Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

(D. Thomas, IIa IIae, from q. 17 to q. 22.)

Hope taken generally is « a movement of the appetitive part toward a future good, arduous or difficult, yet possible of attainment. » Taken theologically, it is « a habit of mind infused by God, by which we expect with certain confidence the eternal life that is a good to be obtained with divine assistance. » It can be considered together with charity, and is then called formed hope; or without charity, and is then called unformed hope, as was said of faith.

You will ask 1° whether unformed Christian hope is a virtue.

I answer. Unformed hope is a virtue, but an imperfect one. ¹

The reason for the first part is that even unformed Christian hope fits the definition of a virtue; for it is a good quality of mind infused by God, by which one lives rightly, and no one misuses it as a principle.

The reason for the second part is that hope without charity does not make a man simply good; for although it is a principle of a good act, it is not of an act meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life; and therefore it has not the standing and character of perfect virtue, as we said before of unformed faith.

Ob. That it is not hope, but presumption, to hope for beatitude without charity.

I answer. That a sinner can hope without charity for beatitude, yet as to be obtained through charity; for at least he implicitly hopes to obtain the remission of sins, and thus, once charity has been obtained, to attain eternal life through it.]

You will ask 2° what the formal object quod of hope is.

I suppose 1° that the adequate and extensive material object of hope is eternal beatitude and all things leading to it, because all these fall under the object quo, that is, under the formal aspect of hope, which is assisting omnipotence, as I shall say presently.

I suppose 2° that among all these beatitude is the primary and principal object, which is called the formal object quod, because it is that which is principally and first of all hoped for on its own account and by reason of itself, while the rest are hoped for by reason of it. But the difficulty is why beatitude should be the formal object quod of hope: is it formal or objective? Objective beatitude is God himself; formal beatitude is the possession of God, or the beatific vision.

I answer. The formal object quod of hope is not formal but objective beatitude ², although it connotes ³ formal beatitude, or the beatific vision.

Proof. of the first part. 1° The formal object quod and immediate object of hope, which is a theological virtue, must be something purely divine and uncreated, as appears in faith and charity; otherwise religion, through whose mediation God is attained by worship, would be a theological virtue — which is commonly denied. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore.

2° That is the formal object quod of hope which hope principally and first attains on its own account and by reason of itself, and by reason of which the rest are attained. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is that, and not formal beatitude. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The one who hopes does not seek God on account of the possession, otherwise he would place his last end in a created act; but he seeks the possession of God on account of God. Likewise, he does not seek the possession of God as a thing that beatifies, but as the mode and application of the God who beatifies, so that the whole reason of beating is God himself. Thus the avaricious man seeks money as a thing, but he does not seek possession as a thing; for he does not seek possession as something to be possessed, but as the mode and application of the thing to be possessed. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part. God is not the object of hope except as to be possessed. Yet he is possessed through the beatific vision, which is formal beatitude. Therefore in the formal object quod of hope there is conveyed by connotation and obliquely the beatific vision, or formal beatitude, as the condition and application of the formal object.

[From this you will gather that neither can the aggregate of formal and objective beatitude be called the formal object quod of hope, both because this aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause; so that the whole formal aspect of the object is objective beatitude, that is, God, while its possession is only the condition required in order that it beatify: just as, when fire applied to wood burns it, fire and the application are not two causes but one only, which is fire alone.]

You will ask 3° what the formal object quo of hope is.

I answer. The formal object quo of hope is assisting omnipotence, that is, affording or offering helps ⁴.

Proof. That is the formal object quo of hope which is the motive and reason why we hope for or expect from God, with certain confidence, eternal beatitude and the means leading to it. Yet this motive is assisting omnipotence. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. We cannot hope with certain confidence for beatitude except from one whom we know to be able and willing to give it. Yet God, as omnipotent, can give it, and as assisting, that is, affording or offering helps, wills to give it. Therefore.

[You will ask 4° whether it is lawful to hope in man.

I answer. It is not lawful to hope in man ⁵, but in God alone, as in the primary cause of our beatitude; because he alone, as principal cause, can lead us to it. But it is lawful to hope in man, or in some creature, as in a secondary and instrumental agent through whom we are helped to attain whatever goods are ordered to beatitude: and in this way we turn to the saints, and ask certain things of other men.

Hence you will infer that it is also lawful to place some hope in our own merits acquired by the grace of God, as in instrumental causes, since they are means ordered by God to salvation, and all confidence is ultimately referred back to the very author of grace and of merits.]

1° : Hope remains in all faithful wayfarers, even in sinners who do not despair or presume.

Proof. 1° because the Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 6 and canon 3, and session XIV, chapter 4, requires hope in sinners who dispose themselves to justification. St. Thomas, in the preceding question 17, a. 8, teaches that hope, in the order of generation, precedes charity, and in Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 4, that faith and hope can exist without charity.

2° A habit is destroyed either accidentally, by the destruction of its foundation, or per se by its contrary, or by the destruction of its object. Yet the foundation of hope, which is faith, remains in faithful sinners, and sins of any kind, except despair and presumption, are not contrary to hope; there remains also the formal object quod of hope, namely future beatitude arduous and possible, and the formal object quo, at least assisting omnipotence. For although a sinner cannot hope to attain beatitude while remaining in the same state, he can nevertheless hope, by the assistance of omnipotence, to change his state, and, once it is changed, to obtain beatitude through grace and charity.

[I said 1° : « In all faithful wayfarers, » because in heretics, since in them the foundation of hope, which is faith, is destroyed, hope also is destroyed; hence, although they may seem to hope, their hope is not theological, but human and false.

I said 2° : « Who do not despair or presume, » because despair and presumption are contrary to hope: of these below.]

I say 2° : In the damned hope does not remain, but it does remain in the souls in Purgatory. ¹

Proof. of the first part. Hope is concerned with future beatitude as possible. Yet it belongs to the condition of the misery of the damned that they know that they can in no way escape damnation and arrive at beatitude. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Hope is founded on faith. Yet faith does not remain in the damned, as we said in the treatise on Faith, dissertation IV, article 2, On those having faith, I say 2°. Therefore neither does hope.

Proof. of the second part. With respect to the souls in Purgatory, beatitude is still absent, arduous, and to be attained through grievous punishments, and thus it is the object of hope.

I say 3° : Theological hope, neither as to its act nor as to its habit, remains in the blessed. ²

Proof. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., VIII, 24, who says : Hope that is seen is not hope; for what does a man see, why doth he hope?

Proof. 2°. When that which gives the species is removed, the species is dissolved, and the same thing cannot remain. ³ Yet in the blessed the formal object from which hope has its species is removed. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The formal object of hope is future beatitude not yet possessed. Therefore in the blessed, etc. Hence, although the blessed still seem to hope for something, either for themselves, as the glory of the body, or for others, as essential beatitude itself, it is not theological hope, but hope commonly and broadly so called, or rather desire flowing from the love of charity.

[You will ask whether fear joined to hope is good.

I answer. A fourfold fear is distinguished : human, servile, filial, and initial. ⁴

1° Human or worldly fear is the flight from temporal evil through offense against God. It is mortally or venially evil, according as it leads into mortal or venial sin. Hence that saying, Matt., X, 28 : Do not be afraid of those who kill the body. And, Luc., IX, 26 : Whoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed. Nevertheless, just as evil love of temporal things does not constitute a particular species of vice, but wanders generically through all the vices; so too, proportion being kept, human fear, considered absolutely.

2° Servile fear of God is the flight from sin out of dread of the punishment to be inflicted by God. It is twofold : 1° Fear servilely or formally servile, by which only the punishment is dreaded, without the mind pursuing guilt with hatred; so that a man would wish to sin if no punishment impended. This fear is evil and vicious, both because it does not exclude the will to sin, and because it holds the punishment of sin dearer than the guilt itself. 2° Fear servile only materially, by which the mind truly turns away from guilt on account of punishment indeed, yet is not so disposed that it would commit sin if the punishment were absent. This latter fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, and it is good, though not perfect; for it arises from a well-ordered love of self. Hence Christ the Lord, Luc., XII, 5 : I will show you whom you shall fear. Fear him who, after he has killed, has power to cast into hell. Yea, I say to you, fear him. And the Council of Trent, session VI, canon 8 : « If anyone shall say that the fear of hell, through which we take refuge in the mercy of God with sorrow for sins, or abstain from sinning, is a sin, or makes sinners worse : let him be anathema. »

3° Filial, or chaste, fear is the fear of sin, in order to avoid offending God. « It belongs to sons to fear the offense of a father, » says the Angelic Doctor ⁵. This fear is most excellent, because it arises from charity; indeed it grows as charity grows; for the more one loves God, the more one fears to displease him by sin. Such fear wonderfully aids hope, since the more we shrink from offending God and distrust our own strength, the greater reason we have for hoping.

4° Initial fear is the flight from sin primarily as it is the evil of guilt, secondarily as it is the cause of punishment. It is called initial, 1° because it belongs to those beginning to walk in the way of God's commandments; for they are led partly by love of virtue, partly by dread of punishment; 2° because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, Ps. cx, 10.]

[Necessity is either of means or of precept; it concerns hope whether habitual or actual.

I say 1° : Habitual hope is necessary for all men, both children and adults, by necessity of means for justification and salvation.

Proof. 1° Sacred Scripture. The Apostle says, Rom., VII, 24 : By hope we are saved. Therefore without hope, just as without faith and charity, there is no salvation; consequently neither justification, since only the just man is to be saved. The same, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity. Hope is here placed among the three virtues which now, that is, in the present life, are necessary for the life of the soul, or for justification. To those who had come to the Church from paganism the same Apostle says, Ephes., II, 12 : You were at that time without Christ,... strangers to the covenants, having no hope of the promise, and without God in this world. Whence those who have no hope are estranged from Christ and God, and therefore not just. Similar things are read Tit., III, 7 ; Hebr., X, 23.

Proof. 2° from Trident., sess. VI, cap. 7 : « Faith, unless hope and charity come to it, neither unites one perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of his body. » What is dealt with here is not acts, but the habits of these three virtues.

Proof. 3° by reason. Man is not just unless his will is ordered to his last end, that is, to eternal beatitude. Yet he cannot be thus ordered unless he hopes that he will obtain this end. Therefore.

I say 2° : Actual hope is necessary for all adults possessed of reason, by necessity both of means and of precept.

Proof. first part. 1° The just, without hope, cannot ask of God graces and helps of every kind for persevering in justice and for attaining the last end. This is intimated by the text of Paul cited above : By hope we are saved. — 2° Sinners certainly need hope in order to dispose themselves for justification, as Trident. teaches, loc. cit. Moreover, in both cases the habit alone does not suffice, but an act is required, that man may be moved toward God.

Confirmation. The habit of hope is necessary by necessity of means for justification. Yet this habit is ordered to act. Therefore.

Proof. second part. 1° The Apostle, Hebr., X, 23 : Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering ; for he is faithful who hath promised. The confession of hope is nothing else than an act, and the precept is expressed by this word, let us hold fast. 1 Tim., V, 5 : But she that is a widow indeed, let her hope in God, and continue in supplications. Let her hope contains alike the act and the precept. Ibid., VI, 17 : Charge them... not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. The same, I Petr., I, 13 : Being sober,... hope perfectly for the grace that is offered you in the revelation of Jesus Christ. — 2° Acts of faith, hope, and charity, which are of necessity of means, are likewise necessary by necessity of precept, because God certainly and necessarily wills these means to be employed. Yet the act of hope is necessary by necessity of means. Therefore. — 3° This necessity is brought out by the condemnation of the following proposition, n. 1, by Alexander VII : « Man is never bound, at any time of his life, to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity in virtue of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues. »

The necessity of the act of hope was denied by the Quietists. Indeed, Michael de Molinos went so far as to teach that the interior life consists in this, that man annihilate his powers and hold himself merely passive, because « to will to act actively is to offend God, who wills to be himself the only agent. » Applying this principle, which is destructive of every act of every virtue, to hope, Molinos said : « The soul ought not to think either of reward or of punishment; nor of paradise, nor of hell; nor of death, nor of eternity. » This proposition is the 7th among the 68 condemned by Innocent XII. The doctrine of absolute quietism had already been reprobated by this definition of Trident., sess. VI, can. 31 : « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he performs good works with a view to eternal reward; let him be anathema. » The Semi-Quietists, among whom the most illustrious Fénelon held first place for some time, did not indeed reprobate the act of hope as evil, but they held it to be less perfect, teaching that the soul can be raised to a state of charity so pure as to become wholly indifferent to the things that concern itself, and « to will nothing for itself, all things for God. » This system is sufficiently known from these three propositions, which are the 1st, 2nd, and 4th among the 23 condemned by Innocent XII : « There is given a habitual state of the love of God which is pure charity, and in which there is no admixture whatsoever of interested motive. Neither the fear of punishments nor the desire of rewards have any longer a part in it. God is loved no longer on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of the happiness to be found in loving. » — « In the state of the contemplative or unitive life, every motive of interested fear and hope is lost. » — « In the state of holy indifference, the soul no longer has voluntary and deliberate desires on account of its own interest, except on those occasions in which it fails faithfully to cooperate with all its grace. »

All know how humbly and even cheerfully Fénelon embraced the pontifical decree, of whom it is reported that Innocent said that « the Archbishop of Cambrai sinned only through excess of the love of God. »

You will ask when the precept of hope binds.

I answer. 1° It binds, like the precept of faith, per se : 1° at the beginning of the use of reason, namely when eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the last end to which everyone must tend; 2° in danger of death, that man may be strengthened against the temptations that then commonly arise, and be borne toward God as the end soon to be attained; 3° frequently in life, at least once each year; for without an act of hope we can neither persist in the state of justice nor act meritoriously. Besides, virtual hope suffices, which the faithful exercise everywhere, e. g., when they pray or receive the sacraments.

2° It binds per accidens : 1° when an act of another virtue must be elicited by precept, e. g., of prayer or of penance, which cannot be exercised without at least an implicit act of hope; 2° when one finds himself in danger of despair; 3° in every temptation, when there is danger of consenting to it unless hope raises up the mind.¹

[The sins opposed to hope are of two kinds: some of them are contrary to the desire for eternal beatitude, others to the confidence of obtaining it.

I say 1°: To the desire for eternal beatitude are opposed: 1° the affection of this age, whereby earthly things are desired more than eternal ones; 2° a disordered affection for heavenly felicity, whereby out of weariness of life and labor ultimate happiness is sought.

The former affection is a mortal sin if earthly things are set up as the ultimate end: e.g., if one were so disposed as to wish to dwell perpetually in the present life and to leave heaven to God, if God were willing to leave him the earth. The latter does not exceed venial, unless there be present an express rebellion against divine providence. One may licitly wish for his own death in order to avoid sin or some other immense evil, provided he submit himself to the divine will,¹ and in no other sense than the Apostle when he says, Rom., VII, 24: Unhappy man that I am! who will deliver me from the body of this death?

I say 2°: To the fiducial expectation of eternal beatitude there is opposed, by way of defect, despair; by way of excess, presumption.

1° Despair is « a giving over of the soul, or a movement of the will, whereby one refuses to attain beatitude through the ordinary means. » It is also defined otherwise, « a want of confidence in obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for obtaining it. »

Despair is a sin; which the Angelic Doctor proves thus, here q. 20, a. 1, o: « Every appetitive movement conformed to true understanding is good in itself; but every appetitive movement conformed to false understanding is evil in itself and sin. Now the true judgment of the intellect concerning God is that salvation comes from Him, and pardon is granted to sinners...; but it is a false opinion that forgiveness is denied to a repentant sinner, or that God does not convert sinners to Himself through justifying grace. And therefore, just as the movement of hope, which conforms to true judgment, is praiseworthy and virtuous; so the opposite movement of despair, which conforms to a false judgment about God, is vicious and a sin. »

This sin is mortal, and indeed most grievous, yet less than the sin of unbelief and hatred of God, but more dangerous, as is shown by the same Doctor, ibid., a. 3, o: « That which has aversion from God first and in itself is the most grievous sin among mortal sins. Now to the theological virtues are opposed unbelief, despair, and hatred of God: among which hatred and unbelief, if compared with despair, are found in themselves, that is according to the account of their own species, graver. For unbelief arises from this, that man does not believe the very truth of God; hatred of God from this, that man's will is opposed to the divine goodness itself; but despair from this, that man does not hope to partake of the goodness of God. From this it is evident that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, but despair as His good is partaken of by us. Hence it is a greater sin, speaking absolutely, not to believe the truth of God, or to hate God, than not to hope to obtain glory from Him. But if despair be compared to those two sins on our part, then despair is more dangerous; because by hope we are recalled from evils and led on to pursue goods. And therefore, when hope is taken away, men unrestrained fall into vices and are withdrawn from laborious goods... And Isidore says in his book de Summo bono: « To commit any crime is the death of the soul; but to despair is to descend into hell. »

It follows that despair properly so called admits no parvity of matter, although at times it may become venial, owing to a defect of full consent.² Therefore the confessor must examine whether, out of an affect of despair, the customary exercises of piety have been intermitted, especially while the precept urged, or not. Thence he will have a sufficiently safe indication of consent given or refused. He should note, however, that many penitents despair not of God's mercy, but of their own cooperation with His grace; which ought not properly to be called despair, but is pusillanimity, which admits parvity of matter.

2° Presumption, which is more frequent than despair, arises from a defect of the fear of God, and is defined: « A rash expectation of beatitude or of the means thereto. »

It is a sin, and indeed, according to St. Thomas, here q. 21, a. 1, o, « it is properly a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, because by such presumption the aid of the Holy Spirit, whereby man is recalled from sin, is removed or contemned. »

It is a grave sin in itself, which is not excused from being so, save by the imperfection of the act. The Angelic Doctor gives the reason, ibid., a. 2, o: « As was said above concerning despair, every appetitive movement which conforms to false understanding is evil in itself and sin. But presumption is a certain appetitive movement, because it imports a certain disordered hope; and it conforms to false understanding, as does despair. For if it is false that God does not grant forgiveness to penitents, or that He does not convert sinners to penance; so too it is false that He grants forgiveness to those persevering in sin, and bestows glory on those ceasing from good work: to which judgment the movement of presumption conforms itself. And therefore presumption is a sin, yet less than despair; because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish, on account of His infinite goodness. For the former belongs to God in Himself, the latter on account of our sins. »

Hence: 1° He sins who hopes for salvation either on account of his own merits, or on account of the merits of Christ, without any cooperation of his own works.³ — 2° Likewise he sins mortally who, in hope of pardon, is induced to sin, because, e.g., God forgives many sins as easily as one. But it is otherwise if he were to say that he would confess many sins as easily as one: which of itself is only venial.⁴ — 3° He contracts no guilt of presumption properly so called who sins in hope of pardon, so that this hope is not the motive of sinning, but merely accompanies the sin. — 4° Those who persevere in sin in the hope of repenting sometime are with difficulty excused from grave sin against the charity due to themselves, since they expose themselves to great danger of damnation.⁵

It must be observed that with the sin of either despair or presumption there is sometimes joined the sin of heresy, e.g., if one were to judge, like Cain, his own sin to be unforgivable; or if one were to hope for salvation by the sole powers of nature, as the Pelagians; or by faith alone, without works, as the Lutherans.]