Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III
Charles René Billuart (1685–1757)
Tractatus I: De fide
Prooemium
Dissertatio I: De objecto fidei
Articulus I: Quodnam sit objectum fidei?
Articulus II: In quid sit ultima resolutio fidei nostrae?
Articulus III: Utrum fides possit subsistere falso?
Articulus IV: De obscuritate in objecto fidei et evidentia in attestante
Articulus V: Utrum mysteria fidei sint evidenter credibilia?
Dissertatio II: De motivis credibilitatis Religionis christianae adversus incredulos, vulgo deistas
Articulus I: Quid sit prophetia? An sit possibilis?
Articulus II: An prophetiae vim habeant probandi veritatem revelationis?
Articulus III: Vaticinia prophetarum de religione christiana et ejus authore
Articulus IV: Miracula Christi et Apostolorum, item promissiones Christi adimpletae in confirmationem religionis christianae
Articulus V: Modus mirabilis et plane divinus quo christiana Religio fuit fundata et propagata
Dissertatio III: De actu interno et externo fidei
Articulus I: Utrum sit de necessitate salutis credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem, et quid?
Articulus II: Caeterae difficultates circa actum fidei internum expenduntur
Articulus III: De actu fidei externo
Dissertatio IV: De habitu et subjecto fidei
Articulus I: De habitu fidei
Articulus II: De subjecto fidei
Articulus III: Utrum vera religio falsae tolerari possit
Articulus IV: Utrum fides rationem naturalem excludat?
Dissertatio V: De vitiis fidei oppositis
Articulus I: De infidelitate in communi
Articulus II: De haeresi
Articulus III: De apostasia
Articulus IV: De cultuum libertate
Articulus V: De blasphemia
Tractatus II: De regulis fidei
Dissertatio I: De divina revelatione
Articulus I: De natura revelationis divinae
Articulus II: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio immediata?
Articulus III: Utrum possibilis sit divina revelatio mediata?
Articulus IV: Utrum veritatum capitibus nostris excedentium, seu mysteriorum, possibilis sit revelatio?
Articulus V: Utrum divina revelatio fuerit necessaria?
Dissertatio II: De Scriptura sacra
Articulus I: Quid sit et an sit Scriptura sacra
Articulus II: De Scriptura sacra divisione, apographis et versionibus
Articulus III: De Scriptura sacra sensibus
Dissertatio III: De traditionibus
Articulus I: Quid, quotuplex sit traditio, et quanta auctoritas illis?
Articulus II: Utrum traditiones divinae sint necessario admittendae?
Articulus III: De sanctorum patribus
Articulus IV: De sacra liturgia
Dissertatio IV: De Ecclesia
Articulus I: Quomodo Ecclesia christiana existere potuerit ante adventum Christi?
Articulus II: Ex quibus constabat religio primaeva?
Articulus III: Quomodo constituta fuit religio mosaica?
Articulus IV: Utrum divina fuerit religio mosaica?
Articulus V: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abroganda?
Articulus VI: Utrum lex seu religio mosaica fuerit abrogata?
Articulus VII: Quid sit Ecclesia, et qui sint in ea?
Articulus VIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit visibilis?
Articulus IX: De notis verae Ecclesiae
Articulus X: Utrum Ecclesia possit decipere seu errare in fide et moribus?
Articulus XI: Utrum Ecclesia sit suprema iudex controversiarum fidei?
Articulus XII: Utrum iudicium Ecclesiae de sensu librorum, seu, ut vocant, de factis dogmaticis, sit infallibile?
Articulus XIII: Utrum Ecclesia sit infallibilis in canonizatione sanctorum?
Dissertatio V: De summo Pontifice
Articulus I: De primatu S. Petri
Articulus II: De primatu Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus III: De vi et ratione primatus Romanorum Pontificum
Articulus IV: De infallibilitate seu inerrantia summi Pontificis in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum
Articulus V: De praeminentia summi Pontificis supra concilium generale
Articulus VI: Solvuntur objectiones
Articulus VII: Utrum Pontifici Romano competat summa potestas temporalis?
Articulus VIII: Quid sit Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate Declaratio anni 1682, et quid de ea sentiendum?
Articulus IX: Utrum doctrina Declarationis anni 1682, ipsaque Declaratio, Ecclesiae Gallicanae merito fuerit attributa?
Articulus X: De Romani Pontificis principatu civili
Dissertatio VI: De conciliis generalibus
Articulus I: Quid et quotuplex sit concilium?
Articulus II: Utrum necessaria sint concilia generalia?
Articulus III: Cujus sit convocare concilium generale?
Articulus IV: De convocatis ad concilium generale et illius praeside
Articulus V: Utrum concilium generale sit infallibile in definiendis quaestionibus fidei et morum?
Articulus VI: Utrum concilium generale debeat necessario confirmari a summo Pontifice?
Tractatus III: De spe
Dissertatio I: De spe
Articulus I: De spe secundum se et de ejus objecto
Articulus II: In quibus sit spes
Articulus III: De necessitate spei
Articulus IV: Quae sint vitia opposita spei theologicae?
Tractatus IV: De charitate
Dissertatio I: De charitate secundum se
(St. Thomas, q. 23.)
Articulus I: Complectens omnia quae spectant charitatem secundum se
[Charity is also called love. Love is an inclination toward good. For the good proposed to the appetite moves and inclines it toward itself like a weight, according to the most famous saying of Augustine, book XIII of the Confess., ch. 9, n. 10 : « My weight is my love ; by it I am carried wherever I am carried. » This inclination of the appetite toward good is called love or complacency. If it is with the election of one good over another, it is called dilection. If it is of a good that is esteemed at a great price, it is called charity. If finally it is with mutual affection, it is called friendship. Love therefore extends more widely than dilection, charity and friendship.
Love is threefold : 1° natural, by which each thing, even non-cognitive, appetites the good suitable to itself; thus a heavy body is said to love the center. 2° animal or sensitive, which follows the apprehension of the senses, and is found also in brutes. 3° rational, which follows the apprehension of the intellect, and this again is twofold, namely of concupiscence, which tends to the object that is loved; and of benevolence, which tends to the person for whom it is loved, and if in addition there be a return of affection on the part of the person loved, it will be the love of friendship. What is loved with the love of benevolence is loved simply and in itself; but what is loved with the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and in itself, but is loved for another. Hence the love of benevolence is love simply, and the love of concupiscence is love in a certain respect.]
Habitual charity is usually defined thus : « A virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for Himself and the neighbor for God. »
You will ask 1° whether charity is properly called friendship with God.
I answer. Charity is true and properly called friendship between God and man1
Proof. 1° from Scripture2 : Christ, John, XV, 14 et 15, says to the Apostles : You are my friends, and : I will no longer call you servants. But I have called you friends. James, II, 23 : Abraham was called the friend of God. Ps., CXXXVIII, 17 : Exceedingly magnified are thy friends, O God. Now nothing can be assigned whereby men are the friends of God except charity.
Proof. 2° For true and properly so-called friendship three conditions are commonly required3 : first, that the love be of benevolence, whereby we wish good to someone for his sake; not of concupiscence, whereby we wish good for our own sake. The second condition is that the love be mutual; for a friend is a friend to his friend, and is called as it were one who loves back (amicatus), so that such love is as it were a bond between two. The third condition is that this mutual love be founded on some sharing; for those who share in nothing have no union with one another. Now these three conditions are found in the love of charity. Therefore.
It is proved 1° By charity man loves God for Himself as last end, and God loves man for his sake, not as for His last end, but for his benefit, or as for the subject to whom He wills eternal beatitude, and thus on both sides it is love of benevolence. 2° It is mutual love; for by charity we love him who loves us, according to that text, Prov., VIII, 17 : I love them that love me, and, John, XIV, 21 : He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him. 3° There is a communication of beatitude here through grace in right and in hope, in heaven in fact. Therefore.
You will ask 2° what is the object of charity.
I answer. 1° It is certain that God is the thing loved by charity, that is, its material, principal and primary object, and in this respect its formal object quo. For by charity we understand nothing else than the dilection of God, according to that text, Matt., XXII, 37 et 38 : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.... This is the first and greatest commandment. Likewise it is certain that the neighbor is the secondary material object of charity; because charity is, as we said, the friendship of man with God. But the law of friendship requires that we love not only the friend, but all who specially belong to him. Hence that text, ibid., 39 : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
I answer. 2° The formal object quo, or the motivating formal reason of charity, is uncreated goodness as lovable in itself and for itself, knowable in the supernatural light4
Proof. Charity 1° is love. But love is not of anything except under the reason of good. 2° It is love of God. Therefore it is of God under the reason of divine good. 3° It is love, not of concupiscence, which generates hope ; but of benevolence. Therefore under the reason of divine good, not as advantageous to us, but as it is in itself and lovable for itself.
I said : « Knowable in the supernatural light ; » because to love God for his goodness as known by the natural light would be natural love, not supernatural, such as charity is.
You will ask 3° whether God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species.
I answer. God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species : God for Himself, the neighbor for God5
Proof. The act whereby God is loved for Himself and the act whereby the neighbor is loved for God are of the same species6. Therefore the habit of charity is of the same species. — The consequence is plain, because habits are specified by acts. — Proof of antecedent. The act which bears on the reason of an object and the act which bears on an object under such a reason are of the same species : just as the vision whereby light is seen and the vision whereby color is seen are of the same species; for the species of the act is taken from the object according to its formal reason. Now the formal reason for loving the neighbor is God; for this is what we must love in the neighbor, that God may be in him, that he may cling to Him as to the last end, and thence God may be loved, praised and glorified for His infinite goodness and perfection : and thus it is plain that the formal reason for loving the neighbor is the infinite goodness of God, lovable in itself and for itself. Therefore.
You will conclude 1° that to love the neighbor from another motive, say for benefits received, for his outstanding qualities, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as they are his perfections, is not the love of charity; because he is not thus formally loved in reason of the divine goodness : but it is natural love. Nor does it matter that perhaps they are supernatural qualities; for supernaturality there plays a material role, if the reason for loving is not supernatural : thus e. g., the impenitent sinner, who knows heaven by the light of faith, loves it with natural love.
I said : « Inasmuch as they are his perfections ; » because, if they are considered as participations of the divine perfection, it seems that they are even thus loved with the love of charity; for, although they are infinitely distant from the infinite perfection of God, yet it is not so much he himself as the very perfection of God in them that is loved : just as in an image the prototype is loved, who is the whole reason for loving the image.
You will conclude 2° that charity is one virtue whole in species7; because, if from any head it were divided into several species, especially from this head, that it is concerned with God and the neighbor. But from this head it is not diversified, as has been proved. Therefore.
You will ask 4° how charity stands in relation to the other virtues.
I answer. 1° Charity is more excellent than the other virtues.
Proof. 1° from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity. 2° Faith and hope are compatible with sin, charity is not. 3° Hope and faith involve imperfection : hope, one's own advantage; faith, obscurity; neither of these is in charity of itself.
I answer. 2° Without charity there can be true virtue, but imperfect8; because without charity there can be a good quality which is a steadfast principle of a good act, consequently true virtue. But because without charity it does not order to the last end, nor make one act meritoriously for eternal life, it is not perfect virtue. See the treatise on the Virtues, dissert. II, a. 4, § 3, where we treated this matter ex professo.
I answer. 3° Charity is the form of the other virtues, not intrinsically and essentially, otherwise all virtues would be of the same species; but extrinsically and accidentally, inasmuch as by it they are referred to the supernatural last end, by which as it were by an ornament they are formed in the supernatural order.
That charity is distinguished from grace we proved in many ways in the treatise on Grace, dissert. IV, a. 1, You will ask 4°. Let the reader consult it.