Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

The question is not about a general council insofar as it comprises the bishops gathered and at the same time the supreme Pontiff; for thus it is certain that no Pontiff is superior to it, otherwise he would be superior to himself; nay, a council so understood is the greater thing, at least extensively. But the question concerns a general council insofar as it comprises only the bishops gathered, with the Pontiff, whether absent or present, not counted. And the question asked is whether the Pontiff is superior in authority and jurisdiction to the council so understood, or the council to the Pontiff.

The French uphold this second part¹, from the time of the Council of Constance, and it is the second proposition of the famous declaration of the French Clergy of the year 1682. But when they are pressed by arguments from Scripture or tradition, by which it is proved that the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head, ruler, pastor of all the faithful, they answer that this must be understood of all the faithful in particular, or taken separately and distributively, not indeed taken collectively and gathered together in a general council; to these, on the contrary, the Pontiff is subject when they are so taken, in nearly the way in which a General is head and rector of an Order, so that all Religious separately and distributively are bound to obey him, yet he himself is subject to the Chapter when assembled and held to its laws; or as the doge of the Venetians takes precedence over the individual members of the republic, yet he himself is inferior and subject to the whole republic.

The theologians of the other nations commonly hold, on the contrary, that the supreme Pontiff is superior in authority, power, and jurisdiction to the whole Church, whether taken distributively or collectively, so that any council whatever, even a general one, is subject to him, not he to the council.

I say: The supreme Pontiff is superior in authority and jurisdiction to every council.

Proof. 1°. It is settled from what has been said hitherto concerning the primacy of St. Peter and the Roman Pontiff, and likewise concerning his infallibility, that he, according to Scripture and tradition, is the head, pastor, father, teacher, and leader of the whole and universal Church. Now the head is above the other members, not only taken separately but also taken together; the shepherd tends and is above not each sheep separately only, but the whole flock; the father, not this or that child, but the whole household; the teacher, not this or that disciple, but the whole school; the leader, not this and that soldier only, but the whole army. Therefore in like manner the Pontiff, not only to the faithful individually taken separately, or to this or that church; not only to the individual bishops of a council distributively: to the council itself he is superior in authority.

Proof. 2°. The supreme Pontiffs exercised, by sovereign right and with no one objecting, supreme power over general councils; for to some they prescribed the rule of defining, the acts of others they rescinded, others they annulled entirely, others they approved and confirmed. Now these are plain marks of superior authority. Therefore.

Proof. first part of the antecedent. Celestine prescribed to the Council of Ephesus the very form and the very sentence to be pronounced against Nestorius; St. Leo, to the Council of Chalcedon against Eutyches; Agatho, to the sixth council against the Monothelites; Adrian I, to the seventh council against the Iconoclasts, and Adrian II, to the eighth council against Photius.

Proof. second part of the antecedent. St. Leo steadfastly refused, however greatly entreated, to confirm canon 28, whereby the rights of the Patriarch of Constantinople were decreed, and sent it back void.

Proof. third part of the antecedent. St. Leo annulled the second Council of Ephesus, summoned with his assent and attended by his legates. Therefore.

As to the fourth part of the antecedent, on the confirmation of councils by the Pontiff, we shall prove it in the next dissertation, while treating of councils; nor do the adversaries deny it altogether, but say it is an honorary confirmation of consent and adherence only, such as can be given by equals or even by inferiors, but not authoritative.

On the contrary. That it is authoritative is evident, because it is sought and given in order that general councils may have firmness; for so speak the Fathers of the fourth and sixth councils, and without this confirmation a council is neither valid nor firm, as appears in the case of the second Council of Ephesus, of canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon, and of the fifth general council, Constantinople II; and the laws declare it expressly so, dist. 17, cap. Regula, from Pope Julius: « Nor is any council ratified now, nor ever shall be, which has not been upheld by its (the Roman Church's) authority. » And cap. Multis, from Pelagius II. Whence Socrates, lib. II Hist., cap. 5, says: « The ecclesiastical canon forbids that decrees be sanctioned for the churches without the judgment of the Roman Bishop. » Sozomen, lib. III, cap. 9, says « there is a law pertaining to the dignity of the priesthood, which pronounces void those acts that are enacted apart from the judgment of the Roman Bishop. » What we shall presently say about appeals from councils to the supreme Pontiff proves the same, and finally reason itself. For a general council has not firmness and indefectibility in its decrees except insofar as it represents the universal Church. Now it does not represent the universal Church unless it has with it the head, the Roman Pontiff, judging along with it; nor is the Roman Pontiff deemed to judge with the councils unless while he confirms the decrees of the councils. Therefore.

Proof. 3° conclusion. It is not lawful to appeal from the supreme Pontiff to a general council; but it is lawful to appeal from a general council to the supreme Pontiff. Now an appeal is made only from an inferior to a superior. Therefore the Pontiff is superior in authority to a general council.

We proved the first part by authority and reason in art. 3, § 6. Moreover, Pius II, in letters published at the assembly of Princes at Mantua in the year 1460, and Julius II and Gregory XIII, in the bull In Coena Domini, forbid under pain of excommunication an appeal from the Pope to a council.

The adversaries oppose certain appeals made from a Pope to a council. But a fact does not prove a right. Of this more fully in the solution of the objections.

The second part of the antecedent also stands proved from the three Pontiffs Boniface I, Gelasius I, and Nicholas I, cited in the place quoted earlier. Moreover, it is proved thus. St. Flavian appealed from the second Council of Ephesus, with its convocation and the general presence of legates, to St. Leo, as is clear from the letter of the same St. Leo to the Emperor Theodosius, in which he says: To our legates « bishop Flavian gave a libellus of appeal. » Likewise Theodoret, bishop of Cyrus, condemned in the same council, appealed, as is clear from the acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Macarius and others, condemned in the sixth ecumenical synod, appealed to Leo II, as appears from the letters of Constantine Pogonatus to the same Leo.

Finally, reason proves it. It is lawful to appeal from a fallible tribunal to an infallible one. Now the supreme Pontiff is infallible, at least in questions of faith and morals, as was proved in the preceding articles. But a general council, as we take it here, with the supreme Pontiff not counted, is fallible, because thus it does not represent the Church, for the Church is not without her head; but a council is not infallible except insofar as it represents the Church.

Proof. 4° conclusion. The supreme Pontiff cannot be judged by a general council. Therefore he is not inferior to it. — Proof of the antecedent.: 1° In the canon Si Papa, dist. 40, it is said: « He who is to judge all, himself is to be judged by no one, unless he be found deviating from the faith.² » 2° Cap. Aliorum, cause 9, q. 3: « God willed the causes of other men to be brought to an end through men, but the causes of the prelate of this See He reserved to His own arbitrament, without question. » This excludes a council both general and particular. 3° The Roman Council, under Adrian II, cap. 4: « We read that the Roman Pontiff judged the rulers of all the churches, but we do not read that anyone judged him. »

Proof. 5° conclusion, from the ancestral doctrine of the Church of Gaul.

Around the year 503, on the occasion of Pope Symmachus, whom a Roman council, popularly called Palmare, had summoned to trial, although he was consenting willingly, St. Avitus, archbishop of Vienne, writes thus in the name of the Church of Gaul to the Senators of the City: « It is not easily understood by what reason or law one more eminent is to be judged by inferiors... It is not for the Pastor of the flock to terrify what is his own, but for a judge. » Now a general council is the flock.

In the year 800, the Gallican bishops, summoned by command of Charlemagne to the Roman council in the case of Leo III, accused by his rivals of various crimes, refused to obey unless the Pontiff himself should freely submit himself to their judgment, on this ground, that since he was head of all the churches, he could be judged by no one. See Anastasius, in the life of Leo III.

In the twelfth century, St. Ives, bishop of Chartres, epist. 159: « Since, he says, we have learned, with the Roman Church herself teaching, that the judgments of the Roman Church can be retraced by no one from outside, if any ever complain that they have been aggrieved by the authority of that Church, we give them this counsel, that they do not go down into Egypt for help, but from that very Church flee to that very Church, and there await relief from her from whom they complain that they received the grievance. » The same he teaches in epist. 233, to the Abbot of Angeriocense, in the case of Paschal II, who was said to have granted investitures to the Emperor Henry contrary to the rights of the Church.

In the same century, St. Bernard, glory of the Church of Gaul, epist. 213, addressing the Pontiff: « Who, he says, will do me justice against you?... There exists indeed the tribunal of Christ; but far be it that I should appeal to it... And so I have recourse to him to whom in the present it has been given to judge concerning all things, “that is, to you. To you I appeal, to you: you judge between me and you. »

In the year 1305, since the magnates of the kingdom asked Clement V to condemn the memory of Boniface VIII, whom they said had been a heretic, that he had existed as a mere private man and never as a legitimate Pontiff, as we saw in art. 3, § 5, n. 4, they add: « When the heresy of the dead Boniface is in question, a general council ought not to be convened. For you are, most holy Father, the Vicar of Jesus Christ, representing the whole body of the Church, who hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Nor could the whole council, when convened, WITHOUT YOU AND EXCEPT THROUGH YOU take cognizance of the matter spoken of above, according to the decrees of the Fathers and the judgment of the doctors of law and of the holy Church of God. » Blind be he who does not see in these words that the authority of the Pontiff is greater than that of the council.

In the year 1324, the theologians of the faculty of Paris presented to Clement VII, seated at Avignon, a theological treatise in which they acknowledge, assert, and prove his « supreme » authority in the Church, as we saw in art. 3, § 5 cited, n. 3. If truly « supreme, » therefore none is greater.

From the time, then, of the Council of Constance only did the Church of Gaul begin to depart from this ancestral opinion of the forefathers, with John Gerson, chancellor of the academy of Paris, acting and leading.