Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

You will ask 1° what a duel is.

I answer. A duel, in Greek monomachia, is the fight of one against one, and thus taken broadly it is the brawl of two between themselves; but as it is taken in law and with respect to ecclesiastical censures, it is commonly defined :¹ «A dangerous fight of two entered into by agreement or compact, with designation of time and place.» And because the matter of censures is odious, and therefore to be restricted, all parts of this definition are to be taken strictly. Therefore

It is called 1° «the fight of two;» because, if several promiscuously fight against several, there will be simply a brawl, not a duel, unless single ones determined against single ones determined fight, as is done in a solemn duel. For a twofold duel is distinguished : one solemn or public, when certain ceremonies are employed, as the choice of godfathers or, as they call them, seconds, the assumption of witnesses, letters of challenge, or libels of citation commonly called cartel, etc.; another simple, when these ceremonies are not employed.

It is called 2nd «a dangerous fight;» because fights which are made without peril of killing or grave wounding, such as with fists, a light staff, pulling of hair, etc., although sometimes they are grave sins, are nevertheless not properly duels.

It is called 3rd «by agreement or compact.» So express it Gregory XIII, constitutio Ad tollendam, given in the year 1582, and Clement VIII, in the constitutio Illius vices, given in the year 1592; that is, from an agreement previously made of fighting at a determinate place and time. Whence those who meeting unexpectedly fight, or if one has sought out another, or threatened him, there is no duel, for lack of compact. Similarly, if of two quarreling, one or both run home and return with arms and fight; likewise, if in a rush of anger they say : «Let us fight here,» and they fight, there is not properly a duel, for lack of compact.

It is called 4th «with designation of time and place.» Thus require Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions; so that, if the designation either of a determinate place or of a determinate time be wanting, there is no duel properly subject to censures.

You will ask 2° whether the duel is licit.

I answer. 1°. The duel by private authority is not licit : 1° because every private vengeance is illicit; 2° because by the precept Thou shalt not kill not only is killing forbidden, but also proximate peril of killing, as in other precepts; 3° because both the Church and Christian princes prohibit the duel under gravest penalties. Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19; Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions.

[Specially Alexander VII condemned this proposition, n. 2 : «A horseman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur the mark of timidity among others.» Since afterwards several authors asserted that the duel is licit in some circumstances, Benedict XIV, constitutio Detestabilem, given November 10, 1752, condemned the following five propositions as false, scandalous and pernicious :

1° «A military man who, unless he offer or accept a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject and unfit for military duties, and thence would be deprived of the office whereby he sustains himself and his own, or ought perpetually to lack hope of promotion otherwise due and merited by him, would be without fault and punishment, whether he offer or accept a duel.»

2° «They can also be excused, for the sake of guarding honor or avoiding contempt among men, who accept duels or challenge to them, when they certainly know that the fight will not follow, namely because it will be impeded by others.»

3° «A duke or military official accepting a duel out of grave fear of loss of fame and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties laid down by the Church against duellists.»

4° «In the natural state of man it is licit to accept and offer a duel, for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them can by no other remedy be warded off.»

5° «The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which plainly justice is denied either through negligence or malice of magistrates.»

It must be added that it is no more licit to take up a duel on this law, that, one being wounded, the fight must cease : because besides the prohibition and scandal, there is present danger of lethal wound. Even if it were certain that the wound would not prove lethal, nevertheless the combat would be illicit : both because any voluntary wound and even blows are included under the precept Thou shalt not kill; and because Clement VIII, constitutio Illius vices, of the year 1592, forbade «duels even non-lethal.»]

I answer. 2°. The duel by public authority is rarely licit. Proof 1° In the first place it is not licit for sake of spectacle or ostentation of strength; because the prince has no right over the life of subjects except malefactors.

2° It is certain that the duel is illicit for detecting crime or innocence, as was once frequent; because in a duel the innocent as equally as the guilty can fall. Whence the manifestation of truth would be awaited either from the devil, and it would be superstition; or from God, and it would be temptation of God.

3° It is not licit to have a duel for ending litigation or controversy between private persons : because either the duel is instituted that through its outcome it may be discerned on which side justice stands, and thus returns the preceding argument; or it is instituted only for this, that, a duel having been made, the parties cease from litigation, and then it is insane and diabolical to wish to incur peril of life, that they desist from a litigation from which they can desist by their own will and with safe life, or which can be terminated by authority of the supreme prince, or by a lot free of danger.

4° Speaking per se, it is not licit to have a duel for ending a controversy, or for avoiding or terminating war between supreme princes; because the duel neither from God nor from nature is a means ordained and proportioned to warding off injury, or to obtaining satisfaction for injury inflicted, which are the two causes of wars and controversies between supreme princes. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. He whose state has the right can equally be conquered as the other. For either the faculty of fighting of each is equal, or if one be more practiced, very many things are wont to happen in this singular combat, on account of which often the stronger and more practiced succumbs; and therefore the justice and common good of the state, whether in warding off injury, or in obtaining satisfaction, which ought to be defended by the common forces of the whole community, is exposed to the hazard of the duel. Ergo.

Nor do you say that the common good is likewise exposed to the hazard of war. For a supreme prince cannot enter into war, whether defensive or offensive, except a greater hope of conquering shine forth, whether by force, by stratagems, by help of confederates; or, should he be conquered, of restoring and increasing his forces. For the enemy holds himself toward his enemy as agent toward patient; but the agent acts not unless he be stronger than the patient.

Therefore when it is opposed, that it is better to end a war by the death of one than of many, it is answered that this is true when the killing of one is a means ordained and proportioned to usefully ending the war for the state; which we deny of the duel, except per accidens, in the cases to be reported below. And therefore I said, «speaking per se, it is not licit».

I said also in the answer that the duel is «rarely» licit by public authority; because several cases are assigned by many in which it seems licit by public authority.

The first is, if he who justly wages war feel himself inferior in forces to the enemy, and that he must either fight and succumb, or fight a duel, he can both accept and offer a duel; because he defends the common good in the better way he can and chooses the lesser danger. The same, for the same reason, seems to be said, if he be doubtful about victory, nor is there hope of restoring the army if it be routed.

Second case. If leaders, weighing the inconveniences of war, the detriments of goods, the deaths of many, etc., judge it more useful to the state to settle the controversy by duel than by war; for then the duel is judged by many licit on the part of him who wages just war, provided however that thence victory become not more doubtful than in war.

Third case is, if from this, that a duel offered by the enemy be not accepted, the enemy become bolder and stronger, the other cast down and more timid. Then also that it can be accepted is the opinion of many. And David seems in a like case to have fought against Goliath; or it must be said that he fought thus by divine instinct.

You will ask 3° what are the punishments of duellists.

[The following were laid down by the council of Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19: «Emperors, kings, dukes, princes, marquesses, counts and temporal lords by whatever other name, who shall have conceded a place for monomachy in their lands among Christians, let them be by that very fact excommunicate and understand themselves deprived of jurisdiction and dominion over the city, castle or place in which or near which they permitted the duel to be made, which they hold from the Church, and if they be fiefs, let them be acquired straightway by their direct lords. Those truly who committed the fight, and those called their godfathers, let them incur penalty of excommunication, proscription of all their goods, perpetual infamy : and let them be bound to be punished as homicides according to the sacred canons, and if they die in the conflict itself, let them lack forever ecclesiastical burial. Those also who give counsel in the cause of a duel both in law and in fact, or by whatever other reason persuade anyone thereto, as well as spectators, let them be held in the bond of excommunication and perpetual malediction : notwithstanding any privilege or evil custom whatsoever, even immemorial.»

The punishments of proscription of all goods and perpetual infamy, which can now nowise be applied, have grown obsolete. The penalty of excommunication latae sententiae is numbered among the censures simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, Oct. 12, 1869. There is mentioned «those perpetrating duels, or simply challenging to it, or accepting it; and any accomplices whatever or offering any aid or favor, as well as spectators of deliberate purpose, permitting it, or not prohibiting it as far as lies in them, of whatsoever dignity they be, even royal or imperial.» Thus were confirmed, besides the decree of Trent, the constitutions of Gregory XIII, Ad tollendam; Clement VIII, Illius vices; Benedict XIV, Detestabilem.

This text, sufficiently perspicuous, will be explained below, on Censures. It need only be noted here that the excommunication extends wider than in the Tridentine decree, namely to challengers with mind of fighting, and to accepters, although from any cause whatever the duel does not follow. This fully accords with the aforesaid bull of Clement VIII.

Privation of ecclesiastical burial, which is a penalty distinct from excommunication, was decreed by Trent against those alone who «died in the conflict itself.» That the abuse of duels might be more efficaciously extirpated, Benedict XIV, in the constitutio Detestabilem, Nov. 10, 1752, decreed that severer measures be taken : «We decree and declare, he says, privation of sacred burial inflicted by the most holy Tridentine synod upon those dying in the place of the duel and combat to be incurred forever, even before sentence of the judge, upon him dying also outside the place of combat from wound accepted therein, whether the duel be publicly or privately declared, and even if the wounded man before death gave not uncertain signs of penance and obtained absolution from sins and censures : taken away the faculty of interpreting and dispensing concerning this penalty from bishops and Ordinaries of places; whereby to others there be offered a document of fleeing the crime and rendering due obedience to the laws of the Church.

Perhaps someone will object that this penalty is prescribed less strictly in the Roman Ritual increased and corrected at the command of the same Benedict XIV, where is read, tit. On Funerals : «Ecclesiastical burial is denied... to those dying in a duel, even if before death they gave signs of penance;» whereby the penalty seems restricted to duellists dying «in the conflict itself,» as had been enacted by Trent.

I answer that the constitution Detestabilem was published after the Brief Quam ardenti, whereby Benedict XIV, March 25, 1752, approved the new edition of the Ritual.]

You will ask 4° if one or both provoke themselves to a duel for preserving honor, not with mind of fighting, certainly knowing it will be impeded by friends, or otherwise not come about, or even with mind of fighting and inflicting some blows, but morally certain that no damage will follow thence, rather peace to be reconciled — do they incur excommunication.

I answer. probably negatively, because they provoke not truly, but apparently only, to a duel; for a duel is a dangerous fight. Yet in the external forum, where nothing is judged of internal things, it will be reckoned a duel, and therefore cannot be excused from fault.

You will ask 5° who can absolve from a duel.

I answer. That Clement VIII, by the cited bull, reserved this case to the Pope alone, derogating from the faculties and indults granted to any persons whatsoever of whatsoever order, state, rank or condition.

[In the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, as was said above, this censure is inscribed among the cases simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and therefore cap. Liceat of the council of Trent can be applied to it, of which below.]

Nevertheless weighty authors judge that, when the case is occult, bishops can absolve from it, on account of the privilege granted to them by the council of Trent, sess. XXIV, cap. 6, Liceat, which was not derogated from by this constitution of Clement VIII, since no mention of it is made, as ought to have been done, that it be judged derogated. So Lezana, after Bonacina and Sanchez. And I judge this to be the common practice.

ARTICLE IV

On scandal.

You will ask 1° what scandal is.

I answer. Scandal is rightly defined «a saying or deed less right, affording another occasion of spiritual ruin.»²

It is called 1st «less right»,³ not in this sense that it is right and surpassed by some other in rightness, but that it have some defect of rightness : that is, not right, either because it is in itself evil and sin; or because, although ex genere good, it has the appearance of evil from circumstances, or from the fact that it is wont to be done badly, and easily presumed so done, even when done well : as when someone reclines before an idol; for although this in itself be not sin, if anyone do it with intention not corrupt, yet because it has a certain appearance of evil, or likeness of veneration of the idol, it can afford another occasion of ruin. And therefore the Apostle warns, I Thess., V, 22: From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.

It is called 2nd «affording another occasion of spiritual ruin,» as when someone by persuasion, counsel, example, etc., induces another to sin. Nor is it necessary that he expressly intend the sin of the other, but it suffices that he say or do that from which, circumstances attended, the sin of the other is apt to follow. Not therefore does every sin committed in the presence of others always carry malice of scandal, but when the peril is foreseen or can and ought to be foreseen that others before whom it is committed be induced thereby to sin.

You will ask 2° how manifold scandal is.

I answer. Scandal is twofold⁴ , one active, which we defined; another passive, which is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor on occasion of the word or deed of another.

Active is twofold : one per se, another per accidens.

Active per se is, when someone expressly intends by his deed or word to induce another to sin; or, if he intend it not expressly, the deed or word is such that of itself it is inducive to sin. Active per accidens, is a word or deed from which, beside the intention of the sinner and the condition of the work, someone ill-disposed is induced to sin, say when someone envies the goods of another. And this scandal, if nowise intended, nor even implicitly, is improperly called scandal.

Passive scandal is also twofold, given and taken. Given is that which truly arises from the word or deed of another which is truly evil, or has the appearance of evil. Taken is that whereby someone from the word or deed of another, beside all his intention and the condition of the work, takes occasion of sinning from his own sinister interpretation alone : and that either from weakness or ignorance, and it is called scandal of the little ones; or from mere malice, and it is called Pharisaic scandal, because the Pharisees from malice took scandal at the holiest words and deeds of Christ, Matth., XV, 1 seqg.

Sometimes therefore passive scandal is without active, as the Pharisaic; sometimes active without passive, as when someone induces another by word or deed to sin, and he consents not. Sometimes active together with passive, as when at the induction of one, another sins.

You will ask 3° whether active scandal is sin.

I answer. Every active scandal properly said is sin ex genere suo mortal; because either the scandalizing work is evil in itself, or has the appearance of evil, and therefore to be omitted for charity of neighbor, by which we are bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor. Whence scandal is opposed to charity and mercy, insofar as this inclines to fraternal correction; consequently mortal sin ex genere.

[The gravity of scandal taken in itself appears from the words of the Lord. For he says, Matth., XVII, 6 et 7: Whoever shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that a millstone be hanged about his neck, and that he be drowned in the depths of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come : but nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal comes! If active scandal be a greater evil than corporal death, if Christ against it redouble malediction and woe, it is certainly something grave per se.]

Yet it can become venial⁵ , not only from indeliberateness, but also from lightness of matter : as if someone from slight and venial indiscretion says or does what has some appearance of evil, whence another, beside the intention of the agent, is induced to sin mortally; or if anyone through venial sin intend to induce another into venial sin only.

You will ask 4° whether active scandal is special sin.

I answer. Scandal per se and with express intention is special sin⁶ , because it has special repugnance to charity, by which we are bound to will the spiritual good of neighbor.

2° Scandal without express intention, which the Author calls here scandal per accidens, if it be given through a work good or indifferent in itself, but having the appearance of evil, is special sin; because it is sin, and it has no other reason of sin than scandal.

3° Scandal without express intention, and per accidens in this sense, which is given through a work already evil of itself, is not special sin, yet it is a special circumstance of act changing species⁷ ; because when there are several malices in one act, the first essential and specific is drawn from the object primary and directly willed, while the circumstance, which is a certain accident of the morally taken act, is taken from the object secondary and indirectly willed. Ergo.

You will ask 5° whether goods both spiritual and temporal are to be relinquished for avoiding passive scandal.

I answer. 1° Spiritual goods which cannot be omitted without sin are not to be relinquished for avoiding passive scandal⁸ : because it implies that some sin, though venial only, be licit; for by that very thing it would cease to be sin. Whence the Apostle, Rom., III, 8, says: Let us not do evil that good may come.

I answer. 2° Spiritual goods which can be omitted without sin are not to be relinquished on account of Pharisaic scandal, if some cause subsist why they be not deferred : because, since those scandalized so sin from malice, they are not in necessity from which they cannot easily liberate themselves without aid of another; and otherwise opportunity would be given to the wicked of impeding good works whenever they wished. Whence Christ taught that this scandal is not to be cared for, Matth. XV, 14, when the disciples reported that the Pharisees were taking scandal at his words and deeds, he answered: Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind.

I answer. 3° Such spiritual goods as can be omitted without sin, if no peril impend, are on account of scandal of the little ones to be concealed or deferred⁹ , until reason rendered, such scandal cease; because we are bound to succor the neighbor placed in spiritual necessity, when we can conveniently. But one who is going to sin from ignorance or weakness on account of my deed is in spiritual necessity. Ergo, since I can conveniently conceal or defer it until he be instructed, I am held to that.

I answer. 4° When there occurs some affirmative precept, whether natural, or positive divine or human, or even negative divine or human, forbidding not intrinsically evil things, incompossible with the natural precept of avoiding scandal of neighbor, there must be weighed which, all things considered, is greater and more binding, and that must be observed; because, when two precepts concur which cannot be observed together, the greater binds, and the others cease to bind for that time. Moreover the precept of avoiding scandal of the little ones binds sometimes more, sometimes less than others, as appears in frequent cases which are commonly admitted.

1° Fraternal correction is of natural right, and yet it is to be omitted, if the one to be corrected take scandal thence and become worse. Likewise the punishment of sinners is of natural right, and yet, according to Augustine, lib. III contra Epist. Parmen., c. 2, it is to be relinquished, where schism is feared from it¹⁰ .

2° Preaching of the Gospel is of positive divine right, and yet one must cease from it on account of scandal¹¹ , Matth., VII, 5 et 6. Likewise integrity of confession is of divine precept, and yet a woman in confession can and ought to omit a sin from which she understands the confessor, whom she necessarily must confess to, will suffer grave scandal from weakness.

3° Conversely, if you know that from entering the house of a certain woman, in which there is an infant to be baptized, whom none other wishes to baptize, scandal will arise, nevertheless you must enter, admonition premised, if possible; because the precept of succoring the salvation of the infant outweighs the precept of avoiding scandal. The same for the same reason must be said if from the conferral of necessary baptism you foresee some to be gravely stirred and to blaspheme.

I answer. 5° Temporal goods of which we are masters, on account of scandal of the little ones, are either wholly to be relinquished, by bestowing them, if we hold them, or by not reclaiming them, if they be in the hands of others (understand, if they be not of grave moment), or scandal must be quieted by admonition or instruction¹² ; because we are bound to succor spiritual necessity of neighbor, though not extreme, at some small temporal damage of ours, as appears from what was said on the order of charity and fraternal correction. But if after instruction scandal still endure, ordinarily then it is from malice. If however scandal be from malice and Pharisaic, temporal goods are not to be relinquished on account of those who stir up such scandals¹³ : because this would harm the common good; for occasion would be given to the wicked of seizing, and it would harm the seizers themselves, who, retaining others' goods, would remain in sin.

[You will ask 6° whether it is licit to permit occasion of sinning, that the culprit be corrected.

I answer. affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and sufficient reason of permitting the sin is present. Whence St. Thomas lays down this rule, IIa IIae, q. 78, a. 4, c: «To induce man to sin is nowise licit; but to use the sin of another unto good is licit : for God uses all sins unto some good; for from any evil whatever he elicits some good.» Hence are excused per se from sin 1° parents and heirs who allow sons or servants to sin, that they may find opportune occasion of correcting them; 2° guards of fields who hide themselves, that they catch the damagers and exact punishment from them¹⁴ .

You will ask 7° whether it is licit, with just cause, even to apply occasion of sin.

I answer. affirmatively more probable, because the sinner is not thus induced into sin, as the usurer is not induced from whom a loan is sought. Hence does not seem to sin the master who deliberately leaves a key applied to the chest in which money is stored up, that he test the doubtful fidelity of the servant¹⁵ ; for he puts an act licit per se, and with sufficient reason.

You will ask 8° whether it is ever sin of scandal to seek from another what he will not do without sin.

I answer. 1° To seek or counsel absolutely a work which cannot be done without sin is always sin of scandal; because this is directly to induce another to sin. I said, «absolutely,» because, if someone were determined upon grave sin, it would be licit to persuade him to the lesser. For the sense is not that he do absolutely the lesser, but conditionally : «If you have resolved to do evil, do rather the lesser.»

I answer. 2° If the thing sought can be done without sin, although it be foreseen that the other will not do it without sin, there is no sin, a just cause subsisting, in seeking it from him. Thus in necessity it is licit to seek a loan from a usurer, sacraments from bad ministers; because whoever seeks thus from just cause seeks what is just and reasonable, and what the other can well do, if he wills.

You will ask 9° what is to be thought of the adornment of women.

I answer. 1° Moderate adornment, according to decency of station, is licit per se. If a woman use it from levity or vanity, she sins venially, on account of disorder of will¹⁶ .

2° Excessive adornment, that is, exceeding her condition, is venial per se. It becomes mortal, however, if it be made to provoke the wantonness of men, or with prevision that it ought to be provoked. 3° Immodest adornment, such as today is used in certain conventicles, is culpable, according to degree of immodesty. Sin is always grave, even if indecency be not grave, if such adornment be employed to incite lust. Certainly women sin mortally who introduce such manner of dressing in places where it did not yet prevail, on account of the peril which thence arises for many ¹⁷