Summa de Ecclesia

After we have explained in what ways in our judgment the law of the papacy does not grant the Roman pontiff to have jurisdiction in temporal things, now must be examined what we promised in the second place, namely in what way it belongs to him. We say moreover that the Roman pontiff, although he does not regularly or directly have power as full in temporal things as in spiritual things, nevertheless also has power in temporal things by consequence and this by his own right, namely as much as is necessary for the conservation of spiritual things, for the direction of the faithful to eternal salvation, and for the correction of sins and the preserving of peace among the Christian people. Which we demonstrate manifestly and irrefragably from many things, for which we shall set down twelve propositions as twelve testimonies of this truth. ¹ That the Roman pontiff has power and jurisdiction by right of his papacy in temporal things in some way is gathered from this, that his principate is directive and preceptive over the secular power in the administration of its office according to the exigency of the ultimate end which is supreme beatitude itself to which all the faithful are to be directed. Which is thus shown by reason. In all ordered arts and powers the art or power to which the ultimate and principal end belongs is the chief and commands all the other arts or powers whose ends are ordered to that end, as is had in 1 Ethics. Furthermore it is clear because the end commands and rules and imposes law on all those things which are toward the end, so that according to the exigency of the end they adapt themselves in due order and are ordered to one another according to the measure and mode of each, but the proper end intended through the papal principate is supreme felicity to which man is ordered through the theological virtues, while the end intended by the secular power is political felicity to which man is ordered through the moral virtues, but no one doubts that the end of the spiritual power is more potent, superior, and more principal than the end to which the secular power directs and tends, whence the latter is ordered to the former: therefore it belongs to the spiritual power, and most of all to the pope who is the universal leader and ruler of the Christian people, to direct and regulate, to command and to give laws to the secular power by which it may be directed in the administration of its office to the ultimate end of eternal felicity. And in this respect the Roman pontiff stands to kings and princes as the master-builder to craftsmen. For the former knows the wherefore and the rules of judging, while the latter, namely the mechanical craftsmen, as experienced in many things know the fact, but are ignorant of the wherefore, on account of which the pope ought to give them laws according to which they ought to execute their jurisdiction and rule the people in order to supernatural beatitude. Whence blessed Aug., knowing and admiring this power in blessed Peter the apostle, in a certain sermon on the apostles Peter and Paul which begins Fortis et humilis, thus says. O wondrous power and ineffable grace of the Saviour: who would easily believe a fisherman of the peoples to be prince of the apostles and to anoint kings over kings, to sanctify kingdoms, to command all realms, to restrain the world by laws, to tread demons under foot, to command virtues, to open heaven to men when he would, to close it when it pleased him, to give the immortal kingdom to the converted, to deny it to the perverse, to know the merits of the world, to remit the faults and crimes of men. These things he. For this reason we said above in the first book of this summa, ch. 90, that the temporal or secular power among the Christian people depends in a certain way by a threefold kind of causality on the spiritual power, namely of the efficient, the formal, and the final cause, on which see fully there. Innocent III seems to have used this argument in ch. Solitae, On majority and obedience, where writing to the Emperor of Constantinople he thus says. But thou couldst rather have understood from the prerogative of the priesthood, from this, that it was said not by just anyone but by God, not to a king but to a priest, not to one descended of royal stock but of priestly lineage, namely of the priests who were in Anathoth. Behold I have set thee over kings and kingdoms to root up and destroy, to build and to plant. From all which things it is clear that truly the Roman pontiff holds the apex of power both spiritual and secular, or temporal, although the temporal not in all things in the same mode in which it is had by the secular prince, but in a worthier, higher, and more perfect mode, for he does not so have it as to exercise its works immediately except in certain cases which are touched on below, but he performs its works in a better way, namely by commanding, directing, and regulating, and by using its works to his own end. ² Second proposition. That the Roman pontiff by right of his vicariate has his jurisdiction in temporal things in some way is shown from this, that he is constituted by God the pastor of all the faithful generally, with the Lord saying to blessed Peter and in him to his successor. Feed my sheep. John, last chapter. Upon which word the Gloss says. To feed is to confirm believing sheep lest they fail from the faith, to provide subjects with earthly things if need be, and to bestow examples of virtues with the word of preaching, to overthrow adversaries, to correct erring subjects. This is the Gloss. But it is clear that to feed the flock of the Lord by providing earthly supports to subjects in necessity, by resisting adversaries, and by correcting the erring requires in the pastor not only spiritual power but also temporal. Whence since when any office or rule is granted to anyone, those things are also deemed granted without which the office or rule cannot rightly be expedited, On the office of a delegate, ch. 1, and ch. Praeterea. Moreover, it is manifest that the Roman pontiff is to be said to have secular power in some way. Innocent III seems to have used this argument in ch. Solitae, On majority and obedience, where to show the Emperor of Constantinople that he could rightly reprove and rebuke him, he thus says. But we, though we have written without rebuking, could nevertheless have rebuked reasonably, for to us in blessed Peter the sheep of Christ are committed, with the Lord saying. Feed my sheep, not distinguishing between these sheep and others, so that he shows himself alien from his fold who does not recognize Peter and his successors as masters and pastors. These things he. From the pastoral care therefore which the Roman pontiff has over all the faithful of whatever state, dignity, or condition they be, it is at once given to be understood that he is to be said to have the apex not only of spiritual power but also of temporal in some way. Third proposition. That the Roman pontiff is shown to have temporal jurisdiction also by right of his principate from this, that every power extends to taking cognizance of all sins, not only of those which are against the articles of faith and the sacraments in which the Christian religion is principally founded, but also of all mortal sins committed concerning whatever personal actions even secular. Which is shown by reason and by authority. By reason thus. To whom it belongs to consider the end belongs to judge of those things which ought to be ordered to the end, because the reason of those things which are ordered to the end is taken from the end, for as to those aiming at any end it belongs to choose those things which are congruous to the end, so to remove those things which furnish impediments to the attainment of the end, as is clear in the physician whose business it is not only to judge and provide concerning things helping to the health which he intends to induce, but also to remove those which impede, and so likewise it is in other things, but so it is that the body is ordered to the soul even according to the gentile philosophers and temporal things are ordered to spiritual things, and all the actions of Christians ought to be ordered to attaining eternal life as our ultimate end according to the Catholic faith expounded to us. Therefore whosoever's business it is to consider the salvation of souls and spiritual things, as it is of prelates having care and rule of souls, as are the pope, archbishops, and bishops, belongs to judge of the spiritual actions of men by which they can deviate from their salvation by sinning concerning whatever matter, whether against the articles of faith or the sacraments or against good morals, by sinning against oneself or one's neighbor by word or deed or in any other way. In the second way the same is clear by the authority of the Lord, Matt. 18, where it is thus said. If thy brother sin against thee, rebuke him between thee and him, if he hear thee thou hast gained thy brother, if he hear thee take with thee one or two witnesses³, that in the mouth of two or three every word may stand, but if he hear them not tell the Church, but if he hear not the Church let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican, that is excommunicated. And it is agreed that he speaks of the jurisdiction of the Church which prelates have, for in the same place there is subjoined. Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven: therefore without any doubt it belongs to the prelates of the Church and most of all to the prelate of prelates to take cognizance by right divinely conferred on him and to judge of any sin whatsoever. Whence blessed Paul excommunicated the notorious fornicator as is read in 1 Cor., chapter five. Since therefore sins of this kind occur concerning the personal actions of men and their contracts even in temporal things, it belongs to the Church to judge of all these, especially if the action be regarded by way of injury or of any other sin whatsoever both among laymen and among clerics or between a cleric and a layman, whichever of them be plaintiff or defendant. Nor can it be said in the aforesaid that the defendant is dragged outside his own forum, because all Christians inasmuch as they are Christians belong to the forum of the Church, and this is what is expressly said in ch. 1, q. 1. Whatsoever contentions have arisen among Christians, let them be brought to the Church and be terminated by ecclesiastical judges, and if they refuse to obey, let them be excluded from the thresholds of the Church until they obey, these things there. Furthermore neither is the jurisdiction of secular princes hereby impeded. Both because the Church does not impede the secular power from exercising its judgment on a secular defendant if he be summoned to its judgment. For it is in the option of the plaintiff to summon the defendant to this or that judgment, and not to both at once. And secondly because many actions are purely secular which, since they have no respect to the ultimate end either by promoting or impeding it, belong to secular princes only, as concerning fiefs and possessions, and not to the Church, as in ch. Novit, Extra, On judgments. And thirdly because the ecclesiastical judge uses one censure of correction and the secular judge another, each of which is necessary to the Christian people for the correction of morals. It is true what lord Durandus says, that although this be the right of the Church divinely conferred on it, yet it does not always nor everywhere use this right, partly to avoid scandal lest it be thought that the Church seeks the emolument of money or temporal glory rather than the correction of vices, partly because of the audacity of certain tyrants in whose lands many churches are founded who through their violent power have not permitted the Church to use its right. Innocent III used this argument in ch. Novit, Extra, On judgments, where writing to the prelates of the kingdom of France and wishing to show that the lord king of France ought not to reckon it an injury that in the controversy which was between him and the king of England he had submitted himself to apostolic judgment, he thus says. No one who is of sound mind is ignorant that it belongs to our judgment to rebuke any Christian for any mortal sin whatsoever, and if he contemn correction to coerce him by ecclesiastical distraint. ⁴ Fourth proposition. The Roman pontiff seems to have jurisdiction even in temporal things, because not only can he coerce by ecclesiastical censure secular princes delinquent concerning the use of their jurisdiction, but even depose from dignity those notably negligent. This proposition is clear in ch. Alius, fifteenth q. 6, where Pope Gelasius thus writes to the Emperor Constantine. Another pontiff likewise, namely Zacharias, deposed the king of the Franks from the kingdom not so much for his iniquities as because he was useless for so great a power, and substituted Pippin, father of the Emperor Charles, in his place, and absolved all the French from the oath of fidelity. These things he. For the fuller understanding of which proposition it is to be considered, according to lord Peter de Palude in his treatise on ecclesiastical power, that although the pope is not bound to confirm every king who from the beginning has taken rule by consent of the people, nevertheless he can depose every such one not only for heresy or schism or any intolerable crime among the people, but also for insufficiency, as if an idiot in sense or impotent in strength presides in the kingdom, through whose insufficiency the kingdom of the faithful is endangered, it is certain that because he deserves to be deposed, since the common good is to be preferred to the private, he ought to be deposed by a superior, and because those of the kingdom, whether they be nobles or others, are inferior to him, and an inferior cannot judge a superior. Therefore he cannot be deposed by them, but because the pope is superior to him in spiritual things and consequently in temporal things inasmuch as is necessary for preserving the spiritual good of himself and of others, and at least by reason of delict, and he cannot in sound conscience retain the kingdom for which he is insufficient and unworthy, consequently the pope can admonish him to yield the kingdom which he cannot retain without sin, and if he refuse to do so excommunicate him, because it belongs to the office of the pope to rebuke any Christian for any mortal sin whatsoever, and if he contemn correction to coerce him by ecclesiastical distraint, On judgments, ch. Novit, and if he persevere in excommunication he can as has been said depose him and absolve his subjects from his subjection as a schismatic on account of contumacy and pertinacious disobedience. And from this also, because one excommunicated ought not to perform legitimate acts and public offices, and schismatics are to be stripped of the military belt, 19, q. 1, Who against, 15, q. 6, second-to-last chapter. But if the nobles or aforesaid electors have not deserved to lose the right of electing, the pope cannot without them substitute another. These things he. But the Gloss, expounding that ch. Alius, deposed from the kingdom, says, firstly, that with the nobles deposing he consented, which seems wholly false: since it contradicts the text and the intention of Pelagius who adduces that chapter to show the excellence of papal power, which is not shown by saying that he consented to the nobles deposing, nor is that consent to be understood as giving authority. Whence lord Peter de Palude where above says that what the Gloss says, he consented, is to be understood as to the institution which could be done through the nobles, but the deposition was done by the authority of the pope and not of the nobles, which could be done by a superior alone, but the election could be done by inferiors. The aforesaid proposition is also confirmed by the example of Innocent IV, who is read to have given a helper to the king of Portugal, who was prodigal and a dissipator and burdened and suffered to be burdened churches, monasteries, pious places and ecclesiastical persons, widows, pupils, and orphans, and to have interdicted to him the administration of the kingdom, as in ch. Grandi, On supplying the negligence of prelates, book 6. And so the apostolic priest stands to kings and princes as the civil architect to the other craftsmen in the city, as Henry of Ghent says in quodlibet 6, art. 23, for as it belongs to the master-builder to command who and of what sort ought to exercise the science of medicine, rhetoric, and so of others in the city, and to admit some and repel some, so the apostolic priest ought to consider who and of what sort ought to rule kingdoms and principalities and to honor the good but depose the evil and those ruling badly and substitute others in their place. These things he. Of this conclusion such is the sentence of lord Vlrici in his summa, for he says. If the king were manifestly a heretic, or if when admonished by the Church he should nevertheless neglect the rule of his kingdom as to those things which are of the faith, namely if he did not intend the extirpation of heretics, he can be deposed by the Church from royal dignity. These things he.

⁵ Fifth proposition. That the Roman pontiff has temporal jurisdiction thence is manifestly shown, that he can not only excommunicate secular princes but also, with them persevering in contumacy, absolve their subjects from the oath so that they observe no fidelity to them. This proposition is clear from the canon of Gregory VII presiding in synod which is had in ch. Nos sanctorum, 15, q. 6, and from the canon of Urban II in ch. Iuratos, in the same cause and question.

⁶ Sixth proposition. That the Roman pontiff has jurisdiction in temporal things is shown from this, that he is discerned to have both swords. But that the material sword in a certain way belongs to the Roman pontiff is clear from John 18, where Christ says to Peter. Put thy sword into the scabbard, which word the most devout Bernard treating, to Pope Eugenius thus says. Why dost thou again attempt to usurp the sword which thou wast once bidden to put into the scabbard, which nevertheless he who denies to be thine does not seem to me to attend sufficiently to the word of the Lord saying. Put thy sword into the scabbard, John chapter eighteen, and Matt. 16. Thine therefore it is, itself to be unsheathed perchance at thy nod but not by thy hand, otherwise if in no way it pertained to thee, when the apostles said. Behold here are two swords, the Lord would not have answered, It is enough. Therefore both the spiritual sword and the material belong to the Church, but the latter indeed for the Church, the former moreover to be exercised also by the Church, the one namely by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of the soldier, but yet at the nod of the priest and the command of the Emperor. These things he. But a nod is said to be not only exhortation but also disposition, whence Pope Leo IV, as in ch. Ergo, 23, q. 8, against the Saracens bids the people to be gathered and to meet them on the shore of the sea. Likewise in ch. Hortatu, in the same cause and q. At the exhortation and prayers of Pope Adrian, King Charles being exhorted undertook war against the Lombards. To the same end blessed Gregory exhorts certain nobles, that they gather soldiers against the enemies and manfully prepare arms, as in ch. Quidem, in the same cause and q. Likewise in the register it is also read that blessed Gregory commanded the citizens of Tuscia to prepare arms against the Lombards, and decreed pay to those serving as soldiers. That also the disposition of this material sword, though not the material exercise of it, befits clerics, St. Thomas in 2, 2, q. 40, art. 2, declares thus saying. Every person or art or virtue to which the end belongs has to dispose of those things which are toward the end: but carnal wars among the faithful people are to be referred as to an end to the divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed, and therefore it belongs to clerics to dispose and induce others to wage just wars. These things St. Thomas. Therefore the disposition also by authority of the material sword against infidels, heretics, schismatics, and tyrants will belong most of all to the Roman pontiff who is leader and pastor and champion of the Christian people. Pope Boniface VIII uses this argument in his extravagant Unam sanctam, where he thus says. In this power indeed, namely of the Roman pontiff, we are instructed by evangelical sayings that there are two swords, namely the spiritual and the temporal. For when the apostles said, behold two swords, etc. as was adduced before from Bernard, it follows. But the sword ought to be under the sword and the temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual power, for when the Apostle says, there is no power but from God, and the things which are from God are ordained, but they would not be ordered unless the sword were under the sword and as inferior were reduced through another to the highest, for according to blessed Dionysius the law of divinity is that the lowest be reduced through middle things

⁷ Seventh proposition. The Roman pontiff seems by divine right to have temporal jurisdiction in some way, namely nobler and more excellent than the secular powers: since to him by right of the highest priesthood belongs to declare, define, and judge doubts and ambiguities concerning whatsoever personal actions of men which are disputed among inferior judges whether clerics or seculars. This Innocent III proves in ch. Per venerabilem, Extra, Who are legitimate children, from Sacred Scripture thus saying. Not only in the patrimony of the Church over which we wield full power in temporal things, but also in other regions, with certain causes inspected, we exercise temporal jurisdiction causally, not that we wish to prejudice the right of another, but because in Deut. 17 it is contained. If thou perceive a difficult and ambiguous judgment before thee between blood and blood, cause and cause, leprosy and not leprosy, and thou see judgment varied within thy gates, coming to the priests of the Levitical kind and to the judge who shall be at that time, who shall judge the truth of the judgment, and thou shalt do whatsoever they who preside in the place which the Lord shall choose say to thee, and thou shalt follow their sentence, but he who shall be proud, refusing to obey the command of the priest who at that time ministers to the Lord thy God, by decree of the judge let him die. ⁸ Eighth proposition. The Roman pontiff has temporal jurisdiction consequently adjoined to the spiritual, from this, that when a case of evident necessity occursfor the defense of the faith against heretics, or against the invasion of pagans, by right of his principate, since he is the head of all the faithful and father, he can exact tithes or tithed portions from each of the faithful yet according to due proportion, lest anyone without reason be burdened more than others, to succor the common necessity of the Church, and can compel rebels and contradictors by ecclesiastical censure. Which can be proved by reason thus. Every Christian from the perfection of the Christian or Christian religion is bound to honor father and mother not only by exhibiting reverence but also by ministering necessities, and if need be by exposing for their salvation all temporal things. And if in this he ought to honor his carnal father and mother, much more his spiritual, namely Christ and His Vicar, and his mother the Church, when a dangerous necessity of the Church or of the Roman pontiff presses, if for his salvation he needs the administration of temporal goods, every Christian when required is bound to succor and assist. Where it is to be considered that the faithful are bound to succor the Roman pontiff not only in necessities pressing for the good of the whole universal Church, but also in the necessities of his apostolic state and person, since he is prince of the whole Christian university and has great need. ⁹ Ninth proposition. The Roman pontiff is argued to have temporal jurisdiction, because he himself by his own right legitimates to secular honors and dignities, as is had in ch. Per venerabilem, Extra, Who are legitimate children, where the pope thus speaks to the noble N. of Montpellier. Through our venerable brother A., archbishop of Arles, thy humility has supplicated us that we deign to adorn thy sons with the title of legitimation so that the objection of birth might not bar them from succession. But that over this the apostolic see has full power is argued from this, that with diverse causes inspected he has dispensed with certain less legitimately born, not only natural but even adulterine, so he legitimated those to spiritual acts, that they could be promoted to bishops, from which it is verisimilarly believed and probably reputed that he can legitimate them to secular acts.

¹⁰ Tenth proposition. The Roman pontiff is argued thence to have temporal jurisdiction, because he himself by right of his pontificate, with temporal lords negligent to do justice to their subjects suffering injury, can supply their negligence and render justice to whatsoever subjects of negligent lords. This proposition is manifestly gathered from Innocent III, On competent forum, ch. Licet, where Innocent thus speaks to the bishop of Vercelli. We command that if at any time letters concerning things especially touching the secular forum happen to be obtained from the apostolic see by the laymen of Vercelli, thou declare them surreptitious, appeal laid aside, to be by our authority void and vain, provided the consuls and commune exhibit the complement of justice in secular judgment to those complaining of them. These things there. Upon which the Gloss says. This is the case in which the ecclesiastical judge can mix himself in secular jurisdiction when the secular judge is negligent to do justice. Plainly since, with blessed Augustine witness, in 4 On the City of God, kingdoms with justice removed are nothing but great bands of robbers, it belongs to the Roman pontiff lest justice perish. ¹¹ Eleventh proposition. That the Roman pontiff has temporal power and jurisdiction is argued by invincible testimony from this, that he transferred the Roman empire from the Greeks to the Germans, and afterwardsconferred the power and right of electing the king emperor on certain princes, as Innocent III manifestly testifies in ch. Venerabilem, Extra, On election, thus saying. Since to them, namely the princes, right and power of this kind has come from the apostolic see which transferred the Roman empire from the Greeks into the person of Charles, to the Germans, where the Gloss says. We read in the chronicles that when the Roman Church was oppressed by Astulph king of the Lombards, it sought aid from Constantine and Beroe his son, Emperors of Constantinople, and when they refused their patronage to the Church, Stephen the second pope, Roman by nation, transferred the empire to Charles the Great who had been son of Pippin whom Zacharias his predecessor had substituted in place of the king of the Franks whom he had deposed, concerning whom 15, q. 6, ch. Alius. This is the Gloss. ¹² Twelfth proposition. The Roman pontiff is argued to have temporal jurisdiction by his own right in the root: because with the empire vacant he has jurisdiction in temporal things, as Innocent III says in ch. Licet, On competent forum, and as is also noted in the Gloss. And it is today declared in Extra, On adjudged matter, Pastoralis, in the Clementines. And from this it is clearly evident that the pope by his own right has temporal jurisdiction, because otherwise he would not have execution in the aforesaid case and in others unless the emperor granted it to him.

¹³ Concerning the power which he has over infidels let this be the 13th proposition. The pope can take away the lordship or any right whatsoever of prelation which infidels have over the faithful. This proposition is of blessed Thomas in the second of the second part, quest. 10, art. 10, thus saying. It is to be considered that lordship and prelation were introduced from human law: but the distinction of the faithful and infidels is from divine law, but divine law which is from grace does not take away human law which is from natural reason. The distinction of the faithful and infidels considered in itself does not take away the lordship and prelation of infidels over the faithful, yet justly through the sentence or ordination of the Church having the authority of God such a right of lordship or prelation can be taken away, because infidels by merit of their infidelity deserve to lose power over the faithful who are transferred into sons of God. But this indeed the Church sometimes does, sometimes does not. For in those infidels who are subjected to the Church and its members by temporal subjection, the Church has thus established this right as is clear in ch. Mancipia and ch. Constitutionem, dist. 54, which both are of Pope Gregory, that a slave of Jews made a Christian be freed from slavery with no price given if he be home-born, that is born in slavery. Likewise if, while remaining an infidel, he have been bought for service or for the sake of serving: but if he have been bought for merchandise or for the sake of merchandise, as to be sold to another, he is bound to expose him for sale within three months, nor does the Church do injury because since the Jews themselves are slaves of the Church, the Church can dispose of their things, as also secular princes have published many laws toward their subjects in favor of liberty: but in those infidels who are not temporally subject to the Church, the Church does not establish right although it could institute it of right, and this it does to avoid scandal, as also the Lord, Matt. 18, says that he could excuse himself from tribute because free are the sons: but therefore he commanded tribute to be paid to avoid scandal. So also Paul, when he had said, 1 Tim. 5, that slaves should honor their lords, subjoins lest the name of the Lord and doctrine be blasphemed. These things St. Thomas. ¹⁴ Fourteenth proposition. The pope is shown to have power in temporal things because he can punish offending Jewsoral punishment and also indirectly with spiritual punishment. This proposition is manifestly had first in ch. Postulasti, Extra, On Jews, where Innocent commands a certain Jew who laid violent hands on a certain cleric to be punished with pecuniary punishment, and congruous temporal satisfaction to be made to the cleric injured; if he do it not, he commands Christians that before he satisfy they presume not to exercise commerce with the aforesaid Jew: where the gloss says. Jews are indirectly excommunicated. Secondly the same is gathered from ch. Saepe, 28, q. 1, where from the council of Toledo it is commanded that Jews who have not avoided intercourse with Christians be assigned to public beatings.

¹⁵ Fifteenth proposition. The pope is argued to have jurisdiction in temporal things: because he can deprive princes apostatizing from the faith of the temporal lordship which they have over the faithful. This proposition, although it is clear from what was said in the fourth proposition, is nevertheless thus shown from the words of Saint Thomas in 2, 2, q. 12, last article, thus saying. But to the Church it does not belong to punish infidelity in those who never received the faith: according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 5: For what have I to do to judge them that are without? But the infidelity of those who had previously embraced the faith it can punish by sentence, and commonly in this they are punished, that they cannot rule over faithful subjects: for this could turn to the great corruption of the faith: for as is said in Prov. 6, An apostate man plots evil in his heart, and sows quarrels, striving to separate men from the faith; and therefore the sooner any are denounced by sentence to be excommunicated on account of apostasy from the faith, by that very fact their subjects are absolved from their lordship and from the oath of fidelity by which they were bound to them. These things Saint Thomas. This is also gathered from ch. Absolutos, Extra, On heretics, and from ch. Nos sanctorum, and ch. Iuratos, 15, q. 6.

¹⁶ Sixteenth proposition. The pope is shown to have jurisdiction also in temporal things, because he can declare war against infidels, heretics, or tyrants insulting the Christian faith, or occupiers of the goods of the Church, or disturbers of the peace and quiet of the Christian people: not indeed that they kill, wound, or maim, but that they defend the faith, liberate the Church and fatherland, and bring back to Christ the land occupied by infidels, and over this he can licitly and justly grant great indulgences to those taking up arms for this. This proposition is sufficiently clear both by authorities and by reason from what was adduced concerning the sixth proposition.