Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Theologians commonly observe that one thing can be loved more than another in a threefold way: 1° Objectively, when we wish a greater good for one than for another, as if I were to desire the empire for Titius and the dukedom for Caius, I love Titius objectively more than Caius. 2° Appretiatively, when one is held in higher esteem than the other, and the lover is so disposed toward him that he would rather lose his friendship than that of the other. 3° Intensively, when one is loved with a more intense endeavor, with a more fervent and more perfect affection according to intensive degrees, than the other.

I say 1°: God is to be loved out of charity above all things and before all things, objectively and appretiatively; and thus, simply speaking, he is to be loved more than our neighbor, and than we ourselves¹.

The reason is that we ought to will God every good, the infinite good, his infinite and lovable perfections, and to take complacency in them. Likewise we ought to esteem him so, and be so affectionately disposed toward him, that we would rather lose all things and endure anything than forsake him. But this is precisely to love him above all things objectively and appretiatively. Therefore.

And this is expressed in several places of Scripture. Matt., XXII, 37 and 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. Ibid., X, 37: He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

In this conclusion all agree, but the difficulty concerns the intensity of love: whether by the precept of charity God is to be loved more intensively than our neighbor?

I suppose 1° that intensity is not required, of itself, for the nature of charity; for the least charity justifies, and every act of charity, even a remiss one, merits eternal life, as was proved in dissertation II.

I suppose 2° that God is worthy to be loved with the most perfect and more intense love than any creature whatsoever; for he cannot be so perfectly loved by any creature that he is not worthy of a more perfect love. And therefore it would be inordinate to choose to love a creature more intensely than God; for this would be to judge that she is worthy of a more intense love, and consequently that she is a greater good and to be loved more appretiatively: which is altogether false and inordinate. Therefore man ought to choose to love God with the highest love and more intensely than a creature. But whether, if this greater intensity is not found in the act of love, on account of the condition of nature, as we shall explain presently, there is inordination and sin? Some of the Louvain theologians affirm this, with Peter Soto. They are not, however, in agreement among themselves; for some say this sin is mortal, others that it is only venial. The more common opinion denies it, in agreement with which

I say 2°: He does not sin against the precept of charity who loves his neighbor with a more intense love, whether natural or supernatural, than God.

Proof. 1° by the same argument by which in the treatise on Penance we shall prove that sorrow for sins need not necessarily be the greatest intensively. The intensity of an act of the will arises from the vehemence of the object that moves it; hence it comes about that the will is borne toward that object with greater endeavor and fervor. But the sensible object, such as our neighbor, moves the will more vehemently than the spiritual object, such as God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The nearer an object is to the will, the more vehemently does it move it. But the sensible object, in this state, is nearer to the will than the spiritual. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Sensible things are proximate and immediate to the senses. But the will, in this state, operates conformably to them and depends upon them, inasmuch as it follows the cognition of the intellect, which in this state draws its cognition from the senses. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The will tends more intensively toward a lesser present good than toward a greater absent one, and flees a lesser present evil more intensively than a greater absent one; this is known from experience, and it happens for no other reason than that the present object is nearer to the will and moves it more; yet in its appretiation it would rather lose the lesser present good than the greater absent one, and suffer the lesser present evil than the greater absent one.

It is proved 2°. All agree, as we have supposed, that we are not bound, speaking absolutely, to the maximum intensity of charity, nor to a definite degree of love, in order to satisfy the precept of charity. I suppose therefore that I now elicit an act of the love of God at four. This act is good and meritorious. Afterwards I elicit an act of honest love, whether natural or supernatural, of my neighbor at five. This second act cannot bring it about that the first, which was good, becomes bad; for the good act passes away, and is no longer subject to mutation. Therefore.

If you say that the question is about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man,

I answer. I deny the supposition; for two really distinct acts are not elicited at the same time, but succeed one another, and when the second arrives, the first passes away. Moreover, if the question were only about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man with each other, the question scarcely arises; for when does this ever happen? Nay, the question vanishes entirely; for it would thus be choosing to love God less intensely than man, which is beside the question and which we confess to be inordinate.