Theologicae regulae
Alan of Lille (1120–1202)
Alan's theological rules, wherein he sets forth over a hundred concise maxims.
Prologus I: Theologicae regulae
Regula I: Monas est, qua quaelibet res est una.
Regula II: In supercoelesti unitas, in coelesti alteritas, in subcoelesti pluralitas.
Regula III: Monas gignit monadem, et in se suum reflectit ardorem.
Regula IV: In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.
Regula V: Sola monas est alpha et omega sine alpha et omega.
Regula VI: Omne limitatum alpha et omega aut est bonum ab alpha, aut est bonum ab alpha et omega.
Regula VII: Deus est spaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam.
Regula VIII: Deus est cui quidlibet quod est, est esse omne quod est.
Regula IX: Quidquid est in Deo, Deus est.
Regula X: Omnis praedicatio de Creatore facta, copulata est atque conjuncta.
Regula XI: Omne simplex esse suum, et id quod est, unum habet.
Regula XII: Nullum simplex subjectum esse potest.
Regula XIII: Solum simplex est forma absque materiali subjecto, et substantia absque formali praedicato.
Regula XIV: Omne esse ex forma est.
Regula XV: Ejus, quod est esse, nullum est esse.
Regula XVI: Sola forma informis est, quia formae non est forma.
Regula XVII: Omne nomen datum ex forma, dictum de forma, cadit a forma.
Regula XVIII: Omnes affirmationes de Deo dictae incompactae, negationes vero verae.
All affirmations spoken of God are noncomposite, negations however are true.
Then an affirmation is called composite, or compact, when it signifies the composition which it seems to signify. As when I say: Peter is just: this affirmation seems to signify the composition of justice with Peter, and it does indeed signify it. But an affirmation is called noncompact, or noncomposite, when it does not signify the composition which it seems to signify: as when it is said, God just; for there is not signified there a composition of justice with God, for it is not composed, or does not inhere; and rather what is signified is that justice is, than that he is just. Negations spoken of God, however, are both true and proper; according to which is removed from God what does not belong to him by inherence. Whence Dionysius, attending to what is said of God through cause, attending rather to the sense from which the words come, than the sense which the words make; considering rather what is said from what, than what of what, says: God is just, pious, strong. Likewise, considering rather what does not belong to God through property, than what is said of God through cause, he says: God is not pious, strong, merciful; removing rather the authority of speaking, than the truth of being.