Theologicae regulae

Of names which are appropriated to persons in name and thing, some are said by position, others by negation.

For example, this name, Father, is said of God by position; this name, however, unbegotten, by negation. For the Father is not called unbegotten by the position of a property, but by the negation of an origin, so that the sense is: The Father is unbegotten; that is, he is not from anyone. Similarly this name, ingenerate. These names, however, specially belong to the Father, so that not nativity but origin is removed. For negations are of more things than positive statements are negative. Whence the Holy Spirit is not called unbegotten, nor ingenerate, because he has being through an origin: yet he can be said not to be begotten, or not to have been begotten. There are, however, those who say that unbegottenness is a property; but if it is a property by which the Father is distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit, a relation seems to have a correlation: therefore either filiation, or another: if another than filiation and procession, there will be more personal relations than five. But if it has filiation as its correlation, either one relation will have two correlations, or unbegottenness will be paternity: which is impossible, since, as Augustine says, it is one thing to be the Father, another to be unbegotten: for it is not in that one is the Father, that he is unbegotten; for to be the Father to be the Father is, and to have origin, is not to be from anyone. Moreover, "begettable" and "unbegettable" seem rather to be opposed, as privation and habit, or as affirmation and negation, than as relatives: and thus "unbegottable" is not said relatively to "begettable," or to the Son. If, however, by this name, unbegotten, some property is predicated of the Father, in that he is not from anyone, by the same reasoning, if a term were coined about the Holy Spirit, a property would be predicated, such as "ingenerator," since no one proceeds, or is generated, from him. It must be known that "begettable" and "unbegettable" are not opposed as privation and habit, but as affirmation and negation; for privation has no place in divine matters, because it removes a habit, and implies a debt: for when it is said: This one is blind, the sense is: he does not have sight, when he ought to have it. But "begettable" and "unbegettable" are opposed as affirmation and negation, like finite and infinite: for by this term, unbegotten, nothing is posited, but rather something is removed.