Summa de Ecclesia

¹ To the things which the adversaries adduce against the most clear and most firmly founded sentence which we have set forth, it is not difficult to answer from what was said above. To the first, moreover, which is taken from the Old Testament: although it be superfluous to answer, since it is manifest that it does not pertain to the point, nevertheless, that the matter may here be liquidly clear, let answer be made first by denying that that gathering made at Jerusalem of the men of Juda and Benjamin with their wives and children was a general synod, as at present our discourse is of a universal synod. Secondly, we also say that it is false that Esdras gave sentence in the cause of the separation of foreign wives in the name and by the authority of that congregation; but he gave it by the authority of King Artaxerxes, whose vicar he was, appointed as prince for the leading back of the captive people to Jerusalem, having power from him over all transgressors of the law of God, as is clear in ch. 2 of the same book, where the copy of the letter of authority given to him is set forth. Thirdly, we say that it is also false that the punishment of those not coming to that convocation was reserved by the authority of that congregation; nay, it was reserved to Esdras, who was as it were prince of the aforesaid congregation by the commission of the king, as we have said, it being true, however, that it was to be done according to the counsel of the princes and elders, as the text says.

² To the second, which is taken from Acts ch. 15, answer is made that it in no way obstructs our point; for although it were granted that the fathers existing in council concurred together with the pope in defining, or in establishing canons or sentence, as here concerning the apostles and elders with Peter seems to the arguing adversaries, nevertheless whatever was done there is to be attributed principally and originally to the Roman pontiff, as prince of the whole Christian republic. Hence the Gloss of Jerome on that place, as adduced a little above in ch. 31, recalling how James and all the other elders had passed over into the sentence of Peter, says that Peter was the prince of that decree, that the law is not to be kept after the gospel. Behold, Jerome says that Peter was the prince of that decree which was made in that synod, that is, that he was its principal author, and this is plainly manifest if one attentively considers that text. For after Peter had defined that the burden of legal observance was not to be imposed on converts from paganism, there follows in the text: And all the multitude was silent. Nicholas of Lyra says, following Jerome, consenting to Peter; which sentence of Peter blessed James, commending it, brought forth, saying: I judge thus; so that the judging of James was not to give sentence authoritatively, but to bring forth the sentence given through Peter, prince and head of the synodal congregation; for he was bishop of Jerusalem, although, as Master Nicholas of Lyra says in the same place, though Peter was principal among the apostles, yet he deferred to him in his own diocese, that he might bring forth the determination of the doubt. But as to what follows: then it pleased the apostles and elders with the whole church to choose men from among them and send them to Antioch, it does not import any definition of a doubt, but a will to publish a definition already made and to make it known through their messengers to the brethren existing at Antioch. By this, moreover, that the apostles, writing to the brethren existing at Antioch, say: it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us, it is not had that that power of jurisdiction was given to that congregation of apostles and elders immediately by the Holy Spirit, as the adversaries feign, but only is it had that that definition of the aforesaid question was made by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit through the apostles and elders, as the Gloss of Bede there touches, which, expounding the aforesaid words, speaks thus: it pleased the Holy Spirit, who, arbiter of His own power, breathes where He wills, speaks where He wills, and us, that is, not only by our will but by the instinct of the Holy Spirit. Thus far the Gloss; and thus from those words nothing else was had except that Peter and the other apostles and elders had convened in one, by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, in the sentence of that canon concerning the law not to be observed after the gospel. Plainly, such assistance by which the Holy Spirit, who is the author of peace and unity, assists holy congregations by breathing and teaching what is to be done, has not taken away from Peter, nor now from his successors, the primacy over the universal synod, nor the unity nor the connection of the whole body of the Church to one head, the vicar of Christ, who, as Chrysostom says, had been the head of the college and the head of the apostolic choir. Besides, that the title of that letter was written common to all the apostles and elders does not obstruct that Peter was the author and prince of that decree, as blessed Jerome says, since the title of that letter was formed common to all, that all occasion of dissension might be taken away. Hence the interlinear Gloss on the word apostles and elders says thus: the common title of the apostles is set first, lest any occasion of dissension be left.

³ To the third, which is taken from the Constantinopolitan synod, it is answered that the acts of that synod, well considered, in no way favor the point of the adversaries, but rather confirm our point. First, because although the vicars and legates of the pope had not yet come to the place of the synod, yet the fathers of the synod proceeded by the authority of the pope; both because the synod itself had been assembled by the authority of Pope Nicholas, and because the fathers themselves had already been sufficiently instructed concerning the mind and will of the supreme pontiff regarding the things to be defined, as the aforesaid metropolitan confesses, saying: especially since we have at hand the things regularly done at Rome, the libellus which Pope Adrian had sent to the Constantinopolitan synod, according to whose form procedure was to be had. Then, because there there threatened a case of the greatest necessity, which has no law — hence, with so great a necessity threatening, as the fathers themselves describe, it was not unfitting that they should deliberate to pronounce the sentence of the definition held — by them even when the vicars of the pope were not present, especially because, as has been said, conforming themselves to the mind both of Pope Nicholas and of Adrian, they had conceived their sentence. Then, thirdly, what they adduce does not pertain to the point of the adversaries, since although, with the vicars of the pope delaying, the aforesaid metropolitan had counseled to proceed without awaiting them further, nevertheless at length the vicars of Pope Saint Adrian came, namely Donatus, bishop of Ostia, and Stephen, bishop of the Ephesine church, and Marinus, cardinal deacon, and they held the place of the Roman pontiff in all things, as is clear from the acts of the same synod, and is had in ch. Adrianus, dist. 63. Hence concerning the judgment and sentence given through them against Photius, it is thus had in the 5th action of the same synod: Then Theodore, the devoted secretary, receiving from the secretaries, read the things briefly said by the most holy vicars of elder Rome, having them thus: You have seen, brethren, you have seen, and heard the things said and done over a long time concerning this cause, and it has appeared to you all that the promotion of this man was inadmissible, and that the deposition of the most holy patriarch Ignatius from his see had been without justice and without laws; we therefore shall judge no new or recent judgment, but an old one, prejudged long ago indeed by the most holy and most blessed Pope Nicholas, but confirmed by the most holy father Adrian; and below: we cast off and anathematize such an attempt, lest any other malign action perchance introduce further things contrary to the Church of God forever. Thus far there. And afterwards below, at the end, the synod, conforming itself to the sentence of the Roman pontiffs, says thus: On this account therefore Photius, refusing to understand so as to do well, neither choosing obedience nor confessing his sin and his most iniquitous prelacy, but disobedient and resisting this holy and universal synod, we have repelled and do anathematize, and make him alien from the whole catholic and apostolic Church, etc. And thus our point is clear.

⁴ To the fourth answer is made that although in universal councils where the pope does not preside personally sentences and canons are pronounced in the name of the council, as is clear in ch. quidam, 16, q. 1, concerning the Chalcedonian council, nevertheless whatever is there concluded, having obliging force, is established universally by the authority of the Roman pontiff, as was said above in ch. 32; since, as the pope alone is prince of the Christian republic, and he himself, as head of the catholic Church, alone is called in the fullness of power, there cannot regularly come to be a law binding or obliging all the faithful unless it is supported by his authority. Hence, as is had in ch. bene, dist. 96, the fathers gathered in synod, speaking of the validity of certain scriptures, to prove that the aforesaid scripture there read had no force, use these two reasons: first, that it did not agree with the canons; secondly and chiefly, that no prelate of the apostolic see had been present in it or was shown to have confirmed it by his own subscription. Where on the word nor with the canons the Gloss says: take these two together, the undivided conception of law, with the authority of the apostolic see postulated therefrom.

⁵ To the fifth it is answered that that text, as is manifest, speaks of a provincial council, in which all bishops are fellow judges, but not so in a universal council. And if the reason of this diversity be sought, it must be said that the reason of the diversity is manifold. First, because the authority of bishops does not so depend on an archbishop or primate or patriarch as on the pope, by whom all degrees of dignities in the Church are disposed, according to ch. omnes, dist. 22. Secondly, because from the pope is derived all power of jurisdiction of the other prelates, as in ch. ita dominus, dist. 19, as we have most amply shown above in the 2nd book, ch. 54. Thirdly, because bishops are not subjected in all things to archbishops, primates, or patriarchs, except in those things only in which the Roman pontiff, on whom their power and order depends, has subjected them to them, as Saint Thomas says in the 2nd book of the Sentences, in the last distinction, in the exposition of the text. Pope Nicholas also says in ch. conquestus, 9, q. 3, that primates and patriarchs have no privilege before other bishops except as much as the sacred canons grant.

⁶ To the sixth, which is taken from the letter of Pope Nicholas, there is no need to answer; for Pope Nicholas pronounces sentence first by the authority of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, which resides in the apostolic see, than by the authority of the six councils; but he subjoined the authority of the councils after his own for the greater aggravation of the punishment or sentence against Photius, and not from necessity, since that power of the primacy of the Roman pontiff by which he can judge anyone does not depend on councils but on omnipotent God Himself, as has often been repeated, and is had in ch. quamvis, dist. 32. Which is manifestly clear from this, that the same Nicholas, in the same letter, condemning Gregory, bishop of the Syracusan church, because he had consecrated Photius, writes speaking thus: according to canonical deliberation we define and establish by apostolic authority that he lack and be deprived of all priestly ministry, so that in no way may it be lawful for him to have hope of restitution in any synod.

⁷ To the seventh, when argument is made from the like form of subscriptions, answer is made in two ways. First, by denying the antecedent, since it is false that the subscription of the pope and his legates and of other bishops is regularly of like form. Hence that the subscription of the pope is other than the subscription of other prelates is commonly openly gathered from all those places in the Decree and Decretals, the Sixth and the Clementines, which are adduced above in ch. 3, in which the pope alone is described as establishing, with the counsel or approbation of the fathers of the council, where consultation and assent or approbation only is attributed to the council of the fathers, but to establish, to the Roman pontiff. Likewise in our days, in the decree of the union of the Greeks made at Florence under Lord Eugenius of holy memory, Eugenius alone in his subscription says: defining, I have subscribed; hence the words are thus: Eugenius, bishop of the catholic Church, thus defining, I have subscribed. The others, as prelates both Latin and Greek, say only: I have subscribed. The falsity of that antecedent of the adversaries is also clear from the variety of the subscriptions of the legates of the pope and of the other prelates. Hence in the book of councils it is thus had that the legate of the pope subscribed in the Chalcedonian council: Paschasius, bishop of the Lucan city, vicar of the lord most blessed pope Leo of the city of Rome, of the apostolic and universal Church, presiding over the synod, I have established, consented, and subscribed. But none of the other prelates wrote I have established, nor defining, I have subscribed, but only I have subscribed. Secondly, answer is made by denying that consequence of the adversaries, since from the fact that sometimes the pope and others subscribe in councils in like manner, it does not follow that prelates concur with the pope with equal authority in establishing, defining, or judging anything in councils, since all such power of the other prelates depends on the Roman pontiff, as we have clearly shown above, especially in the 2nd book, ch. 54. Just as through this: ⁸ that though second causes are said to work some effect together with the first cause, it does not therefore follow that all concur with equal power to that effect. To the eighth answer is made that the reason adduced does not disprove that what has been said is regularly true, although in some particular case the contrary can happen, as we shall say below; nevertheless, in the case adduced on the other side, concerning the accusation of Pope Symmachus, by the authority of Symmachus himself the synod itself did whatever it did, as is clear from the text itself. To the ninth answer is made that it does not pertain to the point, since that Toledan council was not universal but provincial. In provincial councils, however, the matter is otherwise, as we have said above in answering the fourth; since in universal councils the whole power of authority depends on the Roman pontiff, as we have said before, and thus must it be said in answer to many other like allegations concerning provincial councils; hence in this argumentation of the adversaries, who argue from provincial councils to the universal, there is the greatest error, for there is no likeness, as we have shown above. We confess, however, that at times the pope, when aggravating a prohibition or wishing to honor the fathers gathered in council, sometimes says: we prohibit by the authority of the council; and elsewhere says: the authority of the general council has decreed; elsewhere says: it has been defined by the authority and consent of our bishops and of all the other priests and levites, and of the rest of the faithful, and by the counsel of all our fellow councilors.

⁹ To the tenth it is answered that the rule or law of the Church cannot regularly be said to be the universal council, except the plenary one in which the authority and consent of the apostolic see intervenes, since several councils are read to have deviated from the faith, as that of Rimini and the second of Ephesus, and others which will be recalled below, and as is also gathered from the Gloss ipsi sunt canones, 9, q. 3; but that law and rule is the apostolic see, which is never read to have deviated from the catholic faith, the Lord saying to blessed Peter in Luke 22: I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not, which the holy doctors expound of the firmness and uprightness of the faith of the apostolic see, as we have shown at length above in the 2nd book, ch. 109. Hence for this reason the Roman church is called the mother of the faith and teacher, as in ch. omnes, dist. 22. And to the proof we answer that it is none. For which it is to be noted that, as above in the second book around ch. 84 we distinguished, something is said to be the end of a thing in two ways: in one way, namely, that toward which that thing tends from the order given to it, whether natural or supernatural, or what is intended by the agent. In another way the end is said to be that to whose utility the work of the agent is ordered, of which an example can be set in the art of medicine. In one way the end of the art is said to be health, which it intends to induce. In another way the sick man or the human body, as that to whose utility the whole work of the art is ordered. Likewise the end of the polity seems to be the peace and tranquillity of order, since this seems to be its good, to which its whole government seems to look and tend. But the community itself is said to be the end of the government or public power, as that to whose utility the work of the president and agent is ordered; thus the end of the papal power is not the universal Church itself, as that to which it is finally ordered, but that to which through its use the Church, rightly governed, is led, which is heavenly beatitude itself. In the second way, however, namely as that to whose utility that power itself is ordered, its end is well said to be the universal Church itself. With this distinction in hand, we say to the antecedent that the rule of government and the law of ordaining those things which are for the end is not taken from the end said in the second way but in the first; for the physician does not take the rules of healing from those to be healed, nor the general the rule of warfare from his army, nor the prince the laws of ruling from the people, but the reverse; hence that reason of the adversaries seems to be of no force, although with them it seems otherwise. And to the proof which they adduce from the Apostle we answer that by that authority nothing is proved except that the Church is the end of the papal power in the way assigned; hence the laws and rules by which the Church ought to be built up are not to be taken from the Church itself to be built up and ruled, but from the builder, Christ, who as He is the beginning of the Church so is the end, to whose embrace it is to be led through the government of His general vicar, namely the supreme pontiff, who bears His place on earth; hence most aptly in the definition of ecclesiastical power it is said that it is for the building up of the Church according to the evangelical laws, and the sanctions and decrees of the apostolic see, which exists as the mother of all churches, and the head, and the teacher of faith and laws. Hence the papal power is not said to be in the Church as in what regulates, but as in what is regulated. In the true vicar of Christ, however, it is as in what regulates and directs; hence he is the ruler of the Church and shepherd and prince, whose it is to feed, rule, and govern the sheep and people committed to him according to the laws and mandates of Christ, whose vicar he is.