Theologicae regulae
Alan of Lille (1120–1202)
Alan's theological rules, wherein he sets forth over a hundred concise maxims.
Prologus I: Theologicae regulae
Regula I: Monas est, qua quaelibet res est una.
Regula II: In supercoelesti unitas, in coelesti alteritas, in subcoelesti pluralitas.
Regula III: Monas gignit monadem, et in se suum reflectit ardorem.
Regula IV: In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.
Regula V: Sola monas est alpha et omega sine alpha et omega.
The monad alone is alpha and omega without alpha and omega.
This maxim arises from the first, in which it was said that God is a monad by reason of simplicity, and that every thing is from that monad in that it is one in number: and thus the monad alone is alpha and omega, the beginning and end of all things. "All things were made through him,"1 as the authority proclaims, and thus he is the beginning of all things. All things also tend toward the one, that is, toward the supreme end. For even the irrational creature, of which it might seem less, such as brute animals, and indeed insensate things, such as grasses and trees, and even inanimate things, such as stones, naturally tend toward the one, and, in so far as they can, resist section and division; even the stone, of which it might seem less, according to the natural joining together of its parts resists division. There follows: without alpha and omega, meaning that the same monad lacks end and beginning, because since it is entirely simple, all composition is banished from it. Now a thing is said to be composite in four ways: either by the joining together of parts, as corporeal things; or by reason of properties, as spiritual things, since in spiritual things there is a manifold concreted property; or by aptitude for being composed, as any property which, although it is not compacted of parts, is nevertheless apt to be subjected to composition; or by aptitude of the composite, as primordial matter was, according to the philosophers, said to be composite, because it was apt for something to be composed from it. Now all such composition is banished from God. For he is neither compacted from parts, like a body, nor composed by reason of properties, like a spirit; nor apt for being composed, like some property; nor apt as a composite, like primordial matter. For God is form without material substance; and is substance without formal predicate. Since, therefore, he is entirely simple, he lacks beginning and end: for where there is no composition, either in act or in nature, where there could be no origin or beginning, it is not fitting to understand an end.