Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

The difficulty concerns venial fault arising from the imperfection of the act together with grave damage inflicted, about which there is a diversity of opinions. For the resolution of which,

I say 1° : It is more probable that he who gravely damaged his neighbor through venial fault is held to some restitution. This is against Lessius and certain others. The reason is that, as the imperfection of the act, although it diminishes, does not nevertheless take away every character of injustice; so, although it diminishes, it does not nevertheless take away every obligation of restoring, which arises from justice as from its root.

I say 2° : It seems less probable that he who inflicted grave damage through venial fault is held under mortal sin to the reparation of the whole damage. This is the opinion of Sylvester, Soto, Silvius, Steyaert and the more common one, against Henry of St. Ignatius and certain other recent authors.

Proof. The obligation of restoring is here attended to principally, not on the side of the object or of the damage, but on the side of formal injustice. For we are treating of restitution by reason of unjust acquisition; and if there were no formal injustice, however grave the damage might be, there would be no obligation of restoring, as I said in the preceding article. Yet in our case the injustice is imperfect. Therefore the obligation of restoring ought to be imperfect; for the effect ought to answer to the cause. But it would not be imperfect if it were unto the restoration of the whole under mortal sin.

I say 3° : It is probable that he who inflicted grave damage through venial fault is held under venial sin to the reparation of the whole damage. Nevertheless it is equally probable that he is not held under venial sin except to a part of the damage only, according to the condition of the fault, according to the judgment of a good man.

The reason of the first part is that the whole damage is voluntary, although imperfectly. Therefore it seems that the obligation of repairing the whole is imperfect, namely under venial sin.

The reason of the second part is, on the contrary, that an obligation of repairing the whole under venial sin does not seem imperfect, nor proportionate to the light fault from which it arises. It is indeed imperfect on the side of itself, because it is not so strict; but it is not imperfect on the side of the object, because it is unto the whole, nor therefore proportionate to the fault : just as a grave punishment is not proportionate to a light fault, although the accused would be bound to it only lightly.

And indeed it seems hard that one be held under venial sin to pay back twenty or forty thousand pounds and more, and that he cannot be freed from that sin unless he pay back this whole sum. Wherefore it seems more suitable to many to say that he is held only to a part, for example a fiftieth, an eightieth, etc., according to the quantity of the fault, according to the judgment of prudent men.

Moreover, whatever may be said of the speculation of this question, authors of every opinion commonly note that it rarely happens in practice that grave damage is caused by venial fault; because, although venial inconsiderateness is frequent in surreptitious thoughts and internal movements of the mind, which often, easily and subtly arise, and indeed concerning objects conformable to natural inclination; yet it rarely occurs in external works of grave moment, because these ordinarily present their danger at once and more strongly arouse the mind to consideration of themselves, or at least to a confused knowledge of the danger. Hence, unless it be certainly established that the inadvertence was venial, it must be held in practice to be mortal, namely proportioned to the damage, and the obligation of restoring under mortal sin must be pressed upon him.

[There St. Liguori distinguishes¹ : If the fault is venial by reason of the smallness of the matter, it certainly obliges to restitution under light sin. But if the fault is venial by reason of inadvertence or undeliberation, several say, with Layman and Croix (and to this opinion our Billuart adheres), that the obligation of restoring is according to the measure of the fault. But more commonly, and probably, it is held that no obligation of restitution is induced, neither under grave nor under light sin. Not under grave, because such an obligation has no proportion with a light fault. Not under light, because a light obligation has no proportion with grave matter, all the more since a fault imperfectly deliberated cannot induce perfect deliberation : just as in contracts and vows no obligation arises from a consent not fully deliberate.

You will ask 1° whether he is held to restitution who culpably placed the cause of the damage, and afterward tried in vain to impede the damage.

I answer, affirmative. The reason is that retraction, although before God it takes away the sin, does not nevertheless prevent the culpably placed action from being in itself a positive, efficacious and unjust cause of the damage sprung from it².

You will ask 2° whether a damager who is doubtful is held to some restitution.

I answer 1°. If the doubt arose before the damaging action, the question is to be solved from the principles laid down in the treatise on Conscience, where we treat of a doubting law.

I answer 2°. If the doubt arose after the action, several things are to be examined : 1° Whether the damage exists. In which doubt, even if positive, according to the common opinion the agent is not held to restitution³. And this the Angelic Doctor holds, here q. 62, a. 7, o, where he says : « In other cases, however, that are enumerated, one is not always bound to restitution ; for counsel, or flattery, or anything of this kind is not always an efficacious cause of rapine. Whence then only is the counselor, or the palpo, that is, the flatterer, held to restitution, when it can be probably estimated that from causes of this kind an unjust acquisition followed ». Therefore, according to St. Thomas, it must be proved that the action certainly was the cause of the damage; for the adverb probably is used here in the sense that the thing can be proved, that is, that the persuasion is morally certain. — 2° Whether the damage is to be ascribed precisely to this action. In this doubt a threefold opinion is given. The first, which is probable, teaches that restitution is to be made if the action was apt by its nature for inflicting such damage; because then the presumption stands for its influence. The second opinion holds that restitution is to be made pro rata of the doubt. But, besides that the quantity of the thing to be restored could hardly be determined in this case, this opinion on one side harms the agent, if restitution is not to be made, and on the other the damaged party, if it is to be made. The third opinion, absolutely more probable, affirms that the damager who is in doubt is held to nothing; because an injurious action does not suffice for pressing restitution, but there is required a persuasion morally certain that that action truly was the cause of the damage. Whence this question falls back into the preceding one, namely whether the damage exists on the side of the agent, and likewise it is to be solved⁴. — 3° Whether the action, or omission, of the damager, although damaging, was formally unjust, that is, an invader of another's strict right; because the obligation of restitution is born from the violation of commutative justice alone. In a doubt of this kind the agent cannot be held to restitution before the sentence of the judge. — 4° Whether the action, or omission, of the damager, although truly damaging and in itself unjust, was gravely culpable in conscience. And the same answer must be given; because, as was said above, where grave fault is not morally certain, neither is the obligation of restoring certain on account of the damaging⁵]