Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(St. Thomas, q. 23.)

[Charity is also called love. Love is an inclination toward good. For the good proposed to the appetite moves and inclines it toward itself like a weight, according to the most famous saying of Augustine, book XIII of the Confess., ch. 9, n. 10 : « My weight is my love ; by it I am carried wherever I am carried. » This inclination of the appetite toward good is called love or complacency. If it is with the election of one good over another, it is called dilection. If it is of a good that is esteemed at a great price, it is called charity. If finally it is with mutual affection, it is called friendship. Love therefore extends more widely than dilection, charity and friendship.

Love is threefold : 1° natural, by which each thing, even non-cognitive, appetites the good suitable to itself; thus a heavy body is said to love the center. 2° animal or sensitive, which follows the apprehension of the senses, and is found also in brutes. 3° rational, which follows the apprehension of the intellect, and this again is twofold, namely of concupiscence, which tends to the object that is loved; and of benevolence, which tends to the person for whom it is loved, and if in addition there be a return of affection on the part of the person loved, it will be the love of friendship. What is loved with the love of benevolence is loved simply and in itself; but what is loved with the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and in itself, but is loved for another. Hence the love of benevolence is love simply, and the love of concupiscence is love in a certain respect.]

Habitual charity is usually defined thus : « A virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for Himself and the neighbor for God. »

You will ask 1° whether charity is properly called friendship with God.

I answer. Charity is true and properly called friendship between God and man¹

Proof. 1° from Scripture² : Christ, John, XV, 14 et 15, says to the Apostles : You are my friends, and : I will no longer call you servants. But I have called you friends. James, II, 23 : Abraham was called the friend of God. Ps., CXXXVIII, 17 : Exceedingly magnified are thy friends, O God. Now nothing can be assigned whereby men are the friends of God except charity.

Proof. 2° For true and properly so-called friendship three conditions are commonly required³ : first, that the love be of benevolence, whereby we wish good to someone for his sake; not of concupiscence, whereby we wish good for our own sake. The second condition is that the love be mutual; for a friend is a friend to his friend, and is called as it were one who loves back (amicatus), so that such love is as it were a bond between two. The third condition is that this mutual love be founded on some sharing; for those who share in nothing have no union with one another. Now these three conditions are found in the love of charity. Therefore.

It is proved 1° By charity man loves God for Himself as last end, and God loves man for his sake, not as for His last end, but for his benefit, or as for the subject to whom He wills eternal beatitude, and thus on both sides it is love of benevolence. 2° It is mutual love; for by charity we love him who loves us, according to that text, Prov., VIII, 17 : I love them that love me, and, John, XIV, 21 : He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him. 3° There is a communication of beatitude here through grace in right and in hope, in heaven in fact. Therefore.

You will ask 2° what is the object of charity.

I answer. 1° It is certain that God is the thing loved by charity, that is, its material, principal and primary object, and in this respect its formal object quo. For by charity we understand nothing else than the dilection of God, according to that text, Matt., XXII, 37 et 38 : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.... This is the first and greatest commandment. Likewise it is certain that the neighbor is the secondary material object of charity; because charity is, as we said, the friendship of man with God. But the law of friendship requires that we love not only the friend, but all who specially belong to him. Hence that text, ibid., 39 : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

I answer. 2° The formal object quo, or the motivating formal reason of charity, is uncreated goodness as lovable in itself and for itself, knowable in the supernatural light⁴

Proof. Charity 1° is love. But love is not of anything except under the reason of good. 2° It is love of God. Therefore it is of God under the reason of divine good. 3° It is love, not of concupiscence, which generates hope ; but of benevolence. Therefore under the reason of divine good, not as advantageous to us, but as it is in itself and lovable for itself.

I said : « Knowable in the supernatural light ; » because to love God for his goodness as known by the natural light would be natural love, not supernatural, such as charity is.

You will ask 3° whether God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species.

I answer. God and the neighbor are loved by charity of the same species : God for Himself, the neighbor for God⁵

Proof. The act whereby God is loved for Himself and the act whereby the neighbor is loved for God are of the same species⁶. Therefore the habit of charity is of the same species. — The consequence is plain, because habits are specified by acts. — Proof of antecedent. The act which bears on the reason of an object and the act which bears on an object under such a reason are of the same species : just as the vision whereby light is seen and the vision whereby color is seen are of the same species; for the species of the act is taken from the object according to its formal reason. Now the formal reason for loving the neighbor is God; for this is what we must love in the neighbor, that God may be in him, that he may cling to Him as to the last end, and thence God may be loved, praised and glorified for His infinite goodness and perfection : and thus it is plain that the formal reason for loving the neighbor is the infinite goodness of God, lovable in itself and for itself. Therefore.

You will conclude 1° that to love the neighbor from another motive, say for benefits received, for his outstanding qualities, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as they are his perfections, is not the love of charity; because he is not thus formally loved in reason of the divine goodness : but it is natural love. Nor does it matter that perhaps they are supernatural qualities; for supernaturality there plays a material role, if the reason for loving is not supernatural : thus e. g., the impenitent sinner, who knows heaven by the light of faith, loves it with natural love.

I said : « Inasmuch as they are his perfections ; » because, if they are considered as participations of the divine perfection, it seems that they are even thus loved with the love of charity; for, although they are infinitely distant from the infinite perfection of God, yet it is not so much he himself as the very perfection of God in them that is loved : just as in an image the prototype is loved, who is the whole reason for loving the image.

You will conclude 2° that charity is one virtue whole in species⁷; because, if from any head it were divided into several species, especially from this head, that it is concerned with God and the neighbor. But from this head it is not diversified, as has been proved. Therefore.

You will ask 4° how charity stands in relation to the other virtues.

I answer. 1° Charity is more excellent than the other virtues.

Proof. 1° from the Apostle, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three. But the greater of these is charity. 2° Faith and hope are compatible with sin, charity is not. 3° Hope and faith involve imperfection : hope, one's own advantage; faith, obscurity; neither of these is in charity of itself.

I answer. 2° Without charity there can be true virtue, but imperfect⁸; because without charity there can be a good quality which is a steadfast principle of a good act, consequently true virtue. But because without charity it does not order to the last end, nor make one act meritoriously for eternal life, it is not perfect virtue. See the treatise on the Virtues, dissert. II, a. 4, § 3, where we treated this matter ex professo.

I answer. 3° Charity is the form of the other virtues, not intrinsically and essentially, otherwise all virtues would be of the same species; but extrinsically and accidentally, inasmuch as by it they are referred to the supernatural last end, by which as it were by an ornament they are formed in the supernatural order.

That charity is distinguished from grace we proved in many ways in the treatise on Grace, dissert. IV, a. 1, You will ask 4°. Let the reader consult it.

(St. Thomas, q. 24.)

You will ask 1° what is the subject of charity.

I answer. that it is the will¹, because the act of charity, which is love, is elicited from the will; but a virtue is in that power in which its act is.

You will ask 2° what is the efficient cause of charity.

I answer. that the habit of charity is not acquired by our acts, but infused by God², according to that, Rom., V, 5 : The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. The reason is, because charity is a certain friendship of man with God, which is founded in the communication of beatitude. But this communication is not according to natural goods, but according to gratuitous gifts. Therefore charity exceeds the faculty of nature. Add that its object is supernatural good, and that it is a property consequent upon the infusion of grace.

If you say, that from acts of infused charity some habit of love is generated, as the Author teaches, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 1, ad 4,

I answer. that this habit is not the charity by which we are friends and adopted sons of God, but a habit of different species arising from the acts of this infused charity, and therefore acquired, yet not natural absolutely — namely in the sense that it be caused by nature — but in some way supernatural, namely arisen from supernatural acts. Whence, when St. Thomas, 1ae 2ae, q. 51, a. 4, ad 3, says that from acts no habit of an infused habit is produced, he understands a habit of the same species, as the argument required. So interprets Sylvius.

You will ask 3° whether charity can increase.

I answer. That the charity of the wayfarer can increase without limit³ : so it was defined in the council of Vienne, Clementina Ad nostrum, against the Beghards and Beguines⁴. Likewise in the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10 : «This increase of justice, he says, holy Church asks when she prays : «Give us, Lord, an increase of faith, hope and charity.»»

Proof. moreover 1° from Scripture. Ephes., IV, 15 : Doing truth in charity, let us grow in him through all things, who is the head Christ. Philip., I, 9 : I pray that your charity may abound more and more.

Proof. 2nd by reason. From this we are called wayfarers, that we tend toward a destined term, which is God. But it is of the notion of wayfarers that they can tend toward the term in such wise that they approach it more and more; otherwise the way of progress would cease. Ergo we can tend toward God in such wise that we approach him more and more. — I subsume. But it is charity that makes this approach; for we do not approach God with steps of the body, but with affections of mind whereby we are united to him. Ergo charity can always be increased in this life.

You will ask 4° how charity is increased.

I answer. 4°. Charity is not increased extensively, but intensively only⁵ ; because even the least charity extends itself to all those things which are to be loved out of charity. For since it is efficacious love of the last end, namely God, it has in itself sufficient power for loving other things for God's sake. And if actually it is not extended to counsels and to goods of supererogation, this is not from defect of habitual charity itself, but of the will; because we use habits when we will.

I answer. 2°. Charity is not increased intensively by the addition of charity to charity⁶ ; for this would be to multiply charity, not to increase it : but by deeper rooting in the subject, or by greater actualization of the subject, or by closer adherence to the subject; for to be an accident is to inhere. All these are one and the same thing, and St. Thomas uses now one, now another, while he treats of the intension of qualities. Likewise whether you call this greater a new degree or a new mode, it is all one for our purpose; for this question, about the intension of qualities, is philosophical, and therefore we remit it to the physicists.

[You will ask 5° whether charity can be perfect in this life.

I answer.⁷ If perfection of charity be taken on the part of the lovable, no creature's charity can be perfect. For God is infinitely lovable. But any created virtue is finite. Ergo no creature can love God infinitely. On the part indeed of the lover, charity is perfect when he loves as much as he can; which happens threefoldly : 1° When the whole heart of man is actually always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the charity of the homeland, than which nothing is possible in this life, in which it is impossible, because of the weakness of human life, always actually to think of God and be moved by love of him. 2° When man devotes his study to occupying himself with God and divine things, others being set aside, except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires; and this perfection is possible in the wayfarer's state, yet it is not common to all having charity. 3° When habitually someone places his whole heart in God, so that he wills nothing that is contrary to divine love; and this perfection is necessary and common to all who have charity.]

You will ask 6° whether charity is increased by every act of charity, even remiss.

Before the answer, I suppose 1° that our acts do not efficiently and physically cause the increase of charity, because the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same; for increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. But our acts preceding charity, however elicited with supernatural help, do not efficiently produce charity, as we said above. Ergo.

I suppose 2° that our acts concur dispositively to the increase of charity, not only morally or meritoriously, but also physically; because, as I was already saying, the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same, and our acts are physical dispositions to the production of grace and charity. Both suppositions we proved in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. See it.

I answer. Every act of charity, even remiss, whether elicited or imperate, merits de condigno the increase of charity⁸.

Proof. 1° from the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, where it defines thus : «If anyone shall say..., that the justified man does not truly merit by good works done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, an increase of grace... ; let him be anathema.» But the act of charity, even remiss, is a good work done by the just man through the grace of God and the merit of Christ. Ergo it merits the increase of grace, consequently of charity, which is a property consequent upon grace.

Proof. 2nd. An act of charity, even remiss, has all the conditions required for merit de condigno of an increase of charity. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. A remiss act of charity is supernatural, made by grateful and friendly man in homage of God, and ordained by God to reward, since he promises a reward even to the least acts, such as the giving of a cup of water in his name. These however are the conditions of merit de condigno, as we explained in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 1. Ergo.

You will ask 7° when the increase of grace and charity due to remiss acts is conferred.

Before the answer, note that grace and charity are considered two ways : 1° in physical being, insofar as they are qualities; 2° in moral being, insofar as they give right to glory as reward.

If you say that right to glory is founded on grace and charity taken physically, answer that this is true of physical and intrinsic right to glory as inheritance, such as belongs to infants dying after baptism, but not of moral and extrinsic right to glory as reward; for this latter is founded on good works which God accepts unto glory as crown and reward. As if the son of a king, heir of a kingdom, had merited a crown by insignia and heroic deeds proposed by the father, he would have a twofold right to the kingdom : one physical and intrinsic, founded in birth, to the kingdom as inheritance; the other moral and extrinsic, founded in distinguished deeds, to the kingdom as crown and prize.

I answer. 1°. Grace and charity are increased morally straightway by remiss acts, or, which is the same, man by remiss acts of charity acquires new right to the increase of grace, charity and glory. It is evident from what was said above, where we proved that man by remiss acts merits de condigno an increase of grace, charity and glory. Merit moreover is right to reward.

I answer. 2°. Grace and charity are not straightway increased in physical being by remiss acts.

Proof. The increase of grace and charity is not conferred except according to the disposition of the subject. But remiss acts, say up to two in one having charity as six, are not sufficient dispositions for increasing charity physically beyond six, since they are disproportionate to such increase and less perfect than the habit itself. Ergo. — Proof of the major. 1° Grace and charity are not infused into adults except according to the dispositions of the subject, as we proved, On Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. But the reason of increase and of first production is the same, as we already said, since increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. Ergo. 2° Of spiritual things, proportion observed, we must speak as of natural things, unless the contrary appear from revelation; for the sweet providence of God requires this, to dispose of supernatural things as of natural things known to us : otherwise it would be licit for anyone to feign anything whatever concerning supernatural things. But natural effects, whether in growth or in first production, are produced only according to the dispositions of the subject. Ergo.

I answer. 3°. When the just man breaks forth into a more fervent act, the increase of charity which he acquires corresponds to this single more fervent act alone, not to the prior remiss acts, so that there be not one reward conferred under a double title. This is against Bannes and Contenson.

Proof. 1°. Between merit de condigno and reward equality ought to be observed. But if the increase of grace and charity which responds to the more intense act were conferred under another title to the remiss acts, equality is not preserved; for those remiss acts are defrauded of their reward. As if one laboring through six days in the vineyard deserved twenty asses daily, and at the end of the week there were given to him only once twenty asses under several titles, he is defrauded of his hire, nor is equality preserved between merit and reward. Ergo.

Proof. 2nd from absurdities. From the opposite opinion it follows 1° that the just man who through many years should have elicited more than a thousand remiss acts, if he elicit not a more fervent act, and thus die, will perpetually lack the reward owed to his remiss acts. 2° It follows that one who during a long life should have elicited countless remiss acts, as eight, and dying elicit an intense act as ten, obtains no greater essential reward than the most flagitious man who at the end of life elicits an act of charity as ten.

I answer. 4°. The increase owed to remiss acts is not conferred in this life, but deferred until entry into glory, or until the first instant of glorification. So John of St. Thomas, Serra, de Marinis, Gonet, etc.

Proof of the first part. The just man is never sufficiently disposed in this life to the increase of grace and charity owed to remiss acts. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. When the just man elicits a more fervent act, he is disposed thereby to increase corresponding to this act, and at once merits it and receives it. But this increase adequately responds to the more fervent act and is given for it alone, as though no remiss act had preceded, as was proved. Ergo no disposition remains for the increase owed to the remiss acts.

Proof of the second part. The just man at entry into glory, or in the first instant of glorification from the clear vision of God, breaks forth into a most fervent act of such intensity as was the merit of the remiss acts : and since that act is not meritorious, because it is no longer the act of a wayfarer, but only a physical disposition, the whole increase proportioned to this disposition will correspond to the remiss acts alone elicited in the way. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Remiss acts by which man merited de condigno an increase of grace and charity cannot be defrauded of their reward. But they cannot receive it in this life, by lack of disposition, as was proved. Ergo they receive it in the homeland.

[You will ask 8° whether charity can be lost.

I answer. affirmatively, against Calvin, who, condemned by the council of Trent, had renewed the error of Jovinian and of the Beghards and Beguines already proscribed by the council of Vienne, Clement. Ad nostrum, On Heretics.

It is of faith, as is evident from the following definition of the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 23 : «If anyone shall say that a man once justified cannot sin more, nor lose grace, and hence that he who falls and sins was never truly justified... ; let him be anathema.»

Proof. 1° from Sacred Scripture. Ezech., XVIII, 26 : When the just man shall turn himself away from his justice and shall commit iniquity, he shall die in them. Galat., V, 4 : You are made void of Christ, you who are justified in the law; you have fallen from grace. Rom., XI, 20 : Thou standest by faith : be not highminded, but fear. I Cor., IX, 27 : I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, while I preach to others, I myself become a castaway.

It is confirmed. Adam, David, St. Peter were just, and yet by sinning fell from justice and charity. Likewise all infants who are baptized receive grace and charity through baptism. Who would say that none of them ever falls from grace and charity by sinning?

Proof. 2nd from the holy Fathers, who in this are unanimous. Cyprian, de Unitate Ecclesiae and de Lapsis. Tertull., de Praescript., cap. 3. Ambrose, de Poenitentia. Hieron., lib. II contra Iovinian. Augustine, epist. 217⁹ and lib. de Corrept. et Gratia, cap. 12, 13 and 14. Prosper, in Resp. ad capita Gallor., cap. 2 and 7, and elsewhere.

Proof. 3rd by reason¹⁰. Those forms alone are inamissible which fill the whole capacity of matter or object; but those which fill not the whole capacity of matter or subject are amissible by the introduction of another form. But although the charity of the homeland fills the whole capacity of the will, because it is exercised about the highest good clearly seen in itself and is always in act, and therefore inamissible; yet the charity of the wayfarer fills not the whole capacity of the will, because it is exercised about the highest good obscurely and imperfectly known only, nor is it always in act : whence, when actually it is not borne toward God, something can occur whereby charity is lost through the mutability of free choice. Ergo.

You will object : According to the Apostle, I Cor., XIII, 8, charity never falls away. Ergo.

I answer. Charity is compared here to faith and hope, which pertain to the condition of the wayfarer. For through faith we walk, and not through species, II Cor., V, 7. Through faith we know in part... But when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away, I Cor., XIII, 9 and 10. Hope likewise shall be done away, the good which we now hope for being attained. But charity, far from needing to be done away in the homeland, will rather be perfected and remain forever, provided it have been finally had in the way : because God then will necessarily be loved as the highest good and possessed inamissibly. Therefore the cited text is beside the purpose.]

You will ask 9° whether charity is lost by one mortal sin.

I answer. affirmatively¹¹.

It is of faith, decided in the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, in these words : «It must be asserted that the grace of justification once received is lost, not only by infidelity, whereby faith itself also is lost, but by any mortal sin whatsoever, although faith be not lost.»

It is proved moreover by theological arguments. 1° By mortal sin man becomes worthy of eternal death¹², according to that, Rom., VI, 23 : The wages of sin is death. And everyone having charity is worthy of eternal life. But no one can be at once worthy of eternal death and of eternal life. Ergo.

2° One contrary is expelled by another supervening contrary¹³. But any mortal sin whatsoever is contrary to charity according to its proper notion. For charity is the union of friendship with God as last end; mortal sin is aversion from God as last end : charity makes man will to love God above all things, and to subject himself to all his precepts; mortal sin prefers a creature to God, and violates his precepts. Ergo.

Nor does it stand in the way that an act is directly contrary to a habit, and that therefore one act does not destroy a habit; for this is true of acquired habits, but not of infused habits, such as charity is.

(St. Thomas, q. 25.)

We have said in dissertation I that the neighbor is the secondary proximate object of charity. The question now is who come under the name of neighbor.

1° : Man must love himself out of charity¹.

It is proved. Man must love his neighbor as himself, Matt., XIX, 19. Now he must love his neighbor out of charity. Therefore also himself.

It is confirmed. 1°. God, as infinitely good, is worthy to be loved by all with the love of friendship. Therefore man must, on account of God, will this love to himself. Now this is to love oneself with the love of charity. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 2°. The friendship of charity is founded in the communication of beatitude. Therefore those are to be loved out of charity to whom we will beatitude. Now man must will beatitude to himself. Therefore.

I say 2° : Man must love his own body out of charity², not only as what he wills to his friend as a good, but even as that to which he wills good. The reason of the first part is that our body can be an instrument of good works by which God is honored. The reason of the second part is that, although our body is not capable of eternal beatitude consisting in knowing and loving God, it is nevertheless capable of a participated beatitude which overflows from the glorified soul into it.

I say 3° : Sinners are to be loved out of charity according to nature, not according to guilt³. The reason of the first part is : partly because sinners, according to nature, are capable of beatitude, which we must will them for God's sake ; and partly because a sinner does not cease to be a neighbor, according to that word, Matt., XVIII, 15 : If thy brother sin against thee. If brother, then neighbor. Finally, we are commanded to love our enemies, as will presently be proved. Therefore also sinners ; for sinners are enemies. The reason of the second part is evident ; for guilt is contrary to God and is an impediment to beatitude. Whence David said, Psal. CXVII, 113 : The wicked I have hated.

You will say : Holy men imprecate evils upon sinners, as Psal. IX, 18 : Let the sinners be turned into hell. Psal. CIII, 35 : Let the sinners fail from the earth, and the wicked, so that they be no more. Isa., VI, 10 : Blind the heart of this people, and make his ears heavy. Therefore.

I answer.⁴ Imprecations of this kind are to be understood either by way of foretelling, not of wishing. Thus is understood that word : Let the sinners be turned into hell, that is, they will be turned; and this : Blind the heart of this people, that is, thou shalt blind. Or indeed by way of wishing ; yet so that the desire is not referred to the punishment of men, but either to the justice of God punishing, so that it becomes as it were an approbation of the divine justice, or to the removal and destruction of guilt : in which sense is understood : Let the sinners fail from the earth, and the wicked, so that they be no more ; that is, according as they are sinners and wicked, or according to guilt.

[Hence you will gather that it is not lawful to wish eternal damnation upon anyone still living in this world : partly because it cannot be a means toward obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil ; partly because it is contrary to the end for which we must love our neighbor out of charity ; and finally because no man is to be despaired of while he lives. Nor is it even lawful for anyone to desire that another sin, because to sin is simply evil. It is permitted, however, according to many, to wish that God permit some to sin, so that from it they may rise again humbler and more cautious ; for then sin is not desired as an evil, but insofar as God can draw forth a good from it, or rather there is desired the good which is hoped to arise from it, should it please God to procure that good by this means.]

1° : Enemies are to be loved out of charity, not as enemies, for that would be to love sin, but as men ; certainly with a common love, not a special one, speaking per se¹.

Proof. 1° From that text, Matt., V, 44 : Love your enemies. And so that Christ may prove it to be a precept for all, he adds, ibid., 45 : That you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven. But it is necessary for all unto salvation to be children of the heavenly Father².

2° In the Lord's Prayer, Matt., VI, 12, we ask God to forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. Therefore it is a precept to forgive enemies, otherwise forgiveness is not given to us. Likewise, ibid., 15 : If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins.

3° There is a precept that we love our neighbor. Yet the enemy is a neighbor ; for the reason of neighbor consists in this, that one be made to the image of God and can be a partaker of eternal beatitude. Therefore.

I said : « Certainly with a common love, not a special one, speaking per se ; » because the love of an enemy can be considered in two ways³ : 1° In general, as when someone loving God and neighbor does not exclude his own enemies from that generality of the love of neighbor ; and thus the love of enemies is of the necessity of charity. 2° In particular, namely that someone be moved by a particular motion of love toward an enemy ; and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely and per se speaking, but of its perfection ; since to be moved by a motion of love in particular toward any and every man singly is not of the necessity of charity, since this is impossible. It is nevertheless of the necessity of charity according to the preparation of mind, namely that a man have a mind ready for this, that he would love his enemies individually and bestow special benefits upon them, if necessity should occur.

I say 2° : Speaking per se, the common signs and works of charity are to be shown to enemies, not special ones⁴.

Proof. 1° Interior love toward an enemy in common is of the necessity of charity absolutely⁵ ; in particular, however, it is not of the necessity absolutely, but only according to the preparation of mind, as has been said. Therefore the same must be said of the works and signs of love to be shown.

2° By the virtue of charity we are bound to give scandal to no one. Yet, by denying an enemy the common signs of love, we are a scandal to him and to others ; not so by denying special signs. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. By denying an enemy the common signs of love which are commonly shown to all, the enemy rightly presumes that this is done out of hatred of him and resentment for vengeance, and thence is moved to persevere in enmity and to grow more obstinate ; for it is common among men to hate those who hate them. But it is not so when the special signs which are not shown to others, even to non-enemies, are not shown to him.

Therefore, for the explanation of this conclusion, especially with regard to practice, the signs of love must be distinguished

Common signs are called those which are commonly shown to all, or perhaps better, those which a Christian commonly shows to any Christian, a fellow citizen to any fellow citizen, a kinsman to any kinsman, etc. ; because, although these can be special respectively with respect to all men, they are nevertheless common in their class. Special ones are those which are shown to determinate persons, such as friends and familiars.

I said : « Speaking per se ; » because per accidens the common signs can sometimes be denied to enemies without sin, or at least without grave sin ; and sometimes there is a precept to give them special signs.

Therefore we are not bound to give the common signs when charity toward ourselves or our neighbor, or justice, persuades the contrary, or a reasonable cause excuses it. 1° Charity toward ourselves and our neighbor, as when from the denial of the common signs the enemy is hoped to be amended and not scandalized ; or when, from the sight of or conversation with the enemy, you should fear that the recollection of injuries, a greater agitation, or new quarrels might arise. Nevertheless, in this case it ought to be made known that the denial does not come from hatred. 2° Justice, as when parents or superiors, in the just punishment and correction of a son or subject, say on account of an infamous crime, an unworthy contracted marriage, etc., deny conversation, a kindly countenance, or other benefits and signs usually shown to sons or subjects, without internal hatred ; yet this vengeance or punishment must not exceed the measure of the offense, nor endure forever. 3° A reasonable cause, as when you deny speech, a reply, a salutation, etc., to one who has offended you, at the instant of the injury received, or afterward for a brief while, not out of hatred on account of the injury received, and this appears outwardly. Likewise, if the scandal is slight. Likewise, if on account of an injury gravely defaming you or your family you show a sterner countenance or sadness, or deny conversation and salutation, lest you seem to make little account of so great an injury. In these cases you could be excused from sin, at least from grave sin.

On the contrary, however, per accidens we are bound to show the special signs of love to an enemy especially in two cases : 1° When the enemy asks pardon. 2° When his need, at least a grave bodily or spiritual one, so requires. The reason is, that since in certain cases we are bound to do good to an enemy, more fitting cases cannot be assigned than when he suffers grave need, or asks reconciliation ; otherwise it will be a sign of internal hatred and a grave scandal, both to others and to the enemy himself, who will thence be more exasperated and hardened in enmity.

You will ask whether the offended party is bound to forgive or remit everything to the enemy asking reconciliation.

I answer. The offended party is bound, toward the enemy asking reconciliation, to remit the simple offense which is without violation of strict right or loss, or, what is the same, to lay aside aversion, indignation, or hatred, and to show certain signs of this laying aside : it is clear from the foregoing. But he is not bound to remit the injury or the violation of right and the loss, and he can demand for the injury satisfaction, and for the loss restitution ; because everyone can pursue his right before a legitimate judge. Care must nevertheless be taken lest the enemy be compelled to satisfaction or restitution with too great loss to himself, or lest satisfaction be demanded before a judge when he himself offers a reasonable one ; for this can scarcely happen without some appetite for vengeance. Likewise, where the matter concerns a capital punishment or a mutilation, and no benefit accrues from it to the injured party, it is expedient, for the same reason, not to press it. Otherwise it would be, if the community or family of the offended party would remain infamous should the offender not be punished according to the laws.

(St. Thomas, IIa IIae, qq. 26 and 27.)

Theologians commonly observe that one thing can be loved more than another in a threefold way: 1° Objectively, when we wish a greater good for one than for another, as if I were to desire the empire for Titius and the dukedom for Caius, I love Titius objectively more than Caius. 2° Appretiatively, when one is held in higher esteem than the other, and the lover is so disposed toward him that he would rather lose his friendship than that of the other. 3° Intensively, when one is loved with a more intense endeavor, with a more fervent and more perfect affection according to intensive degrees, than the other.

I say 1°: God is to be loved out of charity above all things and before all things, objectively and appretiatively; and thus, simply speaking, he is to be loved more than our neighbor, and than we ourselves¹.

The reason is that we ought to will God every good, the infinite good, his infinite and lovable perfections, and to take complacency in them. Likewise we ought to esteem him so, and be so affectionately disposed toward him, that we would rather lose all things and endure anything than forsake him. But this is precisely to love him above all things objectively and appretiatively. Therefore.

And this is expressed in several places of Scripture. Matt., XXII, 37 and 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. Ibid., X, 37: He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

In this conclusion all agree, but the difficulty concerns the intensity of love: whether by the precept of charity God is to be loved more intensively than our neighbor?

I suppose 1° that intensity is not required, of itself, for the nature of charity; for the least charity justifies, and every act of charity, even a remiss one, merits eternal life, as was proved in dissertation II.

I suppose 2° that God is worthy to be loved with the most perfect and more intense love than any creature whatsoever; for he cannot be so perfectly loved by any creature that he is not worthy of a more perfect love. And therefore it would be inordinate to choose to love a creature more intensely than God; for this would be to judge that she is worthy of a more intense love, and consequently that she is a greater good and to be loved more appretiatively: which is altogether false and inordinate. Therefore man ought to choose to love God with the highest love and more intensely than a creature. But whether, if this greater intensity is not found in the act of love, on account of the condition of nature, as we shall explain presently, there is inordination and sin? Some of the Louvain theologians affirm this, with Peter Soto. They are not, however, in agreement among themselves; for some say this sin is mortal, others that it is only venial. The more common opinion denies it, in agreement with which

I say 2°: He does not sin against the precept of charity who loves his neighbor with a more intense love, whether natural or supernatural, than God.

Proof. 1° by the same argument by which in the treatise on Penance we shall prove that sorrow for sins need not necessarily be the greatest intensively. The intensity of an act of the will arises from the vehemence of the object that moves it; hence it comes about that the will is borne toward that object with greater endeavor and fervor. But the sensible object, such as our neighbor, moves the will more vehemently than the spiritual object, such as God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The nearer an object is to the will, the more vehemently does it move it. But the sensible object, in this state, is nearer to the will than the spiritual. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Sensible things are proximate and immediate to the senses. But the will, in this state, operates conformably to them and depends upon them, inasmuch as it follows the cognition of the intellect, which in this state draws its cognition from the senses. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The will tends more intensively toward a lesser present good than toward a greater absent one, and flees a lesser present evil more intensively than a greater absent one; this is known from experience, and it happens for no other reason than that the present object is nearer to the will and moves it more; yet in its appretiation it would rather lose the lesser present good than the greater absent one, and suffer the lesser present evil than the greater absent one.

It is proved 2°. All agree, as we have supposed, that we are not bound, speaking absolutely, to the maximum intensity of charity, nor to a definite degree of love, in order to satisfy the precept of charity. I suppose therefore that I now elicit an act of the love of God at four. This act is good and meritorious. Afterwards I elicit an act of honest love, whether natural or supernatural, of my neighbor at five. This second act cannot bring it about that the first, which was good, becomes bad; for the good act passes away, and is no longer subject to mutation. Therefore.

If you say that the question is about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man,

I answer. I deny the supposition; for two really distinct acts are not elicited at the same time, but succeed one another, and when the second arrives, the first passes away. Moreover, if the question were only about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man with each other, the question scarcely arises; for when does this ever happen? Nay, the question vanishes entirely; for it would thus be choosing to love God less intensely than man, which is beside the question and which we confess to be inordinate.

In man there are two things, namely a spiritual nature and a bodily nature¹. To that extent does man love himself or his neighbor, inasmuch as he loves himself or his neighbor according to his spiritual nature.

I say 1°: Man ought to love himself more out of charity than his neighbor².

It is proved 1° from that passage, Matt., XXII, 39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. From this it seems that man's love for himself is the exemplar of the love which is for another³.

But the exemplar is prior to what is exemplified. Hence Augustine, book I de Civit., c. 20: « He who loves received, he says, from himself the rule of loving his neighbor. » Therefore.

It is proved 2°. God is loved as the principle of the good on which the love of charity is founded⁴; but man loves himself as a participator of that good, and his neighbor as an associate in this good. Now participation is more excellent than association, just as unity is more excellent than union. Therefore man ought out of charity to love himself more than his neighbor.

I say 2°: Man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; because that thing is more to be loved out of charity which has the fuller account of being lovable out of charity. Now association in the full participation of beatitude, which is the account of loving one's neighbor with respect to his soul, is a greater account of loving than participation in beatitude by way of overflowing, which is the account of loving one's own body. Therefore.

Yet, because the precept of loving one's neighbor, taking the proper body for his spiritual salvation, is affirmative, and although it always binds, nevertheless it does not bind at every moment, but in certain cases of necessity. A threefold necessity is distinguished: extreme, grave, and common. It is called extreme when the neighbor will perish for eternity unless he is helped; as if an infant were about to die without baptism. Grave, when without help he can be saved absolutely, but with great difficulty; as if someone near death and in mortal sin should ask for confession, without which he can be saved absolutely by contrition alone, but far more difficultly than by the sacrament. Common is the necessity in which sinners commonly find themselves, who run into common occasions of sinning.

According to this threefold necessity,

I say 3°: In extreme necessity, anyone is bound to expose his own life for the eternal salvation of his neighbor, if there is hope that he can be helped. In grave necessity, only those are bound upon whom the care of souls rests by office. In common necessity, no one is bound.

Proof. first part. 1° According to Scripture, 1 John, III, 16, we ought to lay down our lives for our brethren; which is true at least in extreme necessity. Hence Augustine, in the book de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9, says: « A Christian will plainly not hesitate to lose his temporal life for the eternal life of his neighbor. »

2° We are bound to expose goods of fortune for saving the bodily life of a neighbor placed in extreme necessity, according to that passage, 1 John, III, 17: Whoever shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God abide in him? Therefore, to save his spiritual life we ought to expose our bodily life. — The consequence is plain; because our bodily life stands related to the spiritual life of our neighbor as our riches do to his bodily life.

Take note, however, that those are not reckoned to be in extreme necessity who thrust themselves into danger of damnation through their own malice, such as those who enter into an unjust war, take up a duel, and the like, who can withdraw themselves from the danger by their own means.

Proof. second part. Those are more bound to provide for their flock, upon whom the care of souls rests by office, than those upon whom this care does not rest. Now these are bound in extreme necessity, while neither is bound in common necessity. Therefore those are bound in grave necessity upon whom the care of souls rests by office, and not others.

Besides, it would be hard to oblige a private person, who has undertaken no care of another beyond that general one which God has enjoined on everyone concerning his neighbor, to pour out his life for his salvation outside extreme necessity. Otherwise would it be, if the question concerned some loss in goods of fortune; for a private person ought to endure that for the salvation of his neighbor.

From this you will infer that pastors are bound, at the peril of their life, say in time of plague, to administer the sacrament of penance to their parishioners; because, although they could be saved absolutely with contrition, it is nevertheless difficult, and indeed far easier with attrition and the sacrament: hence they are in necessity, if not extreme, at least grave. As to the administration of the sacraments of the Eucharist and Extreme Unction, see what we wrote in the treatise on the Eucharist, dissert. VII, a. 4, You will ask 1° and in the treatise on Extreme Unction art. 7, You will ask 2°.

The third part is manifest; because common necessity, from which each person cannot so difficultly extricate himself, and better than anyone else, is not so great that we are bound to pour out our life for it.

[Nevertheless in common or ordinary necessity of either order, namely bodily and spiritual, one must succor one's neighbor even at slight inconvenience. 1° One must succor him, because love of neighbor demands this, and besides, if everyone omitted this duty, common necessity would become grave or even extreme. 2° At slight inconvenience only, because ordinarily the neighbor easily extricates himself from such a necessity, and if he is forced to endure it for a short time, it is not too burdensome for him.

Nor are you bound to come to the aid of everyone placed in common necessity; because others are held by the same obligation, and no one could fulfill it alone.

You will ask whether a man may expose his own bodily life for the bodily life of his neighbor.

Before I answer, I suppose 1° that it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to expose temporal goods for the bodily salvation of one's neighbor; for the life of one's neighbor is more precious than our temporal goods.

I suppose 2° that where the common good is at stake, and the life of persons necessary to the republic, anyone can and is bound to expose his own life for preserving its life.

I suppose 3° that where the lives are equal, if I believe myself to be in mortal sin, or if my life is necessary to my family or others, it is not lawful for me to expose my life for the life of another. These things supposed,

I answer. It is not lawful to expose one's own life for the life of another equal considered precisely in itself, or looking precisely at life and life; for that would be to love one's neighbor not as oneself, but more than oneself, which is against the order of charity. More probably, however, it is lawful out of a motive of Christian virtue.

Proof. this second part from the words of Christ, John., XV, 13: Greater love than this no one has, than that he lay down his life for his friends; which can be understood generally also of bodily welfare, as Chrysostom understood it, book II de Sacerd. Besides, it is lawful to prefer the good of virtue to the good of the body, where necessity so requires.

From this probable opinion many theologians infer that, if two men are in extreme necessity, one may give to the other the only bread he has; in flight from enemies he may give up his horse, though he cannot flee on foot; with plague raging, he may serve the sick; in shipwreck, he may yield the plank which he could occupy, or already has occupied: provided however he has not yet begun to use it; for in this case, says Sylvius, to yield the plank would be to throw oneself into the sea, which seems to belong to the killing of oneself, which is never lawful.]

[Since, in those things in which some principle is found, order is attended to according to comparison with that principle, and since the principle of love is God and the lover himself, it is necessary that, according to the greater nearness to one of these principles, the affection of love be greater.]

I say 1°: The better are to be loved more objectively than those more closely joined to us who are less good: inasmuch as, according to their present state of justice, we ought to will them a greater participation in beatitude than those more closely joined to us but less good, according to their present state; because it belongs to charity that it will the justice of God to be preserved, according to which those who are better participate more in beatitude¹.

I say 2°: Those more closely joined to us according to the flesh are, speaking per se, to be loved more intensively than better strangers²

It is proved. 1° because the intensity of the motion depends on its proper agent³, which is naturally apt to influence those nearer more vehemently than those farther away. Therefore.

2° Scripture in several places specially commends to us the love of relatives, besides the special precept of honoring parents, as Isa., LVIII, 7, after enumerating various works of mercy, adds: And despise not thy own flesh, that is, those who are joined to thee carnally. I Tim., V, 8: If anyone have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. Where the Apostle calls his own those who are joined in any way whatever, but those of his house those who are joined by blood.

Toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; toward relatives, however, we have other friendships as well, according to the mode of union: the friendship of sons toward parents, and conversely, of brother toward brother, of citizen toward fellow citizen, etc. And although these loves are natural or moral, in well-ordered men they are nevertheless commanded by charity; because the good on which any honest friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good on which charity is founded; whence it follows that charity commands the act of every other friendship, as the art that is about the end commands the art that is about those things that are directed to the end.

I said, « speaking per se, » because per accidens it happens that the better are to be loved more than those joined according to the flesh; as if a person to be saved were necessary for the common good; if someone snatched you from death, whether corporal or spiritual, which your parents wished to inflict on you; if he received you when abandoned by your brothers in extreme necessity and cared for you; if among those spiritually joined there be the closest bond, and scarcely any among more remote blood relations, as in the third, fourth, or fifth degree. In these and similar cases, the better are to be loved more than those joined carnally.

What is objected against this conclusion is easily solved, having before one's eyes the distinction between objective and intensive love.

I say 3°: Among variously joined persons, those joined carnally, speaking per se, are to be loved more, in things pertaining to nature, than those otherwise joined⁴.

The conclusion presupposes various modes of union: 1° according to the flesh, as between parents and blood relations; 2° according to political society, as between fellow citizens and comrades in arms, both among themselves and with their magistrates and leaders; 3° according to the reason of service, whether spiritual or temporal.

It is proved of the conclusion; because the intensity of love arises from the union of the beloved with the lover; but the carnal union of origin is prior and more immovable, and it is according to that which pertains to substance, while the others are supervening. Therefore.

I said, « in things pertaining to nature; » because in things pertaining to the other unions, those are to be loved more who are joined according to those unions⁵; understand this, however, outside necessity. Hence in war obedience is given to the general rather than to the father. Comparing, however, love with love, union with union, carnal union is to be preferred to any whatsoever, so that, if the things pertaining to carnal union and the things proper to those other unions cannot both be rendered, these latter are to be omitted, and the unions abandoned, if need be. Thus a soldier ought to leave military service so as to succor the necessity of his parents, a Religious to leave the monastery for the same end. Whence, speaking simply, those joined carnally are to be loved more than those otherwise joined.

You will gather: 1° that in grave or extreme necessity, speaking per se, succor is to be given to parents, children, wife, and probably also brothers and sisters, rather than to any benefactor however distinguished. I said, « speaking per se; » which is true under the same exceptions appended to the second conclusion. 2° Also in equal spiritual necessity, it is more probable that carnal parents and children are to be preferred to spiritual parents and children. 3° A father is to be loved more objectively than a son⁶; for he is loved under the reason of principle, which has the reason of a more eminent good, and more like to God: but a son is to be loved more intensively than a father⁷; for a son is more something of the father, than the father is something of the son. Speaking absolutely, however, the father in necessity is to be preferred to the son, because the father is loved as cause, the son as effect; and greater is the obligation of effect toward cause, than of cause toward effect. 4° A father, speaking per se, is to be loved more than a mother, because he is a nobler principle than the mother⁸. 5° A father, for the reason adduced above, is to be loved more objectively and appreciatively than a wife, but a wife more intensively than father and children; for she is more closely joined than father and children⁹.

[Moreover theologians observe that to change the order in the last three conclusions is not a grave sin, because there is no notable excess of one above another.]