Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, q. 32.)

Eleemosyna in Greek is the same as misericordia in Latin; in common usage, however, mercy is taken for the virtue or habit, and alms for the act: It can be defined¹ as « the work by which something is given to one in need out of compassion, on account of God. » In which definition alms is not taken, as it often is, for the thing given, but for the act of giving. It is said, « on account of God, » because here we are dealing with Christian almsgiving, as distinguished from philosophical almsgiving, which is done by a pagan or anyone else without order to God.

It is an act elicited by mercy²; for mercy is « the virtue inclining the will to compassion for and relief of another's misery, » and it is commanded by charity; for mercy is an effect of charity and is born, so to speak, from its innermost parts, since from love of neighbor there is born the will to relieve his misery, which we regard as our own. But if alms be done from another motive, say to make satisfaction for sins, it will be an act commanded by religion.

Alms are of two kinds³ , corporal and spiritual, according to the twofold misery or defect of man, namely of body and soul.

There are seven corporal works of mercy⁴ , namely to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, and to bury the dead, which are contained in this verse.

I visit, I give drink, I feed, I ransom, I cover, I gather up, I entomb.

There are also seven spiritual works of mercy⁵ , namely to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to correct the sinner, to forgive offenses, to bear burdensome and heavy burdens, and to pray for all, which are also contained in this verse.

Counsel, correct, console, forgive, bear, pray.

Yet so that under τὸ consule both counsel and doctrine are understood.

It is to be noted 1° that the precept of almsgiving is affirmative, and therefore, although it always obliges, it does not oblige for always. Its obligation depends on two things and must be measured by the necessity of another and one's own means; namely, on the part of the giver, that he have superfluous goods, on the part of the receiver, that he suffer some necessity.

Whence

It is to be noted 2° that a threefold necessity is distinguished on the part of the recipient: extreme, grave, and common. Extreme is when the life of a neighbor evidently perishes unless he be succored: nor need the moment of death be awaited, in which alms would no longer profit. Grave necessity is when death does not indeed impend evidently, but is probably feared; or some notable evil less than death evidently impends, such as grave illness, amputation of a limb, hard and prolonged imprisonment, madness, grave defamation, loss of status, so that one is forced to live a miserable life unworthy of men of his condition. Common necessity is what common poor who beg from door to door suffer; who although they are in need and ask only for the necessities of life, because they nevertheless ask from many and receive, their necessity is not judged grave, but common.

It is to be noted 3° that on the part of the giver, the goods he has can be doubly necessary and superfluous to him: namely with respect to life and with respect to status¹ . Necessary for life are those things required of necessity to preserve his own life and that of those whose care devolves upon him, such as parents, wife, and children. For preserving life there is necessarily required food, clothing, and dwelling. The remaining goods beyond these are superfluous to life. Necessary to status are those without which one cannot live suitably according to his state and condition. Whence goods superfluous to status are those without which he can decently maintain his own state and that of his family.

It is to be noted 4° that this decency of status does not consist in something indivisible, but admits of latitude² . Yet nobles and potentates should beware lest, according to the abuse of the present age, they account the greatest luxury whatever as belonging to the reason and decency of their status.

Likewise in judging the necessity of status, regard must be had not only to the present time but also to the future³ ; for what now is not necessary can prudently be judged necessary later, as for a time of illness, old age, imminent war, for bringing up and dowering children, for decently augmenting one's status, provided however its hope be probable.

But caution is needed lest future necessities be feigned from ambition or avarice where there is no probability of them, as if you were to become blind, if your house were burned, etc. The words of the Author are to be noted singly⁴ : « Nor ought one, he says, to consider all cases which can occur in the future; for this would be to think about tomorrow, which the Lord forbids, Matt., VI, 34. But the superfluous and the necessary ought to be judged according to those things which probably, in most cases, occur. » Otherwise all things would always be necessary, and nothing would ever be superfluous in the rich; which was condemned by Innocent XI in this proposition: « Scarcely will you find in seculars, even in kings, anything superfluous to status. And thus scarcely anyone is held to alms, when he is held only out of what is superfluous to status. » It is the 13th. Whence in these matters, both for present and future time, a fearful man should consult a prudent and learned director and stand by his judgment; for no surer rule than this can be laid down in this matter. These things noted,

I say 1°: To give alms is of natural precept and positive divine precept⁵ .

That it is of natural precept is evident from this general principle of the law of nature: All things whatsoever you will that men do to you, do you also to them. Now no one is placed in true necessity who would not wish that relief be given him by one having means. Therefore. From which you will infer that not even infidels themselves are exempt from the obligation of giving alms.

As regards the positive divine precept, it is evident from the Scriptures. It is said Prov., XXI, 13: He that stoppeth his ear against the cry of the poor shall himself cry and shall not be heard. Ecclus., IV, 1: Defraud not the poor man of alms, and turn not away thy eyes from the poor. And ibid., XXIX, 12: By commandment take care of the poor man, and do not dismiss him empty because of his poverty. But especially Christ⁶ , Matt., XXV, 41 et 42: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire... For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. Now no one is condemned except for omission of an act prescribed to him.

It is proved by reason⁷ . Since love of neighbor is of precept, it is necessary that all those things fall under precept without which love of neighbor is not preserved. Now it pertains to love of neighbor that we not only will good to our neighbor but also work for him, according to that word, 1 John, III, 18: Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. But that we may will and work the good of another, it is required that we relieve his necessity; which is done through almsgiving. Therefore the giving of alms is of precept.

From this conclusion it follows that we are bound under mortal sin to give alms to one suffering extreme necessity out of goods superfluous both to nature and to status; because, since this precept binds in some case, none is more certain than where there is extreme necessity on the part of the recipient, and goods are superfluous to nature and status on the part of the giver. But whether it binds in other cases?

I say 2°: Of goods superfluous to nature, even though necessary to status, we are bound under mortal sin to give alms to one suffering extreme necessity. It is common.

It is proved. 1° from chapter III of Luke, 9-11, where Christ said to the crowds: Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire. And the crowds asked him, saying: What therefore shall we do? But he answering said to them: He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner. From the prior words of this text it is clear that here a rigorous precept is treated of, and not merely counsel. From the latter it is clear that we are held to succor one in extreme want even out of things necessary to status, as the second coat ought to be judged. Thus Jerome interprets it, Epist. 150. To this point belongs that solemn saying of Ambrose: « Feed one dying of hunger. If thou hast not fed him, thou hast killed him. »

It is proved. 2° by reason. 1° According to the order of charity, we ought to love the life of our neighbor more than the decency of our status. Therefore. 2° One who is in extreme necessity can secretly take from another those things that are superfluous to the other as to life, even though necessary as to status; nor can anyone lawfully hinder him; because, as we said above from the Author, in extreme necessity all things are common. Therefore the other was bound to give them to him.

Yet from this conclusion do not infer that the rich man or nobleman is bound to cast himself down from his status, or to expend an immense sum of money, say thousands of gold pieces, though not altogether necessary to his status, for saving the life of one private person placed in extreme necessity: 1° Because, although human life in itself is more precious than another's status and whole estate, yet in order to the public good a great quantity of goods or moneys avails more than the life of one private person. 2° Because no one is held to preserve the life of his neighbor more keenly than his own. Now no one is held, for preserving his own life, to pour out riches in such a way that, made healthy or free again, he becomes miserable; for that is morally compared to death; nor is he even held to expend an immense sum of money for procuring himself the most exquisite medicines. Therefore much less is he held to these things for another. Hence charity prescribes succor through ordinary means, not extraordinary ones. Whence in these cases counsel of a prudent man is needed, who, attending to the circumstances, says how much one ought to diminish of his status and give out of his superfluity.

[It is to be observed that if a neighbor needs only the use of a thing, on account of a momentary necessity, it suffices to lend him the thing. Whence the obligation is fulfilled if you lend a garment to one stripped by enemies, or a horse to one wounded, until he has returned home. The reason is, because he is not absolutely poor during the time of the necessity, which ought soon to cease.⁸]

I say 3°: In grave necessity of a neighbor we are bound under mortal sin to relieve him from some way out of things necessary to status. I express the conclusion thus, because the obligation in grave necessity is less than in extreme, and therefore less must be contributed out of things necessary to status. It is more common.

It is proved. 1° from that word, 1 John, III, 17: He that shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? It is not likely the Apostle speaks of extreme necessity alone, which is very rare. And he who has sufficiency for life and status is truly said to have the substance of this world. Therefore.

2° Charity requires that we relieve a neighbor suffering grave necessity, as if, e. g., he labors under grave illness, is sharply afflicted by cold, suffers grave peril of reputation or honor, whenever we can without grave inconvenience to ourselves. Therefore we are bound to relieve him out of some way from things necessary to status; for that is not a grave inconvenience, seeing that it can easily be repaired.

I say 4°: In common necessity everyone is bound at some time, according to place and time, to give alms out of what is superfluous to status.

Attend to the terms of the conclusion. It is said, « at some time, according to place and time; » because the rich man having superfluities is not held to give always and to every poor person coming his way, nor to this one determinately, but at some time, now to one, now to another, as prudence shall judge. It is said, « out of what is superfluous, » and not superfluous to status; because in common necessity he is not held straightway to give everything superfluous to status, but he can reserve it either for other pious uses, or for rationally augmenting his status, for acquiring other possessions, or even for greater necessity of the poor or the republic.

The conclusion so understood seems now common, especially after this proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: « Scarcely in seculars, etc., » as above, note 4°; so that he who never gave alms, or proposed never to give out of what is superfluous to status in common necessities, would not seem excusable from mortal sin.

Therefore the first conclusion is proved from the places of Scripture already cited and others, 1 John, III, 17: He that shall have the substance of this world, etc. I Tim., VI, 17 et 18: Charge the rich of this world... to give easily, to communicate. But they would not give easily who waited for grave or extreme necessity. Compare the other places in the first conclusion.

The second conclusion is proved by reason. 1° Everyone is held by charity to love his neighbor as himself. Now he does not love his neighbor as himself who loves his own superfluities more than what is necessary to his brother for relieving his necessity. Therefore. 2° Although single common necessities are not so grave a thing that to pass over this or that one is sin, nevertheless many occurring in any city produce a notable burden and grave misery, which the rich ought each in some part to relieve. Therefore, although it is not of precept to give alms to individuals, to this one or that one, yet it is of precept to give at some time, according to place and time. 3° If no rich man, having absolutely superfluous goods, were held to give alms in common necessity, soon common necessity would become grave, and grave extreme. Therefore.

[Many denied, with St. Antoninus, this obligation to be grave; because, since the common misery of the poor is light and tolerable, the fault does not seem grave if someone deny them aid. But the more common opinion is that expounded here, which St. Liguori embraced, for the same reasons⁹. « If anyone rich and abundant for a long time denies all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to poorer persons, or of turning them into another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for denying¹⁰ » Yet truly such a one would easily lie under the indirect obligation of relieving the common poor at least several times, namely lest this manner of acting, whose motive is not evident to all, yield occasion of scandal to many.]

You will ask 1° whether one satisfies the precept of almsgiving by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit to a poor man.

Before the answer, note that someone can be doubly poor: simply and secundum quid. I call poor simply he who neither in act, here or elsewhere, has goods, nor is in proximate potency to have them; poor secundum quid, who, although he does not have here goods by which he can now be helped, nevertheless has them elsewhere, or is in proximate potency to have them, whether through skill and industry, or through an expected inheritance.

I answer. 1°. The precept of almsgiving is not satisfied by relieving him who is simply poor by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit.

It is proved. 1° Because it is certain that alms is of precept. Now to lend money, lend goods, sell on credit, is not to give alms; for alms is given gratis, nor do those who ask a loan, a loan of goods, or buy on credit, said to be asking alms. Therefore. 2° It would be inhuman and ridiculous to give to a poor man who has nothing, neither in fact nor in hope, under the condition of restoring later. Therefore.

I answer. 2°. The precept of almsgiving is satisfied by relieving the poor man secundum quid by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit; because the poor man secundum quid is not truly poor, and his present necessity is removed by lending money, lending goods, or selling on credit. Understand this of greater alms, not of small ones; for it is unusual, and would be inhuman, to bind beggars to repayment.

[You will ask 2° how much the rich are held to disburse to the poor.

Answer. They are not held to expend all their superfluity thus; but neither does it suffice to disburse so moderate a part, relative to the amount of their substance, that, if other rich men used the same frugality, relief would be lacking to the poor. But commonly it is judged that the rich satisfy this obligation by giving to the poor placed in common need a fiftieth part of their revenues; which proportion can be diminished when riches greatly exceed¹. Except beneficed clerics, who are held to distribute all their superfluous goods to the poor or to pious works and places, as will be seen in its place.

You will ask 3° from what goods alms ought or can be given.

Answer. 1° From one's own, of which one has free administration²

I say, « from one's own, » because it is not licit out of goods subject to restitution; nor licit for those burdened with debt, to the damage of creditors; nor licit for sons out of the goods of parents, nor servants out of the goods of heirs, unless pardon be duly granted them. I say, « of which one has free administration. » Whence a wife ought not bestow extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, except from her own goods, namely those whose dominion and full administration she herself enjoys and whose fruits she receives. Yet she can make ordinary and common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even while the husband forbids it, since he does not reasonably oppose it, and custom grants this right to wives.

Answer. 2° From the goods of another, if either the poor man be in extreme necessity, and alms cannot be given him from his own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence it is licit for sons to bestow small alms, and for servants bread and the like³.

Likewise tutors can give from the goods committed to them those modest alms which they would owe to give, since they hold the person of the pupils⁴]

You will ask 4° whether alms can be made from things illicitly acquired.

Answer. If the acquisition itself is illicit and unjust, as in theft and rapine, it is not licit; because those things are subject to restitution, unless perhaps the poor man were in extreme necessity, who could not otherwise be relieved.

But if the acquisition itself is not illicit, yet that from which one acquires is illicit, as when a woman acquires through prostitution, it is licit; because, although she practices prostitution disgracefully, nevertheless in what she receives she does not act unjustly. You have this matter disputed at length in the treatise on Contracts, dissertation I, article 8.

You will ask 5° who can give alms.

Answer. Speaking per se, he and only he can give alms who has free administration of his own goods⁵. For this see dissertation II on Contracts, article 2, § 2, where we discuss who can donate, and resolve many questions concerning minors, sons of families, wives, and religious, which pertain to the present question. Compare also dissertation II on Justice, article 3.

You will ask 6° whether clerics are more strictly bound than laymen to alms.

Answer. Affirmatively, especially from ecclesiastical goods superfluous to suitable support. For this see more in dissertation III on Justice, article 3, conclusion 2.

You will ask 7° whether a feigned poor man sins by begging and receiving alms, and whether he is bound to restore them.

Answer. Affirmatively; because givers are not judged to give except to a poor man, and under that tacit condition that he be poor. Whence this donation is null, and the reception theft, according to the Roman Catechism, part III, on the 7th precept of the Decalogue, n. 17, 5°: « Theft, he says, moreover, they seem also to commit who make promises with simulated words, or extort money by deceitful begging; whose sin is the graver because they heap falsehood upon theft. » Therefore they must restore to true poor men, because donors are judged to have renounced the dominion of these alms in favor of the poor.

Some except small and ordinary alms; because, they say, these are presumed to be given absolutely. But that presumption does not seem to us sufficiently founded. Yet if someone were truly poor, but feigned himself poorer, that he might obtain an alms more easily or larger, he does not seem bound to restitution; because it is common opinion that the poor ordinarily exaggerate their poverty, and donors presuppose it.

[You will ask 8° whether one appointed to the distribution of alms can retain a part for himself, if he be truly poor.

Answer. Affirmatively, since he is not in a worse condition than the other poor⁶. Except, however, unless designated poor persons be given the alms, to the exclusion of any others.

You will ask 9° whether magistrates can hinder foreign poor from begging in their places.

Answer. That they cannot hinder all altogether; because there are many poor who are forced to go into exile from their native places, whether by sentence of a judge, or because they have enemies there or have suffered disgrace, or because cities and villages have been devastated either by incursion of enemies or by fire; and these must still live. Whence then shall they live, if repelled by all? Hence it is clear that magistrates who absolutely and indiscriminately forbid the poor to beg in their territories impede the lawful use of charity and injure the right of the poor.

You will ask 10° whether alms should be given voluntarily to poor men who, if they wished, would not be in need.

Answer. Alms ought to be given to those who are voluntarily poor on account of Christ and from love of virtue, whether in religion or outside it, as were St. Benedict Joseph Labre; because they abase themselves into this state for a just cause and from divine vocation, and in them is found the object of mercy. See the Angelic Doctor, below q. 187, a. 3, 4 and 5, and the Opuscule Against Those Who Attack Religion. But alms is not to be given to those who are poor from laziness, love of idleness, and greed for gain: partly because it is not licit for them to beg, partly because charity exercised thus toward them would nourish their idleness and greed. Yet one ought not inquire too curiously about the condition of beggars, lest perhaps true poor men be defrauded of aid necessary to them. For there are many who do not dare declare themselves poor out of shame; but less is the inconvenience of giving to one not in need, than of denying one in need.]