Summa de Ecclesia

¹

Our mind having been declared concerning the sacramental or orders power, it follows that we unfold what we think concerning the jurisdictional power according to the sounder doctrine of the doctors, and most of all of Saint Thomas. First of all, moreover, it is to be known that the power of jurisdiction is properly called the power of declaring the law by way of command for observing what is enjoined, by obliging. Concerning which let this be the first conclusion, that the power of jurisdiction is twofold, according as a twofold forum is distinguished, namely of conscience and of causes. This is clear, since there is one power of jurisdiction in the forum of conscience, which whoever has the care of souls has, according to which he can bind those to be absolved through command to do something. The other is the power of jurisdiction in the forum of causes, through which one man, in affairs and causes to be defined which arise between man and man, has the faculty of defining and of declaring the law even against the unwilling, concerning which there is dist. 10 ch. 1, where it is said: It is one thing to put an end to causes, another diligently to expound the holy scriptures. Through this power a man can be separated from the Church for some correction through excommunication, concerning which there is Matt. 18, where it is said: If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican. Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, where the Gloss says: He hands the power to the apostles, that they may know that, since by such men they are condemned, the human sentence is strengthened by the divine sentence. The distinction of these two powers, moreover, is designated by some doctors thus: that the power of jurisdiction in the forum of causes is called the power of coercive jurisdiction, since it can be exercised against the unwilling; but the power of jurisdiction in the forum of conscience is called the power of non-coercive jurisdiction, since in this forum no unwilling man is absolved or bound.

²

The second conclusion. These two powers of jurisdiction are distinguished from each other and are separated. The conclusion is clear, since simple priests having the care of souls have the first and not the second, whence they cannot excommunicate except from commission made to them or in certain cases granted by law, and conversely many judges who are not priests have in the forum of causes the second, who do not have the first, since they are not priests, whence in the forum of conscience they are not obeyed, although indeed in the cases over which they have been appointed judges.

³

The third conclusion. Each of these powers of jurisdiction is distinguished from the power of orders. The conclusion is clear. First, since, as was said above in ch. 92 concerning the sixth conclusion, the power of orders is the same essentially as the sacerdotal character, but the sacerdotal character is something real and indelible impressed in the soul, and the power of jurisdiction is not of this kind, it is manifest that powers of this kind are distinguished really from each other. Secondly it is proved thus. Those things are distinguished really which so stand that one can stand without the other; but so it is with these keys. For many have the power of orders who have no jurisdiction, as simple priests having no care of the government of souls. And conversely many have the power of jurisdiction who do not have the power of orders, as those having the care of souls who are not yet priests. Likewise archdeacons and elect and many other officials who are not priests, who yet can excommunicate, etc.

⁴

The fourth conclusion. Although the power of jurisdiction is distinguished really from the power of orders, it is nevertheless necessary for the power of orders to go forth into its act, which is to absolve from sins. The conclusion is proved, since it is necessary that the dispenser of the sacrament of penance be such that he can command something to be done; but command belongs to none except to him who has jurisdiction over another. Hence it does not suffice that he who wishes to be absolved subject himself voluntarily, but there is required the power of the superior to whom the penitent is subject; therefore it is of the necessity of this sacrament not only that the minister have the power of orders but also that he have the power of jurisdiction. Secondly it is clear thus, according to Saint Thomas in 4 contra Gentiles. The minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises a certain judgment; but judgment is committed to none except over his subjects, which comes about through jurisdiction. Thirdly it is confirmed thus. The judgment of the Church in the forum of penance ought not to be less ordered than the secular judgment; but in the secular judgment not any judge can judge any man, but only his subject; therefore likewise in the forum of penance not any priest can judge a sinner but only him who is his subject, whence the canon, 16, q. 5, that to none, etc.

⁵

The fifth conclusion. The power of jurisdiction, even in the forum of conscience, does not belong equally to all priests. The conclusion is clear, since to some priests, as bishops, ampler jurisdiction has been given, both as to the subject people and as to reserved cases, and this reasonably. Hence in the old law, through the judgment of whose priesthood the judgment and power of the evangelical priesthood were figured, not all things were committed to lesser judges to discern, but they had recourse to superiors, whence it is said in Exod. 24: If any question shall arise, you shall refer it to them, namely to Aaron and Hur, who were of ampler and superior power; therefore so in the evangelical priesthood it is fittingly to be observed that some be superior and greater than others in the power of jurisdiction.

⁶

The sixth conclusion. The spiritual power of jurisdiction in the forum of causes or of exterior judgment, although it is called a key, is nevertheless not so properly and immediately as the power of orders. The conclusion is clear, since the power of orders extends to heaven itself immediately by removing the impediments to entrance into heaven through the dismissal of sin; but the power of jurisdiction extends itself directly to heaven itself, but through the mediation of the Church, outside of which there is no salvation, just as nor outside the ark of Noah, Extra de sum. trini. et fide, ch. § Una. Through excommunication, moreover, a man comes to be outside the Church militant, and through absolution within. The key of the power of jurisdiction, therefore, from which these proceed, is not the key of the kingdom of heaven immediately but mediately.

⁷

The seventh conclusion. Just as in the power of orders two keys are assigned, namely the key of knowledge and the key of power, so in the spiritual power of jurisdiction. This conclusion is clear from the proof of the ninth conclusion set down in ch. 92, where in sum it was said that in every act which requires fitness on the part of the recipient two necessary things were required, namely the power of discerning concerning the fitness of him toward whom judgment is to be passed, and the very power of defining or judging in the cause, and through these the two keys are distinguished in the forum of conscience. Since therefore these two are likewise necessarily required in the forum of causes or of exterior judgment as in the judgment of conscience, it follows that by a like necessity the knowledge of discerning and the power of judging or defining would be placed as keys of the power of jurisdiction, just as in the power of orders.

⁸

The eighth conclusion. Just as the keys which are assigned in the power of orders are not distinguished essentially among themselves but by relation to diverse acts, as was said in ch. 92 concerning the tenth conclusion, so the keys in the ordinary power of jurisdiction are not distinguished in the essence of the authority but are one and the same essentially, and are distinguished by relation to subordinate acts. The conclusion is clear, since to the same authority to which by office pertains the definition of some cause, to the same pertains the discretion of the just and the unjust concerning it. Hence just as the power of orders is called one key, namely of orders, on account of the unity of the essence of the authority, but two on account of the duality of acts, so the power of jurisdiction in the forum of exterior judgment on account of the unity of the essence of the authority is called one key, namely of jurisdiction, yet on account of the duality of the subordinate acts, which are to discern what is just and what is not, and to condemn or absolve, they are called two keys, designated by the same names by which the keys of orders are named, namely the key of knowledge and the key of power.

⁹

The ninth conclusion. Although among secular judges, in deciding secular cases, both the power of discerning and that of judging are required for a full judgment, yet they cannot be called keys. The conclusion is clear, since the aforesaid powers, as they are secular, and consequently do not extend to spiritual things neither mediately nor immediately, cannot be said to open the kingdom of heaven; therefore they cannot have the character of keys with respect to the heavenly kingdom; the consequence is manifest.

¹⁰

The tenth conclusion. Although some use of the keys, namely the correction of subject women, is fittingly committed at times to women, as abbesses and prioresses, yet in no way does it belong to them to have the power of the keys. The fittingness of the first part of this conclusion is clear, since, as in every ordered multitude one must preside and the rest be subjected, 1 Polit., and it is perilous for men to rule women, power to rule and govern others is fittingly committed to one woman. The fittingness of the second part of the conclusion, moreover, is shown from this, that woman is not a fit subject of principate, since according to the Apostle she is in the state of subjection. For the Apostle says: Let women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted, the Gloss, by any authority, for them to speak, but to be subjected, and in 1 Tim. 2: I permit not a woman to teach in church nor to dominate, the Gloss, with any spiritual prelation. Hence the philosopher also says in his Politics that it is the corruption of citizenship when government or lordship comes to a woman, which if it is true of earthly government or power, is much more to be thought concerning the spiritual. Moreover, this conclusion is made manifest to us from this, that although the most blessed Virgin Mary is more excellent than the apostles, yet Christ did not hand to her but to them the keys of the kingdom of heaven, as is said in ch. nova Extra de pe. et re.

¹¹

The eleventh conclusion. The spiritual power of jurisdiction, although it can belong to others than priests, yet does not belong to mere laymen or even to religious not signed with the clerical crown. The first part of this conclusion is clear from the third conclusion set down in this ch. The second part is clear first by reason, secondly by authority. By reason thus. Spiritual power belongs only to a man assumed to the state of spiritual life and singularly deputed to divine worship; but the clerical crown is that through which first among the faithful one passes from the state of laics to the state of clerics, and to binding oneself to divine offices, whence, as the doctors note in 1 Sentences dist. 25, tonsure is a sign both distinctive and preparatory and susceptive: distinctive indeed of the clerical state from the laical state, but preparatory or dispositive, that he pass to the reception of the orders by which spiritual power is given. It is moreover susceptive of royal honor, since through it one is deputed to divine worship or service. To serve God, however, is to reign, as Gregory says; therefore spiritual jurisdictional power is to be committed only to one signed with the clerical crown, even if he have the monastic crown. By authority the aforesaid conclusion is clear. First from ch. 1 dist. 96, where it is said that not only concerning orders but also concerning ecclesiastical things no faculty of disposing has been read to have been granted to laics. Secondly from ch. decernimus Extra de iudi., where from the synod of Pope Eugene it is said thus: We decree that laics presume not to treat ecclesiastical business, and that bishops and abbots, archbishops, and other prelates of the churches dispose not of ecclesiastical business, most of all of those known to be spiritual, at the judgment of laics, nor for the sake of their prohibition omit to exercise ecclesiastical justice.

¹²

The twelfth conclusion is that although the sacramental or orders power adheres immovably, yet the power of jurisdiction is separable. The first part of this conclusion is clear, since the power of orders is given through some consecration. All consecrations of the Church, however, are immovable while the thing consecrated remains, as is clear even in inanimate things. For an altar once consecrated is not consecrated again unless it has been destroyed; therefore power of this kind remains in essence in the man who through consecration has obtained it as long as he lives, whether he fall into schism or into heresy, which is clear from this, that one returning to the Church is not consecrated again, as blessed Aug. says against the Donatists. The second part of the conclusion is also clear, since, as the power of jurisdiction is given not through consecration but is conferred from the simple injunction of man, it does not adhere immovably to those to whom it is conferred, whence in schismatics and heretics it does not remain, as Aug. says against the Donatists. For they cannot absolve or excommunicate or make indulgences, as is gathered from ch. novatianus 7 q. 1, where blessed Cyprian says: He who observes neither the unity of the spirit nor the bond of peace and separates himself from the bond of the Church and from the college of priests can have neither the power nor the honor of a bishop. The same can also be gathered from what Alexander the second says in ch. audivimus 24 q. 1, and what Pope Nicholas says in ch. miramur in the same place.