Theologicae regulae

Every action which is informal, or deformed, cannot be formed: nor the reverse. So neither can it be more or less informal, or deformed, nor more or less formed.

Note that of actions, some are informal, some deformed, some formed. An action is called informal which lacks proper function, or end. For two things concur, in order that an action be formed: proper function, and due end. The due end is, that the action be directed toward God. Proper function, however, as they say, is the fitting act of each person, etc. The function of a Christian ought to be the fitting act of each person, according to the institutions of the Christian religion.

He, then, who directs his action in due function toward the due end, that is, toward God, gives form to his action. An informal action, however, is one which lacks due function, or due end, as this Jew, who gives alms finally on account of God, yet does not give it in due function, since he does not give it as the institutions of the Christian religion require. A deformed action, however, is that which lacks a due end, as when this one gives alms for the sake of vainglory, or for the sake of earthly gain. According to this we say, that a venial sin cannot become mortal, or the reverse, although this seems to be asserted by an authority, which says: No sin is so venial, that it does not become mortal, so long as it pleases. But this must be referred to the genus of the thing, not to the thing of the genus: so that the sense is: There is no act which is of the genus of venial sins in which, if someone delights excessively, it is not mortal, as if someone should delight excessively in an idle word, or a jesting lie, that idle word, or jesting lie, which otherwise would have been venial, through delight and contempt becomes mortal: yet it is not one and the same act, which was previously venial, that later becomes mortal. But suppose this one does not lie in jest, and consequently lies with the intention of deceiving, so that he persists in the lie, does not the lie, which was previously venial, become mortal? No: rather the preceding is one thing, the consequent another. Again, this one fornicates, and does not turn from the sin: is he not, from day to day, held more guilty for fornication, and thus does the fornication become a greater sin? To which we say that it does not; for the sin of fornication is not increased, but the contempt becomes greater: yet the contempt by which he now contemns more is one thing, and that by which he formerly contemned less is another. But it is asked concerning that one who kills two men with one shot of an arrow, but first the one whom he kills unknowingly, second the one whom he kills knowingly: whether that action, which was formerly a lesser sin, afterward begins to be greater. We say, no, because there are two acts there, and the first is a lesser sin than the second. If, however, it is asked concerning the ignorance which is in a subdeacon, who is bound to know certain things which he does not know, whether it will follow, consequently, in the same person, when he will be a priest, that it begins to be a greater sin than it was: We answer, no. For since ignorance rather removes than establishes, it is not sin. For this one does not sin in that which he does not know, but in that he holds knowing in contempt, so that the sin is in the contempt of knowing, not in the fixity of not knowing. Yet since ignorance proceeds from contempt of knowing, frequently the name of the consequent is taken in the signification of the antecedent. Whence contempt of knowledge is sometimes called ignorance; and according to this, ignorance is sin. But the contempt of knowing that is in this one, after he is a priest, is one thing; another is that which was in him as a subdeacon: and according to this we can establish this rule: No privation can be the merit of a reward, or be the essence of a punishment. For who of sound mind will say that deafness, or blindness, is the merit of a reward, or of a punishment, since these deprive a habit and imply a debt? By similar reasoning, how will ignorance be a merit, since it is a privation? For since we cannot merit by passions, how shall we merit by privations, which are outside all real existence?