Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 60.)

Judgment, as taken here, is the definition or determination of right or of the just ; but the just, as appears from what has been said, is the equal owed to another, which is the object of justice¹. From which it is clear that it is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just and the equal owed to another.

We treat therefore of judgment taken in this sense, not only as it is exercised outwardly by a judge between litigating parties, but also as it is exercised, whether outwardly or inwardly, by private persons concerning the life, goods, and morals of others.

I say: Judgment clothed with due circumstances is licit². It is against the Waldenses and Anabaptists.

Proof. 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XVI, 18, God says to Moses : Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates,... that they may judge the people with just judgment³.

And chap. 1, 16 : Judge that which is just. Which Christ repeats, John, VII, 24. The Apostle, to the Romans, XIII, 4, asserts that not without cause does the judge carry the sword ; for he is God's minister, an avenger in wrath upon him who does evil. Peter judged Ananias and Saphira, Acts, V, 3 ; Paul the incestuous Corinthian, 1 Cor., V, 3.

Proof. by reason. Every act of virtue is licit. Now judgment clothed with due circumstances is an act of virtue, namely of justice, as was said⁴. Therefore.

I said, « clothed with due circumstances », which are three⁵ : first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice ; second, that it proceed from the authority of the one presiding ; third, that it be uttered according to right reason and prudence. The first condition can be understood in a twofold sense : first, that judgment not be against justice ; second, that it be from love of justice, and not from some human motive, say hatred, anger, avarice, vain glory, etc. Through defect of the first condition understood in the first sense, judgment is perverse and unjust. Through defect of the same condition understood in the second sense, it is not properly an unjust judgment, yet evil and illicit gravely or lightly according to the quality of the motive. Through defect of the second condition, it is usurped judgment. But this regards public judgment ; since justice is found in private persons, there can be in them also true and right judgment without authority. Through defect of the third condition, it is rash judgment, namely when someone for light reasons judges doubtful and hidden things.

Nota that suspicion, doubt, opinion, and judgment, where the evil of one's neighbor is in question, are often taken as one and the same by the learned and the unlearned. The reason of this confusion is, because all these acts are about the evil of one's neighbor and from insufficient indications, insofar as they are rash, as they are taken here.

However, if we speak strictly, all these acts are distinguished from one another. For doubt is, when the mind is moved toward either side, but assents to neither, and remains suspended between both. Suspicion is, when the intellect, receding from the doubt or mean, is more inclined to the assent of one side, yet so that it does not yet assent. Some do not distinguish it from opinion except by more and less, and will it to be a weak opinion or one with great misgiving ; opinion however is assent to one side with fear of the opposite side. Judgment is certain and firm assent to one side, without fear of the opposite side.

We treat here of rash suspicion insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, and the principal question is whether it is of its genus mortal sin, so that in the individual it is always mortal when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor. There is difficulty also about the mind of Saint Thomas. That we may begin from the more certain,

I say 1°: Rash judgment is of its genus mortal sin. This is certain and common with the Author¹

Proof. 1° from Scripture. Matt., VII, 1, it is said : Judge not, that ye be not judged. Luke, VI, 37 : Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. To the Romans, XIV, 4 : Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?

Proof. 2°. Rash judgment is not without injury and contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore is against justice and charity². Therefore it is of its genus mortal sin.

It is confirmed. Everyone has the right that a good estimate be had of him by others, so long as he is not proved wicked. Now he who judges rashly of the evil of his neighbor acts against this right. Therefore he is against justice. Also against charity : 1° because against that principle of charity and right reason :

« What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it cannot be that he who thus judges of his neighbor be well disposed toward him.

I say 2°: It is more probable that rash suspicion concerning the evil of one's neighbor, insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, is of its genus mortal sin, and accordingly in the individual always mortal sin, when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor.

Proof. That is mortal sin of its genus which is contrary to justice and charity. Now such is rash suspicion. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. 1° Because, as Saint Thomas says³, it is not without contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore does him an injury. 2° Everyone has the right to be esteemed upright by others, so long as his malice does not sufficiently appear. Now he acts against this right who rashly suspects evil of him, or doubts of his uprightness. Therefore against justice. Also against charity : 1° because he acts against this first principle of all social life : « What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it can scarcely be that he who rashly suspects evil of his neighbor be well affected toward him. Therefore.

The adversaries answer, and it is their chief foundation, that there is indeed injury and contempt, but incomplete ; because suspicion is something incomplete in the genus of judgment.

On the contrary. Grant that contempt is incomplete in the genus of judgment, thence it is not proved that this incomplete contempt is not mortal of its genus ; because, although it is incomplete in the genus of judgment, it is nevertheless complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act. So, v. g., fully voluntary doubt in matters of faith is an incomplete judgment and incomplete contempt in the genus of judgment ; but, because it is complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act, it is sufficient for mortal sin. So again detraction concerning one's neighbor before a single upright man only is incomplete contempt, and yet, according to the highly probable opinion, it is mortal sin of its genus. Or, if you will, detraction before ten is less complete contempt than detraction before twenty, and yet in both cases it is mortal sin of its genus.

Proof. 2°, and this chief refuge of the adversaries is more strongly shaken. Rash suspicion of the gravest evils of one's neighbor is in the individual mortal sin. Therefore rash suspicion of its genus is mortal sin. — The consequence is plain ; because what is venial of its genus, however much it be increased within its species, remains venial, nor becomes mortal unless by some circumstance it be drawn to another species, as theologians commonly teach after D. Thomas, Ia 2ae, q. 88, a. 5. — Proof. of the antecedent. Rash suspicion gravely contemns one's neighbor in the grave case and inflicts on him a grave injury. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. No one exists who does not think himself gravely contemned and suffering grave injury, if someone without cause suspects of him, or even doubts, that he is a sodomite, incestuous with his mother, a heretic, a magician, a sorcerer, etc., so that he would rather lose a notable sum of money than have such a suspicion held of him. I appeal to the very adversaries as witnesses.

There remains the difficulty about the mind of D. Thomas.

The conclusion is therefore proved from D. Thomas, or rather the argument already made from him in the prior proofs is renewed. For, according to Saint Thomas here a. 3, c, rash judgment is mortal sin of its genus, because it is with contempt of one's neighbor. Now, according to the same holy Doctor in the reply to the second objection and in the body of the next article, suspicion also is with contempt of one's neighbor : « From this very fact, he says, that anyone holds an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore does him an injury » ; so that the holy Doctor speaks in exactly the same way of both. Therefore.

Serra answers that Saint Thomas speaks of suspicion in the second degree, in which it is taken for certain judgment.

On the contrary. Saint Thomas speaks of that suspicion of which he speaks in the argument to which he responds. But in the argument to which he responds, he speaks of suspicion as distinguished from certain judgment. It is plain to one reading the argument, which is thus : « By illicit judgment some injury is done to one's neighbor. But evil suspicion consists in the mere opinion of a man, and thus does not seem to pertain to the injury of another. Therefore the judgment of suspicion is not illicit. »

You will object : Saint Thomas here a. 3, c., distinguishing three degrees of suspicion, says : « The first degree indeed is, that a man from light indications begin to doubt of the goodness of someone, and this is venial and light sin ; it pertains, says Augustine, to human temptation, without which this life is not led!...⁴ »

I answer. Saint Thomas, like Saint Augustine on whom he is founded, is speaking of sudden suspicion not fully deliberate. Which is plain first from his very words : « That, he says, a man begin to doubt » ; for no one is said to begin to doubt who after full advertence deliberately doubts and continues to doubt, especially of the grave evil of his neighbor. Second it is plain from the reason he adduces from Augustine, namely that such suspicion « pertains to human temptation, without which this life is not led. » Moreover, rash suspicion fully deliberate of the grave evil of one's neighbor pertains not to human but to diabolical temptation, as Bannez well notes ; and it is false that the life of many is not led without such suspicions.

To be noted for practice.

That suspicion or rash judgment be mortal sin in the individual, three things are required : First, that it be perfectly deliberate ; second, that it be fully rash ; third, that it be concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor : if any one of these is wanting, there will be only venial sin.

As to the first, Sylvius notes, after Lessius and others, that for mortal sin in suspicious or rash judgment it does not suffice to suspect or judge howsoever deliberately ; but that you must advert to and know, or at least doubt that you judge or suspect, from insufficient signs and concerning a grave matter ; otherwise, he says, the judgment will not be voluntary, at least as regards its being rash or concerning a grave matter. This indeed I admit as regards the condition of the grave matter, not only on account of the said reason, but because then you do not gravely contemn your neighbor. As to the insufficiency of the indications truly, it must, I think, be restricted thus : unless, blinded voluntarily by malevolence, envy, hatred, or similar passion, regarding the insufficiency of the indications you neglect to examine them and precipitate your judgment ; for then you virtually advert to it, since you ought and can advert. And besides, otherwise there would scarcely ever be any rash judgment, since a man ill-disposed toward another easily persuades himself that the indications he has of the evil of an enemy are sufficient.

As to the second, rightly did I say that rash judgment is not mortal sin unless it be fully rash, since its whole malice arises from rashness : so that, if it were in no way rash, that is, if altogether sufficient indications were present, it would by no means be sin ; for then it would be prudent and reasonable judgment, nor through it would injury be inflicted on one's neighbor. For the neighbor has lost his right of reputation and good estimation with respect to him whose guilt is proved by sufficient indications.

But if the indications are not indeed altogether sufficient, yet approach near sufficiency, neither will it be mortal sin ; because great probability does not much differ from moral certitude : whence there will not be grave rashness, nor consequently grave injury.

And because to judge with certainty is somewhat more than simply to opine, to opine than to suspect, and to suspect than to doubt, therefore greater indications are required for judging than for suspecting, and for suspecting than for doubting.

As to the third, note that grave evil in this matter, as in the matter of detraction, is that whole and only thing which, the quality of persons and fact being considered, is highly disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor, whether sin or not ; because the malice of this sin consists in contempt of one's neighbor.

Although therefore mortal sin per se is grave matter, and venial sin light matter, nevertheless per accidens, from the quality of persons or of fact, the contrary often happens. For there are some who are not defamed among men even for certain mortal sins, nor are they ashamed themselves, but sometimes are counted to their praise, v. g., dueling or fornication with respect to a soldier, drunkenness with respect to a commoner in these parts, concerning which if you judge rashly you do not sin mortally, because with respect to them it is not grave matter. On the contrary there are some who are much contemned for venial sins, or even for things that are not sins : as if you judge rashly of a bishop or the supreme Pontiff that he is habitually a liar.

[On the contrary, S. Ligorius⁵ holds suspicion to be only venial sin of its genus. « Suspicion, he says, and rash doubt seem of their genus to be sins only venial, especially if they proceed from error of the intellect, whereby the indications are apprehended as sufficient. So Layman⁶, from Saint Thomas..., against many who think it mortal. The reason is, because commonly suspicion is only a kind of incitement to assent ; for there remains in the mind of the one suspecting in some way a good estimation of his neighbor. Therefore no grave injury is done him, since he is not wholly cast down from possession of a good name ; yet some injury is done, because he is rashly doubted. » I said, « especially if from error », because such, since it is not per se voluntary, nor pertinacious, merits excuse ; if truly from malevolence you persist in grave suspicion, it will be mortal, as Lessius etc. teach, on account of the gravity of the injury. However the same holds of positive doubting arising from malevolence, without cause ; for it proceeds from contempt of the other, and consequently is reckoned grave injury. »]

With S. Ligori Gury agrees in this⁷.

The same Doctor⁸ against Cajetan, Navarrus, and several others saying that suspicion howsoever rash can never reach mortal sin, holds as more probable the opposite opinion, « if suspicion or doubt were made without indications concerning most grave sins, as to suspect a pious religious that he is a heretic..., or a man commonly held as Catholic that he is a Jew or atheist. The reason, because perchance greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things, than if a certain judgment were had of them concerning ordinary grave delicts ». And this accords with what Billuart said above concerning the third.

Thence it appears that disputants among themselves, whether evil suspicion be mortal or venial sin of its genus, agree in deciding that it can reach mortal sin, for diverse reasons, namely either from its nature, when grave matter occurs, or from aggravating circumstances. This must be retained, as regards practice, whatever be judged of the speculative question, about which it is licit for each to abound in his own sense.

[Note what S. Ligorius warns⁹ : « In this matter let the confessor observe that many simple persons accuse themselves that they judged rashly. He must bring it about that they know : 1° when sufficient grounds are present for judging thus of some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore not sin ; 2° very often, such judgments are those they are bound to hold, lest some sin be impeded, v. g. lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by consorting with men, and other things of this kind. Only let care be taken lest suspicions of this kind be communicated to others without necessity. »]

A doubt can be interpreted in the better part in two ways: one way, negatively, by not declining into the worse; the other way, positively, by declining into the better.

I say 1°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor must be interpreted in the better part negatively. It follows from the preceding article and from the same principle.

Proof. By this very fact that someone has an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he despises him and injures him, as was said; which is illicit. Now he who does not interpret a doubt about the evil of his neighbor in the better part at least negatively, but declines into the worse, has an evil opinion of his neighbor without sufficient cause, since the reasons for doubting lie on both sides, and are therefore insufficient for suspecting or opining in the worse direction. Therefore.

The same is proved by all that we have said against suspicion and rash judgment.

I say 2°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor are not always to be interpreted positively in the better part, but only in certain cases.

Proof. 1° because the precept of judging one's neighbor well in doubt is affirmative, like the precept of honoring or loving him, which does not bind always.

Proof. 2°. Either there are sufficient reasons for doubting, or there are not. If the first, we can remain in doubt, suspending judgment and not declining to either side; because the doubt is not rash, but reasonable. If the second, the doubt must be rejected at once, because it is rash. But that is not our case; for we are dealing with a founded and reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless — and this is the second part of the conclusion — supposing that, with the matter doubtful on both sides, some act must be elicited concerning the goodness or malice of one's neighbor, that act must be done in the better part, and consequently the doubt must be interpreted positively in the better part; and the reasons of the first conclusion prove this directly.

Likewise, if a grave temptation pressed upon one to have an evil opinion or judgment of one's neighbor, which one could not conquer except by judging positively on the good side, one would also be bound to that, for the same reason.

Wherefore it is also licit, concerning the business undertaken, or on another day at that time, with caution intact, to doubt toward the worse parts by supposing, not that things appear to be worse there, or even by judging that they could be such. For thus it is expedient that the remedy or precaution be applied more securely, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil; nor do you injure anyone; for you do not judge, nor suspect or doubt that your neighbor is in fact vicious, but you merely suppose him to be such, or judge that he could be such, which is indeed true and not injurious to him, and from that supposition you provide for yourself and yours as if he were truly such.

We use this kind of supposition everywhere without sin. Thus a father prudently forbids his daughter the company of some young man, because she may be seduced by him. A master closes the chest more attentively and guards his money, because servants or unknown guests may be thieves. A traveler takes up arms on meeting an unknown man, because he may be a robber; he avoids meeting a deformed old woman, because she may be a witch. And so many other cases. Take care, however, always to keep in mind a right judgment about your neighbor, nor doubt, suspect, or judge beyond the sufficiency of the indications. Provide for your own likewise, so that through excessive caution you do not defame or sadden your neighbor.

[Whether public judgment is to be rendered according to the laws, and whether through usurpation it becomes perverse, which St. Thomas discusses here in art. 5 and 6¹ , will be said below, when we treat of the injustice of the judge.]