Summa de Ecclesia

But since from all the things already said it has been made known that the authority of universal councils depends on the pope, and consequently that they have limited power, the very order demands that we examine to what things universal councils ought or can extend themselves in determining sentence or in establishing, or with what causes they ought to intermeddle: whether indifferently with all, or with some only. It appears to us, however, saving always better judgment, that, with a true and undoubted pontiff standing in the apostolic see, a universal council ought not indifferently intermeddle with single causes, but only with those for whose determination and definition it has been gathered. Which we shall show from manifold reasonable heads.

First, by the irrefragable testimony of the most blessed Pope Leo; for blessed Pope Leo, writing to Anatolius, bishop of Constantinople, and reprehending him for having induced the Chalcedonian synod to constitute Constantinople the first see after Rome — which place had formerly been Alexandria's — speaks thus: These things having been heard, and never before by excesses of rash presumption, that you drag the holy synod, gathered by the zeal of the most Christian prince only for extinguishing heresy and for the confirmation of the catholic faith, into the occasion of your ambition, and that you importune it to give itself to your continence, as though what the multitude has willed, though licit, cannot be annulled. And below: Too impudent therefore, too perverse are these things which are found contrary to the most sacred canons; to the perturbation of the whole Church this proud elation tends, which has wished so to abuse the synodal council that it would either transfer by depraving or compel by terrifying to consent to itself brethren convoked for the business of faith alone, and discharged by the definition of the cause which was to be cured. Thus far he.

Likewise Pope Nicholas, in the second letter which he writes to the Emperor Michael, which was read in the fourth action, manifestly designates that the holy synod ought not intermeddle except with those things which the pope has granted or committed. He speaks thus: But that you have deposed, damned, and expelled by your special judgment the strenuous man, the patriarch Ignatius, and have improvidently substituted in his place a bishop from the lay throng as associate to yourselves, we cannot bear with equanimity at all, especially since we had mandated that the affair of these two be investigated and reported to us, not defined. Thus far he. Behold, it is manifestly had from such reprehensions that universal councils gathered ought to extend themselves in sentencing or defining only to those things for which they have been gathered or convoked, and not to others. Secondly, thus by reason: a universal council has strength and authority from the Roman pontiff, as has been shown above in manifold ways, according to dist. 17 throughout, and ch. Significasti, Extra, on election; a universal council can regularly extend itself only to as much as the pope ordains or disposes who convokes the universal council and supports it by his authority. Hence the aforesaid most blessed Pope Leo, to the bishops who had been gathered in the holy Chalcedonian synod, among other things writes thus, that the fraternal universality and the hearts of all the faithful may know that I adopted my own judgment, not only through the brethren who carried out my place but also through approbation of the synodal acts, in the cause of faith alone, namely, which must often be said, on account of which it pleased that the general council be gathered both by the precept of the Christian princes and by the consent of the apostolic see, that, the heretics being damned, etc. Behold, the pope approves only the things for which the council had been gathered, and not others. Thirdly, it is argued thus: universal councils are not gathered except for great and arduous causes which cannot so commodiously be expedited without a council as with a council; therefore to the expedition of those only, and of the things necessarily depending on them or making for their execution, can universal councils extend themselves. The consequence is clear, since it is for the expedition of those only that they have been convoked and have received authority. Hence Pope Agatho, concerning the power which he gave to his apocrisiaries, writing to the Emperor and narrating how he sent apocrisiaries to the sixth synod, speaks thus: We have given license or authority with your most tranquil empire, while your clemency shall live, simply in satisfying, in so far only as has been enjoined, that they presume to add, change, or diminish nothing, but sincerely to declare the tradition of the apostolic see as it was instituted by our predecessors; for which reason also the legates of the pope in the eighth synod, as is gathered from the fifth action, knowing that they could not extend themselves except as far as their power had been amplified by the apostolic see, spoke thus to the synod: We shall judge no new or recent judgment, but an old one, and one judged long ago by the most holy and most blessed Pope Nicholas, and confirmed by the most holy Pope Adrian; and we cannot be moved or shifted from paternal definitions and laws, nor decline to the right or to the left. Thus far there.

Fourthly, thus: if a universal council intermeddled indifferently with single causes, there would already be in the Church two supreme tribunals, two supreme chairs, which the unity of the Church does not admit, as has been often repeated. Above, therefore, a universal council cannot intermeddle with single causes. Fifthly, thus: to the apostolic see alone, because in it God has placed the principate of the whole Church, does it belong to judge and define concerning the single causes of all the faithful, according to ch. Episcopus, 9, q. 3, where the venerable Bede says that the Roman Church alone by its authority can judge concerning all, and in ch. per principalem, etc., ch. 22, and q.; therefore it seems that this does not belong to universal councils. The consequence is clear. Sixthly, the pope in respect of the universal council is prelate; for he is compared to the Church as its father, prelate, head, and prince, as is clear; therefore the universal synod, representing the universal Church, can do nothing except as much as is granted to it by the authority of its father, prelate, head, and prince. The consequence is clear, and especially from the Gloss on Ps. 44, for thy fathers, etc., which has it thus: in this the bishop is likened to the father, and the Church to the son, because just as a son cannot litigate without the authority of his father, so neither can the Church without the authority of its prelate. Seventhly, thus: to the Roman pontiff some things are reserved in law by reason of his primacy, such as the convocation of universal councils, the deposition of bishops, the examination of greater causes, concerning which in ch. Dudum, 3, q. 6, and specifically concerning many things is had in the Decree and Decretals. Therefore, since such things are thus reserved to the Roman pontiff alone, no one can extend his hand to them without license and authority of him, without injury to the apostolic see. The consequence is clear. But as to what certain adversaries say — that when it is said that the pope alone can do those things, or that such or such things are reserved to the pope alone, there is no exclusion except in respect of inferiors, but not in respect of the congregation of a universal council, in which the authority of the pope seems included — this avails nothing. First, because the congregation itself, as we now speak of it, namely as distinguished from the pope, is nothing but a congregation of inferiors; and therefore if by the word alone inferiors are excluded, it is clear that the congregation of them is excluded, since inferiors, whether dispersed or collected, always remain inferiors in respect of him who is superior. Secondly, because, as shall be said below, although the pope convokes the council, he does not on that account incorporate so great a fullness of his power into the council for doing whatever it wills, but only for expediting the things on account of which it has been gathered; hence in this the recent masters are deceived, and therefore it is no wonder if, with a bad beginning given, they have burst forth into various errors, since, as Aristotle says, a small error in the beginning is the greatest in the end. Eighthly, thus: nothing is to be attributed to a universal council through which it would give occasion of schism in the Church between head and members, between the Roman pontiff or apostolic see and the universal council. This is known; but by a universal council intermeddling with single causes and with things reserved to the apostolic see, division and schism is introduced between the judgment of the apostolic see and the judgment of the universal council, since it would often happen that what the apostolic see bound or loosed, the council would loose or bind, or conversely, as practice has exemplarily shown to us at Basel, when, at the persuasion of certain recent masters, that congregation less prudently attempted to intermeddle with single causes reserved to the Roman pontiff, revoking and retracting sentences given in the Roman curia by the apostolic see, whence many scandals arose in the Church of God. Ninthly, thus: nothing is to be attributed to a universal council which would gravely perturb and damage the whole Church; this is clear. But if a universal council intermeddled indifferently with single causes, it would be necessary that it be made as it were perpetual, or be extended to too long a time, since it would seem necessary that it terminate all the causes assumed — which certainly could not manifestly be done without great expense to the churches and loss to the bishops. Tenthly, thus: presupposing with the lords jurists that it is impossible that the same thing in solidum, in the same way and for the same time, can be possessed by two, and consequently neither exercised, as in ff. communi, si ve certo, si duobus vehiculis. But no one doubts that the pope, as shepherd and judge of the whole Christian republic, is in possession and exercised act of judging concerning the single causes of the faithful, and of executing those things which belong to the fullness of the power of the keys in the whole Church of God. Therefore for the same time it does not seem possible that this belongs to a universal council. The consequence is clear with all the foregoing. From all these things is manifestly evinced the nullity of the dispensation of indulgences, of sentences, of many causes, and of collations of benefices, and of donation, and of other things which are said to have been done at Basel with the Roman pontiff of holy memory, Lord Eugenius, contradicting, unless they shall first have been firmed by the authority of the apostolic see. From what has moreover been said through many chapters concerning the dependence of the authority of councils on the Roman pontiff, the vicar of Christ, is manifestly confuted the most damnable error of Marsilius of Padua, asserting that to a universal council, which he says to be the universality of all the faithful, not distinguishing between laics and clerics, without any dependence on the pope, belongs the whole exercise of ecclesiastical power, as much in provisions of benefices and dispensations and indulgences as in corrections of whatsoever erring men.