Theologicae regulae

All things, insofar as they are, are good.

This rule is proposed by many, and understood by few. Whence Boethius, to John the deacon, entitled a book on the interpretation of this rule, diligently showing how all things, insofar as they are, are good: whether substantially, or accidentally, or in some other way. Whence it is customary to ask whether something natural is attributed to the subject, when it is said: All things, insofar as they are, are good. If natural, whether substantial, or accidental. If substantial, that will be higher than this genus, substance; since every substance is good, but not every good is substance. In like manner it will be higher than every category, and thus all things are reduced to one. Again, if it is substantial, it is either genus, or species, or difference. If genus, as has already been said, it will be higher than the most general genus. If species, in which category will it be contained, which will be predicated of all things? If, however, difference, of which genus will it be constitutive, or divided? Again, if the goodness belongs to God alone, if the goodness of any thing whatsoever, in that it is, is substance, every thing, in that it is, is God. But if it is predicated there accidentally, not every thing, in that it is, is good, since, as that rule of Boethius attests, it is one thing to be something, and another to be in that which it is; for here accident, there substance, is predicated. The sense is: when something is simply predicated of something, an accident can be predicated, as when I say: Plato is white. But when it is added, "in that it is," the thing which is predicated is shown to be the substance of that thing, of which it is predicated, or of that thing from which the subject derives its name, as when it is said: this work is bronze, "in that it is" predicates the substantial nature of bronze. When, however, it is said: this work is human, "in that it is" predicates that which is its being, from which this work has its being, namely the nature of man. Whence we say that nothing, whether accidental, or substantial to the creature, is predicated, when it is said: All things, insofar as they are, are good. Therefore the divine essence is predicated not essentially, but denominatively, namely by a certain denominative transference, so that all things are said to be good, because they are from the highest good, just as when it is said, pointing to a man: this nature is human; and pointing to a man's work: this is a human work, the same is predicated in these two statements, but in one way and another. For in the first, this species, man, is predicated essentially; in the second, denominatively, so that the sense is: this work is human, that is, it has being from the thing of human nature. Similarly when it is said, God is good, the divine goodness is predicated of God essentially. When, however, it is said: All things, insofar as they are, are good, the same divine goodness is predicated denominatively, so that the sense is: All things, insofar as they are, have being from that thing whose is the supreme goodness. And, to say it more explicitly, a habit of being is predicated, from a good principle, in this proposition. According to this rule, we say that every action, insofar as it is, is from God, but that it becomes evil through privation of its due end. For that an action is, this it has from God; but that it is deprived of its due end, this it has from man, since, as Augustine testifies, God causes men to do those things which do not fit; but men do it, so that the things they themselves do do not fit. Similarly we say that all power, all knowledge, is from God. But not the abuse of power, or of knowledge. For the magic art, as much as it is in itself, is from God, such knowledge, that is: but that someone abuses it, is not from God; for someone can learn the magic art not for delight, but for flight, and can teach it for the same end. Similarly also the knowledge of heretics. But how can it be good, when no one can use it well? for no one can use the magic art well: it does not seem, then, that it is from God, or that it is good. To which we say, that someone can use it well, by teaching it, and by representing the things which happen in it: directing all things toward a good end. Thus, then, it is universally true that all things are from God, both the subjects of properties, and the properties of subjects.