Summa summae S. Thomae, Tomus III

This question is raised on the occasion of the book of Jansenius, bishop of Ypres, from which the supreme Pontiffs extracted and condemned five propositions in the sense intended by the author, that is, in the natural and obvious sense.

[A threefold fact is commonly distinguished : one personal and particular; another general, which regards the whole Church ; a third dogmatic or doctrinal : namely, whether some book or some proposition contains true or false doctrine.

Here therefore the question concerns dogmatic or doctrinal facts, and the question is : Whether the judgment of the Church about the doctrine or sense of any text or writing is infallible. It is not therefore asked whether the book entitled Augustinus is genuinely the work of Jansenius, or rather falsely attributed to him. This fact is merely personal and historical, about which the Church does not judge.

Nor is it inquired whether the five famous propositions are contained word for word in the book of Jansenius, but whether the sense of the propositions is the sense of the book. Therefore]

I say : The judgment of the Church about the sense of books, or, as they call it, about dogmatic facts, is infallible.

Proof, 1st, by the same testimonies of Scripture by which we proved the infallibility of the Church in questions of law. Matt., XVI, 18 : The gates of hell shall not prevail against that Church. Matt., XXVIII, 20 : Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. John, XIV, 16 : And I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth. Ibid., XVI, 13 : But when he has come, the Spirit of truth, he will teach you all truth. Ibid., XXI, 16 and 17 : Feed my lambs, feed my sheep. I Tim., III, 15 : The church of the living God, the pillar and ground of truth. But these can stand only if the Church is not fallible about the sense of books, or about dogmatic facts. Ergo. Proof of the minor. Suppose the Church were truly mistaken in judging a heretical book, say Calvin's Institutes, to contain an orthodox sense and Catholic doctrine, and conversely a Catholic book, say the works of Augustine, to contain an erroneous sense and heretical doctrine, and suppose it proposed this judgment to all the faithful; the faithful would believe what they read in the Institutes of Calvin — that God is the author of sin, that he drives man to sin, that faith alone justifies, that to one who has faith no sins are imputed, that good works are useless, that the body of Christ is not really present in the Eucharist : these things, I say, and many other impious and heretical things contained in these Institutes, Catholics would believe; and conversely whatever Augustine defended against the Manichaeans, Donatists, Pelagians, etc., they would believe heretical; and thus the whole Church would be led into error, the gates of hell would prevail against her, she would be no longer the pillar and ground of truth, Christ would not be with her all days, even to the consummation of the world, the Holy Spirit would not teach her all truth and would not abide with her forever, she would feed the sheep and the lambs badly, offering them poisoned pastures instead of sound ones. Ergo. By these testimonies of Scripture the Fifth General Council proved its authority in condemning the Three Chapters.

If you say that, on this hypothesis, the Church would not err about dogma, but about the fact, that is, about the attribution of such or such a dogma to such a book, and thus the gates of hell would not prevail against her,

I answer. Grant that the teaching Church, or the pastors, would not err about dogma; it is nevertheless most true that they would lead all the faithful into error about dogma; for the faithful cannot know dogma except in the fact, namely in the book or proposition which the Church approves or condemns. It does not therefore suffice, for preserving the deposit of faith and for fulfilling the office of pastor and teacher, that the teaching Church intend to assert truth or proscribe error; but this truth and this error must be found in those places which the Church points out; otherwise she would instruct the faithful badly and feed them badly, who cannot penetrate the inner sense of the pastors or of the teaching Church.

It is confirmed. The dogma to be proposed to the faithful is inseparable from the fact, and so connected with it that dogma cannot be proposed infallibly unless the fact is proposed with the same infallibility. But the Church is infallible in proposing dogma. Therefore also in proposing the dogmatic fact. — The minor is evident from the foregoing. — Proof of the major. Although dogma can be weighed and examined in the mind without the fact, yet it cannot be proposed to the faithful, either as to be avoided or as to be held, without the fact, that is, without the text of the proposition or of the book; but if the Church were fallible in proposing the text, no one would be bound to believe it, since perhaps it errs. Ergo.

Proof, 2nd, from the practice of the Church. 1° The Council of Chalcedon, act. 4, declares anyone heretical who should refuse to pronounce anathema against Eutyches, and act. 8 had declared Theodoret a heretic and to be cast out, because after several instances he refused to say simply and without explanation anathema to Nestorius, which nevertheless he finally did. This fact, entirely relevant to the present matter, widely discussed and vindicated against the wars of the innovators, see in the treatise de Incarnatione, digression 2 to dissertation IV, sect. 5, in the greater Work.

2° The Fifth General Council, the second of Constantinople, act. 8, condemned the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Ibas of Edessa, commonly called the Three Chapters; indeed it was assembled for this very thing and for the condemnation of the writings of Origen. Nor did it only condemn these three Nestorian Chapters, but it anathematized whoever should defend them, excuse them, or fail to condemn them.

3° The Fourth Council of the Lateran declares heretical whoever should prove or defend the doctrine of Abbot Joachim in his little book on the Trinity.

In these and several other cases which I omit for brevity's sake, it is, as is evident, a question of the sense of books and authors, that is, of dogmatic facts; and in defining them the Church acknowledges its own infallible authority; otherwise how could it declare men heretics and anathematize those who would not acquiesce in an uncertain and fallible judgment? If then the Church presents itself as infallible in these matters, so it undoubtedly is; otherwise it would err in dogma.

Proof, 3rd, from the inconveniences. If the Church were fallible in defining what is the sense of writers, or in defining dogmatic facts, it follows 1° that tradition wavers, and hence also the authenticity of Scripture founded upon tradition. — Proof. the consequence; because tradition is had only from the writings of councils and of the holy Fathers. Therefore, if the Church could err in defining what is the sense of those writings, the tradition founded upon them wavers. — It is explained further. Although it is of right that Sacred Scripture and tradition are the Word of God, and that all truths revealed in them are to be held by faith, yet it is a dogmatic fact that our Vulgate contains the Word of God, that its sense conforms to the sense of the autograph, that the sense of the holy Fathers is such or such, that they conspire to form tradition, that the canons of councils, say Nicaea or Trent, contain dogmas : these, I say, are dogmatic facts, and if the Church could err in defining them, the whole of religion collapses.

It follows 2° that no heretic, no book however pernicious, could be convicted of heresy, and in any way condemned as such. For all heretics will say, Arians, Nestorians, Pelagians, Eutychians, Lutherans, Calvinists, following the example of the Jansenists [continuat in p. 222], that they abhor all heresies, that they wrote nothing except what accords with Scripture; and if the Church understood their books otherwise, let it be a question of fact, in which it is fallible : and thus all ancient heresies would rise again, new ones would be stirred up, without the Church being able to meet them effectively.

The objections are solved.

You will object, 1st : Christ did not promise the Church infallibility except in matters of faith. But a dogmatic fact, e.g., that the book of Jansenius contains errors, is not a matter of faith. Ergo. — Proof of the minor. Nothing is a matter of faith that is not revealed. But it is not revealed that the book of Jansenius contains errors. Ergo.

To this argument, which the Jansenists make much of and with which they fight as with sword and shield, there is a twofold answer, either one of which suffices to break their obstinacy.

The first answer denies the major, which is asserted quite gratuitously and without any testimony of Scripture or of tradition; nay rather, the contrary is clear from the proofs of the conclusion. For this infallibility in dogmatic facts is necessary, even if they are not matters of faith nor revealed, in order that the gates of hell may not prevail against the Church, that the Church may remain the pillar and ground of truth, that she may guard the deposit of faith, feed the sheep well, and provide for the salvation of all the faithful. Christ, however, does not fail his Church in what is necessary, to whom he promised to be present all days, even to the consummation of the world, and to teach her all truth. This infallibility, therefore, according to the present answer, comes not from revelation, but from the special assistance of the Holy Spirit. For indeed the Jansenists contend that the Church pronounced with infallible judgment that the works of Augustine against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians contain Catholic doctrine. Is that fact more revealed than the fact of Jansenius?

I insist, 1st : If the fact of Jansenius is not revealed, it is not to be believed with divine faith, but only human. But what is believed with merely human faith is uncertain and subject to error. Ergo.

I answer. That the fact of Jansenius, according to the answer given, is to be believed neither with divine nor with merely human faith, but with ecclesiastical faith, which is as it were midway between divine and human, yet most firm and most certain, since it rests upon the special assistance of the Holy Spirit, and hence upon the infallibility of the Church in these matters. Nor say that this assistance is revelation itself; for it is one thing to reveal truths to someone, another to assist him and be present lest he depart from the truths revealed. This is evident in the definitions of councils, in which no new revelations are made; otherwise the Fathers would be sacred writers, and their definitions Sacred Scripture; but the Holy Spirit assists them lest they err.

You will infer : Therefore those who deny the fact of Jansenius are not heretics.

I answer. So it seems to some, who judge them to be merely rash, disobedient, rebellious, and excommunicated. They can nevertheless be called heretics, not precisely because they deny the fact of Jansenius, which according to this answer is not revealed, but because, in denying it, they deny the infallibility of the Church in defining these matters; which infallibility seems to be revealed and a matter of faith.

The second answer, setting aside the major, distinguishes the minor. The fact of Jansenius is not revealed immediately, I concede; mediately, I deny. The solution will be explained in the following answer.

You subsume : But what is only mediately revealed is not the object of the assent of faith, but of theology, as we said in the first part. Ergo.

I answer. I distinguish the subsumption. What is only mediately revealed, as an effect in its cause, or a property in its essence, is not the object of faith but of theology — let this pass; what is only mediately revealed as a part in the whole, I deny. Truth, then, is revealed by God in two ways : 1° immediately in itself in the particular, as this : «God is triune, Christ is man;» 2° mediately in something else, and this again in two ways : either as an effect in its cause, or a property in its essence, as this, for example : «Christ is laughable,» is revealed in this : «Christ is man,» as in its cause; or as a part in its whole, as this : «David sinned in Adam,» is revealed in this universal, as [continuat in p. 224] a part in the whole : «All sinned in Adam.» Let those things that are revealed as effects in their cause not be the object of faith but only of theological assent, because the effect is contained only virtually in its cause. Yet those things that are revealed as parts in the whole are the object of faith, because parts are not only virtually but formally in the whole, and the truth of a universal proposition is per se sought from the truth of the particular propositions contained formally in it; for a universal proposition is true insofar as the particular propositions it contains are true. Hence, by the very fact that the universal proposition is formally revealed, the particular propositions are also formally revealed; and thus they belong to the same light of faith. Moreover it is universally revealed that every text, every proposition, every book condemned by the Church is truly condemnable, for this is comprehended under the revealed infallibility of the Church. Therefore also this text of this proposition, say of Jansenius.

Therefore, according to this solution, the fact of Jansenius is to be believed with divine faith, and those who deny it must be judged heretics, not only because thereby they are convicted of denying the infallibility of the Church, but also because this fact is revealed, just as it is revealed that the five famous propositions contain heresies, that Calvin's Institutes are heretical, that the canons of the Council of Trent assert dogmas of faith, that the text of the Vulgate conforms to its autograph and contains the Word of God, and what is the sense of the Fathers conspiring to found tradition : just as, I say, these are to be believed with divine faith, and whoever denied them would be a heretic, so whoever denies the fact of Jansenius. And under this title Theodoret was declared a heretic by the Council of Chalcedon, because after several remonstrances he refused to pronounce anathema against Nestorius without explanation.

Moreover, according to either answer, it is clear that respectful silence regarding the fact of Jansenius does not suffice, but that it must be believed with interior assent of faith, whether divine or ecclesiastical, and that the formula of Alexander VII must be subscribed without exception, limitation, or explanation, as Clement XI decla-[continuat in p. 225] red by the bull Vineam Domini Sabaoth; and that those are perjured who subscribe simply to the said formula without this interior assent.

You will object, 2nd : The Sixth General Council erred about the sense of the letters of Honorius, condemning him as a heretic. Thus teach Bellarmine and Baronius. Ergo.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. For Honorius was not condemned in that council as a heretic in his teaching, but as a favorer of heresy; on which see at length the treatise de Incarnat., historical digression to dissertation XVIII, sect. 4.

As to Bellarmine and Baronius : 1° They said this in passing, without discussing the present question ex professo, which was then not being debated, especially since they themselves teach that the Church is infallible in other unrevealed facts, as in the canonization of saints. 2° They attribute the error about the sense of the letters of Honorius not to the whole council, but only to the Greeks. 3° Finally, whatever may have been the opinion of these most eminent writers on this point, nothing forces us to adhere to them against our most invincible proofs; for they were not infallible.

You will object, 3rd : The Council of Chalcedon approved the three famous Chapters; the Fifth Council, the second of Constantinople, condemned them. But the three Chapters — namely whether the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas contained the Arian heresy — were dogmatic facts. Ergo.

I answer. 1° I deny the antecedent for the first part. For the Three Chapters were neither approved nor rejected in the Council of Chalcedon, but omitted and neglected, or proposed not judicially but merely historically. First, concerning Theodore of Mopsuestia, who had already died, no mention was made of him or of his writings, except that certain praises of him were contained in the Letter of Ibas, which was recited and not approved, as I shall say presently. Concerning the writings of Theodoret and the letter of Ibas the synod passed no judgment, but admitted their persons only to the assembly, after they had given signs of penitence, had pronounced anathema against Nestorius, [continuat in p. 226] and had subscribed the letter of St. Leo. The Fifth Synod, however, condemned the writings and person of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who had been the author of Nestorianism, and whose death was established by the testimony of his own church, which had expunged his name from the sacred diptychs. But it condemned the writings of Theodoret and Ibas under their names, while it did not strike with anathema their persons, who had died in the peace of the Church. And thus there is no contradiction between the two synods.

I insist, 1st : When the letter of Ibas had been re-read, the legates of the Apostolic See declared Ibas orthodox, as is found in the acts. Ergo.

I answer. That the legates of the Apostolic See indeed called Ibas orthodox, but not his letter orthodox; two things which differ greatly. Hence I distinguish the antecedent. They called Ibas orthodox with attention to the doctrine of the letter, I deny; with attention to the retraction of the letter, I concede. For when certain monks objected to him that St. Cyril had been called a heretic by him, he answered : «As long as St. Cyril had interpreted himself, because the Eastern council called him a heretic and condemned him as a heretic, I too thought him a heretic. But after the churches were united and he had interpreted his chapters, we all held him in communion.» By which he openly declares that he retracts what he had said in his letter against St. Cyril; and since moreover he had subscribed the letter of St. Leo to Flavian, and had pronounced anathema against Nestorius, he was therefore declared orthodox.

I insist, 2nd : Maximus of Antioch in the Council of Chalcedon recognized the very letter of Ibas as orthodox, in these words : «Orthodox is his set forth dictation.» And Ferrandus, deacon of Carthage, in a letter to Pelagius and Anatolius, deacons of the Roman Church, asserts that the letter of Ibas could not have been condemned by the fifth synod without injury to the synod of Chalcedon. Ergo.

I answer to the first : in councils regard is not paid to the remark of one or another, but to what is defined by all or by the majority, as was observed in the fifth synod, act. 6; as to Ferrandus, it is no wonder that he spoke thus; he was the keenest defender of the Three Chapters. And more-[continuat in p. 227] over, he wrote before the fifth synod, whose authority outweighs the authority of a private doctor.

I answer 2° to the main argument. Even granting that the Three Chapters had been approved in the Council of Chalcedon, they could nevertheless be recalled to examination and condemned by the fifth synod without injury to the infallibility of the Church in these facts; because, once the definition of faith of act. 6 had been written down, the Council of Chalcedon was concluded. But what was afterwards done concerning the aforementioned causes of certain bishops has not the force of a council, nor was it approved by St. Leo.

You will object, 4th : At least it cannot be denied that Pope Vigilius varied greatly in the cause of the Three Chapters, now approving, now condemning them. Therefore the judgment of the Church about dogmatic facts is not irreversible.

I answer. Vigilius never approved the Three Chapters as regards the obvious sense of the texts, which is properly the dogmatic fact, but only varied about persons : namely, whether the person of Theodore, already deceased, ought to be anathematized, and whether the writings of Theodoret and Ibas ought to be condemned under their names. But this variation was not of inconstancy, but of prudent economy.

CONSEQUENCE

On appealing from the constitution Unigenitus to a future general council.

Given the infallibility — not of the supreme Pontiff, from which we now abstract, because those against whom we argue here do not acknowledge it, but of the Church in defining controversies of faith and dogmatic facts, which we asserted in the two preceding articles — it follows that it is not licit to appeal from the constitution Unigenitus of Clement XI, condemning one hundred and one propositions of Paschasius Quesnel, to a future general council. This is proved by the following brief and evident argument.

It is not licit to appeal from an infallible and irreformable judgment. But the constitution Unigenitus is an infalli-[continuat in p. 228] ble and irreformable judgment. Ergo. — Proof of the minor. The constitution Unigenitus is a judgment of the Church about a dogmatic fact. But the judgment of the Church is infallible and irreformable in defining dogmas and dogmatic facts, as we proved at length in the two preceding articles. Ergo. — Proof of the major. The universal Church accepted the constitution Unigenitus, and by accepting made it her own. Ergo. — As to the antecedent, it is established 1° from Clement XI himself, who in the letters Pastoralis officii says : «Which (constitution) the universal Church embraces with due veneration.» 2° From the testimonies of almost all the churches of the whole of Europe : Italy, Sicily, Venice, Genoa, Piedmont, Savoy, Germany, Belgium, Bohemia, Hungary, Poland, Spain and Portugal; of the academies of Salamanca, Louvain, Cologne, Douai, Coimbra, etc. All these testimonies are extant in the pastoral instruction of the Most Eminent Cardinal de Bissy, tom. III; in the second instruction of the illustrious D. Languet, then bishop of Soissons, afterwards archbishop of Sens; and in the work entitled : Réfutation du mémoire publié en faveur de l'appel des quatre évêques, approved by the Most Eminent Cardinal d'Alsace, archbishop of Mechlin. As to France, where the question arose, one hundred and ten bishops accepted this constitution, ten refused it, and only four appealed to a future general council. Of the twenty-four academies in the same kingdom, only three — Paris, Reims, and Nantes — revoked the acceptance previously made. Ergo.

It is wonderful how many evasions the Appellants devised in order to elude the force of this argument. Therefore

They say, 1st : indeed the Church gathered in councils is infallible, but not dispersed.

I answer. This assumption is most false and openly contradicts the promises of Christ. For Christ promised to be with the Church all days, even to the consummation of the world. Are councils gathered all days? Or is the dispersed Church not the true Church of Christ, which cannot deceive? Nay rather, the Church gathered in council is not infallible except because it repre-[continuat in p. 229] sents the whole dispersed Church. Therefore a fortiori the latter is infallible. Add that otherwise Christ would not have provided sufficiently for his Church; for until a general council could be gathered, which sometimes cannot be gathered except after centuries, heresies would rage and infect the whole Church.

They say, 2nd : Only the bishops of Europe accepted. But whence do they know this? And grant it — what follows? Is the Council of Trent (say the same of many others) not ecumenical, because the bishops of America and of the East Indies were not present? Are the constitutions against Baius, Jansenius, Molinos, etc., not accepted by the Church, because perhaps they were not sent to the Indians or the Americans? It suffices, therefore, that there be express acceptance by the Church in that part of the world where its supreme Head resides and where the greater multitude of bishops is, since thence it can become known to others. Nor would Christ have provided sufficiently for his Church if the consent of those who dwell in the farthest parts of the world had to be awaited. Thus Augustine answered Julian, book I contra Julianum, c. 4, n. 13.

[«Or do you think, he says, that they are to be despised because they are all churches of the West, and no bishop of the East is commemorated in them by us? What then shall we do, seeing that those are Greeks and we Latins? I think that part of the world ought to suffice you in which the Lord first wished to crown his apostles with most glorious martyrdom. If you had been willing to hear blessed Innocent, who presides over that Church, you would even then have stripped your perilous youth of the Pelagian snares. For what could that holy man answer the African councils, except that which the Roman Apostolic See holds along with the rest, perseveringly in the Church?»]

They say, 3rd : The bishops did not accept the constitution freely : some out of fear of the Inquisition, all out of fear of the excommunication laid upon those who should not accept.

I answer. 1° Fear, whether of the Inquisition or of excommunica-[continuat in p. 230] tion, does not take away freedom in accepting the constitution, just as fear of the punishments of hell or of suspension does not take away freedom in observing laws, whether divine or human. 2° Christ promised that the gates of hell, that is, terrors, blows, exiles, imprisonments, axes, gibbets, all the torments of the devil, would not prevail against the Church. They would prevail, however, if out of fear of the Inquisition or of excommunication bishops accepted false dogmas.

They urge : At least outside France the bishops accepted the constitution from the motive of the infallibility of the Pope. But that motive is false. Therefore the acceptance founded upon it is illegitimate and null.

I answer. 1° Given the minor as now stated, which we shall elsewhere prove false, I deny the consequence; because the infallibility of the Church does not rest upon the motives and reasons by which bishops can be moved to pass judgment in matters of faith, but upon the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to her; while this stands, it cannot happen that the Church, deceived by any principle whatever, be led into error; otherwise the gates of hell would prevail against her, and Christ would not be with her all days. It suffices, therefore, that the Church has defined, whatever reason induced her to do so, because she cannot err in defining. 2° If the instance held, the bulls against Baius, Jansenius, Molinos and others would waver; nay, nothing would be fixed in the Church, nor would the decrees of the general councils themselves be for the faithful a rule of faith. For how many and how various the reasons and deliberations of individuals before coming to a definition! If, therefore, a definition once given depended on the reasons and motives of the individual defining bishops, they would have to be scrutinized whether true or false, in order that the definition might have the force of law and rule. But this once admitted, the Church is shaken to her foundations and has nowhere certain where to plant her foot. 3° In the council which the Appellants demand, according to the instance, the bishops outside France could not be present : because nearly all are imbued with the opinion of papal infallibility, or they would be bound, upon entering the council, to strip off this opinion of theirs; which is absurd. There would therefore be present at this council the supreme Pon-[continuat in p. 231] tiff and the Gallican bishops. Would it then be a general council? I am mistaken — neither the Pontiff nor the Gallican bishops can be present; for they are parties in the suit : the supreme Pontiff, who issued the constitution, and the Gallican bishops, one hundred and ten, who accepted it. Then the Americans, Asians, Africans must be summoned — if perhaps they have heard nothing of the bull — and these alone, sitting without a head, would constitute a general council? Good heavens! what absurdities, and with how many chimeras the Appellants love to feed themselves, over a general council impossible and plainly chimaeric!

They say, 4th : The Pope forbids his bull to be examined. Therefore the bishops did not accept as judges.

I answer. We do not read this either in the bull or in the letters Pastoralis officii.

They urge : At least he requires obedience of every kind to the bull. Therefore it was not licit for the bishops to examine it.

I answer. I deny the consequence, at least if it is understood of the propositions contained in the bull. For the bull is directed to the faithful according to each one's condition. Now bishops are so subjects of the Pope that they are also judges of doctrine with him and under him. The Pontiff therefore, as superior, exacts from all the faithful, consequently from the bishops as subjects, obedience to his constitution, just as a legislator in civil affairs exacts obedience to his law; so that the bishops are bound to accept the constitution as a papal law, yet not as a law of the Church, nor are they forbidden, as judges, to examine the doctrine — if not the bull itself, at least the propositions condemned in it — and, should they find anything less consonant with the faith, reverently to set it before the Pontiff; which, since they have not done, save for very few, the papal law has become a law of the Church.

Nor does it matter that the Pope never revokes what he has once pronounced ex cathedra. For that is a sign that he has never taught ex cathedra anything against faith or morals; for the Holy Spirit, who is ever present to the Church, would not permit all the bishops to accept doctrine contrary to faith or morals. Finally, the bulls against Baius, Jansenius, Molinos and others were issued under the same tenor [continuat in p. 232], which notwithstanding, they have been so accepted by the Church that they are now laws of the Church and rules of faith.

They say 5°: The bishops are not unanimous in their acceptance: some accepted simply, others relatively, with respect to their explanations. Ergo.

I answer: all accepted simply, none relatively, that is, with a relation restricting the bull to their explanations, as though the sense of the bull were erroneous or could have no other legitimate sense than the sense of the explanations; but they appended their explanations to their acceptance only to forestall abuses of the bull that might occur. An acceptance relative in this sense, however, does not impede a simple acceptance. Thus we accept Scripture simply, while explaining it against the false interpretations of heretics and for the instruction of the faithful, not indeed so as to restrict its sense to ours, as though its own sense were false, or another sense than ours could not be legitimate.

They say 6°: The Constitution condemns in a vague and indeterminate way one hundred and one propositions respectively as false, erroneous, ill-sounding, scandalous, heretical, etc. But a constitution of this kind cannot be a rule of faith. Ergo. — Proof of the minor: Faith must have a fixed object. Yet we are left uncertain which proposition is erroneous, which scandalous, which heretical, etc. Ergo.

I answer. I deny the minor. To the proof, I distinguish the minor. That we are left uncertain which proposition is erroneous, which heretical, etc., and that this is the object of the constitution — I deny. And that it is not the object of the constitution — I concede. The constitution therefore does not oblige us to believe this or that proposition in particular to be scandalous, or heretical, etc.; but to believe that there is none upon which some qualification does not fall, and that there is no qualification which some proposition does not deserve; in one word, that all these propositions are defective, and that none of them can be upheld. This object, however, is fixed and determinate. Let there be a parity of case. A most experienced and trustworthy physician warns the guests that all the dishes of the banquet are poisoned, without explaining the quality of the poison that belongs to each dish: whether it be cold, or hot, or instantly [continuat in p. 233] deadly, or causing languor, etc. The object of human faith at banquets is that these dishes are tainted and to be avoided, and this suffices that no one taste anything of them, nor will they much care to inquire into the quality of the poisons. So too in our case. The Church does not require that I believe or say this proposition to be heretical, that one ill-sounding, this other scandalous, etc.; but only that I hold them all as defective and justly condemned, none of which can I therefore uphold. Moreover, in no other way were the propositions of Wyclif and John Hus condemned in the Council of Constance, the propositions of Baius, the book Maximes des Saints, and others; which notwithstanding, the constitutions against those have been accepted by the Church as rules of faith.

They say 7°: It could happen that the greater part of the bishops together with the supreme Pontiff, with very few excepted crying out against it from the opposite side, define an error and pertinaciously defend it. Therefore nothing can be argued from the acceptance of the constitution by the greater part of the bishops for its infallibility. — Proof of the antecedent: from the councils of Rimini and Seleucia, where the greater part of the bishops subscribed to the Arian heresy. Ergo.

I answer. I deny the antecedent, which is subversive of the whole of Religion. For once this is admitted, the Church is no longer catholic, as is evident, nor visible; for to which party will the faithful give credence, if not to the greater authority? They will have to weigh the arguments of each side, of which weighing, however, they are for the most part incapable, and trust to their own private spirit; which is the basis of the heresy of Luther and of Calvin. And when these heretics object to us the fallibility of the Church, we shall have nothing wherewith to answer. Hence Augustine proves expressly against the Donatists that the Church is not among them, because, although three hundred bishops were numbered among them, these were nevertheless few in comparison with the rest, and confined within the limits of Africa. Moreover, no heretic, no heresy, will ever be able to be condemned; for there is no cause so perverse that it does not find some patrons.

To the proof. In the first place, it is false that the Fathers of Seleucien-[continuat in p. 234] ses subscribed to Arianism; for nothing was defined in that council, on account of the dissension of opinions. 2° It is false that the Fathers of Rimini subscribed to the Arian heresy. For they subscribed to a formula Catholic in itself, but which, on account of the omission of the Homoousion through the fraud of the Arians, the latter abused. 3° It is false that the greater part of the bishops of the whole Church subscribed to this Arian perfidy. 4° Finally, it is false that the Fathers of Rimini, as regards their subscription, were conjoined with the supreme Pontiff; for Pope Liberius, now for two years restored to himself and brought back to Rome, openly professed and defended the Nicene faith. The first and the fourth are established from all the historians; the second and the third we proved in the greater Work, in the treatise de Trinitate, digression 3 to the introductory dissertation. Resort thither.

It must be observed nevertheless that, while certain Fathers say that, at the time of the councils of Rimini and Seleucia, all, few excepted, accommodated themselves to the times and were infected with the plague or perfidy of Arius: either they do not speak of the whole Church, but of certain provinces of Asia, in which this heresy raged most; or they understand that the Arian plague had pervaded all the provinces and been diffused everywhere, not however that it had infected all; or they speak hyperbolically and by way of exaggeration, on account of the multitude of those who seemed to have fallen away; or finally, by the heresy or perfidy of Arius they understood the crafty formula which the Fathers of Rimini had subscribed, which, although Catholic in itself, nevertheless favored the Arians, who abused it on account of the omitted word consubstantial. See the places cited in the work On the Trinity.

They say 8°: Many propositions of Quesnel are read in the holy Fathers in exactly the same terms. Therefore these too are to be condemned.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. That many propositions are read in the holy Fathers in exactly the same terms and in the same sense — I deny; in a different sense — I concede. For the sense of any proposition is drawn out, not from the mere words of which it is composed viewed in isolation, but viewed with respect to the circumstances and the condition of the author and of the time. Hence I deny the consequence.

They say 9°: The supreme Pontiff did not declare the Appellants heretics.

I answer: that he declared them separated from the communion of the Church, which is very close to it. And if the Pontiff expressed nothing else, he did so out of prudent economy, hoping that the Appellants would rather be won back by lenity than by severity.

They say 10°: Father Quesnel was condemned unheard. Likewise: Why did the Pontiff, though asked so many times, refuse to explain his constitution?

I answer to the first. It was not a question of the person of Quesnel, who indeed was not even named, but of his book. Now a book is at once its own accuser, witness and advocate, and to prove or condemn it, it suffices to read it and understand its sense. Hence, whatever Quesnel might have said, he would perchance have proved that his mind and intention were right, but not that the obvious sense of his book was orthodox.

To the second: the Pontiff explained his bull when in the letters Pastoralis officii he declared that by it there are not condemned the doctrines wont to be taught in the Catholic schools. If this explanation did not suffice them, more ample ones would not have sufficed. Besides, they asked not so much an explanation as a revocation. «The sacred Order kept silence, said the theological Faculty of Paris in the instrument of its appeal, out of its filial observance and reverence toward the Holy See and toward the most holy Lord Clement, and hoped that his Holiness, moved by such great evils, would at last revoke the aforesaid constitution.» Again: either the explanations would have been conformable to the proper sense of the bull, or disconformable. If the former, they would have rejected even those, as they rejected the bull itself, or they would have asked for an explanation of the explanations, and so on without end. If the latter, they would have cast it abroad that the bull had needed emendation and had been reformed, and that a new one had been issued, rejecting the former.