Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, IIa IIae, qq. 26 and 27.)

Theologians commonly observe that one thing can be loved more than another in a threefold way: 1° Objectively, when we wish a greater good for one than for another, as if I were to desire the empire for Titius and the dukedom for Caius, I love Titius objectively more than Caius. 2° Appretiatively, when one is held in higher esteem than the other, and the lover is so disposed toward him that he would rather lose his friendship than that of the other. 3° Intensively, when one is loved with a more intense endeavor, with a more fervent and more perfect affection according to intensive degrees, than the other.

I say 1°: God is to be loved out of charity above all things and before all things, objectively and appretiatively; and thus, simply speaking, he is to be loved more than our neighbor, and than we ourselves¹.

The reason is that we ought to will God every good, the infinite good, his infinite and lovable perfections, and to take complacency in them. Likewise we ought to esteem him so, and be so affectionately disposed toward him, that we would rather lose all things and endure anything than forsake him. But this is precisely to love him above all things objectively and appretiatively. Therefore.

And this is expressed in several places of Scripture. Matt., XXII, 37 and 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. Ibid., X, 37: He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

In this conclusion all agree, but the difficulty concerns the intensity of love: whether by the precept of charity God is to be loved more intensively than our neighbor?

I suppose 1° that intensity is not required, of itself, for the nature of charity; for the least charity justifies, and every act of charity, even a remiss one, merits eternal life, as was proved in dissertation II.

I suppose 2° that God is worthy to be loved with the most perfect and more intense love than any creature whatsoever; for he cannot be so perfectly loved by any creature that he is not worthy of a more perfect love. And therefore it would be inordinate to choose to love a creature more intensely than God; for this would be to judge that she is worthy of a more intense love, and consequently that she is a greater good and to be loved more appretiatively: which is altogether false and inordinate. Therefore man ought to choose to love God with the highest love and more intensely than a creature. But whether, if this greater intensity is not found in the act of love, on account of the condition of nature, as we shall explain presently, there is inordination and sin? Some of the Louvain theologians affirm this, with Peter Soto. They are not, however, in agreement among themselves; for some say this sin is mortal, others that it is only venial. The more common opinion denies it, in agreement with which

I say 2°: He does not sin against the precept of charity who loves his neighbor with a more intense love, whether natural or supernatural, than God.

Proof. 1° by the same argument by which in the treatise on Penance we shall prove that sorrow for sins need not necessarily be the greatest intensively. The intensity of an act of the will arises from the vehemence of the object that moves it; hence it comes about that the will is borne toward that object with greater endeavor and fervor. But the sensible object, such as our neighbor, moves the will more vehemently than the spiritual object, such as God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The nearer an object is to the will, the more vehemently does it move it. But the sensible object, in this state, is nearer to the will than the spiritual. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Sensible things are proximate and immediate to the senses. But the will, in this state, operates conformably to them and depends upon them, inasmuch as it follows the cognition of the intellect, which in this state draws its cognition from the senses. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The will tends more intensively toward a lesser present good than toward a greater absent one, and flees a lesser present evil more intensively than a greater absent one; this is known from experience, and it happens for no other reason than that the present object is nearer to the will and moves it more; yet in its appretiation it would rather lose the lesser present good than the greater absent one, and suffer the lesser present evil than the greater absent one.

It is proved 2°. All agree, as we have supposed, that we are not bound, speaking absolutely, to the maximum intensity of charity, nor to a definite degree of love, in order to satisfy the precept of charity. I suppose therefore that I now elicit an act of the love of God at four. This act is good and meritorious. Afterwards I elicit an act of honest love, whether natural or supernatural, of my neighbor at five. This second act cannot bring it about that the first, which was good, becomes bad; for the good act passes away, and is no longer subject to mutation. Therefore.

If you say that the question is about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man,

I answer. I deny the supposition; for two really distinct acts are not elicited at the same time, but succeed one another, and when the second arrives, the first passes away. Moreover, if the question were only about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man with each other, the question scarcely arises; for when does this ever happen? Nay, the question vanishes entirely; for it would thus be choosing to love God less intensely than man, which is beside the question and which we confess to be inordinate.

In man there are two things, namely a spiritual nature and a bodily nature¹. To that extent does man love himself or his neighbor, inasmuch as he loves himself or his neighbor according to his spiritual nature.

I say 1°: Man ought to love himself more out of charity than his neighbor².

It is proved 1° from that passage, Matt., XXII, 39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. From this it seems that man's love for himself is the exemplar of the love which is for another³.

But the exemplar is prior to what is exemplified. Hence Augustine, book I de Civit., c. 20: « He who loves received, he says, from himself the rule of loving his neighbor. » Therefore.

It is proved 2°. God is loved as the principle of the good on which the love of charity is founded⁴; but man loves himself as a participator of that good, and his neighbor as an associate in this good. Now participation is more excellent than association, just as unity is more excellent than union. Therefore man ought out of charity to love himself more than his neighbor.

I say 2°: Man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; because that thing is more to be loved out of charity which has the fuller account of being lovable out of charity. Now association in the full participation of beatitude, which is the account of loving one's neighbor with respect to his soul, is a greater account of loving than participation in beatitude by way of overflowing, which is the account of loving one's own body. Therefore.

Yet, because the precept of loving one's neighbor, taking the proper body for his spiritual salvation, is affirmative, and although it always binds, nevertheless it does not bind at every moment, but in certain cases of necessity. A threefold necessity is distinguished: extreme, grave, and common. It is called extreme when the neighbor will perish for eternity unless he is helped; as if an infant were about to die without baptism. Grave, when without help he can be saved absolutely, but with great difficulty; as if someone near death and in mortal sin should ask for confession, without which he can be saved absolutely by contrition alone, but far more difficultly than by the sacrament. Common is the necessity in which sinners commonly find themselves, who run into common occasions of sinning.

According to this threefold necessity,

I say 3°: In extreme necessity, anyone is bound to expose his own life for the eternal salvation of his neighbor, if there is hope that he can be helped. In grave necessity, only those are bound upon whom the care of souls rests by office. In common necessity, no one is bound.

Proof. first part. 1° According to Scripture, 1 John, III, 16, we ought to lay down our lives for our brethren; which is true at least in extreme necessity. Hence Augustine, in the book de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9, says: « A Christian will plainly not hesitate to lose his temporal life for the eternal life of his neighbor. »

2° We are bound to expose goods of fortune for saving the bodily life of a neighbor placed in extreme necessity, according to that passage, 1 John, III, 17: Whoever shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God abide in him? Therefore, to save his spiritual life we ought to expose our bodily life. — The consequence is plain; because our bodily life stands related to the spiritual life of our neighbor as our riches do to his bodily life.

Take note, however, that those are not reckoned to be in extreme necessity who thrust themselves into danger of damnation through their own malice, such as those who enter into an unjust war, take up a duel, and the like, who can withdraw themselves from the danger by their own means.

Proof. second part. Those are more bound to provide for their flock, upon whom the care of souls rests by office, than those upon whom this care does not rest. Now these are bound in extreme necessity, while neither is bound in common necessity. Therefore those are bound in grave necessity upon whom the care of souls rests by office, and not others.

Besides, it would be hard to oblige a private person, who has undertaken no care of another beyond that general one which God has enjoined on everyone concerning his neighbor, to pour out his life for his salvation outside extreme necessity. Otherwise would it be, if the question concerned some loss in goods of fortune; for a private person ought to endure that for the salvation of his neighbor.

From this you will infer that pastors are bound, at the peril of their life, say in time of plague, to administer the sacrament of penance to their parishioners; because, although they could be saved absolutely with contrition, it is nevertheless difficult, and indeed far easier with attrition and the sacrament: hence they are in necessity, if not extreme, at least grave. As to the administration of the sacraments of the Eucharist and Extreme Unction, see what we wrote in the treatise on the Eucharist, dissert. VII, a. 4, You will ask 1° and in the treatise on Extreme Unction art. 7, You will ask 2°.

The third part is manifest; because common necessity, from which each person cannot so difficultly extricate himself, and better than anyone else, is not so great that we are bound to pour out our life for it.

[Nevertheless in common or ordinary necessity of either order, namely bodily and spiritual, one must succor one's neighbor even at slight inconvenience. 1° One must succor him, because love of neighbor demands this, and besides, if everyone omitted this duty, common necessity would become grave or even extreme. 2° At slight inconvenience only, because ordinarily the neighbor easily extricates himself from such a necessity, and if he is forced to endure it for a short time, it is not too burdensome for him.

Nor are you bound to come to the aid of everyone placed in common necessity; because others are held by the same obligation, and no one could fulfill it alone.

You will ask whether a man may expose his own bodily life for the bodily life of his neighbor.

Before I answer, I suppose 1° that it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to expose temporal goods for the bodily salvation of one's neighbor; for the life of one's neighbor is more precious than our temporal goods.

I suppose 2° that where the common good is at stake, and the life of persons necessary to the republic, anyone can and is bound to expose his own life for preserving its life.

I suppose 3° that where the lives are equal, if I believe myself to be in mortal sin, or if my life is necessary to my family or others, it is not lawful for me to expose my life for the life of another. These things supposed,

I answer. It is not lawful to expose one's own life for the life of another equal considered precisely in itself, or looking precisely at life and life; for that would be to love one's neighbor not as oneself, but more than oneself, which is against the order of charity. More probably, however, it is lawful out of a motive of Christian virtue.

Proof. this second part from the words of Christ, John., XV, 13: Greater love than this no one has, than that he lay down his life for his friends; which can be understood generally also of bodily welfare, as Chrysostom understood it, book II de Sacerd. Besides, it is lawful to prefer the good of virtue to the good of the body, where necessity so requires.

From this probable opinion many theologians infer that, if two men are in extreme necessity, one may give to the other the only bread he has; in flight from enemies he may give up his horse, though he cannot flee on foot; with plague raging, he may serve the sick; in shipwreck, he may yield the plank which he could occupy, or already has occupied: provided however he has not yet begun to use it; for in this case, says Sylvius, to yield the plank would be to throw oneself into the sea, which seems to belong to the killing of oneself, which is never lawful.]

[Since, in those things in which some principle is found, order is attended to according to comparison with that principle, and since the principle of love is God and the lover himself, it is necessary that, according to the greater nearness to one of these principles, the affection of love be greater.]

I say 1°: The better are to be loved more objectively than those more closely joined to us who are less good: inasmuch as, according to their present state of justice, we ought to will them a greater participation in beatitude than those more closely joined to us but less good, according to their present state; because it belongs to charity that it will the justice of God to be preserved, according to which those who are better participate more in beatitude¹.

I say 2°: Those more closely joined to us according to the flesh are, speaking per se, to be loved more intensively than better strangers²

It is proved. 1° because the intensity of the motion depends on its proper agent³, which is naturally apt to influence those nearer more vehemently than those farther away. Therefore.

2° Scripture in several places specially commends to us the love of relatives, besides the special precept of honoring parents, as Isa., LVIII, 7, after enumerating various works of mercy, adds: And despise not thy own flesh, that is, those who are joined to thee carnally. I Tim., V, 8: If anyone have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. Where the Apostle calls his own those who are joined in any way whatever, but those of his house those who are joined by blood.

Toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; toward relatives, however, we have other friendships as well, according to the mode of union: the friendship of sons toward parents, and conversely, of brother toward brother, of citizen toward fellow citizen, etc. And although these loves are natural or moral, in well-ordered men they are nevertheless commanded by charity; because the good on which any honest friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good on which charity is founded; whence it follows that charity commands the act of every other friendship, as the art that is about the end commands the art that is about those things that are directed to the end.

I said, « speaking per se, » because per accidens it happens that the better are to be loved more than those joined according to the flesh; as if a person to be saved were necessary for the common good; if someone snatched you from death, whether corporal or spiritual, which your parents wished to inflict on you; if he received you when abandoned by your brothers in extreme necessity and cared for you; if among those spiritually joined there be the closest bond, and scarcely any among more remote blood relations, as in the third, fourth, or fifth degree. In these and similar cases, the better are to be loved more than those joined carnally.

What is objected against this conclusion is easily solved, having before one's eyes the distinction between objective and intensive love.

I say 3°: Among variously joined persons, those joined carnally, speaking per se, are to be loved more, in things pertaining to nature, than those otherwise joined⁴.

The conclusion presupposes various modes of union: 1° according to the flesh, as between parents and blood relations; 2° according to political society, as between fellow citizens and comrades in arms, both among themselves and with their magistrates and leaders; 3° according to the reason of service, whether spiritual or temporal.

It is proved of the conclusion; because the intensity of love arises from the union of the beloved with the lover; but the carnal union of origin is prior and more immovable, and it is according to that which pertains to substance, while the others are supervening. Therefore.

I said, « in things pertaining to nature; » because in things pertaining to the other unions, those are to be loved more who are joined according to those unions⁵; understand this, however, outside necessity. Hence in war obedience is given to the general rather than to the father. Comparing, however, love with love, union with union, carnal union is to be preferred to any whatsoever, so that, if the things pertaining to carnal union and the things proper to those other unions cannot both be rendered, these latter are to be omitted, and the unions abandoned, if need be. Thus a soldier ought to leave military service so as to succor the necessity of his parents, a Religious to leave the monastery for the same end. Whence, speaking simply, those joined carnally are to be loved more than those otherwise joined.

You will gather: 1° that in grave or extreme necessity, speaking per se, succor is to be given to parents, children, wife, and probably also brothers and sisters, rather than to any benefactor however distinguished. I said, « speaking per se; » which is true under the same exceptions appended to the second conclusion. 2° Also in equal spiritual necessity, it is more probable that carnal parents and children are to be preferred to spiritual parents and children. 3° A father is to be loved more objectively than a son⁶; for he is loved under the reason of principle, which has the reason of a more eminent good, and more like to God: but a son is to be loved more intensively than a father⁷; for a son is more something of the father, than the father is something of the son. Speaking absolutely, however, the father in necessity is to be preferred to the son, because the father is loved as cause, the son as effect; and greater is the obligation of effect toward cause, than of cause toward effect. 4° A father, speaking per se, is to be loved more than a mother, because he is a nobler principle than the mother⁸. 5° A father, for the reason adduced above, is to be loved more objectively and appreciatively than a wife, but a wife more intensively than father and children; for she is more closely joined than father and children⁹.

[Moreover theologians observe that to change the order in the last three conclusions is not a grave sin, because there is no notable excess of one above another.]

[By faith it is certain that it is licit in some sense to serve God, whether loving him or exercising other works of virtue, on account of retribution.]

Thus it was defined in the Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 11 and canon 31, in these words: « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he does good works with a view to eternal reward; let him be anathema. »

[This is true even if man is not in the state of justice, as is clear from the condemnation of the following proposition by Alexander VIII: « Whosoever serves God even with a view to eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not without fault, as often as he acts with a view even to beatitude. » It is the 13th.]

It is evident from Scripture in several places. David says, Psal. CXVIII, 112: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications, on account of retribution. The Apostle relates, Hebr., XI, 8, 26, that Abraham and Moses did good with a view to eternal reward. Christ incites the Apostles to patience in sufferings with a view to reward: Rejoice, he says, and exult, because your reward is abundant in heaven. And the Church sings of the martyrs: « They delivered their bodies to torments, that they might become heirs in the house of the Lord. »

I say 2°: It is not licit to love God or serve him on account of retribution as on account of an end of the thing loved, that is, of God¹: partly because God cannot be ordered to anything as to an end, since he himself is the last end to which all things are ordered; partly because otherwise the retribution would be loved more than God; for the end is loved more than those things which are directed to the end.

I say 3°: It is licit to serve God, whether loving him or exercising works of virtue, on account of eternal retribution, in such a way that the retribution be the end of love and good works, not ultimate, but further orderable to God².

It is proved as to the first part. 1° There is no disorder in that means are ordered to their own proper and legitimate end, and merits to reward. Now the proper and legitimate end of good works and their reward is eternal beatitude, according to that word, Matt., XIX, 17: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. And 1 Pet., 1, 9: Bearing about the end of your faith, the salvation of souls. This the things we adduced for the first conclusion prove.

2° It belongs to friends to seek mutual fruition. Now our reward is nothing else than to enjoy God. Therefore.

It is proved as to the second part. Our last end is God. Now eternal beatitude, although objectively it is God, formally nevertheless is not God, but something created, namely the beatific vision. Therefore.

Hence follows the third part. For if we can serve God on account of eternal retribution as on account of the end of good works, but not ultimate: therefore as on account of an end further orderable to God, so that we intend to see God, that we may love him more securely and more intensely, and praise and glorify him for eternity; so affected, that if no beatitude were to be hoped for, we would nonetheless love him and serve him.

I say 4°: It is licit to serve God with a view to temporal reward, not as an end properly so called of good works — for it would be disordered that acts of virtue, which are more excellent than temporal goods, be ordered as means to them as to an end — but as accompanying some good, or conducing to it, so that they hold the place only of certain accessory motives. For temporal goods help us toward attaining the supernatural end: 1° inasmuch as through them this corporal life, in which alone opportunity is given for meriting beatitude, is sustained; 2° inasmuch as they serve us organically for acts of virtue.

The practice of the Church confirms this, which asks of God serenity, rain, fruits, etc. Indeed Christ himself commands us to ask in the Lord's Prayer for our daily bread.

You will ask 1° whether there is given a special precept of loving God by an internal act.

Not a few have taught that no special precept distinct from the others is given of loving God by an explicit internal act, but that the love of God prescribed is nothing else than the observance of the other commandments, even without any internal affection of love; which certainly offends pious ears not a little. Against whom therefore

I answer.¹ A special precept, distinct from the others, is given of loving God with an explicit internal affection and act, and not only in effect, by observing the other commandments.

It is proved. 1° from these words of Christ, Matt., XXII, 37-40: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment. And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments dependeth the whole law. The same is read Deut., VI, 5, and Luke, X, 27.

From these I form a threefold argument.

First. According to Augustine and all interpreters, the words of Scripture are to be taken in the natural and obvious sense unless some grave inconvenience stands in the way. Now these words: to love with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind, naturally and obviously signify an internal affection and act of love, nor can they be twisted into another sense except by open violence; nor does any inconvenience stand against this sense; indeed all things conspire toward it. Therefore.

Second. Among things that are not distinct, one cannot be counted first, second, and third, nor can one be called the greatest: this is evident per se. Now, according to the cited Scripture, the precept of the love of God among the others is numbered first, the precept of the love of neighbor second, the others, which hang on these two, third. Likewise, the precept of the love of God is said to be the greatest among the others. Therefore the precept of the love of God is special and distinct from the other precepts.

Third. Nothing hangs on itself. Now the law, or the precepts of the whole law, hang on these two precepts. Therefore these two precepts are distinct from the others.

It is confirmed. Scripture distinguishes the love of God and the observance of the commandments as cause and effect, as sign and thing signified, John, XIV, 15: If you love me, keep my commandments. Where love is assigned as the cause of the observance of the commandments, and the observance of the commandments as the sign of love.

To this point the following condemned propositions tend: First: « Man at no time of life whatsoever is held to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues. » It is the first among those condemned by Alexander VII, in the year 1665. — Second: « Whether he sins mortally who would elicit once only in life an act of the love of God, we do not dare to condemn. » — Third: « It is probable that the precept of charity toward God obliges per se not even rigorously every five years. » — Fourth: « Then it obliges only when we are held to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified. » These are the fifth, sixth, and seventh among those condemned by Innocent XI, in the year 1679. — Fifth: « Man is not held to love the last end neither at the beginning nor in the course of his life morally. » It is condemned by Alexander VIII, August 24, 1690.

What we have said about the precept of loving God internally must be said about the precept of loving one's neighbor internally, for the same reasons; to which add: We are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves; but we love ourselves with an internal affection. Likewise Christ says, John, XV, 12: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you. But Christ loved us not only through external works, but with internal affection.

Neither say that the neighbor is relieved merely by an external work, and that the internal affection need not be attended to. For both assumptions are false. For the neighbor is relieved also by internal prayers, and he would scorn the external work if it were shown him without affection.

Hence the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI: « We are not held to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act. » It is the tenth. — « We can satisfy the precept of loving our neighbor through external acts alone. » It is the eleventh.

[You will ask 2° whether we are held always to act from the motive of charity.

I answer. Negatively. 1° Acts of the other virtues elicited on account of their proper motives are good, as acts of faith and hope, which are obligatory even in the state of sin. The Council of Trent, session XIV, chapter 4, declares attrition to be a gift of God and to dispose the penitent to justification. Likewise session VI, canon 31, defines: « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he does good works with a view to eternal reward; let him be anathema. »

The following propositions were condemned by Alexander VIII: the 8th, « An infidel must sin in every work. » — the 13th, « Whosoever serves God even with a view to eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not without fault, as often as he acts with a view even to beatitude. » — the 15th, « Attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments, without the love of benevolence toward God for himself, is not a good motive or supernatural. »

2° There are given acts indifferent from their species², that is, acts which possess a certain natural goodness but are neither good nor evil in the supernatural order; and these acts are licit, as was proved in the treatise on Human Acts, dissertation IV, article 4. Now if we were always bound to act from the motive of charity, such acts would not be licit. Therefore.]

You will ask 3° when the precept of charity obliges.

I answer. The precept of the love of God obliges per se: 1° At the beginning of sufficient use of reason. Of this I have said enough in the treatise on Sins, dissertation VIII, article 6.

2° It obliges per se at the end of life; because then the spirit returns to God who created it, and the devil lies in wait for him most of all, man would be accused of most grave negligence and contempt if he did not convert himself through love to God, with whom he hopes to be joined in eternal love in beatitude.

3° It obliges per se frequently during life, since charity is the principal virtue by which we tend toward the end for which we were created. But how often and when, is uncertain.

Some assign Sundays and feast days, on which, when the faithful honor God as the principle of all things, they are thereby incited also to love him. Others require an act of love once or twice in the week. But since, as I said, these things are uncertain, the faithful are to be exhorted to exercise themselves often, and as often as they can, in these acts of charity. This they will easily accomplish if they recite the Lord's Prayer with attention and affection, in whose recitation the formal act of the love of God is exercised by saying: Hallowed be thy name; for this is nothing else than to will that the name of God be held holy everywhere and by all, and be glorified.

[Thus St. Liguori, Homo apost., IV, 13: « Regarding the act of charity, the opinion pleases me more of those who require it once in the month, since he will scarcely be able to observe the divine law who frequently does not exercise his love for God in positive acts. »

That acts of charity are to be elicited frequently is clear from these words, Deut., VI, 5-8: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thy heart, and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising, and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand. It is clear moreover from the text itself that implicit acts are included under this precept and fulfilled by them; for the enumerated actions are not per se acts of charity. Whence the faithful who live piously satisfy the precept of charity easily: they pray, receive the sacraments, avoid sin lest they offend God and displease him, embrace the divine will in all things and prefer it to their own, etc. They are nevertheless to be exhorted to elicit explicit acts frequently, because they are most pleasing to God, confirm the habit of charity, and from them devotion grows.

It is clear that those do not satisfy the precept of charity, even though ignorance excuses them at least in part, who remain in mortal sin for months; nor those who indeed detest sin, but from attrition alone, which does not attain to the reason of true charity.]

But per accidens the precept of charity obliges whenever another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without the love of God; because whoever is held to the end is held to the means.