Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

I. Hatred of God. — Hatred in common is an act or movement of the will whereby one is borne with malevolence toward something. It is twofold, hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity. Hatred of abomination is that whereby we avert ourselves from something as evil to us and unbecoming. Hatred of enmity is that whereby we will evil to someone so that it be ill with him; whence this hatred is not so much aversion as pursuit of something which we apprehend as good to ourselves and evil to another.

Hatred of God is the gravest of all sins¹ ; because the reason of fault consists in voluntary aversion from God. But this aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God than in other sins; because in hatred of God it is intended directly and per se, but in other sins indirectly only and through another thing : thus, e.g., one who fornicates does not intend directly and per se to turn away from God, but intends disordered delight, to which aversion from God is annexed.

II. Hatred of neighbor. — Hatred of neighbor, whether of abomination or of enmity, is ex genere suo mortal sin² ; because it is directly contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul. But out of charity we are bound to love our neighbor according to what he has from God, that is, according to nature and grace. Ergo to turn away from the neighbor according to nature and grace, and to will him evil, is ex genere suo mortal sin. See more in what was said on the love of enemies.

Both however can become venial, not only from indeliberation of act, but also from lightness of matter : hatred of enmity, if some light evil be wished the neighbor. Hatred of abomination is rarely mortal; because simple displeasure at a created person subject to many defects and without imprecation of evil on account of them does not seem so great a disorder : unless such as that someone refuse pardon to one asking it, or the common offices of charity, or unless there be grave cause of scandal, or unless it endure while the precept of loving the neighbor urges.

[From these things you gather 1° that it is never licit to wish evil upon the neighbor under the notion of evil, but otherwise under the notion of good, that is, that from the evil wished some good outweighing the evil come to him. Care must be taken nevertheless lest beneath the cloak of a better good the poison of hatred or vengeance lie hidden. And because the life of an innocent man outweighs the goods of fortune of any private person, the following propositions were rightly condemned by Innocent XI, under numbers 13, 14 and 15 : «If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin grieve over the life of anyone and rejoice naturally over his death, ask and desire it ineffectually with affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal emolument.» — «It is licit with absolute desire to covet the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one coveting, since plainly the rich inheritance will accrue to him.» — «It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent committed by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches thence obtained by inheritance.»

You gather 2° that someone can wish death for himself that he may enjoy God and offend him no more, as did the Apostle, saying, Rom., VII, 24 : Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But what of him who wished death for himself that he might be delivered from the miseries of this life? I answer that this is per se illicit, because death is more terrible than all evils of this life : unless it be wished under the condition that it please God thus, and with the desire at least implicit of a better life, namely eternal.]

III. Sloth (Acedia). — Sloth theologically taken is weariness or sadness about spiritual good³ . If it be about spiritual good in common, it is not a special vice, but a circumstance of every vice; for every vice shuns the spiritual good of the opposite virtue. But it is special sin, insofar as it is weariness about divine good pertaining to us, apprehended as proper evil; as if anyone were saddened by friendship with God, by beatitude set before him, or by means necessary to friendship with God and beatitude, as the sacraments, the divine precepts, good works, insofar as they are necessary to friendship with God and beatitude.

For this reason sloth is mortal sin from its genus⁴ , because it is contrary to charity, through which spiritual life is had; for the proper effect of charity is joy in God, but sloth is sadness about divine good pertaining to us, as was said.

IV. Envy. — It is sadness about another's good estimated as proper evil, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory and excellence.

It is sin, because he grieves over what he ought to rejoice over, namely the neighbor's good. It is sin ex genere suo mortal, because it is contrary to charity. Yet it can be venial, both from indeliberation of act, and from lightness of matter, as if it be about some slight good of the neighbor.

V. Discord. — Discord of which we treat here and as it is opposed to charity, is dissension of wills concerning divine good or the neighbor's good, to which we are bound to consent out of charity; because, if we be bound to consent not out of charity, but out of another virtue, it will not be against charity, but against that other virtue. It is ex genere mortal sin, on account of contrariety to charity.

VI. Contention. — Contention generally taken is a battle of words; specially however, as taken here, it is defined by Ambrose : «Assault upon truth with confidence of clamor.» Understand truth which one knows, or can and ought to know, as in heretics. Understand also assault upon truth from the heart, not for exercise or examination's sake.

It is ex genere suo mortal sin⁵ , because it is contrary to charity, insofar as it is contrary to peace, which is the effect of charity.

VII. Schism. — Schism, in Greek, in Latin scission, according to usage received among ecclesiastical writers, is taken for a special sin, which is defined : «Voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church⁶ .» The unity of the Church moreover is chiefly regarded in two things, namely in the connection or communion of the members of the Church with each other, and in the order of all members toward one head, which is Christ himself, whose place the supreme Pontiff holds in the Church.

Whence one can become schismatic three ways : 1° separating himself from the head; 2° from the members; 3° from head and members at once.

[Schism is one thing pure, opposed only to charity and peace, as in those who believe one holy Church, under visible head the Roman Pontiff, and whatever the Roman Church teaches, yet out of pride refuse to submit and obey the Pope, or to be united with the other members of the Church. Another is joined with heresy, in those who separate themselves from obedience to the Pope because they acknowledge not his power. Hence, although all heretics are schismatics, but not conversely, and schism can be severed absolutely from heresy, nevertheless scarcely or hardly ever is true schism found re ipsa without some heresy, or at least without breaking forth into heresy. Schismatics, whether they depart from the unity of the Church, or withdraw themselves from due obedience to the Pope, are punished with excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved in the Roman manner to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, in these words : «Schismatics and those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or recede from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time being.» This censure was renewed by the bull Coenae. From it follows privation of jurisdiction, when schism is manifest⁷ .]