Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

It is to be noted 1° that the precept of almsgiving is affirmative, and therefore, although it always obliges, it does not oblige for always. Its obligation depends on two things and must be measured by the necessity of another and one's own means; namely, on the part of the giver, that he have superfluous goods, on the part of the receiver, that he suffer some necessity.

Whence

It is to be noted 2° that a threefold necessity is distinguished on the part of the recipient: extreme, grave, and common. Extreme is when the life of a neighbor evidently perishes unless he be succored: nor need the moment of death be awaited, in which alms would no longer profit. Grave necessity is when death does not indeed impend evidently, but is probably feared; or some notable evil less than death evidently impends, such as grave illness, amputation of a limb, hard and prolonged imprisonment, madness, grave defamation, loss of status, so that one is forced to live a miserable life unworthy of men of his condition. Common necessity is what common poor who beg from door to door suffer; who although they are in need and ask only for the necessities of life, because they nevertheless ask from many and receive, their necessity is not judged grave, but common.

It is to be noted 3° that on the part of the giver, the goods he has can be doubly necessary and superfluous to him: namely with respect to life and with respect to status¹ . Necessary for life are those things required of necessity to preserve his own life and that of those whose care devolves upon him, such as parents, wife, and children. For preserving life there is necessarily required food, clothing, and dwelling. The remaining goods beyond these are superfluous to life. Necessary to status are those without which one cannot live suitably according to his state and condition. Whence goods superfluous to status are those without which he can decently maintain his own state and that of his family.

It is to be noted 4° that this decency of status does not consist in something indivisible, but admits of latitude² . Yet nobles and potentates should beware lest, according to the abuse of the present age, they account the greatest luxury whatever as belonging to the reason and decency of their status.

Likewise in judging the necessity of status, regard must be had not only to the present time but also to the future³ ; for what now is not necessary can prudently be judged necessary later, as for a time of illness, old age, imminent war, for bringing up and dowering children, for decently augmenting one's status, provided however its hope be probable.

But caution is needed lest future necessities be feigned from ambition or avarice where there is no probability of them, as if you were to become blind, if your house were burned, etc. The words of the Author are to be noted singly⁴ : « Nor ought one, he says, to consider all cases which can occur in the future; for this would be to think about tomorrow, which the Lord forbids, Matt., VI, 34. But the superfluous and the necessary ought to be judged according to those things which probably, in most cases, occur. » Otherwise all things would always be necessary, and nothing would ever be superfluous in the rich; which was condemned by Innocent XI in this proposition: « Scarcely will you find in seculars, even in kings, anything superfluous to status. And thus scarcely anyone is held to alms, when he is held only out of what is superfluous to status. » It is the 13th. Whence in these matters, both for present and future time, a fearful man should consult a prudent and learned director and stand by his judgment; for no surer rule than this can be laid down in this matter. These things noted,

I say 1°: To give alms is of natural precept and positive divine precept⁵ .

That it is of natural precept is evident from this general principle of the law of nature: All things whatsoever you will that men do to you, do you also to them. Now no one is placed in true necessity who would not wish that relief be given him by one having means. Therefore. From which you will infer that not even infidels themselves are exempt from the obligation of giving alms.

As regards the positive divine precept, it is evident from the Scriptures. It is said Prov., XXI, 13: He that stoppeth his ear against the cry of the poor shall himself cry and shall not be heard. Ecclus., IV, 1: Defraud not the poor man of alms, and turn not away thy eyes from the poor. And ibid., XXIX, 12: By commandment take care of the poor man, and do not dismiss him empty because of his poverty. But especially Christ⁶ , Matt., XXV, 41 et 42: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire... For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. Now no one is condemned except for omission of an act prescribed to him.

It is proved by reason⁷ . Since love of neighbor is of precept, it is necessary that all those things fall under precept without which love of neighbor is not preserved. Now it pertains to love of neighbor that we not only will good to our neighbor but also work for him, according to that word, 1 John, III, 18: Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. But that we may will and work the good of another, it is required that we relieve his necessity; which is done through almsgiving. Therefore the giving of alms is of precept.

From this conclusion it follows that we are bound under mortal sin to give alms to one suffering extreme necessity out of goods superfluous both to nature and to status; because, since this precept binds in some case, none is more certain than where there is extreme necessity on the part of the recipient, and goods are superfluous to nature and status on the part of the giver. But whether it binds in other cases?

I say 2°: Of goods superfluous to nature, even though necessary to status, we are bound under mortal sin to give alms to one suffering extreme necessity. It is common.

It is proved. 1° from chapter III of Luke, 9-11, where Christ said to the crowds: Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire. And the crowds asked him, saying: What therefore shall we do? But he answering said to them: He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner. From the prior words of this text it is clear that here a rigorous precept is treated of, and not merely counsel. From the latter it is clear that we are held to succor one in extreme want even out of things necessary to status, as the second coat ought to be judged. Thus Jerome interprets it, Epist. 150. To this point belongs that solemn saying of Ambrose: « Feed one dying of hunger. If thou hast not fed him, thou hast killed him. »

It is proved. 2° by reason. 1° According to the order of charity, we ought to love the life of our neighbor more than the decency of our status. Therefore. 2° One who is in extreme necessity can secretly take from another those things that are superfluous to the other as to life, even though necessary as to status; nor can anyone lawfully hinder him; because, as we said above from the Author, in extreme necessity all things are common. Therefore the other was bound to give them to him.

Yet from this conclusion do not infer that the rich man or nobleman is bound to cast himself down from his status, or to expend an immense sum of money, say thousands of gold pieces, though not altogether necessary to his status, for saving the life of one private person placed in extreme necessity: 1° Because, although human life in itself is more precious than another's status and whole estate, yet in order to the public good a great quantity of goods or moneys avails more than the life of one private person. 2° Because no one is held to preserve the life of his neighbor more keenly than his own. Now no one is held, for preserving his own life, to pour out riches in such a way that, made healthy or free again, he becomes miserable; for that is morally compared to death; nor is he even held to expend an immense sum of money for procuring himself the most exquisite medicines. Therefore much less is he held to these things for another. Hence charity prescribes succor through ordinary means, not extraordinary ones. Whence in these cases counsel of a prudent man is needed, who, attending to the circumstances, says how much one ought to diminish of his status and give out of his superfluity.

[It is to be observed that if a neighbor needs only the use of a thing, on account of a momentary necessity, it suffices to lend him the thing. Whence the obligation is fulfilled if you lend a garment to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he has returned home. The reason is, because he is not absolutely poor during the time of the necessity, which ought soon to cease.⁸]

I say 3°: In grave necessity of a neighbor we are bound under mortal sin to relieve him from some way out of things necessary to status. I express the conclusion thus, because the obligation in grave necessity is less than in extreme, and therefore less must be contributed out of things necessary to status. It is more common.

It is proved. 1° from that word, 1 John, III, 17: He that shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? It is not likely the Apostle speaks of extreme necessity alone, which is very rare. And he who has sufficiency for life and status is truly said to have the substance of this world. Therefore.

2° Charity requires that we relieve a neighbor suffering grave necessity, as if, e. g., he labors under grave illness, is sharply afflicted by cold, suffers grave peril of reputation or honor, whenever we can without grave inconvenience to ourselves. Therefore we are bound to relieve him out of some way from things necessary to status; for that is not a grave inconvenience, seeing that it can easily be repaired.

I say 4°: In common necessity everyone is bound at some time, according to place and time, to give alms out of what is superfluous to status.

Attend to the terms of the conclusion. It is said, « at some time, according to place and time; » because the rich man having superfluities is not held to give always and to every poor person coming his way, nor to this one determinately, but at some time, now to one, now to another, as prudence shall judge. It is said, « out of what is superfluous, » and not superfluous to status; because in common necessity he is not held straightway to give everything superfluous to status, but he can reserve it either for other pious uses, or for rationally augmenting his status, for acquiring other possessions, or even for greater necessity of the poor or the republic.

The conclusion so understood seems now common, especially after this proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: « Scarcely in seculars, etc., » as above, note 4°; so that he who never gave alms, or proposed never to give out of what is superfluous to status in common necessities, would not seem excusable from mortal sin.

Therefore the first conclusion is proved from the places of Scripture already cited and others, 1 John, III, 17: He that shall have the substance of this world, etc. I Tim., VI, 17 et 18: Charge the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate. But they would not give easily who waited for grave or extreme necessity. Compare the other places in the first conclusion.

The second conclusion is proved by reason. 1° Everyone is held by charity to love his neighbor as himself. Now he does not love his neighbor as himself who loves his own superfluities more than what is necessary to his brother for relieving his necessity. Therefore. 2° Although single common necessities are not so grave a thing that to pass over this or that one is sin, nevertheless many occurring in any city produce a notable burden and grave misery, which the rich ought each in some part to relieve. Therefore, although it is not of precept to give alms to individuals, to this one or that one, yet it is of precept to give at some time, according to place and time. 3° If no rich man, having absolutely superfluous goods, were held to give alms in common necessity, soon common necessity would become grave, and grave extreme. Therefore.

[Many denied, with St. Antoninus, this obligation to be grave; because, since the common misery of the poor is light and tolerable, the fault does not seem grave if someone deny them aid. But the more common opinion is that expounded here, which St. Liguori embraced, for the same reasons⁹. « If anyone rich and abundant for a long time denies all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to poorer persons, or of turning them into another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for denying¹⁰ » Yet truly such a one would easily lie under the indirect obligation of relieving the common poor at least several times, namely lest this manner of acting, whose motive is not evident to all, yield occasion of scandal to many.]