Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

[By the name of council the same thing is signified in the Church as by the name of assemblies in a kingdom. For just as, when a controversy arises concerning things pertaining to the good of the commonwealth, the princes of the kingdom or magistrates gather together, or deputies elected by the people, that they may determine what needs to be done; so, when some controversy arisen in the Church concerning things pertaining to religion must be settled, the prelates of the particular churches come together, and, their opinions being compared at once, they determine what seems good. So we see it done by the Apostles, Acts, xv, where Christian councils began to be celebrated, and thereafter in each age.

The Latin name of council is found everywhere in the Old and New Testament for the assemblies of the Jews, but the Greek name, that is σύνοδος, is not found in the Scriptures; for where we read in Latin concilium, in the Greek text there is everywhere συνέδριον or συναγωγή. But the name synod appears first in the canons of the Apostles, canon 36, where bishops are commanded to hold councils twice each year; then it is read in Eusebius, book V of his History, chap. 23, and thereafter in all authors.

A council can be defined: « A gathering of ecclesiastical persons, especially bishops, convoked by legitimate authority, to determine what pertains to the religion and morals of Christians. »

We have the use of councils from the Apostles, as was said, and it is probable that their institution is divine, both from what is said, Matt., XVIII, 20: Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them; and because it is likely that the Apostles celebrated the first council either from the precept of Christ or from a special motion of the Holy Spirit, which was the norm of those that followed, and in which it was licit for them to say, Acts, xv, 28: It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us.

Now there are four kinds of councils, namely general, national, provincial, and diocesan. General are called those to which the bishops of the whole world are convoked and can and ought to be present, unless legitimately impeded, and over which no one rightly presides except the Supreme Pontiff, or another in his name. Hence they are also called ecumenical, that is, councils of the whole earth. In national councils the archbishops and bishops of one kingdom or nation come together, over whom some patriarch or primate presides. Such were many Roman, Toledan, and African councils, concerning which it must be noted that, although they are distinguished from general and provincial ones, they are sometimes nevertheless called by the names of either, respectively with regard to the nation or kingdom. Provincial are properly called those in which only the bishops of one ecclesiastical province come together, over whom the archbishop or metropolitan presides. Diocesan are those in which only the priests of one bishopric come together, and over these presides the bishop, who alone possesses jurisdiction. Ordinarily gatherings of this kind are not adorned with the name of council, but are called synods, and they differ from councils in this, that the priests do not sit as judges, and have not a decisive voice but only a consultative one.]

[It is agreed by all that councils, especially general ones, are most useful to the Church, and Paul III declares this in the bull of the indiction of the Council of Trent, saying: « Calling to mind that our forebears, endowed with admirable wisdom and soundness, often in the gravest perils of the Christian commonwealth employed as the best and most opportune remedy ecumenical councils and general gatherings of bishops, we also have set our mind on holding a general council. » The controversy here, therefore, concerns only absolute necessity: 1° against the heretics who, that they might elude the condemnation imminent to them or pronounced against them by the Roman Pontiff, as happened in the cause of Jansenism, did not hesitate to appeal to a general council; 2° against those who, among Catholics, contended that general councils must be frequented of necessity, because the Pope alone, without the concurrence of bishops, cannot sufficiently provide for the good governance of the Church. Whence

I say 1°: General councils are not simply necessary.

It is proved. 1° That is not simply necessary to the Church which does not pertain essentially to its government. Yet general councils do not pertain essentially to the government of the Church. Therefore they are not simply necessary. — The major is evident. — Proof. of the minor: Christ conferred on Peter and his successors all power and authority necessary for governing the Church, when he said to Peter, John, XXI, 15 and 17: Feed my sheep. And Matt., XVI, 18 and 19: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church... And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc. Yet by these and similar words Peter was constituted supreme rector of the Church, and there was conferred on him the fullness of power for governing the Church monarchically in the place and name of Christ. Therefore, since Peter could, and the Pope can, do whatever things are required for governing the Christian people, general councils do not pertain essentially to the government of the Church.

2° That is not simply necessary to the Church without which the greatest evils can be extinguished and have been extinguished. Yet the greatest evils can be extinguished and have been extinguished without general councils. Therefore general councils are not simply necessary. — Proof. of the minor: Before the Council of Nicaea, that is, for three hundred years and more, various hereses arose and schisms were born, hatched by Montanus and Novatian. Now these are the greatest evils with which the Church can be afflicted. Yet these evils were extinguished by the sole authority of the Roman Pontiffs and of bishops executing their decisions. Therefore. Whence Augustine, to the Pelagians complaining that they had been condemned by simple bishops « without the gathering of a synod, » answers, book IV contra duas epist. Pelag. ad Bonif., chap. 12, n. 34: « Was the gathering of a synod needed, that open ruin might be condemned? As if no heresy was ever condemned except by the gathering of a synod — whereas such are found very rarely indeed, for the condemnation of which this necessity existed; and far more, incomparably more numerous are those which, where they existed, merited to be disapproved and condemned there, and thence were able to become known as to be avoided through the other lands. But the pride of these men so exalts itself against God... that for their sake a synod of East and West must be gathered... Whereas rather, by vigilance and pastoral diligence, after competent and sufficient judgment made concerning them, wherever those wolves appear they are to be crushed, either that they may be healed and changed, or that they may be avoided for the salvation and integrity of others, the Shepherd of shepherds assisting, who seeks the lost sheep even among the little ones, etc. » Hence also the Faculty of Paris, the Jansenists appealing to a future council from the dogmatic constitutions of the Roman Pontiff, issued this declaration on February 9, 1663: « It is not absolutely necessary that a general council exist for uprooting whatever schisms and whatever heresies, e.g., the Pelagian and Jansenist, which are established to have been sufficiently extinguished without a general council, which is necessary only in certain cases. »

It is confirmed by historical facts. If seven general councils were celebrated for extinguishing seven heresies, more than one hundred heresies have been extinguished by the Apostolic See alone, particular councils cooperating; and if one schism was removed by the general Council of Constance, schisms above twenty-five were cut away without a general council. Therefore.

I say 2°: A general council is sometimes morally necessary.

Proof. A general council is morally necessary if, without such a council, it be morally impossible that Catholic truth be placed perfectly in safety and the unity of the Church be wholly repaired. Yet this can happen. Therefore.

Proof. of the minor from facts. 1° As regards Catholic doctrine, when the Arian pestilence had invaded nearly the whole Orient, it seemed that the gathering of the Council of Nicaea was the fitter means, because the more solemn, for extinguishing the heresy. So it was done; and with subsequent heresies it was so necessary to expel them, that Christian princes themselves importuned the Holy See for the gathering of a council, of which thing we have an illustrious example in the convocation and celebration of the Council of Trent. In our own age, when errors of every kind everywhere invaded the minds of many and cast into peril not only revealed truths but reason itself; when moreover it never seemed more necessary that the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff be placed beyond every doubt, because the favorers both of gallicanism and of liberalism either denied it or made light of it: five hundred bishops gathered at Rome in the year 1867 « were filled with the highest joy, as Pius IX himself solemnly attested, when from his sacred mouth they understood that amid so many crises of the present time he was of this counsel, that he would summon, as the remedy in the gravest perils of the Christian cause, an ecumenical council — the greatest, as said his illustrious predecessor Paul III. » 2° As regards the unity of the Church, indeed all general councils labored for its repair when shaken by heresies; but no other medium seemed available for undertaking and bringing this work to a happy issue, when in the fifteenth century the Church was torn apart by a dire and long schism, than to summon a general council, that a certain Pope might be elected: which begun at Pisa was completed at Constance.

From this it follows that, however necessary a general council may seem in certain and transitory circumstances, as an extraordinary medium of providing for the good of the Church, this necessity can occur only rarely, and outside the case in which a certain Pope is not acknowledged by the whole Church, it pertains to the Roman Pontiff, as will soon appear, to judge and pronounce concerning it.

Some, however, especially among the favorers of gallicanism, having gone further, did not hesitate to assert that the Pope cannot sufficiently provide for the good of the Church, even ordinarily, both in publishing decrees of faith and in enacting disciplinary laws, unless all these things be determined in a general council and afterwards committed by the Pontiff to execution; as if he himself and he alone were not endowed with supreme doctrinal and legislative power and authority. Thence they concluded that the decree should be renewed and observed by which the Council of Constance, session XXXIX, concerning general councils, sanctioned that general councils « henceforth are to be celebrated perpetually from decade to decade, » which, they said, obtained the force of obliging law through the approval of Martin V, who, session XLIV, « desiring and willing to satisfy the decree of this general council, » indicted the next council in the city of Pavia, where, Martin having died, it was celebrated by Eugene IV. Only by this way, they affirmed, could the power of the Roman Pontiff be perfectly reconciled with the rights and divine authority of the bishops.¹

Among the many arguments by which this system can be refuted, let it suffice to propose the following.

1° As was said, a general council, by its nature, is an extraordinary medium of healing the gravest evils by which the Church could be shaken, and these evils can occur neither frequently nor at equally distant times. Therefore recourse must be had to a general council only extraordinarily. Therefore periodicity and decenniality accord not with the nature of a general council.

2° Those who contended that a general council must often be frequented asserted this because, in their opinion, 1° since supreme authority belongs not to the Pope alone but to the body of pastors, that is, collectively to the Pope and the bishops, so that no act pertaining to the government of the Church becomes absolute and definitive except from the concurrence of these two elements,² unless the Pope submit his decrees to the ratification of the bishops in council, he inflicts detriment on their authority; 2° because papal definitions, in the matter of faith and morals, would not be irreformable unless with the consent of the Church intervening, that is, of the bishops, as the Declaration of the Clergy of Gaul of the year 1682 maintains, and this consent would be rendered solemnly, more expediently and more certainly in a general council.

— To these I answer: 1° The power of the Supreme Pontiff is ordinary in the whole Church, and supreme, as has been proved above. Therefore his decrees are of themselves absolute and definitive. Therefore they do not need the ratification of the bishops. Therefore, when he exercises this supreme power, nowise does he harm the authority of the bishops who, from the institution of Christ, are truly the pastors of their churches, under dependence on the supreme Pastor of the whole Church. Therefore, far from the authority of the bishops being pressed down by the Pope, detracting is done from the authority of the Pope by this assertion. 2° This doctrine, which never was common in the Church since it was pierced through by the solemn definition of the Vatican Council, must be held formally heretical, as has been proved above.

3° As regards the Constantinopolitan decree on celebrating a general council each decade, it must be said, 1° that it could have seemed opportune to the council thus to decree, so that, if perhaps the schism which it was trying to extinguish should persevere, there would be ready the supreme medium of providing for the peril of the Church, and this disposition answered a transitory necessity. 2° When this decree was enacted, session XXXIX, the assembly of bishops was not a perfect council, because gathered outside the authority of the Pontiff, with a certain Pope not yet elected, it lacked its true and necessary head; and besides the election of the Pope, which it was not licit to defer, such a council had not the right of enacting laws pertaining to the ordinary administration of the Church. 3° Indeed Martin V, elected in session XI, determined in session XLIV that the next council was to be celebrated in the city of Pavia, « that he might satisfy the decree of this general council, » and thus it was prudent to act, lest a rupture between the new Pontiff and the council throw everything again into peril; truly he could not abdicate from his supreme power, by force of which the convocation of a general council pertains to the Pope alone, whenever and as often as it seems to him necessary and opportune. 4° In the XLVth and last session, the Pontiff being asked to confirm the acts of the council — by which petition the council acknowledged that nothing was absolute and definitive before that confirmation — answered with his own mouth that « he wished to hold and inviolably observe all and singular things decreed conciliarly by the council in the matter of faith, and not otherwise, nor in any other manner; » which he afterwards ordered to be repeated through the advocate of the council. Moreover, the decree on the periodicity and decenniality of the general council was not included in the matter of faith, which principally regarded the condemnation of the heresies of John Wycliffe, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague. Therefore that decree was not formally confirmed by the Pontiff. It must be added that even if this confirmation had intervened, the execution of such a law was to be left to the future judgment of the Pope, who, as was demonstrated in the preceding dissertation, is above the council, both while its celebration endures and after it is completed. Moreover, in fact the periodicity of councils was not afterwards observed, and it is incredible that the Popes neglected for four centuries and more a true law strictly binding them and necessary for the good governance of the Church.]

It belongs to the Supreme Pontiff alone, certain and undoubted, to convoke a general council.¹

It is proved. 1° Julius, in his letter to the Orientals, in Socrates, lib. II, chap. 13, says: « The ecclesiastical canon forbids that decrees be sanctioned for the churches without the opinion of the Roman Bishop; » or, as Cassiodorus reads it in the Hist. tripart., « that councils must not be celebrated without the opinion of the Roman Pontiff. » This is related in cap. Regula of the cited place, dist. 17; and this canon, renewed by the synod of Nicaea, the Alexandrian synod writes, epist. to Pope Felix.

Pelagius II, epist. 1, chap. 1, to the bishops who had not come together at the convocation of John of Constantinople, says: « By many apostolic again, and canonical, and ecclesiastical rules we are instructed that councils must not be celebrated without the opinion of the Roman Pontiff. » It is related in cap. Multis, dist. 17.

In the Council of Chalcedon, act. I, Dioscorus was forbidden to sit among the bishops, « because, say the Fathers, he dared make a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See; which was never licit, never done. »

If you say that from these it follows that even diocesan or provincial councils cannot be convoked except by the Roman Pontiff, especially since in cap. Nec licuit, of the same dist. 17, Pelagius II says that neither is it licit to celebrate a particular synod without the authority of the Apostolic See — but the consequent is not admitted. Therefore.

I answer: that the laws and the Pontiffs themselves grant, nay command, bishops and archbishops to celebrate particular councils; and thus they are celebrated not without their authority. The chapter Nec licuit speaks of particular synods gathered against a universal synod. It is plain from the rubric, which runs thus: « Without the authority of the Apostolic See it is not licit for some to gather a particular synod against a universal one. »

It is proved. 2° To those alone belongs the right of convoking a general council who have the care of the whole Church and authority over the bishops to be convoked. Yet this is the Roman Pontiff, as appears from the preceding dissertation. Therefore. — Of the major also it is established; because a general council regards the universal Church, and without authority over the bishops, by which they are compelled to appear at the council, the convocation would be fruitless and impotent.

You will say: The eastern councils were for the most part convoked by the authority of emperors. Therefore.

I answer: that no council of the orientals was convoked without at least the assent of the Supreme Pontiff, consequently without his authority. For although, speaking absolutely, authority and assent are not the same, nevertheless in him who has authority to do something, to consent to it is for it to be done by his authority. Whence, since the authority of convoking councils rests with the Pope alone, as has been proved, it is the same thing with respect to him to give consent to the convocation of a council and to convoke it through another.

[I said in the conclusion: « of a Pontiff certain and undoubted; » because in the case of schism, in which there would be doubtful popes, as happened at the time of the Council of Constance, the Church could, through her prelates, convoke a council to succor the present necessity, namely, to provide herself with a certain Pope. But if it should further define anything in the matter of faith and morals, or in things pertaining to the universal Church, it will not be ratified and firm unless confirmed by the subsequent Pope, as was said already before.]

You will ask 1° who are those that may be convoked by right to a general council.

I answer. Only bishops are to be summoned by right to a general council.

Proof. 1°. Those alone are to be summoned by right to a general council who have jurisdiction not only in the internal forum but also in the external ecclesiastical forum. But only bishops have jurisdiction of this kind. Therefore. — The minor is evident; for laymen, of whatever condition or dignity they may be, even imperial, do not have jurisdiction in the external ecclesiastical forum, since it is spiritual. Nor inferior clerics, such as curates. This is clear from usage, and because they are not primary and proper pastors, but, as the Author says in IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 6, ad 2, «have only certain ministrations under the bishops,» which the bishops limit at their nod.

— Proof of the major. In general councils not only are controversies concerning faith, morals, and the private causes of bishops simply defined, but laws are also enacted, penalties are decreed, and the contumacious are compelled to obey the definitions and sentences pronounced. But these things pertain to the external forum of the Church. Therefore.

Proof. 2°. From the usage of the Church, which is not accustomed to summon to general councils anyone but bishops by right.

I said «by right»; because sometimes Abbots and Generals of Orders are summoned by privilege of the supreme Pontiffs, with a decisive right of vote, and that not incongruously, namely as representing their subjects, who were exempted by a prior privilege from the jurisdiction of the bishops.

[When the convocation of the Vatican Council was under discussion, it was keenly disputed whether bishops administering no diocese, formerly called annular or honorary bishops, although marked with the episcopal character, ought by right to be admitted to it; such bishops were then called bishops in partibus infidelium, because their sees were situated in regions that were not Christian; now, however, by a decree laid down by Pius IX, they are called titular, or shining with title alone. Not a few held the negative side, on the ground that bishops sit in a council chiefly as witnesses of the faith of their churches. The most wise Pontiff, passing over the speculative question of strict right, composed the dispute in practice, by summoning the titular bishops together with the diocesan bishops.]

Theologians and canonists are also summoned, not with a decisive right of vote, but that they may inquire into and examine the matters of faith and of the Church, and report their opinions to the Fathers of the council. Likewise emperors are sometimes summoned, not to define the matters of the Church, but to defend and aid the council, and to be witnesses of the decrees and to commit them to execution more willingly and more effectively, and to coerce rebels with penalties.

You will ask 2° what number of bishops is required for a general council.

I answer. It is not required that absolutely all the bishops of the whole world be present; otherwise general councils could never be celebrated. Nor is a fixed number of bishops required, since this is had neither from Scripture, nor from tradition, nor from usage. But it is required that the convocation made by the authority of the supreme Pontiff become known to all, at least to the greater provinces, and that no true bishop who is not excommunicated be excluded from any part of the whole world, but that some from the greater part of the provinces be present: yet so that, if the council is celebrated in the East, more from the East be present, and some from the West to represent the others, and conversely, if it is celebrated in the West. This is clear from the practice of the Church in the earlier councils.

You will ask 3° whether bishops in a council are truly judges, or only counselors.

I answer. As I said before, they are not only counselors, but truly judges, enjoying a decisive right of vote, yet subordinate to the supreme Pontiff.

Proof. 1°. The Apostles in the council of Jerusalem, Acts, XV, 34, were true judges. For they said: It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us; and James pronounced sentence under these words, ibid., 19: Therefore I judge. 2°. The bishops subscribe in the councils: «I N., decreeing,» or: «I N., defining, have subscribed.»

[Nor does it matter that the supreme Pontiffs are accustomed to say: «With the holy council approving,» or: «By the counsel of our brethren»; because indeed the bishops approve and give counsel, but they not only render this, they also judge together with the Pontiff. The Pontiff says, by their counsel, and not by their judgment, because he receives counsel from them, but not judgment, nor the power of judging, which he has from God alone.]

I said «yet subordinate to the supreme Pontiff»; because the supreme Pontiff sits in the council, not as a simple president, but as prince. Now judges in the senate are subordinate to the prince, so that he is not bound to follow the greater part of the judges, but could nullify their judgment.

You will ask 4° whose it is to preside over a general council.

I answer. To preside authoritatively over a general council belongs to the supreme Pontiff alone, by himself or through his legates.

Proof. 1°. To preside authoritatively over a general council belongs to him whose it is to preside over the whole Church, which the general council represents. But to preside authoritatively over the whole Church belongs to the supreme Pontiff alone, whose head, pastor, and prince he doubtless is, as is clear from the preceding dissertation. Therefore. 2°. To preside over a general council belongs to him whose it is to convoke it, as is clear in diocesan, provincial, and national councils. But to convoke a general council belongs to the Pontiff alone, as was proved in art. 1. Therefore. 3°. If a synod had been celebrated in the time of Christ, Christ would without doubt have presided over it. Therefore this belongs to his Vicar.

Proof. 4°. From the usage and practice of the Church. No general council has been celebrated up to this time over which the supreme Pontiff has not presided, by himself or through his legates. Therefore the Church has consistently recognized in him the right of presiding.

[You will say: Emperors are often said to have presided over councils. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Emperors are often said to have presided over councils by place and honor, I concede; by authority and power, I deny. Or they are said to have presided in order to protect the council and preserve order, I concede; in order to define and decree in matters of faith and in things pertaining to purely ecclesiastical discipline, I deny.]

A general council lawfully convoked and confirmed by the supreme Pontiff is infallible in defining questions of faith and morals.

Proof. 1° from all that by which we proved in dissertation III, art. 5, that the universal Church, whether believing or teaching, cannot err; for a general council is the universal Church itself representatively.

Proof. 2° from all that by which we proved the infallibility of the supreme Pontiff; because, if a council confirmed by the supreme Pontiff could err, it would follow that the Pontiff himself would err by confirming erroneous definitions.

Proof. 3°. If a general council confirmed by the supreme Pontiff could err, we should have nothing certain and fixed in the Church, since no greater and more certain judgment than that of such a general council is given.

[Likewise, all the heresies condemned by general councils would revive; for heretics would say that the councils by which they were condemned had erred, or at least had not settled the question. Likewise, we should not know with certainty whether those books are canonical which the councils defined to be canonical: whence faith and religion would be wholly undermined. Likewise, the Church would have been hitherto in intolerable error, proposing as to be believed on faith what had been defined by general councils, which could be false.]

You will object: Aug., lib. II Contra Donat., c. 3, n. 4, says that earlier plenary councils can be corrected by later ones. Therefore he acknowledges them to be fallible.

I answer. I deny the consequence in the sense of the conclusion. For Augustine there speaks of plenary councils, not on questions of faith and morals, on which the conclusion proceeds; but on particular facts, in which we grant that plenary councils can err from false testimonies, and therefore can also be corrected by later councils, namely « when, as the holy Doctor says in the same place, by some experience of events what was closed is laid open, and what lay hidden comes to be known. »

[You will ask whether councils define truths that are new and not yet received in the Church.

I answer. Negatively. A definition issued by a general council is nothing other than the authentic determination of some truth which has always and everywhere been held by the universal Church as certain doctrine, so that by that very fact it stands established that this doctrine belongs to the deposit of divine revelation. It was said above that the universal Church, in which the faithful are to be reckoned as an essential part, is infallible passively, or in believing, so that, if an error in matters of faith and morals should infect some men, and even many, it cannot stain the whole Church or the greater part of the Church, since the Church of the living God is the pillar and firmament of truth, 1 Tim., III, 15. If, therefore, any controversy arises concerning these matters which ought not to be tolerated without detriment to souls, it is authoritatively declared, either by the Pope alone or by the teaching Church, that is, by the bishops judging with the Pope in council, what the universal Church has always held as true regarding the question at issue; and this definition being issued, the doctrine thus solemnly proposed must be held to be believed as of faith.

This is set forth most luminously by Vincent of Lerins in his Commonitorium, lib. I, c. 32 : « What else has the Church ever striven to accomplish by the decrees of her councils, save that what before was believed simply might afterwards be believed more diligently; what before was preached more slackly might afterwards be preached more urgently; what before was practiced more securely might afterwards be practiced more anxiously? This, I say, always, and nothing besides, has the Catholic Church accomplished by the decrees of her councils, aroused by the novelty of heretics, save that what she had before received from her elders by tradition alone she might then consign to posterity also by the written record of Scripture, comprehending a great sum of things in few words, and very often, for the sake of clearness of understanding, not marking out a new meaning of the faith, but signing it with the property of a new appellation.]

Confirmation by the supreme Pontiff must necessarily be added to a general council, so that it may be ratified and firm.

Proof. First, from Julius I, Pelagius II, and the fourth synod, whose texts we cited in art. 1 of this dissertation, according to which no council is ratified and firm unless it is supported by the authority of the Roman Pontiff. And it is supported by his confirmation as its means.

Proof. Second, from the usage and practice of the Church. All general councils celebrated up to now have been confirmed by the supreme Pontiff, and several requested his confirmation. This is an open indication that this confirmation was judged necessary; otherwise why would it have been given so accurately, so consistently, and requested so often?

Proof. Third. A general council is not ratified and firm in its decrees except insofar as it represents the universal Church. Yet it does not represent the universal Church unless it has its head, the Roman Pontiff, judging with it; nor is the Roman Pontiff considered to judge unless while he confirms the decrees of the council. Therefore.

At once, however, a not slight difficulty occurs. A general council legitimately convoked, with the apostolic legates sitting with and judging with the council, who act in the place of the Roman Pontiff and preside in his name, represents the whole Church; for it is united to its head. Therefore by this very fact its decrees are ratified and firm, and they need no further confirmation from the Pontiff.

For the unfolding of this difficulty, it must be observed that apostolic legates are sent to councils sometimes with an instruction of the supreme Pontiff concerning the questions to be defined, which is customary when few things are to be defined; sometimes without an instruction, which happens when more things are to be defined, as at the Council of Trent. With this observation premised, to the proposed difficulty

I answer. First, if the legates have an instruction and do not follow it in defining together with the council, the definition is not ratified and infallible; for since they do not then act as legates of the Pontiff, the council is not, in defining, joined to its head, nor consequently does it represent the Church.

Second, if however they follow their instruction exactly, we judge, whatever some may say, that the definition of the council is ratified and infallible, because then it has its head joined to it, namely the supreme Pontiff expressly consenting with it, and thus it represents the whole Church.

Nor should you say that this instruction of the Pontiff is not a definition ex cathedra, since otherwise the votes of the bishops would not be free; but only the definition of the Pontiff ex cathedra is infallible. I grant indeed that this instruction, while it is given, is not a definition ex cathedra; but while the council consents to it, and the decree is formed according to it, it begins to be a definition ex cathedra, and it is the definitive sentence not only of the council but also of the Pontiff, which he cannot retract. For the legates are sent precisely so that, if the council assents to the instruction, the decree be formed; if it does not assent, the decree be suspended, and in the meantime the Pontiff be consulted.

Nevertheless, in this case we judge the confirmation of the supreme Pontiff necessary, not that the decrees of the council acquire infallibility, which they already have, but that it become known to the Church that everything was duly observed in the council, and that the decrees were formed according to the instruction and mind of the Pontiff: which cannot otherwise be certainly known, since sometimes the legates, besides the public instructions, hold secret ones, which perhaps they did not produce, or at least could not produce.

Third, if however the legates are present at the council without an instruction of the supreme

Pontiff, whatever the council defines, even with them assenting, is not of infallible authority, unless the confirmation of the supreme Pontiff is added; because the Pontiff cannot confer on legates the privilege of infallibility. For it is annexed to the supreme pontificate itself, or to the dignity of the head and supreme shepherd of the Church, for whom alone Christ prayed, that his faith should not fail; but the Pope cannot make legates supreme Pontiffs and supreme shepherds of the Church.

It is confirmed. The legates with an instruction of the Pontiff can depart from it and err. Therefore they can equally err without an instruction.

But the argument made before returns. A council legitimately convoked, with the apostolic legates presiding, represents the whole Church. Yet the whole Church cannot err. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. A council legitimately convoked, with the apostolic legates presiding, represents the whole Church incompletely and imperfectly, I concede; completely and perfectly, I deny. For the consent of the head with the body is not yet had, seeing that the legates, although they preside in the name of the Pontiff, are nevertheless not the head and Pontiff with the privilege of infallibility, and he himself has not yet opened his mind concerning what is defined.

You will ask how many general councils there are.

I answer. Twenty are commonly counted: eight celebrated in the East, namely Nicaea I, to which Sardica is joined, Constantinople I, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople II, Constantinople III, Nicaea II, and Constantinople IV; eleven celebrated in the West after the schism of Photius, namely the four Lateran councils, the two of Lyons, Vienne, Constance, Florence, Lateran V, and Trent. Some add Pisa.

[In the time of the great schism, this council was convoked by the cardinals of both obediences and assembled at Pisa, in the year 1409, to extinguish the schism through the election of a Pontiff whose authority would be acknowledged by the universal Church. But the evil was not thereby removed, rather increased; for to the two pontiffs Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, pertinacious in retaining the papacy, was added a third, namely Alexander V, and peace was restored to the Church only through the election of Martin V made at the Council of Constance.

Some expunge this council from the number of general councils, because it was not convoked by the authority of the Pontiff. But it seems that, in the case of schism, when the Pontiff is doubtful, the Church has the right of convoking a council, if not ultimately to define matters of faith and morals, at least to provide herself with a certain head, as was done in the following Council of Constance: otherwise Christ would not have provided sufficiently for the necessity and security of his Church.

If this council was legitimate because of the present necessity, the chief reason why it is not commonly reckoned among the general councils seems to be that, the schism not being extinguished, it lacked the approval customarily given by a certain Pontiff, which lacking, a council, however legitimate it may be, lacks formal ecumenicity.

The twentieth is the Vatican Council, convoked by Pius IX by letters dated June 29, 1868. It was opened on December 8, 1869, on the feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother of God, and suspended by the same Pontiff, on account of "the calamitous condition of affairs," on October 20, 1870. "Therefore," says the Pontiff in the apostolic letters, "since we perceive with great sorrow of soul that affairs have been brought to such a pass that the Vatican Council cannot entirely continue its course in such a time, after mature deliberation, of our own motion, by apostolic authority, in the tenor of these presents, we suspend the celebration of the same ecumenical Vatican Council until another more opportune and fitting time, which is to be declared by this Holy See, and we announce it suspended, beseeching God, the author and defender of his Church, that, all impediments at last removed, he may the sooner restore liberty and peace to his most faithful Spouse." — May God bring it about that, the storm at last calmed by which the Church is shaken on every side, this most sacred synod, gathered again in the Holy Spirit, may happily bring to the desired end the work auspiciously begun and mournfully interrupted!]