Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

1°: Acceptance of persons is the injustice by which, in common matters to be distributed by justice, no regard is had to the proportion of merits or the suitability of those who are candidates, but to some cause irrelevant to the matter. ¹

I said, « in common matters », whether goods, such as public offices, benefices, honors, judgments, etc.; or evils, that is burdensome things, such as taxes, tolls, public works, contributions, penalties, etc.

It must be observed, however, that common goods are of two kinds. Some are ordered primarily and immediately to the public good, and through it only mediately and secondarily to the benefit of the particular persons who occupy them, such as benefices, public offices, dignities, etc. Others are ordered primarily to the benefit of particular persons, such as the public treasury, common revenues, a legacy to be distributed to the poor, a sum of money handed over by the king to be distributed, stipends for well-deserving soldiers, etc.

In both kinds of goods, bad distribution is an acceptance of persons opposed to distributive justice, insofar as no regard is had to the proportion of merits; but moreover in both is found a violation of commutative justice, though in different ways. In the bad distribution of goods of the first kind, commutative justice is violated toward the state or the Church; because this or that has strict right that provision be made for it from the best ministers, and this devolves upon the providers by their office. Hence, strictly speaking, restitution must be made to it, not indeed to the particular persons, for whose benefit these goods are not primarily ordered, and who therefore have not strict right to them, but only a right of aptitude. But in the bad distribution of goods of the second kind there is found a violation of commutative justice even toward private persons; because from the fact that these goods are destined primarily to them, they have strict right to them, that is, a right to the thing itself, and the bad distributor is held to restitute to them.

I say 2°: Acceptance of persons is, by its genus, mortal sin. ² Because every injustice is, by its genus, mortal sin. Now acceptance of persons is an injustice opposed to distributive justice, which is a virtue more excellent than commutative justice, and from which follow damages no less than from commutative justice. Therefore.