Summa de Ecclesia

Truly, for us considering those things which we have unfolded above concerning the order and unity of the Church, it seems necessary to say, always saving better judgment, what we said before: namely that in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church militant the spiritual power has the principate over the secular power; for as the Philosopher says, primo poli, whenever anything is constituted from several things ordered to one another, whether from conjoined things as man from body and soul, or from divided things as an army from soldiers, in all of them there is to be found a ruling and a subjected element, just as in harmonic music there is one principal sound, and in a mixture one predominant element, and in man the soul over the body and the intellect over the sensible appetite, and in the house the husband over the wife, and universally the male over the female, and man over beasts: but since the whole body of the entire Christian commonwealth is compacted from spiritual and temporal things as from two sides, as Hugh of St. Victor says in book 2 on the sacraments, and spiritual things are preferred to earthly things as the soul to the body: it is necessary to say that the spiritual power has the principate over the secular power, so that to the hierarch of this hierarchy of the Church militant (who after Christ is the Roman pontiff, to whom Christ in blessed Peter handed over both keys) the government of the whole Church in some way pertains, not only in spiritual but also in temporal things, according to what is said in dist. 22, ch. Omnes, where Pope Nicholas says that to blessed Peter, the key-bearer of eternal life, he committed the rights of the earthly and heavenly rule together, where the Gloss says: an argument that the Pope has both swords, namely the spiritual and the temporal, which is true by first authority, and he has the execution of superior jurisdiction in spiritual things: in temporal things, however, only in the cases spoken of above. Hence it must be said to the objections of the adversaries.

¹ To the first the assumption simply posited is denied, and most of all in him in whom is the spiritual power of the government of the Church according to fullness as we say in the Pope: as we have in part expounded above, that just as in the bestowal of the principal thing the accessory is understood even if no express mention is made of it, and in the bestowal of the greater is understood the bestowal of the lesser which is ordered to it, and in the bestowal of government are understood to be bestowed all those things without which that government cannot rightly be dispatched or executed, so in the bestowal of spiritual power on the Pope as on the head and rector of the whole Christian polity, there necessarily comes to be understood the bestowal of secular power as far as is necessary for the preservation of spiritual goods, and the direction of the faithful into the kingdom of heaven. Hence in the bestowal of the heavenly keys, especially as to the key of jurisdiction, there intervenes the handing over of the keys of earthly things by force of a certain necessary consequence in the manner stated above: nor was it needful to express anything concerning the bestowal of the earthly kingdom or of temporal jurisdiction: because, as we have said, in the bestowal of the principal thing, namely the power of the kingdom of heaven, it was sufficiently understood. But as to what is said, that these two are divided in opposition, it is answered that this is not true, as will be seen below in the answer to the third objection.

² To the second objection, in which it is said that Christ had neither power nor lordship: it is answered that this is false: since whoever says that Christ had neither temporal nor spiritual power, as also Lord John 22 says in that decretal Quia vir reprobus, contradicts sacred Scripture in many places: but most of all that place in the last chapter of Matt., where Christ is read to have said: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth, and in Apoc. 1 he is called prince of the things of the earth. And at Heb. 1 it is said, which is taken from Ps. 8: Thou hast set him over the works of thy hands, where the Gloss says: Behold the power of Christ is shown: for as nothing is excepted in the work of the Lord so neither from the power of Christ, so says the Gloss. But as Lord Durandus well says, it happens that one having the power and authority of jurisdiction does not use it in his own person nor is it fitting as to all things: rather lesser things ought to be committed to lesser men, and middle things to middle men, and greater things to the highest: as was counseled to Moses by Jethro, Exod. 18, that he should appoint judges who should judge only lesser and easier things, and remit the harder things to Moses to be judged. And the apostles said in Acts 6, ch.: It is not fitting for us to leave the word of God and serve tables. And in this manner Christ, although he had all power, yet the highest work for which he had come was to instruct us concerning his life and concerning our redemption to be made through him: on account of which he was vacant about those things as if totally, leaving aside lesser things which could be done through others. Hence Ambrose on that place in John 18, My kingdom is not of this world, says: He rightly declines earthly things because he descended for heavenly things.

To the proofs that Christ had no power it is answered, to the first which is from Luke 12, by saying that it does not prove the contention of the adversaries: since Christ did not say that because he denied that he had the power of all things but for two reasons. First because he disdained to have execution in such small matters, and that man could have recourse to lesser men whose office it was to execute such things immediately. This reason blessed Ambrose touches in the Gloss saying thus: He does not deign to be a judge of lawsuits or an arbiter of properties who has the judgment of the living and the dead and the arbiter of merits, 1 Cor. 6: If you have secular judgments etc. Secondly because to divide a community was the office of the devil not of Christ. Hosea 13: He divides among brothers, namely the devil. 1 Cor. 1: For God is not of dissension but of peace. This reason the Gloss touches which on that place Who made me etc. says thus: I am not a God of dissension but of peace and unity, who came to make peace between man and the angels, that many may have one body and one soul: not that they be divided but that they have all things in common lest anyone be needy among them: he who does not gather with me is a divider of brotherhood: an author of dissension. So says the Gloss. From which it is clear that the aforesaid authority in which the adversaries trust greatly in no way supports them. To the second proof which is taken from that place in John 6, that Christ fled lest they make him king: it is answered that it does nothing for the adversaries, which is clear thus from the exposition of St. Thomas on this place. For St. Thomas asks, since Christ himself was king, why did he flee: to this, he says, a threefold reason is assigned. One because it would have derogated from his dignity if he had received a kingdom from man, he who was so a king that by participation in him all kings exist. Prov. 8: By me kings reign. Another reason because it would have prejudiced his teaching if he had received splendor and strength from men: for he worked and taught here so that the whole be ascribed to divine power, and not only to human favor. John 5: I do not receive splendor from men. The third reason is that he might teach us to despise worldly dignities. John 13: For I have given you an example etc.

³ To the third proof which is taken from that place in John 18, My kingdom is not of this world: it is answered that that authority rightly understood in no way supports the adversaries: since by it Christ does not deny that he is king: indeed afterwards he expressly conceded it. For when Pilate had said to him: Therefore art thou a king? He answered: Thou sayest that I am a king: for (he says) for this was I born and for this came I into the world that I should bear witness to the truth. Nor does he say my kingdom is not in this world, since his kingdom is in heaven and on earth: but he says it is not of this world, not namely by worldly election nor by human succession.

For the fuller understanding of this authority, that the adversaries may understand that they have nothing of favor, it is to be noted: that as St. Thomas says on John expounding this place, kingdom is sometimes called the people of him who reigns, sometimes the royal power itself. In the first way therefore taking kingdom, Augustine expounds it saying: My kingdom, that is my faithful. Apoc. 5: Thou hast made us a kingdom to our God: is not of this world, namely through effect and imitation, rescued indeed through the bestowal of grace: for so he has rescued us from the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of his splendor. But Chrysostom expounds it taking kingdom in the second way saying: My kingdom, that is my power and authority by which I am king, is not of this world, that is it has no origin from worldly causes and the election of men but from elsewhere, namely from the Father himself. Dan. 7: His power which shall not be taken away and his kingdom which shall not be corrupted. And below he concludes: My kingdom is not hence, that is it has no beginning from this world: yet it is here, because it reaches from end to end strongly and disposes all things sweetly, etc. Ps.: Ask of me and I will give thee the nations and thy possession etc. It is clear therefore that in Christ there was the power and authority of temporal jurisdiction although he made little use of temporal jurisdiction. And I say little because when he made as it were a scourge of cords and cast out the sellers and buyers from the temple, and overturned the tables of the money-changers, John 2, he seems to have used power. Hence the Jews said to him: By what power dost thou do this?

Yet it is because he had principally come to redeem and save us; as if all his acts turned about our instruction, and few or none about the exercise of any jurisdiction: not because he did not have both powers, but that he might attend totally to our salvation, as is said in John 3: For God did not send his Son into the world to judge the world but that the world might be saved through him. But the sacrament of your salvation having been completed through the death of Christ and his resurrection, Christ committed to Peter the whole government of the Church, which was necessary and expedient for the government of the whole Church. And because both powers, spiritual and temporal, are necessary for this: therefore he conferred both powers on Peter, and concerning the spiritual power indeed no Christian doubts. Concerning the temporal power it is clear in Acts 5, where it is read that Peter condemned Ananias and Sapphira judicially for the crime of theft and lying. Hence on that place: But Peter said to Ananias, the Gloss says: he speaks as prince of all. And on that place: Why hast thou put this thing in thy heart? thou hast not lied to men but to God, the Gloss which is Bede's says thus: Not for the sake of gain did he give so severe a sentence of transgression, but foreseeing future tares which would adulterate the simplicity of the Church with depraved morals, he suffered the guilty to be cured by no repentance, but cut off the noxious shoot by the root for the fear of posterity, so says the Gloss. Likewise blessed Augustine in the book on the marvels of sacred Scripture treating this word says: Behold how great is the apostolic strength: while Ananias was sound in Christ, when Peter rebuked him by the command of speech alone he bound him with death, and Tabitha bound by the bond of death he loosed by the same power of command; and therefore Ananias and Sapphira first died quickly in the sight of the Church that it might be shown how great the apostolic authority was, so says he.

But the reason is read elsewhere that Peter himself used this power: because on account of the small number of believers over whom the power had been given to him, the whole intention of Peter and of the other apostles and disciples was to convert others to the faith through preaching and the working of miracles. Hence in the last chapter of Mark it is said: But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord cooperating and confirming the word etc. But the faithful having been multiplied, the later men and successors not unduly and not unfittingly at times exercised and used it when they judged this expedient: hence Christ and the apostles left many things to be executed and ordained to their successors according to diverse times and diverse states of the Church, which they themselves did not then execute nor ordain through themselves: because there was then no need of it: as Augustine beautifully shows in the letter to Count Boniface.

To the third objection, when it is said that these two powers cannot meet in one person: it is answered by denying this. And to the proof, when it is said that two species of the same genus etc., it is answered that this reasoning fails: because this proposition is not universally true but only in those things in which from a special reason is found repugnance of being together. For example, in all natures existing through themselves there is repugnance of being in the same subject: because each from its nature is apt to constitute its own supposit, as man and ass. Likewise in opposites where repugnance is from the nature of opposition so that they are not only distinct but also contrary, and therefore in whatever genus opposition is found between any species, all species of that genus are incompatible, as in whiteness and blackness and concerning all middle colors, because they all have opposition among themselves at least imperfectly; for it is the nature of contraries that they expel one another. Hence contraries are those which are most distant from one another, and are in the same susceptible alternately not at once, as the Philosopher says in the predicaments. But those forms which are so distinct that they are not contraries but disparate are compossible in the same subject, as quantity and quality which are distinguished by the most general genus in man. Species also of the proximate genus can be together, as is clear in the virtues both moral and intellectual, for the same man can at once have virtues, namely temperance, justice and fortitude and so of the others: indeed whoever has one perfectly and completely has all: as is clear in the 6th book of the Ethics. It is clear therefore that it is not a good argument: These forms are distinct; therefore they are not compossible in the same subject. So therefore in the matter proposed, because the jurisdictions, namely the temporal and the spiritual, although they are distinct, are nevertheless not contrary: which is clear, because one contrary is not ordered to another, indeed it corrupts it. But temporal jurisdiction is ordered to the spiritual as we have shown above. Likewise one jurisdiction aids and strengthens the other, and consequently it does not follow that on account of their distinction they are incompatible in the same person.

Which is also clear from the deed: because in the same person of Christ there were both jurisdictions: for it has been said: The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all they that dwell therein, Ps. 23. It is also clear from another thing: because if they were not compossible it would follow that no ecclesiastical person could have any temporal jurisdiction, neither castle nor village nor anything else: which is most absurd. It is clear therefore that those jurisdictions are compatible notwithstanding their distinction from one another.

Hence in the time of the law of nature both kingdom and priesthood ran together at once, and all the firstborn of kings were priests and kings, and exercised jurisdiction in temporal and spiritual things: so both ran together at once in the Mosaic law until Samuel, under whom the people asked for a king for themselves, whom, as far as was from the part of the people, the Lord granted as a burden on account of their sins. Hence the Lord said to Samuel: They have not cast thee off but me, lest I reign over them. By the disposing eternal providence which also converts our evils and those things which proceed for our sins into good. This was done as a presage of what was to come, God so ordaining, in the new law, that priests, freed from the judgments of temporal things, should accustom themselves, as the time of Christ's coming pressed, to be vacant for spiritual things, who coming as king and priest according to the order of Melchisedech, who was at once king and priest of the most high God, reduced the priesthood, which accidentally according to what was said had been made servile in the Mosaic law, in which priests were subjected to kings, to the liberty of the priesthood of the law of nature: in which in the same person both dignities ought to reside according to the course of the law of nature. But after Christ's coming, when it was time to be vacant for spiritual things, by God's disposition the government and authority of temporal things, and all jurisdiction concerning them and execution, was committed to emperors and secular princes, with only the first authority remaining, as has been said, with priests as with those whose exercise ought to be nobler, and who are in the greater and higher degree, while kings and princes handle temporal affairs, who as lesser and lower are occupied about lower things, as on that place in 1 Cor. 6, If you have secular affairs, appoint those who are contemptible in the Church to judge. The Gloss says: The greater ought to attend to spiritual things.

The aforesaid dignities are therefore distinct not from the nature of the thing but on account of the divine disposition, and yet they are not so wholly distinct that the superior jurisdiction does not remain with the Pope, though differently as we have said in spiritual and in temporal things: because in spiritual things he has execution regularly and immediately, but in temporal things not regularly but in the assigned cases.

⁴ To the fourth reason, when it is said that offices ought to be distinct etc., it is answered that this has place when several meddle at once with the same affair: which is not in the matter proposed: because concerning spiritual things no one can meddle except the ecclesiastical judge, but concerning temporal things the ecclesiastical judge and the lay judge do not meddle at once: because no one ought to be drawn for the same cause to diverse tribunals: but it is in the plaintiff's option to have recourse to one of them and that one alone has then to take cognizance of that affair and to judge, and so there is no confusion.

⁵ To the fifth, by which it is said that the Lord said: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's etc. It must be said that that authority in no way favors the adversaries: since according to the truth of the Gospel text it was not Christ's intention in that place to make the distinction of the aforesaid jurisdictions nor to assign the persons on whom they fall: but to answer the tempting question of the Jews, who since they deemed themselves alone to be of the people of God while the rest were pagans and idolaters, some of them did not believe that they were bound to Caesar, the pagan emperor, to pay the census, but that those who were vacant for the worship of the true God were immune from censuses and tributes, and therefore with the Herodians who were of the emperor's race they came to Christ putting to him this question: Is it lawful to give the census to Caesar or not? so that if he said not, they might accuse him before the emperor; if he said yes, they might accuse him before the chief priests as speaking against the liberty of the worship of God. But Jesus knowing their wickedness, a census coin stamped with Caesar's image having been shown to him, answered: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's: he spoke of rendering to Caesar the census owed to him and to God worship in oblations and sacrifices according to the rite of the law. Therefore concerning the rendering of debts and not concerning the distinction of jurisdictions and of the persons on whom they fall.

⁶ To the sixth, when it is said that human rule presides over human things etc., it is answered that it is true that the priesthood is from God to preside over divine and spiritual things as far as is from the first and principal intention of the priesthood: but because divine and spiritual things are disturbed and sometimes impeded through the abuse of men concerning temporal things: therefore to the priesthood secondarily and consequently it pertains to remove impediments and disturbances, and to strike with the spiritual sword those who impede and disturb. For these are the true bounds of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction from the foundation which it is not lawful to transgress: because temporal jurisdiction in no way extends itself to spiritual things of which it knows nothing. But spiritual jurisdiction extends itself first and principally to spiritual things: secondarily and by a certain consequence it extends itself to the actions of men concerning temporal things which are ordered to spiritual things as to the end, insofar as the abuse of men concerning them can impede the end.

⁷ To the seventh it is answered that the reasoning does not proceed: since although according to St. Thomas in 2. 2, q. 7, ch. 86, art. 2, for cause of greed to meddle in secular affairs is prohibited to religious and clerics, yet for cause of charity they can meddle in secular affairs with due moderation according to the superior's leave, both ministering and directing. Hence in the decrees, dist. 88, ch. Decrevit, Pope Melchiades says: The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric hire possessions or meddle in secular affairs except for the care of pupils or orphans or widows, or if perchance the bishop of the city commands him to have the charge of ecclesiastical affairs. Therefore it does not derogate from the dignity of the supreme pontificate if for cause of charity and with urgent necessity for the preservation of spiritual things, for the correction of vices, for the punishment of evildoers and for the keeping of peace and justice in the Christian people he at times meddles in secular affairs as director and teacher. ⁸ To the eighth, when it is said that the secular judge etc., it is answered that the reasoning does not proceed, because there is not a like reason concerning the secular judge and the ecclesiastical: because the secular judge is wholly incapable of ecclesiastical or spiritual jurisdiction, as in ch. Decernimus, on judges, alleged from the opposite side. hence neither can he possess spiritual things, in ch. causam, on rescripts. hence Ozias was punished with leprosy who wished to usurp for himself the office of the priests, Paralip. 26. but the ecclesiastical judge is well capable of temporal jurisdiction. For indeed from the beginning all causes even temporal of jurisdiction were treated before priests, as is had in ch. Per venerabilem, which if they are for the law. nor indeed are those two jurisdictions contrary to one another: indeed as we have said above they can concur together in one and the same person.

⁹ To the ninth objection, when it is said: that to have jurisdiction in temporal things is repugnant to ecclesiastical perfection: it is answered that this is false. And to the proof when that place in Matt. 19 is adduced, If thou wilt be perfect: St. Thomas answers in 2. 2, q. 184, art. 7, that the renunciation of one's own means can be considered in two ways. In one way according as it is an act: and thus perfection does not consist in it essentially but a certain instrument of perfection: and therefore nothing prevents the state of perfection from existing without renunciation of one's own. In another way it can be considered according to preparation of mind, namely that a man be ready, if need be, to leave or distribute all things, and this pertains directly to perfection, so says St. Thomas. But since the power of jurisdiction can stand in the person of the lord Pope with this preparation of mind: it is clear that it can stand with apostolic perfection. hence Christ was most perfect, and yet in him there were both powers as has been said. For many holy prelates from the devotion of the faithful had much temporal jurisdiction: of whose perfection and goodness nothing, however, is believed to have been derogated by this.

¹⁰ To the tenth, when it is argued that the jurisdictions of secular princes would be superfluous: it is answered by denying that the jurisdictions would be superfluous: indeed they are necessary: as we have shown elsewhere in book 1. Both because, since plenary temporal jurisdiction is not posited in the Roman pontiff regularly as to immediate execution or exercise: but in certain cases as has been said, for the good and perfect government of the Christian people secular powers are necessary whose office it is to attend directly to these temporal things, administering and governing them. hence in 1 Peter 2 it is said of the secular power: that it is for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of the good. And secondly that the spiritual power, freed from baser and secular affairs, may be freer to be vacant for spiritual things: and lest on account of the administration of temporal and lower things they be impeded from the government of spiritual and higher things. hence for this reason the offices of these dignities are said to be distinct by God: as is had in ch. Cum ad verum, dist. 96. And so much let this have been said for this second book of this present summa on the Church.

The End of the Second Book.