Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Tractatus I: De fide
Prooemium
Dissertatio I: De objecto fidei
Articulus I: Quodnam sit objectum fidei?
Articulus II: In quid sit ultima resolutio fidei nostrae?
Articulus III: Utrum fides possit subsistere falso?
Articulus IV: De obscuritate in objecto fidei et evidentia in attestante
Articulus V: Utrum mysteria fidei sint evidenter credibilia?
Dissertatio II: De motivis credibilitatis Religionis christianae adversus incredulos, vulgo deistas
Articulus I: Quid sit prophetia? An sit possibilis?
Articulus II: An prophetiae vim habeant probandi veritatem revelationis?
Articulus III: Vaticinia prophetarum de religione christiana et ejus authore
Articulus IV: Miracula Christi et Apostolorum, item promissiones Christi adimpletae in confirmationem religionis christianae
Articulus V: Modus mirabilis et plane divinus quo christiana Religio fuit fundata et propagata
Dissertatio III: De actu interno et externo fidei
Articulus I: Utrum sit de necessitate salutis credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem, et quid?
Articulus II: Caeterae difficultates circa actum fidei internum expenduntur
Articulus III: De actu fidei externo
Dissertatio IV: De habitu et subjecto fidei
Articulus I: De habitu fidei
Articulus II: De subjecto fidei
Articulus III: Utrum vera religio falsae tolerari possit
Articulus IV: Utrum fides rationem naturalem excludat?
Dissertatio V: De vitiis fidei oppositis
Articulus I: De infidelitate in communi
Articulus II: De haeresi
Articulus III: De apostasia
Articulus IV: De cultuum libertate
Articulus V: De blasphemia
Tractatus II: De regulis fidei
Dissertatio I: De divina revelatione
Articulus I: De natura revelationis divinae
Articulus II: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio immediata?
Articulus III: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio mediata?
Articulus IV: Utrum veritatum capitibus nostris excedentium, seu mysteriorum, possibilis sit revelatio?
Articulus V: Utrum divina revelatio fuerit necessaria?
Dissertatio II: De Scriptura sacra
Articulus I: Quid sit et an sit Scriptura sacra
Articulus II: De Scriptura sacra divisione, apographis et versionibus
Articulus III: De Scriptura sacra sensibus
Dissertatio III: De traditionibus
Articulus I: Quid, quotuplex sit traditio, et quanta auctoritas illis?
Articulus II: Utrum traditiones divinae sint necessario admittendae?
Articulus III: De sanctorum patribus
Articulus IV: De sacra liturgia
Dissertatio IV: De Ecclesia
Articulus I: Quomodo Ecclesia christiana existere potuerit ante adventum Christi?
Articulus II: Ex quibus constabat religio primaeva?
Articulus III: Quomodo constituta fuit religio mosaica?
Articulus IV: Utrum divina fuerit religio mosaica?
Articulus V: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abroganda?
Articulus VI: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abrogata?
Articulus VII: Quid sit Ecclesia, et qui sint in ea?
Articulus VIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit visibilis?
Articulus IX: De notis verae Ecclesiae
Articulus X: Utrum Ecclesia possit decipere seu errare in fide et moribus?
Articulus XI: Utrum Ecclesia sit suprema iudex controversiarum fidei?
Articulus XII: Utrum iudicium Ecclesiae de sensu librorum, seu, ut vocant, de factis dogmaticis, sit infallibile?
Articulus XIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit infallibilis in canonizatione sanctorum?
Dissertatio V: De summo Pontifice
Articulus I: De primatu S. Petri
Articulus II: De primatu Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus III: De vi et ratione primatus Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus IV: De infallibilitate seu inerrantia summi Pontificis in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum
Articulus V: De praeminentia summi Pontificis supra concilium generale
Articulus VI: Solvuntur objectiones
Articulus VII: Utrum Pontifici Romano competat summa potestas temporalis?
Articulus VIII: Quid sit Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate Declaratio anni 1682, et quid de ea sentiendum?
Articulus IX: Utrum doctrina Declarationis anni 1682, ipsaque Declaratio, Ecclesiae Gallicanae merito fuerit attributa?
Articulus X: De Romani Pontificis principatu civili
Dissertatio VI: De conciliis generalibus
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit concilium?
Articulus II: Utrum necessaria sint concilia generalia?
Articulus III: Cujus sit convocare concilium generale?
Articulus IV: De convocatis ad concilium generale et illius praeside
Articulus V: Utrum concilium generale sit infallibile in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum?
Articulus VI: Utrum concilium generale debeat necessario confirmari a summo Pontifice?
Tractatus III: De spe
Dissertatio I: De spe
Articulus I: De spe secundum se et de ejus objecto
Articulus II: In quibus sit spes
Articulus III: De necessitate spei
Articulus IV: Quae sint vitia opposita spei theologicae?
Tractatus IV: De charitate
Dissertatio I: De charitate secundum se
Articulus I: Complectens omnia quae spectant charitatem secundum se
Dissertatio II: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis
Articulus I: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis
Dissertatio III: De charitate erga proximum
Articulus I: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate diligere seipsum, corpus suum et peccatores?
Articulus II: Utrum inimici sint ex charitate diligendi, eisque exhibenda signa et opera charitatis?
Dissertatio IV: De ordine et praecipuo actu charitatis, qui est dilectio
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit magis ex charitate diligendus, quam proximus?
Articulus II: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate magis se diligere quam proximum?
Articulus III: Quis ordo servandus sit in dilectione proximorum?
Articulus IV: An et quo sensu liceat diligere Deum et illi servire propter retributionem?
Articulus V: De praecipto charitatis
Dissertatio V: De eleemosyna
Articulus I: Utrum dare eleemosynam sit in praecipto, et quando?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa eleemosynam breviter solvuntur
Dissertatio VI: De correptione fraterna
Articulus I: Utrum correptio fraterna sit in praecipto, et quae conditiones requirantur ut obliget?
Articulus II: De ordine correptionis fraternae
Dissertatio VII: De vitiis charitati oppositis
Articulus I: De odio Dei et proximi, de accidia, invidia, discordia, contentione et schismate
Articulus II: De bello
Articulus III: De duello
Tractatus V: De iure et iustitia
Dissertatio I: De iure et dominio
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit ius?
Articulus II: Quid et quotuplex sit dominium? Quid ususfructus et usus?
Articulus III: Utrum usus in rebus unico actu consumptibilibus distinguatur a dominio?
Articulus IV: De possessione
Dissertatio II: De subjecto et objecto dominii
Articulus I: De subjecto et objecto dominii in genere
Articulus II: De dominio uxorum et filiorumfamilias
Articulus III: De dominio clericorum
Dissertatio III: De modis acquirendi dominium
Articulus I: De modis acquirendi dominia rerum quae nullius sunt
Articulus II: De primo modo acquirendi dominium rerum quae sunt alicujus, scilicet de accessione
Articulus III: De altero modo acquirendi dominia rerum quae sunt alienus, nimirum de praescriptione
Dissertatio IV: De iustitia
Articulus I: De definitione, objecto et subjecto iustitiae
Articulus II: De divisione iustitiae
Dissertatio V: De actu iustitiae ut sic, nempe de iudicio
Articulus I: Utrum iudicium sit licitum?
Articulus II: De suspicione et iudicio temerario
Articulus III: Utrum dubia de male proximi sint in meliorem partem interpretanda?
Dissertatio VI: De actu iustitiae commutativae, nempe de restitutione
Articulus I: De qualitate et necessitate restitutionis
Articulus II: Ex quotuplex titulo obligetur restitutio, sit affirmativa vel negativa?
Articulus III: Utrum incurratur obligatio restitutionis ratione damni illati absque culpa theologica?
Articulus IV: Utrum culpa theologica vehemens inducat obligationem restituendi, et qualem?
Articulus V: Utrum et quanto culpa iuridica inducat obligationem restituendi ratione contractus et quasi-contractus, seu officii?
Articulus VI: Quomodo sit restituendum a possessore bonae fidei
Articulus VII: Utrum qui bona fide emit rem furtivam, ubi novit esse furtivam, teneatur eam reddere vero domino?
Articulus VIII: De restitutione facienda a possessore mala fidei
Articulus IX: Utrum illi qui impediunt aliquem a consecutione alicujus boni, teneantur ad restitutionem?
Articulus X: De restitutione facienda ab his qui injuriae damnificationi cooperantur
Articulus XI: Quando sit facienda restitutio?
Articulus XII: Quomodo sit facienda restitutio?
Articulus XIII: Quo loco, cujus expensis et periculo restituenda sit?
Dico 1° : For debts arising from unjust acquisition, detention, or damage, restitution must be made at the expense of the debtor, in the place where the owner would have possessed the thing if it had not been taken away. This is the common opinion.
Proof., because the owner ought not to suffer loss through the fault of the debtor. Yet he would suffer it, if he had to recover his property at his own expense. Therefore.
It is confirmed. He who is bound to an end is bound to the means necessary and proportionate for attaining that end. Now the debtor is bound to such a restitution as keeps the owner indemnified; and this cannot come about without expense. Therefore he is bound to those expenses.
Understand this, however, of expenses that do not much exceed the value of the thing; and therefore I said, « proportionate means; » because otherwise the restitution would be judged more burdensome, and therefore morally impossible, as I shall say below. Make an exception when from the omission of restitution there follows for the owner some other damage greatly exceeding the expenses 1.
[Yet there must be deducted the expenses which the owner would have had to make to preserve the thing, or to bring it to the place where it must now be given back; because otherwise the owner would grow rich from another's property.
If, moreover, the restitution ought to be judged morally impossible on account of the extraordinary expenses necessary for sending the thing back, the bad-faith detainer cannot turn it to his own use, unless he is himself in grave necessity, since he may not grow rich from another's property; but from the presumed will of the owner he must distribute it to the poor, or spend it on other pious causes — unless he can sell the thing and send the price to the owner 2.
How great, then, the expenses are that the unjust detainer is bound to make in order to restore the thing itself is not easily determined. Some bind him to expenses of any amount whatever; others only to those that equal the value of the thing; others to expenses twice as great as the debt. Since the general rule stands fixed, judgment must be made in each individual case, taking account both of the value of the thing and of the respective condition of debtor and creditor; and if the expenses appear evidently disproportionate, then either the restitution must be deferred until it can be made less burdensomely, or, if the thing is of great importance, it must be sold, so that the price may be sent to the owner, or, if its value is slight, the thing itself or its price must be spent on pious works.]
I say 2° : For debts arising from a thing received, restitution must be made in the place where the things are held; and if they must be transferred to the owner, this must be done at his expense; because no one without his own fault ought to suffer loss.
As regards debts from contract, it is certain that one must stand by the agreement expressly made in the contract, as to place and expenses; but if no agreement was expressly made, the tacit agreement must be gathered from the nature of the contract, the custom of the place, and other circumstances.
I say 3° : When the owner himself designated the messenger through whom he wished his property restored to him, he incurs the loss if the thing perishes by accident or through the fault of the messenger, under whatever title the thing is owed to him, and whether the same thing is to be given back or another; because in such a case the messenger bears the person of the owner, and what is handed over to him is reckoned as handed over to the owner. Similarly, if he left the debtor the freedom to choose whichever messenger he wished, provided he choose one who is regarded as trustworthy; because then the debtor has performed all that the owner required, and consequently all that the debtor himself owed.
I say 4° : If a thing owed solely by the title of a thing received perishes — even though sufficient diligence was used on the part of the debtor, that is, if he chose a messenger who is regarded as trustworthy, and sent it back by ways not regarded as dangerous — whether it perish by accident or through the fault of the messenger, it does not perish to the debtor, but to the owner, and consequently the debtor is exempted from further restitution; because this thing is the owner's, and a thing perishes to its owner, especially since no fault intervened on the part of the debtor. From this you will gather, conversely, that if the debtor is at fault, because he either chose a messenger who was not regarded as trustworthy, or sent the thing back by dangerous ways, it perishes to him, and he is held to further restitution.
I say 5° : A thing owed by reason of unjust acquisition, detention, or damage, however it may perish — outside the case of the third conclusion, whether the same thing is to be given back or not — perishes to the debtor himself, who in consequence is bound to further restitution. This is the more common and more probable opinion; because, if that thing were to perish by accident in the hands of the debtor, it would perish to him, as we said above according to the common opinion, since the unjust detainer is bound even for fortuitous chance, having taken upon himself every peril of the thing. Hence the common axiom does not avail here: « Res perit domino, » the thing perishes to the owner. Therefore it also perishes to the debtor himself, if it perish in the hands of a messenger whom he chose.
I say 6° : A thing owed from contract, if the same thing in number is to be given back, as in commodatum, hire, or deposit, perishes to the owner, provided sufficient diligence was used on the part of the debtor. If another thing in number is to be given back, as in a mutuum loan, in the price of goods, etc., it perishes to the debtor, even if he used sufficient diligence: because, in the first case, the thing is the owner's and remains under his dominion; in the second case, however, it is the debtor's. Moreover, as the thing cries out for its owner, so also it perishes to the owner. Hence, if you send back a horse given in commodatum together with money given in mutuum, and both perish on the way, the horse perishes to the owner, and the money to you.