Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Use is distinguished in two ways: one independent and irrevocable at the nod of the grantor, as in a loan; the other dependent and revocable at the nod of the grantor, such as guests have at a banquet laid out, or individual religious at food or drink granted to them by the superior; for these things, whether the banquet, or the food and drink, can be taken away by the owner or superior without injustice as long as they exist.

Irrevocable use is called by Nicholas III, cap. Exiit, de verborum signific. in 6°, and by some theologians "use of right," because it is an absolute and solid right. Revocable use is called use of fact; because the right it imports or supposes is very weak, being dependent on the will of another.

I say: Revocable use in things consumable by one act is distinguished from dominion.

Proof. First. Separation is a manifest proof of real distinction. But revocable use, as in the conclusion, is separable from dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. He who grants to another the faculty of using his thing, while retaining the power of revoking this faculty at his nod and of disposing of his thing to whatever use he wishes, grants the use and retains dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. That he grants the use is evident in itself. That he retains dominion is proved. He is truly lord who can recall his thing to himself at his pleasure, no contract intervening, and dispose of it for any use whatever. Therefore.

Proof. Second. Individual religious have the use of those things that are granted to them for sustenance, revocable by the superior. But they do not have dominion over them, since by vow of poverty they have abdicated the dominion and property of all things¹ . Therefore.

It is confirmed by the example Nicholas III uses. A father of a family giving a banquet to guests gives them the use of foods revocable at his nod. Yet he does not transfer dominion to them. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Guests are not lords of what is set on the table, nor can they use it for any use whatever, but only for eating, and that so dependently on the will of the father of the family that he would commit no injustice if he took away what he had set out. Therefore.

So with us think Nicholas III, Clement V, and before them Alexander III and Gregory IX, Soto, Navarrus, Sylvius, Lessius, and many others together with the entire school of the Scotists.

You will object: John XXII, Extravag. Ad conditorem, asserts the contrary of our opinion, and says that to say that in such things use can be constituted separately from dominion repugns to right and runs counter to reason. Therefore either he, or the Pontiffs praised above, erred.

I answer. First: suppose we admit that John XXII erred in this part, nothing absurd follows, since it is not a matter of faith or morals, but partly natural, partly civil; and besides he said this not defining as Pontiff, but reasoning as a particular doctor.

It can be answered secondly that John XXII did not err even in this; because he does not take dominion strictly and properly, but broadly and improperly for right however tenuous, or rather for the license of using a thing by consuming it, which since in things consumable by the use itself it is equivalent as to effect to dominion (for the Friars Minor consume food as freely as if they were owners), therefore the Pontiff called this right, though most tenuous and revocable, dominion, namely equivalently and analogically. This solution is intimated by the gloss in Clement., Exivi de Paradiso, § Proinde.