Summa de Ecclesia

When the things concerning the amplitude of the Roman pontiff in spirituals which seemed good to us have been completed, it has come into our mind to close this book with that consideration: whether namely the principate of the Roman pontiff extends not only to spirituals but also to temporals, so that in the whole Christian world he have temporal jurisdiction. But having perused diverse ways of speaking we find among others two extreme ways of speaking. The first is that of those saying that the Roman pontiff by reason of his principate consists in spirituals alone, so that in no way by right of the papacy does he extend to temporals. By right of the papacy they say, for otherwise they well concede that he can have some jurisdiction in temporals, as for instance in those things which have been acquired to the Church by donation of the faithful or by permission of princes. The second way of speaking is that of those affirming totally the opposite, namely that the Roman pontiff by right of his principate or vicariate of Christ has in the whole round of lands full jurisdiction not only in spirituals but also in temporals, adding that the jurisdictional power of all secular princes is derived from the pope into them. But we, declining—however much it was in us—these aforesaid ways, which seem to us less probable, always saving the judgment of the apostolic see, to whose emendation and correction we submit what we have now and elsewhere written. Proceeding therefore by the middle way, we shall set these two conclusions. ¹ The first is against the first way of speaking: that the Roman pontiff by right of his principate have some jurisdiction in temporals in the whole Christian world. This conclusion is gathered first from ch. Omnes, dist. 22, in which Pope Nicholas says that Christ committed to blessed Peter, bearer of the keys of eternal life, the rights of earthly and heavenly empire together, where the Gloss says: An argument that the pope has both swords, namely the spiritual and the temporal; 63 dist., Tibi domino, and 15 q. 6, Alius, and ch. Nos sanctorum and ch. Iuratos. Secondly the conclusion is clear by the authority and testimony of blessed Thomas, who at the end of the second book on the Sentences says that to the spiritual power secular power is joined in the pope, who holds the apex of both powers, namely the spiritual and the secular—this by the disposing of him who is king and priest according to the order of Melchisedech and lord of lords, whose power shall not be taken away and whose kingdom shall not be corrupted: thus Saint Thomas.

² The second conclusion against the second way of speaking is that, although the pope have in some way jurisdiction in temporals in the whole Christian world, yet not so ample or plenary or extended as those of the second way assert or dogmatize, but as much as is necessary for preserving the spiritual good of himself and of others, or as the necessity of the Church exacts or the due of pastoral office in the correction of sins demands, as we shall explain more fully. According therefore to these two conclusions of ours, for fuller illustration of the truth we shall do two things at present. First we shall assign the modes according to which the Roman pontiff does not seem to be said to have jurisdiction in the whole Christian world in temporals. Secondly we shall explain the modes according to which the Roman pontiff truly has jurisdiction everywhere even in temporals, as in the next chapter. Concerning the first let this be the proposition.³ The Pope is not so to be said to have jurisdiction in temporals by right of the papacy that he is so to be called lord of the whole world. This proposition, although in our judgment it is clear enough, can nevertheless thus be proved. Nothing which was forbidden to the apostles can be said to belong to the Roman pontiff by right of the apostolic principate, it is clear; for since the Roman pontiff succeeds Peter in power and office, he cannot have by right of the papacy what was prohibited and forbidden to Peter and all the apostles; but lordship in temporals was forbidden to the apostles; therefore the Roman pontiff by right of the apostolic principate has not power or jurisdiction in temporals so as to be lord of the world. The consequence is good. The major is clear; but the minor is had in Matt. 20, where Christ says to the apostles: You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that are greater exercise power over them; it shall not be so among you, but whosoever will be greater among you, let him be your minister, and whosoever will be first among you shall be your servant; so the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his soul for the redemption of many. And likewise all are read in Luke 22. In which words that lordship was forbidden to the apostles is clear. For blessed Bernard in the second book on Consideration to Pope Eugene thus says: For what else did the holy apostle leave to thee? What I have, he says, I give to thee. What was that? One thing I know: it is not gold or silver, when he himself says, Gold and silver is not with me; be it that by any other reason thou vindicate this to thyself, but not by apostolic right; for neither could he give to thee what he had not; what he had he gave: solicitude, as he said, over the churches—was it domination? Who says to thee, Not lording it over the clergy, but made a pattern of the flock, and lest thou think the saying is of humility alone and not also the voice of the truth of the Lord in the Gospel: The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that have power over them are called beneficent; and he says, But you not so. It is plain that this lordship is forbidden to the apostles; how darest thou usurp it both for thyself, either as lording the apostolate or the apostolate lording? Plainly thou art prohibited from either; if thou wilt have both together, thou shalt lose both; otherwise think not thyself excepted from the number of those of whom the Lord complains: They have reigned, and not by me, and princes have come forth, and I knew not; but if we hear the prohibition, let us hear the form of the edict: He that is the greater among you, let him become as the lesser, and he that is the leader, as he that serveth: this is the apostolic form; domination is forbidden, ministration is enjoined. Thus Bernard. Likewise the same Bernard below: Go forth, I say, into the field; the field, the world, is credited to thee; be thou, go forth into it not as lord but as steward, to see and to prove, whence thou art to be required to render an account. Thus far he. The aforesaid proposition is also clear from the donation of temporals in Italy which Constantine is said to have made to blessed Sylvester the Roman pontiff, for if the Roman pontiff by right of his principate had been lord of temporals, no donation would have been made to Sylvester, but rather a restitution of what was his, of which nevertheless the contrary is confessed by the Roman pontiff and the emperor Constantine; concerning Constantine it is had in ch. Pi. Constantinus, dist. 96; concerning the Roman pontiff it is had in ch. Futuram, twelfth q. 1.

⁴ Second proposition. The Roman pontiff is not said so to have full principate or jurisdiction in temporals in the whole Christian world as to be able truly to usurp to himself in temporals the name of king or emperor of the world. This proposition is clear from the first. It is also clear by the testimony of Pope Nicholas in ch. Cum ad verum, dist. 96, where he thus says: When it is come to the truth, neither let the emperor seize to himself beyond the rights of the pontificate nor let the pontiff usurp to himself the name of emperor; for the same mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, by his own acts and distinct dignities distinguished the offices of either power. Thus far he. And the same is set in ch. Quoniam, dist. 10. ⁵ Third proposition. The Roman pontiff is not said so to have secular power or full jurisdiction in temporals that, as all ecclesiastical dignities are said to hang from the apostolic see and take jurisdiction from it according to ch. Omnes, dist. 22, and ch. Ita dominus, dist. 19, so the rights of principate and the jurisdictions of secular kings and princes hang from it. This proposition is clear by authorities and by reason. By authority first thus concerning the Empire, that it is from God alone and not from the pope. For Pope John thus says in ch. Si Imperator, dist. 96: If the emperor is catholic, he is a son, not a prelate of the Church; what pertains to religion it pertains to him to learn, not to teach, he has the privileges of his power which he has divinely obtained for administering public laws, where the Gloss says: therefore not from the pope, for the empire is from God alone. Secondly the same confesses Pope Innocent in ch. Quaesitum, 21 q. 4. Likewise thirdly the same confesses Pope Innocent the third in ch. Solitae, on majority and obedience, where thus writing to the emperor Constantine he says: Moreover thou oughtest to have known that God made two great lights in the firmament of heaven, that is of the universal Church, that is he instituted two dignities, which are pontifical authority and royal majesty. This also is had in the Authentics, How bishops ought, in the preface. Likewise the emperor Justinian writes, Code, on enucleating the old law, in the preface: With God as author governing our empire which has been handed to us by the heavenly majesty etc. Behold that he says the empire was handed to him by the heavenly majesty; but none of those, whether pontiffs or emperors, confesses that imperial power depends absolutely on the pope, and thus it is to be said of other secular dignities. But by reason the aforesaid proposition is proved thus: Nothing prior depends in being on its posterior, but the power of secular princes, whether royal or imperial, precedes in time the papacy or apostolic principate. Therefore it cannot be said with truth that the power of jurisdiction of secular princes depends on the apostolic principate. The consequence is good. The major is manifest; but the minor also is clear from that of the apostle in 1 Cor. 15: Not first that which is spiritual, but that which is animal. Again from this, that there were kings and emperors before Peter was made pope, and even before the heavenly keys of the kingdom of heaven were given to the Church, as is manifest. Moreover this proposition is fortified, for if all Christian princes who do not recognize their dominions from the Roman pontiff of this kind—as the king of France, as Innocent the third makes manifest in ch. Per venerabilem, Who are legitimate children, who acknowledges no superior in temporals—were not in the state of salvation, since they possess those things not in good faith, it would be most grave to say and would disturb the whole world.

⁶ Fourth proposition. The Roman pontiff by right of the papacy has not power or jurisdiction in temporals so that he may directly intermeddle or judge concerning the fiefs of secular princes or concerning possessions regularly. This proposition is clear both from the preceding and from the confession of the Roman pontiff Innocent the third, as in ch. Novit, Extra, on judgments, where he thus says: For we do not intend to judge concerning a fief, the judgment of which belongs to the king himself, unless perchance by common law through special privilege or contrary custom something has been derogated. This proposition is also clear by the testimony of Alexander the third who in ch. Causam, Extra, Who are legitimate children, thus says: We attending that it pertains to the king, not to the Church, to judge concerning such possessions, lest we seem to derogate from the right of the king of England who asserts that the judgment of them pertains to him, command your brotherhood that, leaving the judgment of possessions to the king, concerning the principal cause etc. This also most openly shows blessed Bernard in the book on Consideration to Pope Eugene, saying: In crimes not in possessions is your power, for for those indeed you received these keys of the kingdom of heaven. And below he says: These lowest earthly things have their judges, the kings and princes of the earth. ⁷ Fifth proposition. The Pope has not jurisdiction in temporals so that from any secular judge soever appeal can be made to him commonly and regularly. This proposition is clear by the testimony of Pope Alexander who in ch. Si duobus, Extra, on appeals, to the question by which it is asked whether, if from a civil judge before judgment or after appeal has been made to the pope, such an appeal holds, answers: It holds indeed in those who are subject to temporal jurisdiction, but in others it holds by custom of the Church; according to the rigour of law we believe it does not hold; where the Gloss says: And thus it is clear that temporal jurisdiction does not pertain to the Church.

Sixth proposition. The Pope does not have jurisdiction in temporal things in such a way that he himself can freely dispose at his own pleasure of the goods of ecclesiastics. This proposition is proved. For the understanding of which it is to be noted that ecclesiastical goods are granted to communities and not to a singular person, and therefore in ecclesiastical goods no singular person has free power and lordship, but only the community, as the church of Vallis Oloron, or the Toledan, has lordship and ownership in the places proper to itself. A singular person, however, not as singular but as a part and member of the community has power in those goods of using them for his own sustenance according to the exigency and decency of his person and state, in which however there is a difference, because one member is simple, as a simple canon, and that one has nothing but use in the goods of the community according to the exigency of his state in the aforesaid manner. But there is another member which has the general administration and dispensation of all the goods of the community, assigning to each what is due to him according to the due proportion of justice, disposing also for the common good of the college in good faith as seems expedient to him, and such is the bishop in every cathedral church. Whence in ch. Episcopus, 12, q. 1, from the council of Antioch it is thus had. The bishop has power over ecclesiastical things for dispensing toward all who are needy with the greatest reverence and fear of God, etc. because not only is every congregation of ecclesiastical men one by spiritual unity, but indeed all ecclesiastical congregations have a certain general unity inasmuch as they are one Church having connection to one principal member, to whom as to the head of all belongs the care of the general Church, namely the lord pope, therefore he himself as head and supreme member is the principal and universal dispenser of all ecclesiastical goods generally, spiritual and temporal, not that he is lord, but only the community of the universal Church, as it comprises the head and the other members, namely prelates and simple ecclesiastical persons, is lady and owner. From these things not only is the truth of the aforesaid proposition clear, but also the falsity of those who say that no singular person other than the pope nor any college or community has right or lordship in the goods of the Church, but the lord pope, who is not only administrator and dispenser but true lord and owner of the goods of the Church, and can ordain and alienate them as he wills. For as the apostle says, speaking universally of all prelates, 1 Cor. 15. So let a man esteem us as ministers and dispensers, etc. Ministers and dispensers he says, not lords. Whence to this St. Thomas in 2, 2, q. 100, arg. 1, says that although the things of the Church belong to the pope as principal dispenser, they are not his as lord and possessor. And in q. 175, arg. 8, he posits that if a prelate dispenses unfaithfully the ecclesiastical goods committed to his dispensation which are to be paid out to the poor, or to be expended for the use of ministers or for divine worship, there is no doubt that he acts against the fidelity of his dispensation and sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Where it is to be considered that the pope can dispense from the goods of the Church not only for the state of the universal Church or the sustenance of ministers and of the poor, but also for the fitting state of his person, as we have declared in the second book, ch. 69. ⁸ Seventh proposition, that the pope does not have power or jurisdiction in temporal things, as kings have lordship in temporal goods, nor in such a way as to be regularly their dispenser. The proof is clear first as to lordship from the preceding, because if in the goods of clerics the pope is not lord, much less in the goods of laymen. For the declaration of the second part it is to be considered that the goods of laymen are not conferred on the community as ecclesiastical goods are, but are acquired by singular persons by their own art, labor, and industry, and the singular persons have in them right and power and true lordship, and each can ordain, dispense, retain, and alienate his own at his pleasure without injury to anyone since he is lord, and therefore such goods have no order and connection among themselves nor to one common head which would have to ordain and dispense them as in ecclesiastical goods, since each is the ordainer of his own thing at pleasure, and therefore neither secular princes nor the pope have lordship or dispensation in such things. Whence the Emperor, although he is the supreme prince and as it were the head among seculars, as in ch. In apibus, 7, q. 1, nevertheless does not have free power of dispensing or administering the temporal goods of seculars as the pope does the ecclesiastical goods. And so the proposition is clear, that although the pope has the authority and reason of head not only with respect to clerics but also with respect to seculars, nevertheless he cannot so freely dispense or dispose concerning seculars as concerning clerics.

⁹ Eighth proposition. The Roman pontiff does not have jurisdiction in temporal things as full as in spiritual things, such that as he can depose an ecclesiastical prelate even without his fault so he could depose a secular prince or layman. This proposition lord Peter de Palude declares in his book on ecclesiastical power in this way. Whence it is to be known that though the pope can depose a lay prince and an ecclesiastical prelate, yet not equally, because a lay prince, whether vassal or stranger, he cannot depose without a just and reasonable cause, such that he be unworthy of that principate and have deserved to lose it and be deprived of it, and if without such a cause he deprives him, he not only sins in attempting but also does nothing in depriving, just as a sentence passed by one who is not his judge is invalid, but in the prelates of the Church it is otherwise, because they are not lords but procurators. Whence just as a superior administrator who has full power can institute and destitute inferior administrators and whatever he does holds even when he institutes one less good, although in this he himself sins, so the pope in placing and deposing ecclesiastical persons, although he sins unless he does this for the betterment of the Church, nevertheless what he does holds. To such an extent indeed proceeds the reason which says that they are procurators not lords, that without any sin of his own or another's the pope can depose the less good and place the better, because in the offices of the republic public utility is sought, not private. Whence if he removes a prelate who is not delinquent and is good and places a better one, he does not sin, nor can that one complain, just as a procurator cannot when he is revoked by his lord because he is relieved of the burden. But it is otherwise in lay princes who are true lords of what they have, but no one's own property is to be taken away from him without his fault, whence neither a fief from a vassal and much less can what anyone holds from no other be taken away without his own fault. Thus far lord Peter de Palude.