Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

Hope taken generally is « a movement of the appetitive part toward a future good, arduous or difficult, yet possible of attainment. » Taken theologically, it is « a habit of mind infused by God, by which we expect with certain confidence the eternal life that is a good to be obtained with divine assistance. » It can be considered together with charity, and is then called formed hope; or without charity, and is then called unformed hope, as was said of faith.

You will ask 1° whether unformed Christian hope is a virtue.

I answer. Unformed hope is a virtue, but an imperfect one. ¹

The reason for the first part is that even unformed Christian hope fits the definition of a virtue; for it is a good quality of mind infused by God, by which one lives rightly, and no one misuses it as a principle.

The reason for the second part is that hope without charity does not make a man simply good; for although it is a principle of a good act, it is not of an act meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life; and therefore it has not the standing and character of perfect virtue, as we said before of unformed faith.

Ob. That it is not hope, but presumption, to hope for beatitude without charity.

I answer. That a sinner can hope without charity for beatitude, yet as to be obtained through charity; for at least he implicitly hopes to obtain the remission of sins, and thus, once charity has been obtained, to attain eternal life through it.]

You will ask 2° what the formal object quod of hope is.

I suppose 1° that the adequate and extensive material object of hope is eternal beatitude and all things leading to it, because all these fall under the object quo, that is, under the formal aspect of hope, which is assisting omnipotence, as I shall say presently.

I suppose 2° that among all these beatitude is the primary and principal object, which is called the formal object quod, because it is that which is principally and first of all hoped for on its own account and by reason of itself, while the rest are hoped for by reason of it. But the difficulty is why beatitude should be the formal object quod of hope: is it formal or objective? Objective beatitude is God himself; formal beatitude is the possession of God, or the beatific vision.

I answer. The formal object quod of hope is not formal but objective beatitude ², although it connotes ³ formal beatitude, or the beatific vision.

Proof. of the first part. 1° The formal object quod and immediate object of hope, which is a theological virtue, must be something purely divine and uncreated, as appears in faith and charity; otherwise religion, through whose mediation God is attained by worship, would be a theological virtue — which is commonly denied. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore.

2° That is the formal object quod of hope which hope principally and first attains on its own account and by reason of itself, and by reason of which the rest are attained. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is that, and not formal beatitude. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The one who hopes does not seek God on account of the possession, otherwise he would place his last end in a created act; but he seeks the possession of God on account of God. Likewise, he does not seek the possession of God as a thing that beatifies, but as the mode and application of the God who beatifies, so that the whole reason of beating is God himself. Thus the avaricious man seeks money as a thing, but he does not seek possession as a thing; for he does not seek possession as something to be possessed, but as the mode and application of the thing to be possessed. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part. God is not the object of hope except as to be possessed. Yet he is possessed through the beatific vision, which is formal beatitude. Therefore in the formal object quod of hope there is conveyed by connotation and obliquely the beatific vision, or formal beatitude, as the condition and application of the formal object.

[From this you will gather that neither can the aggregate of formal and objective beatitude be called the formal object quod of hope, both because this aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause; so that the whole formal aspect of the object is objective beatitude, that is, God, while its possession is only the condition required in order that it beatify: just as, when fire applied to wood burns it, fire and the application are not two causes but one only, which is fire alone.]

You will ask 3° what the formal object quo of hope is.

I answer. The formal object quo of hope is assisting omnipotence, that is, affording or offering helps ⁴.

Proof. That is the formal object quo of hope which is the motive and reason why we hope for or expect from God, with certain confidence, eternal beatitude and the means leading to it. Yet this motive is assisting omnipotence. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. We cannot hope with certain confidence for beatitude except from one whom we know to be able and willing to give it. Yet God, as omnipotent, can give it, and as assisting, that is, affording or offering helps, wills to give it. Therefore.

[You will ask 4° whether it is lawful to hope in man.

I answer. It is not lawful to hope in man ⁵, but in God alone, as in the primary cause of our beatitude; because he alone, as principal cause, can lead us to it. But it is lawful to hope in man, or in some creature, as in a secondary and instrumental agent through whom we are helped to attain whatever goods are ordered to beatitude: and in this way we turn to the saints, and ask certain things of other men.

Hence you will infer that it is also lawful to place some hope in our own merits acquired by the grace of God, as in instrumental causes, since they are means ordered by God to salvation, and all confidence is ultimately referred back to the very author of grace and of merits.]