Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, from q. 34 to q. 43.)

The vices opposed to charity are, according to the Author, in the questions cited: hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to love itself; sloth, which is opposed to joy in the divine good; envy, which is opposed to joy in the good of another; discord, which is opposed to the effect of charity, which is peace; contention, which is opposed to peace as regards speech; schism, war, strife, and sedition, which are opposed to peace as regards deed; and scandal, which is opposed to charity as regards beneficence. Of all these we shall speak at greater or lesser length, according to the greater or lesser necessity of the subject matter, in this dissertation.

I. Hatred of God. — Hatred in common is an act or movement of the will whereby one is borne with malevolence toward something. It is twofold, hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity. Hatred of abomination is that whereby we avert ourselves from something as evil to us and unbecoming. Hatred of enmity is that whereby we will evil to someone so that it be ill with him; whence this hatred is not so much aversion as pursuit of something which we apprehend as good to ourselves and evil to another.

Hatred of God is the gravest of all sins¹ ; because the reason of fault consists in voluntary aversion from God. But this aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God than in other sins; because in hatred of God it is intended directly and per se, but in other sins indirectly only and through another thing : thus, e.g., one who fornicates does not intend directly and per se to turn away from God, but intends disordered delight, to which aversion from God is annexed.

II. Hatred of neighbor. — Hatred of neighbor, whether of abomination or of enmity, is ex genere suo mortal sin² ; because it is directly contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul. But out of charity we are bound to love our neighbor according to what he has from God, that is, according to nature and grace. Ergo to turn away from the neighbor according to nature and grace, and to will him evil, is ex genere suo mortal sin. See more in what was said on the love of enemies.

Both however can become venial, not only from indeliberation of act, but also from lightness of matter : hatred of enmity, if some light evil be wished the neighbor. Hatred of abomination is rarely mortal; because simple displeasure at a created person subject to many defects and without imprecation of evil on account of them does not seem so great a disorder : unless such as that someone refuse pardon to one asking it, or the common offices of charity, or unless there be grave cause of scandal, or unless it endure while the precept of loving the neighbor urges.

[From these things you gather 1° that it is never licit to wish evil upon the neighbor under the notion of evil, but otherwise under the notion of good, that is, that from the evil wished some good outweighing the evil come to him. Care must be taken nevertheless lest beneath the cloak of a better good the poison of hatred or vengeance lie hidden. And because the life of an innocent man outweighs the goods of fortune of any private person, the following propositions were rightly condemned by Innocent XI, under numbers 13, 14 and 15 : «If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin grieve over the life of anyone and rejoice naturally over his death, ask and desire it ineffectually with affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal emolument.» — «It is licit with absolute desire to covet the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one coveting, since plainly the rich inheritance will accrue to him.» — «It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent committed by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches thence obtained by inheritance.»

You gather 2° that someone can wish death for himself that he may enjoy God and offend him no more, as did the Apostle, saying, Rom., VII, 24 : Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But what of him who wished death for himself that he might be delivered from the miseries of this life? I answer that this is per se illicit, because death is more terrible than all evils of this life : unless it be wished under the condition that it please God thus, and with the desire at least implicit of a better life, namely eternal.]

III. Sloth (Acedia). — Sloth theologically taken is weariness or sadness about spiritual good³ . If it be about spiritual good in common, it is not a special vice, but a circumstance of every vice; for every vice shuns the spiritual good of the opposite virtue. But it is special sin, insofar as it is weariness about divine good pertaining to us, apprehended as proper evil; as if anyone were saddened by friendship with God, by beatitude set before him, or by means necessary to friendship with God and beatitude, as the sacraments, the divine precepts, good works, insofar as they are necessary to friendship with God and beatitude.

For this reason sloth is mortal sin from its genus⁴ , because it is contrary to charity, through which spiritual life is had; for the proper effect of charity is joy in God, but sloth is sadness about divine good pertaining to us, as was said.

IV. Envy. — It is sadness about another's good estimated as proper evil, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory and excellence.

It is sin, because he grieves over what he ought to rejoice over, namely the neighbor's good. It is sin ex genere suo mortal, because it is contrary to charity. Yet it can be venial, both from indeliberation of act, and from lightness of matter, as if it be about some slight good of the neighbor.

V. Discord. — Discord of which we treat here and as it is opposed to charity, is dissension of wills concerning divine good or the neighbor's good, to which we are bound to consent out of charity; because, if we be bound to consent not out of charity, but out of another virtue, it will not be against charity, but against that other virtue. It is ex genere mortal sin, on account of contrariety to charity.

VI. Contention. — Contention generally taken is a battle of words; specially however, as taken here, it is defined by Ambrose : «Assault upon truth with confidence of clamor.» Understand truth which one knows, or can and ought to know, as in heretics. Understand also assault upon truth from the heart, not for exercise or examination's sake.

It is ex genere suo mortal sin⁵ , because it is contrary to charity, insofar as it is contrary to peace, which is the effect of charity.

VII. Schism. — Schism, in Greek, in Latin scission, according to usage received among ecclesiastical writers, is taken for a special sin, which is defined : «Voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church⁶ .» The unity of the Church moreover is chiefly regarded in two things, namely in the connection or communion of the members of the Church with each other, and in the order of all members toward one head, which is Christ himself, whose place the supreme Pontiff holds in the Church.

Whence one can become schismatic three ways : 1° separating himself from the head; 2° from the members; 3° from head and members at once.

[Schism is one thing pure, opposed only to charity and peace, as in those who believe one holy Church, under visible head the Roman Pontiff, and whatever the Roman Church teaches, yet out of pride refuse to submit and obey the Pope, or to be united with the other members of the Church. Another is joined with heresy, in those who separate themselves from obedience to the Pope because they acknowledge not his power. Hence, although all heretics are schismatics, but not conversely, and schism can be severed absolutely from heresy, nevertheless scarcely or hardly ever is true schism found re ipsa without some heresy, or at least without breaking forth into heresy. Schismatics, whether they depart from the unity of the Church, or withdraw themselves from due obedience to the Pope, are punished with excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved in the Roman manner to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, in these words : «Schismatics and those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or recede from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time being.» This censure was renewed by the bull Coenae. From it follows privation of jurisdiction, when schism is manifest⁷ .]

War can be defined : «A clash by force and arms between two hostile armies.» By which it differs from a duel, which is a clash of one against one.

War is twofold : offensive, which is for obtaining satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and defensive, which is for repelling an injury being inflicted.

You will ask 1° whether war is licit.

[That war is always sin the Manichaeans once dogmatized, from St. Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74; then the Wyclifites, as Waldensis testifies. But Luther proclaimed that to fight against the Turks was to contradict God willing through them to punish our sins. Erasmus contended that all war is forbidden Christians, against whom]

I answer. To make war is not per se evil, but, with three conditions posited, namely legitimate authority of declaring war, just cause and right intention, it is licit¹ .

Proof. from Scripture. In the ancient Law, God often commanded or approved war : Exod., XXII, 8 seqq. ; Num., XXI, 2 et 3 and XXV, 17 et 18 ; Deuter., VII, 1 seqq. ; I Reg., XV, 2 et 3 ; II Reg., VIII, 1 seqq. ; Josue, I, 2 seqq., VI, 2 seqq., VIII, 1 seqq., X, 8 seqq., and elsewhere often.

In the new Law² , Luc., III, 14, when soldiers asked what they should do that they might flee the coming wrath which John the Baptist threatened to sinners, the holy Precursor did not bid them desert military service, but to use it well : Do nothing violently, he says, nor accuse anyone falsely, and be content with your pay. By which words he tacitly approves war, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 138³ , to Marcellinus.

It is confirmed. from the usage of the Church, which in several councils decreed war for the recovery of the Holy Land.

Proof by reason. By the law of nature it is licit to repel force by force. Ergo defensive war is licit. As to offensive : A private man who has suffered injury or damage can seek satisfaction or restitution. Ergo likewise can the state. — I subsume. But sometimes satisfaction or restitution cannot otherwise be had than by arms, say if those who injure or damage, being required, refuse to satisfy or restitute, nor have they a superior who would or could compel them to satisfaction or restitution. Ergo.

I said : «With certain conditions posited, namely legitimate authority, just cause and right intention.»

The authority required for declaring an offensive war must be supreme⁴ , acknowledging no other superior in temporal matters, such as emperors, kings, certain dukes, independent states have, such as Venice, Switzerland, etc. 1° Because whoever has a superior can prosecute his right before him. But war cannot be undertaken except when there is no other way of prosecuting his right. 2° Offensive war is an act of supreme vindicative justice. Ergo it pertains to the supreme prince. But defensive war, the danger pressing, dependent princes, dukes, magistrates can declare it by natural law, since it is licit even to any private person to repel force by force. Understand, while danger and necessity last; these ceasing, they ought to seek and await from the supreme prince or independent state the judgment, power and execution of the injury to be avenged.

The just cause of declaring offensive war, generally speaking, is single, namely grave injury or damage inflicted, unrepaired, nor repairable in any other way.

As to right intention, war must not be waged except from intention of justice and common good, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 189⁵ and lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74.

You will ask 2° whether, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is licit to make war.

I answer. 1°. If reparation of injury is at stake, a prince doubtful about the justice of the war cannot declare war; because in doubt, especially of such moment, the safer part must be chosen. If recovery of possession is at stake, the condition of the possessor is better in doubt, and therefore war cannot be moved against him. If neither possess, it is licit to bring war against him who refuses to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt.

[The true reason why, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is not licit to declare it, is because no one acts licitly, when the act can be good or evil, unless he be morally certain of the honesty of his action, as was explained and proved in the treatise on Human Acts, dissert. V, on Conscience.

When neither possesses, and the right is doubtful, it does not seem that this one or that one should be compelled by violence and arms to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt, because, proceeding thus, the one or the other would be despoiled of his right; but the titles invoked on either side are to be examined and weighed, and if the parties cannot compose their litigation between themselves, they ought to commit the decision of the cause to the arbitration of another, whose sentence they promise themselves to stand by. But if the contenders should come forward voluntarily to agree upon dividing the litigated thing between them, so that each abandon part of the right which perhaps belongs to him, this manner of proceeding is certainly to be commended, whereby justice is fully satisfied, but it seems nowise to be imposed.]

I answer. 2°. Those who are subjects of a warring prince, when ordered, can and ought to enroll themselves in the militia, and enrolled to make war, even if they doubt of the justice of the war, forming however for themselves a practical judgment that they may licitly obey and make war; because 1° the superior has a certain right of commanding, nor is he stripped of his right by the subject's doubt. Ergo the subject is bound to obey; for the right of commanding and the obligation of obeying are correlatives. 2° From denial of obedience, while its cause manifest cannot be assigned, authority is enervated in superiors, and the whole government subverted. From these principles therefore the subject can form the practical judgment that when ordered he may licitly make war. Confer what I wrote dissert. V on Human Acts, art. 2, You will ask 3°.

I answer. 3°. Those who are not subjects of the warring prince, in doubt about the justice of the war, cannot serve as soldiers; because by not soldiering they injure no one, since they have not the necessity of obeying like the subjects of whom in the preceding answer; but by soldiering they expose themselves to inflict grave injury upon another prince. The same seems altogether the reason concerning the subjects of the warring prince, if, not ordered, but of their own will, they serve for pay.

However, since the causes of wars are often not manifest, and the justice of a war also often is obscure even to theologians and jurists themselves, from this answer, true elsewhere per se, it would follow that almost all soldiers were blameworthy; for who among them, whether subjects or not, inquires into the causes and justice of the war? Therefore several weighty authors judge that, if their doubt be merely negative, insofar as they have no reasons for or against, and from the probity and prudence of the prince and his counsels they can persuade themselves that they would not move war unless it were just, they may licitly serve.

But those who are ready to make war whether the war be just or unjust, are certainly in the state of damnation, because of the will to make war even unjustly.

You will ask 3° whether there can be a just war on both sides.

I answer. War per se from the nature of the thing cannot be just on both sides, but it can per accidens and from ignorance, or, others say, it cannot be just on both sides materially, well however formally : because it cannot come to pass, according to the truth of the thing, that in one there be right of seeking satisfaction or restitution without there being in the other obligation of satisfying or restituting; for right and obligation are correlatives. Ergo, if he resist, he resists unjustly, and conversely if he resists justly, the other seeks unjustly. But truly, if one ignore the right of the other, he sins not by resisting, and thus per accidens, by reason of ignorance, the war is just on both sides.

You will ask 4° whether in a just war it is licit to kill innocents.

I answer. In a just war it is never licit per se and by intention to kill innocents, unless special authority has been made by God. Yet it is licit per accidens and beside intention. Proof of the first part. 1° From that general command of God, Exod., XXIII, 7: Thou shalt not kill the innocent and just. 2° An innocent cannot be killed in a just war except on account of the guilt of the state. But that is not licit. Ergo. — Proof of the minor. The state cannot be punished by the enemy except in goods over which it has dominion. But the state has not dominion over the life of innocents, but God alone, who granted not the right of the sword to the state except against those who do evil. Ergo.

Under the name of innocents come infants, children unfit for war, women, peasants, plebeians, merchants having nothing to do with war, clerics and religious, cap. de treuga et pace, lib. I Decretal., tit. 34, c. 2. All these, I say, by presumption of law are judged innocent, until the contrary be proved of them.

Proof of the second part: 1° If neither per accidens and beside intention killing innocents were licit in a just war, it would be impossible to carry out a war : a city could not, e.g., be stormed, or a tower demolished in which innocents were enclosed; enemies could not be attacked who placed innocents in the front of battle, which they would never omit, and thus the justice of the combatants would be frustrated. 2° When two effects, equally immediate, of one act, the one good, the other evil, can, a just reason subsisting, the good effect be intended and the evil permitted.⁶ But the demolition of a tower or the explosion of war machines upon enemies is immediately protective of the homeland and destructive of innocents. Ergo the first effect can be intended for the common good, and the other permitted. This principle of the Author more widely drawn out and expounded you have dissert. VIII, On Justice, art. 2.

You will ask 5° what are the obligations and sins of combatants.

I answer. 1°. Supreme princes and leaders of armies 1° are bound ex officio to see that military discipline be observed insofar as they can, and to coerce soldiers from plunderings, thefts, burnings, ravishments, etc.; otherwise they sin mortally and are bound to restitution of those damages. 2° They sin mortally if they provide not just pay to the soldiers, and they are bound to restitute damages which soldiers inflict by lack of pay.

I answer. 2°. Subordinate leaders sin mortally and are bound to restitution : 1° If, no necessity compelling, they rashly expose soldiers to sure slaughter. 2° If they retain part of the pay or moneys conceded for soldiers. 3° If they have a smaller number of soldiers and receive pay for a greater, such are those who, while the troops are mustered, present not real soldiers in military dress, commonly called passe-volants, or present the same twice or thrice : into which sin also those muster-masters or commissaries implicate themselves who knowingly admit it; nor are they bound only for theft of pay, but for the damage which can accrue to the state on account of insufficient number of soldiers. Except how, they shall have seen. 4° Those sin and are bound to restitution who, while they lead troops through a province, on account of accepted gifts from certain villages or citizens, burden other villages, or citizens, with the number of soldiers.

I answer. 3°. Common soldiers 1° ought to be content with their pay, according to the precept of the holy Precursor, Luc., III, 14. Whence they sin mortally and are bound to restitution if, in lands not hostile, beyond roof, bed, straw, etc., as custom allows, they extort moneys, despoil, pillage, or otherwise do damage. Nor does the authority or connivance of leaders excuse them, unless perchance, the pay failing or diminished, they take precisely what is necessary for urgent need. 2° They are bound, even with certain peril of life, not to desert their post, or fortress, unless victory be plainly despaired of.

[I answer. 4°. While war lasts, all those things are licit which are permitted by the law of nations and are necessary for obtaining the end. Hence it is licit to prepare ambushes, employ stratagems, e.g., feign flight, etc. In a just war it is licit to besiege cities and storm them, deprive them of water. Likewise to despoil innocents of goods, if they be members of the enemy state, nor can victory be had otherwise. It is licit even to demolish churches, if enemies use them for defense. Sometimes, but only from the most urgent cause, cities can be delivered to plunder. This however is adverse to modern customs, besides the case where a justly imposed tribute is denied.

But illicit are frauds which can be guarded against by no prudence, as to infect wells and fountains with poison. Nor is it licit to hire assassins who secretly slay the leader of the opposing army; for, by consent of all, perfidy can never be made honorable.

Likewise it is not licit to kill captives taken in war and all who can harm no longer, except in punishment of crime. Captives moreover can flee, if no promise given by them stand in the way.⁷

You will ask 6° whether it is licit for a Catholic prince to call heretics or Gentiles to aid.

I answer. affirmatively per se, at least speaking speculatively, provided scandal and peril of faith be far off. But it can be per accidens illicit, namely on account of damages imminent to religion.

You will ask 7° when do the fighting become irregular.

I answer. In a just defensive war, even those who kill do not become irregular. But in a just offensive war, those alone who kill incur irregularity, not indeed others. But in an unjust war, though only one be killed, all aggressors are irregular, because they act after the manner of one agent.⁸ This last is drawn out from St. Thomas.⁹ Of these things more fully below, on Irregularity.

You will ask 1° what a duel is.

I answer. A duel, in Greek monomachia, is the fight of one against one, and thus taken broadly it is the brawl of two between themselves; but as it is taken in law and with respect to ecclesiastical censures, it is commonly defined :¹ «A dangerous fight of two entered into by agreement or compact, with designation of time and place.» And because the matter of censures is odious, and therefore to be restricted, all parts of this definition are to be taken strictly. Therefore

It is called 1° «the fight of two;» because, if several promiscuously fight against several, there will be simply a brawl, not a duel, unless single ones determined against single ones determined fight, as is done in a solemn duel. For a twofold duel is distinguished : one solemn or public, when certain ceremonies are employed, as the choice of godfathers or, as they call them, seconds, the assumption of witnesses, letters of challenge, or libels of citation commonly called cartel, etc.; another simple, when these ceremonies are not employed.

It is called 2nd «a dangerous fight;» because fights which are made without peril of killing or grave wounding, such as with fists, a light staff, pulling of hair, etc., although sometimes they are grave sins, are nevertheless not properly duels.

It is called 3rd «by agreement or compact.» So express it Gregory XIII, constitutio Ad tollendam, given in the year 1582, and Clement VIII, in the constitutio Illius vices, given in the year 1592; that is, from an agreement previously made of fighting at a determinate place and time. Whence those who meeting unexpectedly fight, or if one has sought out another, or threatened him, there is no duel, for lack of compact. Similarly, if of two quarreling, one or both run home and return with arms and fight; likewise, if in a rush of anger they say : «Let us fight here,» and they fight, there is not properly a duel, for lack of compact.

It is called 4th «with designation of time and place.» Thus require Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions; so that, if the designation either of a determinate place or of a determinate time be wanting, there is no duel properly subject to censures.

You will ask 2° whether the duel is licit.

I answer. 1°. The duel by private authority is not licit : 1° because every private vengeance is illicit; 2° because by the precept Thou shalt not kill not only is killing forbidden, but also proximate peril of killing, as in other precepts; 3° because both the Church and Christian princes prohibit the duel under gravest penalties. Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19; Gregory XIII and Clement VIII, in the cited constitutions.

[Specially Alexander VII condemned this proposition, n. 2 : «A horseman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur the mark of timidity among others.» Since afterwards several authors asserted that the duel is licit in some circumstances, Benedict XIV, constitutio Detestabilem, given November 10, 1752, condemned the following five propositions as false, scandalous and pernicious :

1° «A military man who, unless he offer or accept a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject and unfit for military duties, and thence would be deprived of the office whereby he sustains himself and his own, or ought perpetually to lack hope of promotion otherwise due and merited by him, would be without fault and punishment, whether he offer or accept a duel.»

2° «They can also be excused, for the sake of guarding honor or avoiding contempt among men, who accept duels or challenge to them, when they certainly know that the fight will not follow, namely because it will be impeded by others.»

3° «A duke or military official accepting a duel out of grave fear of loss of fame and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties laid down by the Church against duellists.»

4° «In the natural state of man it is licit to accept and offer a duel, for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them can by no other remedy be warded off.»

5° «The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which plainly justice is denied either through negligence or malice of magistrates.»

It must be added that it is no more licit to take up a duel on this law, that, one being wounded, the fight must cease : because besides the prohibition and scandal, there is present danger of lethal wound. Even if it were certain that the wound would not prove lethal, nevertheless the combat would be illicit : both because any voluntary wound and even blows are included under the precept Thou shalt not kill; and because Clement VIII, constitutio Illius vices, of the year 1592, forbade «duels even non-lethal.»]

I answer. 2°. The duel by public authority is rarely licit. Proof 1° In the first place it is not licit for sake of spectacle or ostentation of strength; because the prince has no right over the life of subjects except malefactors.

2° It is certain that the duel is illicit for detecting crime or innocence, as was once frequent; because in a duel the innocent as equally as the guilty can fall. Whence the manifestation of truth would be awaited either from the devil, and it would be superstition; or from God, and it would be temptation of God.

3° It is not licit to have a duel for ending litigation or controversy between private persons : because either the duel is instituted that through its outcome it may be discerned on which side justice stands, and thus returns the preceding argument; or it is instituted only for this, that, a duel having been made, the parties cease from litigation, and then it is insane and diabolical to wish to incur peril of life, that they desist from a litigation from which they can desist by their own will and with safe life, or which can be terminated by authority of the supreme prince, or by a lot free of danger.

4° Speaking per se, it is not licit to have a duel for ending a controversy, or for avoiding or terminating war between supreme princes; because the duel neither from God nor from nature is a means ordained and proportioned to warding off injury, or to obtaining satisfaction for injury inflicted, which are the two causes of wars and controversies between supreme princes. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. He whose state has the right can equally be conquered as the other. For either the faculty of fighting of each is equal, or if one be more practiced, very many things are wont to happen in this singular combat, on account of which often the stronger and more practiced succumbs; and therefore the justice and common good of the state, whether in warding off injury, or in obtaining satisfaction, which ought to be defended by the common forces of the whole community, is exposed to the hazard of the duel. Ergo.

Nor do you say that the common good is likewise exposed to the hazard of war. For a supreme prince cannot enter into war, whether defensive or offensive, except a greater hope of conquering shine forth, whether by force, by stratagems, by help of confederates; or, should he be conquered, of restoring and increasing his forces. For the enemy holds himself toward his enemy as agent toward patient; but the agent acts not unless he be stronger than the patient.

Therefore when it is opposed, that it is better to end a war by the death of one than of many, it is answered that this is true when the killing of one is a means ordained and proportioned to usefully ending the war for the state; which we deny of the duel, except per accidens, in the cases to be reported below. And therefore I said, «speaking per se, it is not licit».

I said also in the answer that the duel is «rarely» licit by public authority; because several cases are assigned by many in which it seems licit by public authority.

The first is, if he who justly wages war feel himself inferior in forces to the enemy, and that he must either fight and succumb, or fight a duel, he can both accept and offer a duel; because he defends the common good in the better way he can and chooses the lesser danger. The same, for the same reason, seems to be said, if he be doubtful about victory, nor is there hope of restoring the army if it be routed.

Second case. If leaders, weighing the inconveniences of war, the detriments of goods, the deaths of many, etc., judge it more useful to the state to settle the controversy by duel than by war; for then the duel is judged by many licit on the part of him who wages just war, provided however that thence victory become not more doubtful than in war.

Third case is, if from this, that a duel offered by the enemy be not accepted, the enemy become bolder and stronger, the other cast down and more timid. Then also that it can be accepted is the opinion of many. And David seems in a like case to have fought against Goliath; or it must be said that he fought thus by divine instinct.

You will ask 3° what are the punishments of duellists.

[The following were laid down by the council of Trent, sess. XXV, On Reform., cap. 19: «Emperors, kings, dukes, princes, marquesses, counts and temporal lords by whatever other name, who shall have conceded a place for monomachy in their lands among Christians, let them be by that very fact excommunicate and understand themselves deprived of jurisdiction and dominion over the city, castle or place in which or near which they permitted the duel to be made, which they hold from the Church, and if they be fiefs, let them be acquired straightway by their direct lords. Those truly who committed the fight, and those called their godfathers, let them incur penalty of excommunication, proscription of all their goods, perpetual infamy : and let them be bound to be punished as homicides according to the sacred canons, and if they die in the conflict itself, let them lack forever ecclesiastical burial. Those also who give counsel in the cause of a duel both in law and in fact, or by whatever other reason persuade anyone thereto, as well as spectators, let them be held in the bond of excommunication and perpetual malediction : notwithstanding any privilege or evil custom whatsoever, even immemorial.»

The punishments of proscription of all goods and perpetual infamy, which can now nowise be applied, have grown obsolete. The penalty of excommunication latae sententiae is numbered among the censures simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, Oct. 12, 1869. There is mentioned «those perpetrating duels, or simply challenging to it, or accepting it; and any accomplices whatever or offering any aid or favor, as well as spectators of deliberate purpose, permitting it, or not prohibiting it as far as lies in them, of whatsoever dignity they be, even royal or imperial.» Thus were confirmed, besides the decree of Trent, the constitutions of Gregory XIII, Ad tollendam; Clement VIII, Illius vices; Benedict XIV, Detestabilem.

This text, sufficiently perspicuous, will be explained below, on Censures. It need only be noted here that the excommunication extends wider than in the Tridentine decree, namely to challengers with mind of fighting, and to accepters, although from any cause whatever the duel does not follow. This fully accords with the aforesaid bull of Clement VIII.

Privation of ecclesiastical burial, which is a penalty distinct from excommunication, was decreed by Trent against those alone who «died in the conflict itself.» That the abuse of duels might be more efficaciously extirpated, Benedict XIV, in the constitutio Detestabilem, Nov. 10, 1752, decreed that severer measures be taken : «We decree and declare, he says, privation of sacred burial inflicted by the most holy Tridentine synod upon those dying in the place of the duel and combat to be incurred forever, even before sentence of the judge, upon him dying also outside the place of combat from wound accepted therein, whether the duel be publicly or privately declared, and even if the wounded man before death gave not uncertain signs of penance and obtained absolution from sins and censures : taken away the faculty of interpreting and dispensing concerning this penalty from bishops and Ordinaries of places; whereby to others there be offered a document of fleeing the crime and rendering due obedience to the laws of the Church.

Perhaps someone will object that this penalty is prescribed less strictly in the Roman Ritual increased and corrected at the command of the same Benedict XIV, where is read, tit. On Funerals : «Ecclesiastical burial is denied... to those dying in a duel, even if before death they gave signs of penance;» whereby the penalty seems restricted to duellists dying «in the conflict itself,» as had been enacted by Trent.

I answer that the constitution Detestabilem was published after the Brief Quam ardenti, whereby Benedict XIV, March 25, 1752, approved the new edition of the Ritual.]

You will ask 4° if one or both provoke themselves to a duel for preserving honor, not with mind of fighting, certainly knowing it will be impeded by friends, or otherwise not come about, or even with mind of fighting and inflicting some blows, but morally certain that no damage will follow thence, rather peace to be reconciled — do they incur excommunication.

I answer. probably negatively, because they provoke not truly, but apparently only, to a duel; for a duel is a dangerous fight. Yet in the external forum, where nothing is judged of internal things, it will be reckoned a duel, and therefore cannot be excused from fault.

You will ask 5° who can absolve from a duel.

I answer. That Clement VIII, by the cited bull, reserved this case to the Pope alone, derogating from the faculties and indults granted to any persons whatsoever of whatsoever order, state, rank or condition.

[In the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, as was said above, this censure is inscribed among the cases simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and therefore cap. Liceat of the council of Trent can be applied to it, of which below.]

Nevertheless weighty authors judge that, when the case is occult, bishops can absolve from it, on account of the privilege granted to them by the council of Trent, sess. XXIV, cap. 6, Liceat, which was not derogated from by this constitution of Clement VIII, since no mention of it is made, as ought to have been done, that it be judged derogated. So Lezana, after Bonacina and Sanchez. And I judge this to be the common practice.

ARTICLE IV

On scandal.

You will ask 1° what scandal is.

I answer. Scandal is rightly defined «a saying or deed less right, affording another occasion of spiritual ruin.»²

It is called 1st «less right»,³ not in this sense that it is right and surpassed by some other in rightness, but that it have some defect of rightness : that is, not right, either because it is in itself evil and sin; or because, although ex genere good, it has the appearance of evil from circumstances, or from the fact that it is wont to be done badly, and easily presumed so done, even when done well : as when someone reclines before an idol; for although this in itself be not sin, if anyone do it with intention not corrupt, yet because it has a certain appearance of evil, or likeness of veneration of the idol, it can afford another occasion of ruin. And therefore the Apostle warns, I Thess., V, 22: From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.

It is called 2nd «affording another occasion of spiritual ruin,» as when someone by persuasion, counsel, example, etc., induces another to sin. Nor is it necessary that he expressly intend the sin of the other, but it suffices that he say or do that from which, circumstances attended, the sin of the other is apt to follow. Not therefore does every sin committed in the presence of others always carry malice of scandal, but when the peril is foreseen or can and ought to be foreseen that others before whom it is committed be induced thereby to sin.

You will ask 2° how manifold scandal is.

I answer. Scandal is twofold⁴ , one active, which we defined; another passive, which is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor on occasion of the word or deed of another.

Active is twofold : one per se, another per accidens.

Active per se is, when someone expressly intends by his deed or word to induce another to sin; or, if he intend it not expressly, the deed or word is such that of itself it is inducive to sin. Active per accidens, is a word or deed from which, beside the intention of the sinner and the condition of the work, someone ill-disposed is induced to sin, say when someone envies the goods of another. And this scandal, if nowise intended, nor even implicitly, is improperly called scandal.

Passive scandal is also twofold, given and taken. Given is that which truly arises from the word or deed of another which is truly evil, or has the appearance of evil. Taken is that whereby someone from the word or deed of another, beside all his intention and the condition of the work, takes occasion of sinning from his own sinister interpretation alone : and that either from weakness or ignorance, and it is called scandal of the little ones; or from mere malice, and it is called Pharisaic scandal, because the Pharisees from malice took scandal at the holiest words and deeds of Christ, Matth., XV, 1 seqg.

Sometimes therefore passive scandal is without active, as the Pharisaic; sometimes active without passive, as when someone induces another by word or deed to sin, and he consents not. Sometimes active together with passive, as when at the induction of one, another sins.

You will ask 3° whether active scandal is sin.

I answer. Every active scandal properly said is sin ex genere suo mortal; because either the scandalizing work is evil in itself, or has the appearance of evil, and therefore to be omitted for charity of neighbor, by which we are bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor. Whence scandal is opposed to charity and mercy, insofar as this inclines to fraternal correction; consequently mortal sin ex genere.

[The gravity of scandal taken in itself appears from the words of the Lord. For he says, Matth., XVII, 6 et 7: Whoever shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that a millstone be hanged about his neck, and that he be drowned in the depths of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come : but nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal comes! If active scandal be a greater evil than corporal death, if Christ against it redouble malediction and woe, it is certainly something grave per se.]

Yet it can become venial⁵ , not only from indeliberateness, but also from lightness of matter : as if someone from slight and venial indiscretion says or does what has some appearance of evil, whence another, beside the intention of the agent, is induced to sin mortally; or if anyone through venial sin intend to induce another into venial sin only.

You will ask 4° whether active scandal is special sin.

I answer. Scandal per se and with express intention is special sin⁶ , because it has special repugnance to charity, by which we are bound to will the spiritual good of neighbor.

2° Scandal without express intention, which the Author calls here scandal per accidens, if it be given through a work good or indifferent in itself, but having the appearance of evil, is special sin; because it is sin, and it has no other reason of sin than scandal.

3° Scandal without express intention, and per accidens in this sense, which is given through a work already evil of itself, is not special sin, yet it is a special circumstance of act changing species⁷ ; because when there are several malices in one act, the first essential and specific is drawn from the object primary and directly willed, while the circumstance, which is a certain accident of the morally taken act, is taken from the object secondary and indirectly willed. Ergo.

You will ask 5° whether goods both spiritual and temporal are to be relinquished for avoiding passive scandal.

I answer. 1° Spiritual goods which cannot be omitted without sin are not to be relinquished for avoiding passive scandal⁸ : because it implies that some sin, though venial only, be licit; for by that very thing it would cease to be sin. Whence the Apostle, Rom., III, 8, says: Let us not do evil that good may come.

I answer. 2° Spiritual goods which can be omitted without sin are not to be relinquished on account of Pharisaic scandal, if some cause subsist why they be not deferred : because, since those scandalized so sin from malice, they are not in necessity from which they cannot easily liberate themselves without aid of another; and otherwise opportunity would be given to the wicked of impeding good works whenever they wished. Whence Christ taught that this scandal is not to be cared for, Matth. XV, 14, when the disciples reported that the Pharisees were taking scandal at his words and deeds, he answered: Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind.

I answer. 3° Such spiritual goods as can be omitted without sin, if no peril impend, are on account of scandal of the little ones to be concealed or deferred⁹ , until reason rendered, such scandal cease; because we are bound to succor the neighbor placed in spiritual necessity, when we can conveniently. But one who is going to sin from ignorance or weakness on account of my deed is in spiritual necessity. Ergo, since I can conveniently conceal or defer it until he be instructed, I am held to that.

I answer. 4° When there occurs some affirmative precept, whether natural, or positive divine or human, or even negative divine or human, forbidding not intrinsically evil things, incompossible with the natural precept of avoiding scandal of neighbor, there must be weighed which, all things considered, is greater and more binding, and that must be observed; because, when two precepts concur which cannot be observed together, the greater binds, and the others cease to bind for that time. Moreover the precept of avoiding scandal of the little ones binds sometimes more, sometimes less than others, as appears in frequent cases which are commonly admitted.

1° Fraternal correction is of natural right, and yet it is to be omitted, if the one to be corrected take scandal thence and become worse. Likewise the punishment of sinners is of natural right, and yet, according to Augustine, lib. III contra Epist. Parmen., c. 2, it is to be relinquished, where schism is feared from it¹⁰ .

2° Preaching of the Gospel is of positive divine right, and yet one must cease from it on account of scandal¹¹ , Matth., VII, 5 et 6. Likewise integrity of confession is of divine precept, and yet a woman in confession can and ought to omit a sin from which she understands the confessor, whom she necessarily must confess to, will suffer grave scandal from weakness.

3° Conversely, if you know that from entering the house of a certain woman, in which there is an infant to be baptized, whom none other wishes to baptize, scandal will arise, nevertheless you must enter, admonition premised, if possible; because the precept of succoring the salvation of the infant outweighs the precept of avoiding scandal. The same for the same reason must be said if from the conferral of necessary baptism you foresee some to be gravely stirred and to blaspheme.

I answer. 5° Temporal goods of which we are masters, on account of scandal of the little ones, are either wholly to be relinquished, by bestowing them, if we hold them, or by not reclaiming them, if they be in the hands of others (understand, if they be not of grave moment), or scandal must be quieted by admonition or instruction¹² ; because we are bound to succor spiritual necessity of neighbor, though not extreme, at some small temporal damage of ours, as appears from what was said on the order of charity and fraternal correction. But if after instruction scandal still endure, ordinarily then it is from malice. If however scandal be from malice and Pharisaic, temporal goods are not to be relinquished on account of those who stir up such scandals¹³ : because this would harm the common good; for occasion would be given to the wicked of seizing, and it would harm the seizers themselves, who, retaining others' goods, would remain in sin.

[You will ask 6° whether it is licit to permit occasion of sinning, that the culprit be corrected.

I answer. affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and sufficient reason of permitting the sin is present. Whence St. Thomas lays down this rule, IIa IIae, q. 78, a. 4, c: «To induce man to sin is nowise licit; but to use the sin of another unto good is licit : for God uses all sins unto some good; for from any evil whatever he elicits some good.» Hence are excused per se from sin 1° parents and heirs who allow sons or servants to sin, that they may find opportune occasion of correcting them; 2° guards of fields who hide themselves, that they catch the damagers and exact punishment from them¹⁴ .

You will ask 7° whether it is licit, with just cause, even to apply occasion of sin.

I answer. affirmatively more probable, because the sinner is not thus induced into sin, as the usurer is not induced from whom a loan is sought. Hence does not seem to sin the master who deliberately leaves a key applied to the chest in which money is stored up, that he test the doubtful fidelity of the servant¹⁵ ; for he puts an act licit per se, and with sufficient reason.

You will ask 8° whether it is ever sin of scandal to seek from another what he will not do without sin.

I answer. 1° To seek or counsel absolutely a work which cannot be done without sin is always sin of scandal; because this is directly to induce another to sin. I said, «absolutely,» because, if someone were determined upon grave sin, it would be licit to persuade him to the lesser. For the sense is not that he do absolutely the lesser, but conditionally : «If you have resolved to do evil, do rather the lesser.»

I answer. 2° If the thing sought can be done without sin, although it be foreseen that the other will not do it without sin, there is no sin, a just cause subsisting, in seeking it from him. Thus in necessity it is licit to seek a loan from a usurer, sacraments from bad ministers; because whoever seeks thus from just cause seeks what is just and reasonable, and what the other can well do, if he wills.

You will ask 9° what is to be thought of the adornment of women.

I answer. 1° Moderate adornment, according to decency of station, is licit per se. If a woman use it from levity or vanity, she sins venially, on account of disorder of will¹⁶ .

2° Excessive adornment, that is, exceeding her condition, is venial per se. It becomes mortal, however, if it be made to provoke the wantonness of men, or with prevision that it ought to be provoked. 3° Immodest adornment, such as today is used in certain conventicles, is culpable, according to degree of immodesty. Sin is always grave, even if indecency be not grave, if such adornment be employed to incite lust. Certainly women sin mortally who introduce such manner of dressing in places where it did not yet prevail, on account of the peril which thence arises for many ¹⁷