Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

: To every and only intellectual nature, namely God, angel, and man, dominion belongs ¹ ; because to every and only intellectual nature belongs the foundation of dominion, namely intellect and will, by which it has the power of disposing of its own acts, and by acts over external things. Hence Genesis, I, 26, God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth: where he attributes to man dominion over beasts and fishes because he is the image of God. Now he is the image of God through intellect and will.

I say secondly: All sublunary things can fall under the dominion of man, inasmuch as he can acquire them for himself and dispose of what is acquired at his nod; but of those things of which he has legitimate title he is de facto lord.

He is also absolutely lord of operations freely exercised through intellect and will, through the external senses and through the locomotive power ² ; because such are subject to his free choice. Not so perfectly is he lord of actions naturally exercised through the interior senses and the sensitive appetite; because these sometimes depend on the disposition of a bodily organ, which is not in man's power. But of the actions of the vegetative faculty he is in no way lord, because they are in no wise subject to the command of reason.

I say thirdly: Man is not absolutely and directly lord of his own life and members, but only custodian and user ³ ; God alone is Lord. So doctors everywhere.

It is proved. First from Scripture. Deut., XXXII, 39, God says: See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me. I will kill, and I will make to live. And Wisdom, XVI, 13: Thou, Lord, hast power of life and death; that is, thou alone.

Proof by reason. First. Life and body are presupposed to dominion as its foundations. Therefore they are not subject to dominion. — If you say that liberty also is a foundation of dominion, and yet man is its lord, seeing that he can sell it into servitude; I answer that what is sold into servitude is not liberty itself or the power of free choice, which is the foundation of dominion, but only the use; just as man can also sell the use of his own body. — Secondly. By the precept Thou shalt not kill, killing is prohibited, not only of another, but also of oneself, and likewise mutilation. Therefore man cannot dispose at pleasure of life or members, and consequently has no dominion over them. — Thirdly. Dominion is only over those things which we can acquire by our industry; for just as we can acquire them, so we can relinquish them. But we cannot acquire life or members by our own industry. Therefore. — Fourthly. Dominion is only over distinct things. But life and members are not a thing distinct from us. Therefore.

I say thirdly: Neither princes nor the commonwealth have direct dominion over the life and members of citizens, as if they could kill or mutilate citizens at pleasure, but only indirect, inasmuch as the life of certain men is harmful to the public good.

It is evident both from the praised precept: Thou shalt not kill; and because every private person stands to the commonwealth as a member to the body; no one however is lord of his own members, as was said. Therefore.

I say fourthly: Man is lord of his own reputation and honor ⁴ . It is common against Cajetan, q. 73, a. 2. This dominion however is at times bound up.

Proof of the first part. Man acquires reputation by his own labor, or at least the right to it; having once acquired it, by the faculty of choice he governs it, preserves it, or loses it without wrong to anyone, as Augustine did by making his falls manifest. Therefore he is its lord. — The corollary is evident; because all these acts are the principal acts of dominion.

It is confirmed. If man were not lord of his own reputation, he could not forgive or remit its restitution; for no one can remit what is not his own. Yet this is often done, and laudably done. Therefore.

Nor does it stand in the way that man can forgive the mutilation of a member, of which nevertheless he is not lord. For, if the member could be restored as reputation can, he could not forgive its restitution. What therefore he forgives is not the restitution of the member, but satisfaction for the injury inflicted and pecuniary restitution for the damage followed.

Proof of the second part. Our reputation is sometimes necessary to our neighbor. Therefore then we cannot dispose of it at will, either neglecting or squandering it.

[But our reputation can be necessary to our neighbor in three ways: first, so that the reputation of our neighbor hangs on our reputation, and from our infamy follows his infamy: as from the infamy of a monk follows the infamy of the community, and from the infamy of a father follows the infamy of his household. Secondly, so that our reputation is necessary to our neighbor for rendering to him an office owed him by strict right: thus the reputation of a prelate or parish priest is necessary that he may well govern his subjects. Thirdly, so that our reputation is necessary to our neighbor in order that an office be rendered him which is owed him only out of charity. Whoever in this last case neglects or squanders his reputation sins only against charity. But whoever in the two prior cases does not care for his reputation probably sins against justice, not precisely because he defames himself, but because he harms his neighbor.

I say fourthly: Man can fall under the dominion of the property of another man.

It is proved. Servitude is prohibited by no law: first, not by natural law; because, as was said, man has useful dominion of his own body. Therefore he can transfer it to another. Secondly, not by divine law, as is evident from the Old Testament, Exod., XXI, 2 seqq.; Levit., XXV, 39 seqq., and from the New, Philem., 10 seqq.; I Petr., II, 18. Thirdly, not by human law, as is evident from various places of both laws, where many things are discussed about slaves. But servitude was introduced by the law of nations; now however, the new law disposing, servitude is no longer admitted among Christians, few places excepted: whence this question has become almost speculative.]