyer,” and this is because such things thus defined in universal councils do not have strength from the councils but from the divine law to which the pope is subject, whence also the Gloss on that passage, As, dist. 15, says thus: “it seems therefore that the pope cannot destroy the statutes of a council, but understand that this is said against the articles of faith.” Likewise lord Arch. in the Rosarium, answering to the same point, says thus: “I confess that in those things which pertain to faith and the general state of the Church, in these he cannot act against the statutes of councils.”

¹⁶ To the thirteenth, which is taken concerning the examination of the sentences of the pope, it is answered by denying the assumption, for we say that it is false that the sentence of the Roman pontiff was ever placed as suspect of truth or justice in any universal council and thence came to be examined in it. Hence Pope Agapitus, writing to the emperors to the sixth synod concerning the legates whom he sent, says thus, that they ought to offer the suggestion in which we set forth beforehand the confession of our apostolic faith, “not however as contending about uncertain things, but as setting forth simply, by compendious definition, things certain and immutable.” But those things which have been brought forward from the other side to prove the antecedent are of no strength if the deeds of the aforesaid councils are rightly weighed. Indeed the sentences of the Roman pontiffs against the aforesaid heretics were not refuted, or read in the synods that they might be examined by the synod, but as far as is gathered from the deeds of the aforesaid councils this seems to have been done for a twofold reason. First so that notice might come to all the fathers existing in the council of the sentences which the Roman pontiff had given, whence in the sixth synod George, archbishop of Constantinople, and the synod subject to him said to the Emperor: “we ask your tranquillity that the suggestions directed to your fortitude instructed by God, both from Agapitus the most holy pope of the apostolic see of ancient Rome and from his synod, be re-read, so that we may receive a hearing, in order that we too may receive knowledge of all the force which is contained in them.” Thus far he. Likewise in the eighth synod in the fifth action it is had that when Photius, led into the presence of the synod, was asked by the synod itself whether he embraced the judgments of the apostolic chair promulgated both concerning himself and concerning Ignatius the patriarch, and he was silent, the vicars of senior Rome said: “Behold the man who stopped his ears like the deaf asp and does not hear the voice which the holy synod objected to him, but wishes by this silence to escape the condemnation which the holy Roman Church promulgated against him many years ago; yet let the letters which were sent concerning him by the holy Roman Church be read. Does it therefore please all that they be read?” The holy synod said: “It pleases.” Behold that at the petition of the vicars of the pope those letters were read, and this that they might come to the knowledge of all, and not that they might be examined whether they were just or canonical. Although after the completion of the first letter the vicars of the pope are read to have said to the synod: “To this what does the holy synod say? Is this letter full of canonical exposition or not?” and the holy synod answered that it embraced the canonical law and synodal precept and legislation, nevertheless these things were not so done or said by way of examination: since in the fourth action of the same synod all those letters themselves had already been read, accepted and commended, nor was that interrogation of the vicars of the pope an interrogation of doubt so that they doubted the truth of the apostolic letters, but it was made that the calumny of the adversaries might be removed, as was that question of John, Matt. 11: “Who are you; do we expect another?” Likewise the question of Christ when He asks concerning Lazarus, “where have you laid him,” not because He did not know, but so that those who showed the sepulchre could neither deny nor calumniate. So here they ask, so that by the answer given through the synod the calumny of the heretics might be more fully removed.

Second because it was condescended that before the synod those judged or condemned themselves might be heard if they wished to object anything against what had been judged, both that the mouths of those speaking against might be stopped, especially because they complained, although falsely, that they had not heard their deposition. Hence they said: “Let us hear our deposition, let us be condemned with ourselves hearing,” and that the justice of the Roman pontiff might become more illustrious, which is clear from those things which are had in action 4 of the eighth synod, where it is read thus: “After these things the most magnificent and most glorious princes through Babanis,” etc., it is above in ch. 25 at length. But this is manifest from the fourth action where Babanis the most magnificent patrician said that his associates and accomplices did not know the judgment made by the pope against them, and therefore the sentence of condemnation ought to be recited before them. The vicars of Pope Nicholas say thus: “It is not permitted to us to rescind the judgment of the holy Roman pontiffs, for this is contrary to the canonical institutes, since those present there through their own envoys and those abiding at Rome heard the sentence against themselves and, with damnation pronounced against their associate and the laying of hands upon him, both heard and clearly learned; yet, that we may make the just judgment of the holy Roman Church more manifest to them, let him enter and hear the synodal definitions and the judgments of the most blessed Pope Nicholas read, and be certified more and more.” The most magnificent and most glorious said: “This is upright and good.” Thus far there.

From these words it is manifestly clear that such a rehandling of the sentence of the Roman pontiff, made in the synod at the suggestion of the aforesaid princes for the reasons assigned, argues no superiority in the synod over the Roman pontiff.

¹⁷ To the fourteenth, which is taken from the letter of blessed Ambrose, it is answered that there is nothing in that letter of blessed Ambrose which in truth favors the adversaries, which is gathered from many things. First because, since that council of Capua was provincial and not universal, if the argument proceeded not only the universal but also the provincial would be argued to be above the pope, which would be an error worse than the first. Second it is said that even if it were a universal council, the letter in all those parts from which the adversaries take their arguments has another meaning than the adversary pretends. For when it says, “O Pope Damasus, the form of judging could not befit us,” the sense is not that the pope himself did not have the faculty of judging, but it says that the form of judging, namely by way of delegation from the council, could not befit him since he was superior. And this is what it subjoins below: “For it does not befit us to judge as from the authority of a synod, we who discharge the embassy of Christ, not of your council.” But when it consequently says, “for if the synod were now whole we would rightly discern those things which the series of your scriptures embraces,” the sense is not that which the adversary gives, saying that the pope confesses that if the synod had not delegated he could have taken cognizance of the cause, but because the synod by delegating anticipated, he says he cannot undertake the burden of judging. These are fabricated words, nor are such things contained in the aforesaid letter, but the true sense is that Pope Damasus says that if the synod were whole it would fittingly judge that cause, assuming judgment to itself, but because it was not whole since already dissolved, and judgment on that part of the synod had been committed to those judges to whom he wrote, he says that such a form of judging does not pertain to him, but that if, through delegation from the council to him, those to whom the cause was delegated judge first, and he awaits the norm of their sentence, then he will be able to judge their judgment by approving or dissolving it. Hence there is no doubt to anyone that from the fact that the pope was unwilling to assume to himself causes delegated through a synod, but wished that the deputed judges first judge, it is not argued that the synod is above the pope, but it is very true that seemliness is shown in the pope, since he wished that the delegation of the cause made through the synod have place.

¹⁸ To the fifteenth, which is taken from the authority of blessed Ambrose, it is answered that that authority in nothing favors the adversaries. For we say that Ambrose spoke truly, that Christ gave eminence of power to the Church subjecting all things to her, but not to the understanding of the adversaries, namely that to the universal Church, as to a universality in all its members, such excellence of power was given in common, because as Ambrose says in the book On Penance, and as is had On Penance, dist. 1, section It is certain: “In the priests alone did the Church receive the keys.” Therefore the excellence of the power of the Church is in the prelates and chiefly in the prelate of prelates, the general vicar of Christ, who alone is called into fullness of power, and to whom as Cyril says all by divine law bow the head.

¹⁹ To the sixteenth, which is taken from ch. We read, dist. 93, it is answered that it does nothing for the purpose on account of two things. First because there Jerome does not speak of the authority of jurisdiction of the world with respect to the Roman or apostolic Church but speaks of the authority of custom, which is said to be of so much greater authority by how much more general it is and by more men is approved, as is gathered from ch. Nov. dist. 12, just as Aug. says concerning the canonical scriptures, and as is had in ch. In canonical, dist. 19. According to which rule there is no doubt that the custom of the world is greater than the custom of the city which the apostolic see does not bid to be observed in all things. That Jerome speaks in this way is clear from the intention of Jerome speaking, for he speaks against the custom which reigned in the city, that certain deacons be preferred to presbyters, from which custom other deacons through the world wished to precede their presbyters although the contrary custom existed through the world, concerning which custom he speaks thus in the text: “Why do you bring forward to me the custom of one city? Why do you vindicate into laws of the Church the paucity from which arrogance has arisen? Everything rare is more desired. Pennyroyal among the Indians is more precious than pepper. Paucity makes deacons honorable, but multitude makes presbyters contemptible.” Thus far he. That that text also speaks of custom is clear from the Gloss which says thus in the same place on the word “greater”: “it is greater and therefore the general custom is rather to be followed, as here.” Then second, the aforesaid authority of Jerome does not serve for the adversaries, because the Roman pontiff is bishop not of the city alone but of the world, since he is the head and prince of the universal Church. Hence Jerome himself, speaking on the death or birth of the holy fathers, says thus of blessed Peter: “Peter is in Christ the foundation of the Church, Cephas the principate and head of the body of Christ, prince of the apostles, shepherd of the human race, rock of the Church, keeper of the keys of the kingdom.”

²⁰ To the seventeenth, which is taken from a certain letter of the same Jerome, it is answered that in nothing does it favor the adversaries. For what Jerome says, that God gave all His power to the disciples, is soundly to be understood, since it is not to be understood, nor did blessed Jerome understand, of all divine power absolutely, because He gave to the disciples neither the power of authority which is of God alone nor the power of excellence which is proper to Christ, but only the ministerial, as Aug. says. Nor did He give even the ministerial to His disciples without order, because all things which are from God are ordered, Rom. 13. It is therefore said that Christ gave all power to the disciples, because He made all sharers of that power, yet not so that any of them should be called into fullness of power, but one only, namely Peter, whom He set over all as head and prince, as Jerome himself says, as is clear in the answer to the preceding argument. And so it is clear that although the other prelates who succeed the apostles are sharers of the power of the keys, yet the Roman pontiff who succeeds Peter received before all, and consequently is greater and superior to all of them, whether dispersed or congregated.

²¹ To the eighteenth, which is taken from the letter of Augustine, it is answered that in nothing does it favor the adversaries although among them it is reckoned their Achilles. Moreover because it is not the intention of blessed Augustine to say in that letter that the universal council is superior to the pope in authority of power, which is clear because in the letter itself, as also in the book On Unique Baptism, it is set forth that in the Roman Church the principate of the apostolic chair has flourished, which would not be true if another tribunal superior to, or another chair higher than, that of the Roman pontiff were named; what blessed Aug. therefore says, “there still remained therefore the plenary council of the universal Church,” he did not say by reason of superiority of principate or of power which is greater in the plenary council than in the apostolic see, since as has been said the authority of councils depends on the Roman pontiff, but he said this by reason of a fuller and greater examination, such as was hoped for in the plenary council of the fathers of the whole Church. But that this is indeed the meaning of blessed Aug. is clear from the words of his letter itself, and from other things which he recounts concerning that matter in the book On Unique Baptism. But he says thus in the aforesaid letter: “but yet now as though they had something to say, that bad judges had been weighed, which is the voice of all bad litigants when they have been overcome even by the most manifest truth, as though it could not still be said to them, and most justly said: Behold, let us suppose those bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges, there still remained the plenary council of the universal Church, where the cause could be pleaded even with those judges themselves.” Thus far there. And Aug. said this chiefly because, as he himself says in the book On Unique Baptism, the greater bishops of the accusers complained to the Emperor concerning Caecilianus, who though innocent had been judged by the pope, that that judgment at Rome had not been fully examined and set forth, for which reason Aug. said that the aforesaid bishops, the accusers of Caecilianus, who said, although falsely, that the judgment made at Rome had been less fully examined, before they made a schism separating themselves from the apostolic see, ought to have awaited the judgment of the universal plenary council where with the pope himself a fuller discussion and consultation would take place. But what Aug. consequently says, that if they were convicted of having judged badly their sentences would be loosed, is not so to be taken that those sentences would be loosed by the authority of the plenary council with the power of an equally superior judge, since as we said above Aug. himself says that in the Roman Church the principate of the apostolic see has always flourished, but it is to be understood that this would come about by the authority of the Roman pontiff himself, better counselled and informed, by whose authority the aforesaid council would come to be congregated, so that the pope himself, better informed and counselled through the universal council, if it were so that judgment had first been badly made, by declaring the aforesaid Vincent innocent would loose his sentence, or would revoke the sentence of others approved by him, which he could have done not only through the mediation of a council but alone, according to ch. Sentence 35, q. 9. Hence we read a like thing done in ch. Hinc etiam, dist. 17 in the accusation of Pope Symmachus, where by the authority of the same man both the synod is congregated and sentence in the cause. Moreover a like thing is had concerning blessed Gregory, who as is had in ch. If anyone, 2, q. 7, says thus: “If anyone wishes to accuse us over these things or contends to make us act outside authority, let him come to the apostolic see and there before the confession of blessed Peter let him contend with me, so that there one of us may receive sentence.” But it is clear that sentence through the apostolic see, whether against the pope or for him, would come to be borne by none but the authority of the pope sitting in it, from whom his throne receives authority, or through another to whom he himself committed it, and so in the case proposed. And so it is clear that the aforesaid letter of Aug., rightly understood, in nothing favors the adversaries although the adversaries ground themselves greatly in it, without reason however in our judgment.

²² To the nineteenth, which is taken from ch. I think, 2, q. 7, it is answered that in no part does it serve the adversaries. Not indeed in the first part, although Paul, thinking well, could publicly reprehend Peter thinking not well, yet it does not follow on that account that he was superior to him in the office of ecclesiastical dignity, as is clear from ch. Paul, in the same cause and question. Nor indeed in the second part, because that text is not to be extended to the bishop of Rome who is both head and prince and judge of the whole Church and from whom the councils receive strength, as has been oft repeated. ²³ To the twentieth, which is taken from the Gloss on ch. Anastasius, dist. 19, it is answered that the Gloss is understood to mean that where faith is at stake the synodal gathering of the fathers of the Church is greater, not with greatness of power, but with greatness of discretion of judgment, superior and greater than the pope himself by its greatness of approbation, according to the principle that he who uses greater reason, his words seem to be of greater authority, as in ch. 1, dist. 20, and according to the principle that the party which uses the juster reason is said to be greater although it be less in another respect, as the Gloss has it on ch. Many, dist. 40. But greater discretion and judgment is with likelihood more regularly argued to be in all the fathers of one general synod than in one man alone even if he be pope, and on that account when the case is very doubtful and has strong defenders for either side recourse must be had to a synod, since as lord Arch. says in this place it would be too dangerous to commit our faith to the judgment of one man. Second, it can be answered that the glosses of the Decree seem on account of contradiction to be entangled and to serve little. Hence the Gloss on ch. Whatsoever, 24, q. 1, says thus: “That the sentence of the whole Church is to be preferred to the Roman if in anything they contradict one another, arg. dist. 93, We read, but I believe the contrary, and in fact this is the faith unless the Roman Church erred, which I do not believe can happen because God would not permit, arg. below ch. 2, Right, and ch. Shameful.” Thus far the Gloss.

²⁴ To the twenty-first, which is taken from not being able to sin, it is answered in two ways, by denying first the antecedent universally: since it seems false, as is clear concerning the council of Rimini and the second of Ephesus, and concerning many others of which mention will be had below. But concerning the apostolic see this is most certain, that in it the Christian religion has always remained immaculate, as we showed above in book 2 and as is had in ch. In faith, 24, q. 1. Second it is answered by denying the consequence even if the antecedent were true. Yet the consequence does not hold. We assigned the reason elsewhere, namely that these graces are of diverse order and kind: not to be able to err in faith or in morals, and the grace of prelacy or of power of jurisdiction or of the keys, which are so distinct that one does not argue the other, as is manifest. Otherwise one layman or woman confirmed in grace would be of greater authority than the Roman pontiff not confirmed in grace, which is not only erroneous, as we showed in book 2, but even absurd to hear.

²⁵ To the twenty-second, concerning the deeds in the eighth synod, it is answered that it avails nothing for the purpose of the adversaries, because that saying, as is clear from the deeds of the same synod, was said by Zacharias, the most pertinacious defender of Photius the heretic, by whom that Zacharias had been ordained bishop and had also been condemned with him, whence those words, as of one foolish heretic, are not to be brought forward into authority. Hence the Emperor, answering the saying of Zacharias and his accomplices, as is had in the deeds, said thus: “Until the present you are in your sin and lie dead in the sepulchre of your wickedness, whence all the supreme shepherds, the patriarchs, concordantly condemn you, and below, we all know that you are laymen and we have not brought you to bark in order to make words, all your words are lies.” Thus far there. And in that same sixth action against the same Zacharias, Metrophanes, metropolitan of Smyrna, answering said that he had spoken falsely in saying that anyone justified through the apostolic see was damned through the Church, nor one damned through that see justified through the Church. And he answered to each of the examples which Zacharias had adduced, where, since Zacharias had adduced the aforesaid heretics in favor of his errors, among other examples was the fact that the African synod had not justified Apiarius, justified by the Roman prelates, but had rejected him. The aforesaid metropolitan, after many things concerning that history, answers thus: the African synod is therefore found to have obeyed rather the judgment of Zosimus the Roman pope, and through this to have rejected its own sentence and to have restored the justifiable Apiarius, not as thou falsely sayest, by the wish of the Roman pontiff. Thus far he.

²⁶ To the twenty-third, which is taken from the fact that a council at times judges the pope, it is answered that that argument does not serve for the adversaries, which is clear from three things. First because it is false that a universal council by right deposes, or can depose, the Roman pontiff except in the case of heresy, whatever is at times read to have been done in fact, as we said in book 2 around ch. 103. But in the case of heresy it is special, as is clear from the alleged ch. If the pope, dist. 40, because a heretic pope would come under the council like any other of the faithful if deviant from the faith. For through heresy he falls from the papacy, having become, as St. Thomas says in 4, dist. 19, less than every one of the faithful, and the Gloss has the same on ch. Acacius, 24, q. 1, where it says thus: “Here is the case in which a pope can bind a pope, and in which a pope falls under a canon of sentence already passed.” Nor does that rule stand in the way, that an equal cannot loose or bind an equal, because if the pope is a heretic, in that he is a heretic he is less than any Catholic, and to that case the chapter brought forward from the other side, If the pope, applies, as is clear to one reading it. For it says thus: “If the pope, neglecting his own and his brethren’s salvation, is found useless, and remiss in his works, no mortal presumes to reprehend fault in him in his office, because he himself, about to judge all, is to be judged by none unless he is found deviant from the faith.” Thus far there. And it is understood, as the Gloss inextricably says, that the chapter (since it speaks of a pope already notorious through obstinately defended heresy, in which case by the law itself he is deprived of the pontificate, because with faith removed, through which the first connection of man to the mystical body of Christ comes about, he ceases to be a member of the Church, and consequently a head) is manifestly demonstrated, and from this no superiority of prelacy is argued in the universal council over a Catholic and undoubted pope. Second this is shown from the fact that although, according to the Gloss on ch. Acacius which was brought forward a little before, in the case of heresy a pope can bind a pope, it does not on that account follow that the pope is a prelate superior to his predecessor or to his successor, with him existing as Catholic. Third the same is shown, in that if that argument of the adversaries served, it would serve against them, arguing thus: the pope reproves and damns bad and iniquitous councils, as is clear concerning Rimini and the second of Ephesus and others, as in ch. All things, 9, q. 3; therefore it follows by stronger reason that the pope is superior to universal councils, which nevertheless they deny, although it be true.

²⁷ To the twenty-fourth, which is taken from the necessity of councils, it is answered by denying the consequence. For we say with lord Henry, and elsewhere we said above, that the authority of the whole council and the authority of the pope are not anything greater than that authority itself. Nevertheless it does not follow that at times a general council ought not to be convoked in certain cases, because this is not done to have greater authority, but to have fuller collation and deliberation and for greater solemnity and concord of the Church, as we showed more fully above.

²⁸ To the twenty-fifth, which is taken from ch. Concerning which, dist. 20, it is answered by denying the consequence. For the adversaries are deceived in not distinguishing between authority and power of jurisdiction, although many are said to be and are wise and prudent men and of great authority who discharge no power of jurisdiction or prelacy. Hence from that order which the Gloss lays down in the solution of the question, no superiority of jurisdiction over the pope follows, and although the canons which are made in a council with the counsel of the greater fathers of the whole Church are reputed of greater authority, that is of reputation or appreciation, than decrees made without them by the supreme pontiffs alone, according to what is had in ch. Decretals, dist. 20, that by however greater reason anyone uses, of so much greater authority his words seem to be, nevertheless on that account it does not follow that the council is greater in power of jurisdiction than the pope himself, especially since it is the same man who by authority makes canons in council, and who without a synod makes decrees and decretals. Hence in this respect decretals and canons are of equal, nay of the same, authority, as in ch. Decretals, dist. 20. We can assign an example of this in those things which the pope does with the cardinals in consistory, and those which he does alone. It is plain that things done by the pope in consistory with the counsel of the lord cardinals are reputed of greater authority than things done by him alone, and nevertheless these and those are of the same force and authority since they are issued with the same power. From all which things, well considered, the temerity of the modern masters comes manifestly to be derided, who accuse of flattery, or of false understanding and interpretation of sacred Scripture, the ancient doctors who, compelled by truth, spoke in favor of the principate of the Roman pontiff, in which stupid and temerarious judgment these modern masters above all, as filled with diabolical presumption, come to be accused: since the aforesaid doctors, speaking in honor of blessed Peter and for the amplitude of his principate, are either Roman pontiffs crowned for Christ by martyrdom, or glorious confessors venerated by the universal Church, or holy fathers, or doctors more excellent than others in the Church of God in divine and human law, it would be very dangerous and insane to postpone the traditions of so many holy fathers, nay to trample them as false, and to adhere to the assertions of these modern masters whose head and master seems to have been Ockham and a certain disciple of his named Gerson, who, passing over the expositions of the holy fathers and doctors of the Church, interpret holy Scripture after their own will in the manner of heretics, against whom blessed Jerome in ch. Let us not bring, 24, q. 1, says: “Let us not bring deceitful balances, that we weigh what we wish at our own judgment, saying this is heavy, this is light, but let us bring the divine balance from the sacred Scriptures as from the treasuries of the Lord, and in it let us weigh what is weightier.” And in ch. Ridiculous, dist. 12, Pope Nicholas says: “It is ridiculous and a sufficiently abominable disgrace that we suffer the traditions which of old we received from the fathers to be broken.”