Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

[Three opinions have been published on this question.

The first is that the supreme Pontiff has by divine law most plenary power over the whole world, in matters both ecclesiastical and political. Indeed Ostiensis even holds that the empire was transferred from the Greeks, as it were from princes of infidels, to the Church, and resides in the supreme Pontiff, as the Vicar of the supreme and true King Christ; and therefore that the Pope can give the kingdoms of infidels of his own right to whichever faithful men he wills.

The second, which Bellarmine¹ calls not so much an opinion as a heresy, is placed at the other extreme. It teaches that the Pope, as Pope and by divine law, has no temporal power whatever, nor can he in any way command secular princes, much less deprive them of their kingdoms and principality, even if they otherwise deserve to be deprived of them. This opinion, as regards temporal things, was professed by the authors of the Declaration of the Gallican Clergy of the year 1682.

The third opinion, placed in the middle, and common to Catholic theologians, holds that the Pope as Pope has directly and immediately no temporal power at all, but only spiritual; yet that, by reason of his spiritual power, he has at least indirectly a certain power in temporal things, and that a supreme one. Thus Hugh of St. Victor, lib. II de Sacramentis, p. 2, c. 4, whom Alexander Alensis follows, 3rd part of the Summa, q. 40; likewise St. Bonaventure, De origine iurisdictionis, q. 3, at the end, and many others after them. It is reported that the Roman theologians prepared a censorial judgment against Bellarmine, because he had asserted only an indirect power, and that the supreme Pontiff did not sanction this judgment, on account of the outstanding merits of the author. Hence

I say: Supreme temporal power, at least indirect, belongs to the Roman Pontiff.

The proposition is first explained. Although the Pope as such has no power that is merely temporal, he nevertheless has, in order to the spiritual good, supreme power of disposing of the temporal goods of Christians, so that thus he may be able to attain the spiritual end set before him, that is, to procure the eternal salvation of souls, which excels every temporal end.

This is illustrated by a similitude. For as spirit and flesh stand related in man, so do the two powers stand related in the Church, namely the spiritual and the temporal. Flesh is without spirit in brutes, spirit without flesh in angels. From which it appears that neither exists precisely for the sake of the other. But since the flesh is united to the spirit in man, because one person results from their conjunction, they necessarily have subordination, without which connection would be impossible. For the flesh is subject, the spirit is present; and although the spirit does not mingle itself in the actions of the flesh, but allows it to act as befits it, whenever actions of this kind hinder the end of the spirit himself, the spirit commands the flesh and chastises it, so that it may be held in the necessary dependence and subjection.

"So entirely does the political power have its own princes, its own laws, its own judgments, etc., and similarly the ecclesiastical its own bishops, its own canons, its own judgments. The former has for its end temporal peace, the latter eternal salvation. They are found sometimes separated, as formerly in the time of the Apostles, when princes of infidels were not of the bosom of the Church; sometimes joined, as now. When, however, they are joined, they make one body, and therefore, that they may be truly connected, the inferior ought to be subjected to and subordinated to the superior. And so the spiritual power does not mingle itself in temporal affairs, but allows all things to proceed in the same manner in which they were done before the union, provided they do not harm the spiritual end, or are not necessary for attaining this end. If, however, something of this kind occurs, the spiritual power can and must coerce the temporal in every manner and way that seems necessary for that purpose.

Proof. 1st, by reason. 1° Civil power is subject to spiritual power, when both parts belong to the same Christian commonwealth. Therefore the spiritual prince can command the temporal prince, and dispose of temporal things in order to the superior good which he is bound to procure for his subjects; for every superior commands his inferior. — It is proved from the ends of each power. Temporal felicity, which is the end of civil power, is not the last end of man, whose last end, namely eternal felicity, is the proper and necessary end of spiritual power. But all things depend on the last end and ought to be referred to it. Therefore.

2° Kings and Popes, clerics and laity do not make spiritually two commonwealths, but one, that is, one Church, which excels the civil commonwealth. For the Apostle says, Rom., XII, 5: We who are many are one body in Christ; and 1 Cor., XII, 13: In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body. But in every body the members are connected and dependent one upon another; yet it would not rightly be asserted that spiritual things depend on temporal things. Therefore temporal things depend on spiritual things and are subjected to them.

3° If temporal administration impedes the spiritual good, by the judgment of all the temporal prince is bound to change that manner of administering, even with detriment to the temporal good. Whence it follows that temporal power is subject to spiritual.

4° Any commonwealth whatsoever, because it is perfect in itself and ought to suffice for itself, can command any other commonwealth, even one not subject to it, and compel it to change its administration, indeed even depose its prince and install another, when it cannot otherwise defend itself from his injuries. Therefore much more will the spiritual commonwealth be able to command the temporal commonwealth subject to it, and compel it to change its administration, and depose princes and install others, if it cannot otherwise protect the spiritual good. This Boniface VIII expresses, after Bernard, lib. IV de Consideratione, in the extravg. Unam sanctam: « Both therefore are in the power of the Church, that is, the spiritual sword and the material one. But the latter is to be exercised for the Church, the former indeed by the Church. The former by the hand of priests, the latter by kings and soldiers, but at the nod and with the patience of the priest. Now it behooves the sword to be under the sword, and temporal authority to be subject to spiritual power. For, since the Apostle says: There is no power but of God; and those things that are of God are ordered; they would not be ordered unless sword were under sword, and, as inferior, were reduced through another to the supreme. »

5° It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an infidel or heretical king attempting to drag his subjects into his heresy or infidelity. But it pertains to the Pope to judge whether a king drags them into heresy or not, because the care of religion is committed to no other. Therefore it is for the Pope to judge whether the king is to be deposed or not deposed. — The major is proved. When human law and divine law are opposed, divine law ought to be observed, human law being set aside. But it is of divine law to preserve the true faith and religion, which is only one and absolutely necessary; but it is of human law that we have this or that king. Therefore.

This argument greatly pleased the Angelic Doctor, saying, IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 10, c: « It must be considered that dominion and prelacy were introduced by human law [namely as regards the persons possessing them]; but the distinction between the faithful and infidels is by divine law. Now divine law, which is from grace, does not take away human law, which is from natural reason. Therefore the distinction between faithful and infidels, considered in itself, does not take away the dominion and prelacy of infidels over the faithful. Nevertheless it can justly be taken away by the sentence or ordination of the Church having authority from God for such a right of dominion or prelacy; because infidels by merit of their unbelief deserve to lose power over the faithful, who are transferred into the sons of God. But this indeed the Church sometimes does, sometimes does not... » Nor does St. Thomas understand by infidels the pagans alone, as Barclay and certain others seem to have thought; for ibid., a. 6, c, comparing infidels of different kinds in respect to the faith, he says: « According to this, the unbelief of heretics, who profess the faith of the Gospel and resist it, corrupting it, sin more gravely than the Jews, who never received the faith of the Gospel. But because [the Jews] received its figure in the old law, which, interpreting it badly, they corrupt, therefore also their unbelief is a graver sin than the unbelief of the pagans, who in no way received the faith of the Gospel. » Therefore, under this respect, heretics are infidels of a worse species, as the holy Doctor concludes: « Whence, speaking simply, the unbelief of heretics is the worst. » Not only toward Christian princes does the holy Doctor attribute this right to the Church, but also toward infidels properly so called. For he says in the same art. 10: « But among those infidels who do not temporally subject themselves to the Church or its members, the said right of the Church does not obtain, although it could establish it by law. And it does this to avoid scandal. » He repeats the same ibid., q. 12, a. 2, c: « The distinction between faithful and infidels is according to divine law, by which human law is not taken away. But someone sinning through unbelief can by sentence forfeit the right of dominion, as also sometimes on account of other faults... And therefore, as soon as anyone is denounced as excommunicated by sentence on account of apostasy from the faith, ipso facto his subjects are absolved from his dominion and from the oath of fidelity by which they were bound to him. » Likewise q. 60, a. 6, ad 3: « Secular power is subjected to spiritual, as body to soul, as Gregory Nazianzen says, Orat. 17. And therefore it is not a usurped judgment if a spiritual prelate meddles in temporal things, as regards those things in which secular power is subjected to him, or those which are left to him by secular power.² Moreover, in II Sentent., dist. 44, at the end, the same Doctor says that in the Pope is the apex of both powers, namely spiritual and temporal; whence it is rightly concluded that temporal power, in those who exercise it in a lower degree, is subordinate to him. The same is read in lib. III de Regimine principum, cap. 10 et 19, which we omit, because its authenticity is not sufficiently established.

Proof. 2nd, from the authority and practice of the Church. For in several ecumenical councils the Church decreed that laymen, should they be found to be heretics, were to be deprived of their temporal goods, and absolved subjects from the sacrament of fidelity toward princes who professed heresy, or neglected to purge their territories of this stain, or injured ecclesiastical rights. This appears from the acts of the councils of Lateran III and IV, and the council of Lyons I. As an example take the sentence pronounced by Innocent IV in this last council against the emperor Frederick II, in these words: « We therefore, concerning the premises and very many other of his nefarious excesses, with our brothers and the sacred council, after diligent deliberation had beforehand, since we unworthily hold the vicarship of Jesus Christ on earth, and it was said to us in the person of the blessed apostle Peter: Whatsoever you shall bind on earth, etc., the said prince, who rendered himself most unworthy of the empire and kingdoms and every honor and dignity, and who on account of his impieties is rejected by God from reigning or commanding, bound by his own sins and cast off, deprived of every honor and dignity by the Lord, we declare, denounce, and nevertheless by sentencing deprive, forever absolving all who are bound to him by oath of fidelity from an oath of this kind, etc. » In the preceding council of Lateran IV, Innocent III had similarly deposed Raymond from the county of Toulouse.

Here it must be noted, 1° that the Pope acted in this case as the Vicar of Christ, in virtue of the general power conferred by Christ on Peter and his successors, and emitted not merely a bare declaration, but authoritatively pronounced a true sentence. It must be said besides that the Pope did not receive from the council the power he then exercised; for, as proved above, the council is not above the Pope, but the Pope is above the council, and whatsoever he does «with the approbation of the sacred council» the same he can do outside the council and alone. 2° The facts praised above must be held as dogmatic, that is, as Catholic doctrine concerning the law by virtue of which the acts are implicatory. For attention must be paid not merely to the bare fact, but also and chiefly to the foundation on which the right asserted by the Pope and council rests. But in the sentence premised it is taught that this power proceeds from the institution of Christ and pertains to the nature of the supreme pontificate. Therefore by divine law this power belongs to the Roman Pontiff.

The same reasoning must be applied to the deposition of Henry IV emperor, father of Frederick II, made by St. Gregory VII in the Roman council. For it matters little that that council was not ecumenical, since it has been said that this power was by no means conferred on the Pope by the council.

Of this Pope the following eulogy is found in the Roman Breviary: « Against the impious attempts of the emperor Henry, a strong athlete in all things remained undismayed, and feared not to place himself as a wall for the house of Israel, and deprived the same Henry, fallen into the depth of evils, of communion with the faithful and of his kingdom, and freed the subject peoples from the fidelity given to him. »

« But that all these things may be explained more particularly, says Bellarmine, de Summo Pontifice, lib. V, cap. 6, the spiritual power of the Pope must be compared with the persons of judges or secular princes, with their civil laws, and with their forum and judgments.

« As regards persons, the Pope as Pope cannot ordinarily depose temporal princes, even for a just cause, in the manner in which he deposes bishops, that is, as ordinary judge. Yet he can change kingdoms, and take away from one and confer on another, as supreme spiritual prince, if this be necessary for the salvation of souls, as has been proved.

« As regards laws, the Pope as Pope cannot ordinarily enact a civil law, or confirm or invalidate the laws of princes, because he is not himself the political prince of the Church. Yet he can do all those things, if some civil law be necessary for the salvation of souls, and yet the kings are unwilling to enact it; or if another be harmful to the salvation of souls, and yet the kings are unwilling to abrogate it.

« Therefore best is the rule handed down by the Gloss on cap. Possessor, de Regulis iuris in Sexto, which is such: « When imperial and pontifical laws contrary to each other are found concerning the same matter, if the matter of the law is a thing involving peril to souls, the imperial law is abrogated by the pontifical. » And in this way the law found in cap. Si qui, de Praescriptionibus abrogated the imperial law found in the Code, de praescriptione of thirty or forty years, even with bad faith, which could not be observed without mortal sin. But when the matter of the law is a temporal thing not involving peril to souls, a pontifical law cannot abrogate an imperial law, but both are to be observed, the one in the ecclesiastical forum, the other in the civil forum.

« As regards judgments, the Pope as Pope cannot ordinarily judge of temporal things. Rightly indeed Bernard says to Eugenius, lib. I de Consideratione, cap. 6: « These low and earthly things have their own judges, the kings and princes of the earth. Why do you invade others' boundaries? Why do you extend your sickle into another's harvest? » Likewise: « Your power is in crimes, not in possessions. » Yet nevertheless, in the case in which this is necessary for the salvation of souls, the Pontiff can assume also temporal judgments, namely when there is no one who can judge, as when two supreme kings contend, or when those who can and ought to judge are unwilling to pronounce sentence. Whence Bernard, ibid., cap. 7: « But it is one thing, he says, to run incidentally into these matters, a cause indeed urging it; another thing again to devote oneself to these, as to great and worthy matters of such and such intention. » And Innocent III, cap. Per venerabilem, Qui filii sint legitimi, says that the Pope exercises temporal jurisdiction only incidentally. »