Theologicae regulae

Monad is that by which any thing is one.

God is said to be not only one, but indeed a monad, that is, unity: and this for many reasons. For he is called one, or unity, by reason of simplicity, or singularity. For from God all plurality is banished. Now all plurality is threefold: plurality of parts, which is found in corporeal things, which are made up of parts; plurality of properties, which is found at least in corporeal things: for in them many properties are combined by concretion, as in spirits; there is a plurality of effects, which is found in properties: for any property, though it may not have a joining together of parts, or a concretion of natures, nevertheless has a plurality of effects. Whence whiteness makes a thing white, makes it colored, makes it qualified: and every such diversity is banished from the celestial monad. For God is not diverse by reason of parts, because he is incorporeal; he is not diverse by reason of properties, as Augustine says; because in him there is no number, no plurality: he is not diverse by various effects, because he is not a formal cause. Wherefore he is truly one, indeed unity. Whence Boethius in the book On the Trinity says, speaking of God: "Truly, then, one, in which there is no number, or plurality." He is also called one, or unity, by reason of immutability: for, as is found in the gloss upon the book of Kings, where it is said: "There was a certain man in Ramathaim-zophim," and so on, by this term one is predicated of God immutability. He is also called one by reason of exclusion, so that the sense is: God is one, that is, not many. He is also called one by reason of likeness, because he has a manifold likeness with unity. Unity descends from no one: all plurality flows from unity; unity of itself begets unity: of itself it brings forth equality. So God is from no one, and whatever is from himself; so of himself he begets another self, that is, the Son; of himself he brings forth one equal to himself, that is, the Holy Spirit. Whence you can draw another rule from what has been said.

In the supercelestial, unity; in the celestial, otherness; in the subcelestial, plurality.

The supercelestial is God, in whom there is supreme unity. The celestial is the angel, in whom there is first otherness, because he is the first created by God, and the first made mutable after God: yet he is not said to have as much variety as the subcelestial has. Whence, because otherness is the first plurality, in him it is not said to be plurality, but only otherness. In the subcelestial, however, as in these corporeal things, full plurality is said to exist, because it is subject to manifold variety. Wherefore truly God is one, or unity, by reason of simplicity, by reason of immutability, by reason of exclusion, by reason of likeness: therefore the monad alone is, that is, God alone truly exists, that is, simply and immutably a being; but other things truly are not, because they never remain in the same state. Here follows the end of the first rule, by which any thing is one. For nothing is one by any species of unity that is not one from the supreme monad. For there is a unity of singularity, according to which anything is said to be one in number. Whence Boethius: "Whatever is, is therefore, because it is one in number; and whatever, in this unity, is one, has it from that source that it is one." There is a unity of union, according to which many men are said to be one, not from unity, but from union; and this too is from God: whence also the authority testifies concerning John: "All things were made through him," etc.¹ All concord is from God. There is also unity of distinction, or discretion, which draws its origin from the same source. For whatever is discrete or distinct is from God. There is also unity of integrity, which consists in the composition of parts, according to which a man is said to be one, that is, integrated from soul and body, is from God. Whence the authority: "Every joining together is from God." There is also unity of adunation, according to which many men, coming together under the same law of living, and placed under the yoke of the same law, are said to be one people, is from God. There is unity of consensus, according to which it is said: "They had one heart and one soul,"² is from God.

Monad begets monad, and reflects its own ardor back into itself.

This rule arises from the one before: for it has been said that God is called a monad for this reason, that from himself he begets God, from himself also he produces the Holy Spirit, just as unity of itself begets unity. Monad, therefore, begets monad, that is, the Father the Son: for it was necessary that if a monad should beget, it should beget a monad: for nothing can be begotten from a simple thing by division, as happens in natural generation. It was necessary, then, either that nothing be begotten from the simple, or that a simple thing be begotten from the simple. Whence Augustine says that the Father poured his whole substance into the Son, because he is not of the same substance with the Father by division, but by the fullness of nature. And because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it follows: And reflects its own ardor back into itself. The Holy Spirit is called ardor, love, kiss, and connection of the Father and the Son, because the Father spiritually agrees with the Son in breathing forth the Holy Spirit. And because in the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are given by the Father and the Son, their love toward us is signified, because the production of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is a certain signification of the love of the Father and the Son, that is, the unity of both; for unless they agreed in one nature, they would not breathe forth by one breathing: this is called the ardor, or love, of the Father and the Son. This ardor, then, proceeds from the monad, that is, from the Father, in such a way that it does not desert him, because it is of the same essence with him; or it reflects its own ardor into another, that is, into the Son, that is, the Holy Spirit; but it proceeds from the Father in such a way that it proceeds by his authority from the Son.

In the Father, unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the connection of unity and equality.

This rule descends from the third, and is as it were an explanation of the third, because the Father is called monad for the reasons stated, namely that he is from no one, and whatever is from him: the Son also is from him through generation, the Holy Spirit through procession: of himself also he begets a monad, that is, a thing of the same nature, and simple. In the Father is specially said to be unity; in the Son, equality. I do not say otherness, lest a diversity of nature be understood there, but rather equality. For in equality is noted both personal plurality and unity of nature; for nothing is equal to itself, nor is anything equal to another which is dissimilar in nature. Now for a threefold reason equality is specially attributed to the Son, although it belongs also to the Holy Spirit: because, first, equality occurs in the Son; because the Holy Spirit also is equal to the Father, this he has from him: equality also, or likeness, is specially observed in that which proceeds from another through generation. Why, moreover, in the Holy Spirit is said to be the connection of unity and equality, is clear from what has already been said.

The monad alone is alpha and omega without alpha and omega.

This maxim arises from the first, in which it was said that God is a monad by reason of simplicity, and that every thing is from that monad in that it is one in number: and thus the monad alone is alpha and omega, the beginning and end of all things. "All things were made through him,"¹ as the authority proclaims, and thus he is the beginning of all things. All things also tend toward the one, that is, toward the supreme end. For even the irrational creature, of which it might seem less, such as brute animals, and indeed insensate things, such as grasses and trees, and even inanimate things, such as stones, naturally tend toward the one, and, in so far as they can, resist section and division; even the stone, of which it might seem less, according to the natural joining together of its parts resists division. There follows: without alpha and omega, meaning that the same monad lacks end and beginning, because since it is entirely simple, all composition is banished from it. Now a thing is said to be composite in four ways: either by the joining together of parts, as corporeal things; or by reason of properties, as spiritual things, since in spiritual things there is a manifold concreted property; or by aptitude for being composed, as any property which, although it is not compacted of parts, is nevertheless apt to be subjected to composition; or by aptitude of the composite, as primordial matter was, according to the philosophers, said to be composite, because it was apt for something to be composed from it. Now all such composition is banished from God. For he is neither compacted from parts, like a body, nor composed by reason of properties, like a spirit; nor apt for being composed, like some property; nor apt as a composite, like primordial matter. For God is form without material substance; and is substance without formal predicate. Since, therefore, he is entirely simple, he lacks beginning and end: for where there is no composition, either in act or in nature, where there could be no origin or beginning, it is not fitting to understand an end.

Everything limited by alpha and omega is either good from alpha, or is good from alpha and omega.

This descends from that rule in which it was said: The monad alone is alpha and omega, because if all things are from God as from a beginning, therefore they are from alpha, that is, from the very beginning, good by the habit of a good beginning. But note, by what is said: Everything limited by alpha and omega, is meant everything created, which is enclosed by two limits, that is, beginning and end, in act or in nature. For everything generated naturally tends toward destruction. Whence also the angelic nature is naturally dissolvable, of which Plato says: "Gods of gods, whose father and maker I am, by nature indeed dissolvable, by my will indissolvable." Whence Augustine, on Genesis, says that every creature has a morning and an evening, that is, a beginning and an end, at least by nature. And thus everything created is either good from alpha, that is, is naturally a partaker of goodness, and has this from its author: or from alpha and omega, as the rational creature, which tends toward beatitude, which is the end of all things. From the end, then, the rational creature alone is good, which not only naturally tends toward God, but also cultivates him, as a Father, by the manners of its life, and recalls him by the understanding of the mind, and seeks him, with the whole striving of charity, that it may be given to it as its reward.

God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere.

This is proved by that rule in which it was said that the monad alone is alpha and omega: for from the fact that God lacks beginning and end, he is called a sphere; for it is proper to the spherical form to lack beginning and end. But he is not a corporeal sphere, but rather an intelligible one. For when we say that God is a sphere, we ought not to be led to imaginations, so as to imagine him to be a sphere in the likeness of bodies; but, with understanding as our guide, we should understand by this reasoning that God is a sphere, because he is eternal. Whence in Martianus, eternity is said to have a diadem, because this signifies that it lacks beginning and end. Whence, the lack of beginning and end is called a diadem, as it were two "demes," that is, beginning and end. There follows: whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere. O what a great difference between a corporeal and an intelligible sphere! In a corporeal sphere the center, on account of its smallness, is scarcely thought to be anywhere; the circumference, however, is comprehended in many places. In the intelligible sphere, however, the center is everywhere, the circumference nowhere. The creature is called the center, because just as time compared to eternity is reckoned a moment, so the creature compared to the immensity of God is a point, or a center. The immensity of God, then, is called the circumference, because by disposing all things it is in a certain manner carried around all things, and embraces all things within its immensity. There is also this other difference between a corporeal and an intelligible sphere, that the center of a corporeal sphere is immobile, the circumference mobile; in the intelligible sphere it is the opposite, because God, remaining stable, causes all things to be moved.

God is one for whom whatever he is, is to be everything that he is.

To this gives credence that rule in which it was said: Monad is, etc. For since God is simple, there is nothing in him except what he himself is, as Boethius says in the book On the Trinity. For in him there is neither diversity of parts, nor plurality of properties. By whatever terms, then, God is shown to be something, one and the same is predicated to be. For "the same" and "one" are set down for these terms, when it is said: God is God, strong, patient, merciful. For it is the same for God to be God, to be strong, to be merciful. Whence Boethius, in the book On the Trinity, says: It is the same for God to be, as to be great. The sense, then, is: God is whatever he is; he is everything that he is, that is, God is that thing of which, by whatever term something is predicated, the same is predicated by all other terms of him. But this is chiefly to be understood of the terms of the three predicaments, of substance, quality, and quantity. Whatever terms, then, of the first, or second, or third predicament are said of God, predicate of him the divine essence, as when it is said: God is God, substance, spirit, pious, merciful, strong, great, immense. Whence, according to this, that rule seems to have been handed down by some:

Whatever is in God, is God.

That is, whatever term in natural things predicates inherence, in God predicates essence. Now such universality, when it is said: Whatever is in God is God; or, Whatever it is that it is, etc., does not refer to a plurality of things signified, but of signifiers and effects; for the effects of one and the same cause are diverse, signified by diverse names, when it is said: God is strong, pious, prudent. There is, therefore, universality in speaking, in effecting, but singularity in being.

Every predication made concerning the Creator is coupled and conjoined.

This rule descends from the one already touched on, because if one and the same thing is predicated by the aforesaid terms of God, coupled and conjoined is the predication, because when any term is predicated of him, nothing is left outside that predication: for I say as much when I say: God is good; as if I said: God is God good, strong, pious. Concerning a creature, however, nothing is set down in a coupled way, but separately. For when it is said, Peter is just, although something is predicated, yet many things are left outside this predication which belong to Peter, which are predicated of him by other terms, as when I say, Peter is pious, merciful. Whence Boethius in the book On the Trinitysays: Separately indeed in other things, but in God distinctly and yet coupled, in this way. For when we say: substance is man or is God, it is said as though that of which it is itself predicated is substance; as substance man, or God; but it differs; since man is not entirely himself man: and for this reason not substance either: for what he is, he owes to other things, which are not man. But God is this very thing which he is, God: for he is nothing else but what he is.

Every simple thing is its own being, and what it is, it has as one.

This rule descends from that one: God is one for whom whatever he is, etc. The sense, then, is: Every simple thing, etc., that is: if anyone should say simply, of that which is truly simple, is, as, God is, and should say: God is something, as, God is great, or strong: no one ought to understand that something different is predicated in the second proposition than in the first, so that if it is said of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit, is, nothing else is predicated than when it is said: the Father is powerful, the Son is powerful, the Holy Spirit is powerful; but altogether the same thing: by no reasoning ought it to be understood that what he is, is one thing, and that by which he is powerful, another, since for the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit it is altogether the same to be, and to be powerful.