Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Tractatus I: De fide
Prooemium
Dissertatio I: De objecto fidei
Articulus I: Quodnam sit objectum fidei?
Articulus II: In quid sit ultima resolutio fidei nostrae?
Articulus III: Utrum fides possit subsistere falso?
Articulus IV: De obscuritate in objecto fidei et evidentia in attestante
Articulus V: Utrum mysteria fidei sint evidenter credibilia?
Dissertatio II: De motivis credibilitatis Religionis christianae adversus incredulos, vulgo deistas
Articulus I: Quid sit prophetia? An sit possibilis?
Articulus II: An prophetiae vim habeant probandi veritatem revelationis?
Articulus III: Vaticinia prophetarum de religione christiana et ejus authore
Articulus IV: Miracula Christi et Apostolorum, item promissiones Christi adimpletae in confirmationem religionis christianae
Articulus V: Modus mirabilis et plane divinus quo christiana Religio fuit fundata et propagata
Dissertatio III: De actu interno et externo fidei
Articulus I: Utrum sit de necessitate salutis credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem, et quid?
Articulus II: Caeterae difficultates circa actum fidei internum expenduntur
Articulus III: De actu fidei externo
Dissertatio IV: De habitu et subjecto fidei
Articulus I: De habitu fidei
Articulus II: De subjecto fidei
Articulus III: Utrum vera religio falsae tolerari possit
Articulus IV: Utrum fides rationem naturalem excludat?
Dissertatio V: De vitiis fidei oppositis
Articulus I: De infidelitate in communi
Articulus II: De haeresi
Articulus III: De apostasia
Articulus IV: De cultuum libertate
Articulus V: De blasphemia
Tractatus II: De regulis fidei
Dissertatio I: De divina revelatione
Articulus I: De natura revelationis divinae
Articulus II: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio immediata?
Articulus III: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio mediata?
Articulus IV: Utrum veritatum capitibus nostris excedentium, seu mysteriorum, possibilis sit revelatio?
Articulus V: Utrum divina revelatio fuerit necessaria?
Dissertatio II: De Scriptura sacra
Articulus I: Quid sit et an sit Scriptura sacra
Articulus II: De Scriptura sacra divisione, apographis et versionibus
Articulus III: De Scriptura sacra sensibus
Dissertatio III: De traditionibus
Articulus I: Quid, quotuplex sit traditio, et quanta auctoritas illis?
Articulus II: Utrum traditiones divinae sint necessario admittendae?
Articulus III: De sanctorum patribus
Articulus IV: De sacra liturgia
Dissertatio IV: De Ecclesia
Articulus I: Quomodo Ecclesia christiana existere potuerit ante adventum Christi?
Articulus II: Ex quibus constabat religio primaeva?
Articulus III: Quomodo constituta fuit religio mosaica?
Articulus IV: Utrum divina fuerit religio mosaica?
Articulus V: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abroganda?
Articulus VI: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abrogata?
Articulus VII: Quid sit Ecclesia, et qui sint in ea?
Articulus VIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit visibilis?
Articulus IX: De notis verae Ecclesiae
Articulus X: Utrum Ecclesia possit decipere seu errare in fide et moribus?
Articulus XI: Utrum Ecclesia sit suprema iudex controversiarum fidei?
Articulus XII: Utrum iudicium Ecclesiae de sensu librorum, seu, ut vocant, de factis dogmaticis, sit infallibile?
Articulus XIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit infallibilis in canonizatione sanctorum?
Dissertatio V: De summo Pontifice
Articulus I: De primatu S. Petri
Articulus II: De primatu Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus III: De vi et ratione primatus Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus IV: De infallibilitate seu inerrantia summi Pontificis in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum
Articulus V: De praeminentia summi Pontificis supra concilium generale
Articulus VI: Solvuntur objectiones
Articulus VII: Utrum Pontifici Romano competat summa potestas temporalis?
Articulus VIII: Quid sit Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate Declaratio anni 1682, et quid de ea sentiendum?
Articulus IX: Utrum doctrina Declarationis anni 1682, ipsaque Declaratio, Ecclesiae Gallicanae merito fuerit attributa?
Articulus X: De Romani Pontificis principatu civili
Dissertatio VI: De conciliis generalibus
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit concilium?
Articulus II: Utrum necessaria sint concilia generalia?
Articulus III: Cujus sit convocare concilium generale?
Articulus IV: De convocatis ad concilium generale et illius praeside
Articulus V: Utrum concilium generale sit infallibile in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum?
Articulus VI: Utrum concilium generale debeat necessario confirmari a summo Pontifice?
Tractatus III: De spe
Dissertatio I: De spe
Articulus I: De spe secundum se et de ejus objecto
Articulus II: In quibus sit spes
Articulus III: De necessitate spei
Articulus IV: Quae sint vitia opposita spei theologicae?
Tractatus IV: De charitate
Dissertatio I: De charitate secundum se
Articulus I: Complectens omnia quae spectant charitatem secundum se
Dissertatio II: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis
Articulus I: De subjecto, causa, augmento et amissione charitatis
Dissertatio III: De charitate erga proximum
Articulus I: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate diligere seipsum, corpus suum et peccatores?
Articulus II: Utrum inimici sint ex charitate diligendi, eisque exhibenda signa et opera charitatis?
Dissertatio IV: De ordine et praecipuo actu charitatis, qui est dilectio
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit magis ex charitate diligendus, quam proximus?
Articulus II: Utrum homo debeat ex charitate magis se diligere quam proximum?
Articulus III: Quis ordo servandus sit in dilectione proximorum?
Articulus IV: An et quo sensu liceat diligere Deum et illi servire propter retributionem?
Articulus V: De praecipto charitatis
Dissertatio V: De eleemosyna
Articulus I: Utrum dare eleemosynam sit in praecipto, et quando?
Articulus II: Variae quaestiones circa eleemosynam breviter solvuntur
Dissertatio VI: De correptione fraterna
Articulus I: Utrum correptio fraterna sit in praecipto, et quae conditiones requirantur ut obliget?
Articulus II: De ordine correptionis fraternae
Dissertatio VII: De vitiis charitati oppositis
Articulus I: De odio Dei et proximi, de accidia, invidia, discordia, contentione et schismate
Articulus II: De bello
Articulus III: De duello
Tractatus V: De iure et iustitia
Dissertatio I: De iure et dominio
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit ius?
Articulus II: Quid et quotuplex sit dominium? Quid ususfructus et usus?
Articulus III: Utrum usus in rebus unico actu consumptibilibus distinguatur a dominio?
Articulus IV: De possessione
Dissertatio II: De subjecto et objecto dominii
Articulus I: De subjecto et objecto dominii in genere
Articulus II: De dominio uxorum et filiorumfamilias
Articulus III: De dominio clericorum
Dissertatio III: De modis acquirendi dominium
Articulus I: De modis acquirendi dominia rerum quae nullius sunt
Articulus II: De primo modo acquirendi dominium rerum quae sunt alicujus, scilicet de accessione
Articulus III: De altero modo acquirendi dominia rerum quae sunt alienus, nimirum de praescriptione
Dissertatio IV: De iustitia
Articulus I: De definitione, objecto et subjecto iustitiae
Articulus II: De divisione iustitiae
Dissertatio V: De actu iustitiae ut sic, nempe de iudicio
Articulus I: Utrum iudicium sit licitum?
Articulus II: De suspicione et iudicio temerario
Articulus III: Utrum dubia de male proximi sint in meliorem partem interpretanda?
Dissertatio VI: De actu iustitiae commutativae, nempe de restitutione
Articulus I: De qualitate et necessitate restitutionis
Articulus II: Ex quotuplex titulo obligetur restitutio, sit affirmativa vel negativa?
Articulus III: Utrum incurratur obligatio restitutionis ratione damni illati absque culpa theologica?
Note. A twofold fault is distinguished : one theological, the other juridical. Theological fault is formal sin before God, whether mortal or venial. Juridical fault is the omission of some diligence from which damage follows to another. Such an omission, I say, jurists call a fault, even if perchance it be not a fault before God, for example because it is either involuntary, or is not of such diligence as one is bound to employ. But if it be a voluntary omission of such diligence as one can and is bound to employ, it will be at once both a theological and a juridical fault.
Juridical fault is divided into gross, light, and lightest. Gross fault is the omission of the diligence which prudent men are accustomed to employ in such a case, in such a business; as if someone go out of the house without having closed the door of the inner room.
Light fault is the omission of the diligence which the more prudent are accustomed to employ; as if someone go out with the door of the room indeed closed, but not bolted.
Lightest fault is the omission of the diligence which the most prudent are accustomed to employ; as if someone did not try with his hand whether a closed and bolted door were well bolted.
It is asked, therefore, whether in simple damaging, in which no gain accrues to the damager, theological fault is required, or that he have sinned before God, in order that he be liable to restitution, or whether juridical fault suffices. Concerning which :
I say : No one, contract set aside, is bound to restitution by reason of damage inflicted before the sentence of the judge, unless he have admitted theological fault against commutative justice in inflicting the damage. This is the common teaching against Adrian and certain ancient authors.
Proof. The damager, in the case proposed, is not bound to restore by reason of a thing received ; because, as is supposed, he received nothing, nor has he been made richer by the damage : nor by reason of an unjust action ; for where there is no fault before God, the damaging action is not formally unjust : nor from positive law ; for none can be assigned outside of contract. Therefore from no heading is he bound to restore,
It is confirmed. If damaging merely materially unjust induced the obligation of restoring, it would follow that a madman, or one asleep, or one who damaged his neighbor by a mere chance event, would be held to restitution ; which no one admits.
Therefore, however much damage to another may follow from your act, if you have not truly sinned before God, either because you employed the due diligence, or because you omitted it through natural inadvertence or blameless forgetfulness, although it is called gross fault in law, you are not held to restore in the forum of conscience before the sentence of the judge.
And this is true even though the damager deal with a thing illicitly, provided it be not dangerous and as it were a way leading to damage, such that neither per se nor in the majority of cases does damage follow from it, nor could it have been foreseen in a human way as about to follow; because, although the cause is voluntary, it is nevertheless not voluntary as the cause of such damage, which could not be foreseen in a human way as about to follow from it. Hence, if while hunting in a prohibited place or time you kill a man, thinking invincibly that you are killing a wild beast, you are not held to restore on account of the homicide.
I said, « before the sentence of the judge ; » because the judge, where there is gross juridical fault, though there be no theological fault, through natural inadvertence or some other case, is accustomed to condemn the damager to restitution or rather to payment, or to the surrender of the animal, if the damage was inflicted through an animal, unless it be otherwise certainly evident that he is innocent. And the damager is held, more probably, to obey this sentence as just in the forum of conscience. For this sentence does not rest upon a false presumption, as certain ones think; because the judge condemns you not because he presumes you have sinned internally before God, but because you have sinned externally, that is, because you omitted the diligence which prudent men are accustomed to employ, on account of which juridical fault, though not theological, the laws decree the obligation of restoring, with the sentence of the judge supervening.
And indeed justly, both because gross juridical fault usually proceeds from theological fault, although the contrary sometimes occurs per accidens, and laws attend to what happens for the most part; and on account of the common good, namely that men be more attentive in guarding their own goods, and more cautious in avoiding damage to their neighbor.
[You will ask whether he is held to restitution who blamelessly placed the cause of the damage, if afterward he neglect to remove it.
I answer, affirmative ; because he who placed the efficacious cause of the damage, and does not retract it when he morally can, wills it virtually, and consequently becomes at that moment strictly, effectively and formally the unjust cause of the damage1.
I said, « when he morally can, » that is, without great and proportionate inconvenience, as is commonly taught.]